

*Published Quarterly*

# JOURNAL *of the* Royal United Service Institution.



Vol. LXIII., No. 449.—FEBRUARY, 1918.



PUBLISHED AT THE

Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall,  
LONDON, S.W. 1.

Telegraphic Address: "RUSSATUS, PARL, LONDON."


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
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To Capital Paid up, viz.—	£ s. d.	
£2 10s. 0d. per Share on		
2,078,536 Shares of £12 each	5,188,840 0 0	
" Reserve Fund	4,342,826 0 0	
" Dividend payable on 1st February, 1918	350,246 14 0	
" Balance of Profit and Loss Account, as below	733,785 5 8	
	10,615,697 19 8	
" Current, Deposit and other Accounts	220,551,768 9 5	
Acceptances on account of Customers	8,826,865 17 6	
By Cash in hand (including Gold Coin £7,000 0 0) and Cash at Bank of England	44,110,353 13 10	
" Money at Call and at Short Notice	31,003,560 9 2	
" Investments		
War Loans, at cost (of which £408,418 10s. is lodged for Public and other Accounts) and other British Government Securities	33,116,534 13 6	
Stocks Guaranteed by the British Government, India Stocks and Indian Railway Debentures	181,789 10 0	
British Railway Debenture and Preference Stocks, British Corporation Stocks, Colonial and Foreign Government Stocks and Bonds	1,774,673 4 2	
Sundry Investments	66,352 18 0	
Bills of Exchange	521,463 5 10	
	35,052,991 17 10	
	146,421,719 12 4	
" Advances on Current and other Accounts	68,510,358 1 9	
" Advances on War Loans	12,645,539 9 0	
" Liabilities of Customers for Acceptances	8,826,865 17 6	
Bank Premises, at Head Office and Branches	2,837,210 6 0	
Belfast Bank Shares		
49,688 £12 10 0 Old Shares £2 10 0 paid		
14,204 £12 10 0 New Shares £2 10 0 paid		
Cost	£1,225,908 0 0	
Less pari Premium on Shares issued	473,269 0 0	
	752,639 0 0	
	£239,994,332 6 7	

Dr.	PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT for the year ending 31st December, 1917.	Cr.
To Interim Dividend at 18 per cent. per annum to June 30th, 1917, less Income Tax	£ s. d.	
222,703 9 11		
Dividend payable on 1st February, 1918, at 18 per cent. per annum, less Income Tax	350,246 14 0	
Reserve Fund for Contingencies	500,000 0 0	
Salaries and Bonus to Staff serving with H.M. Forces and Bonus to other Members of the Staff	304,518 19 3	
Balance carried forward to next account	733,785 5 8	
	£2,211,254 8 10	
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
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
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
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
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
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
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## SPANISH INFANTRY UNIFORM, 1715.

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The Plate represents an ensign bearing the King's Colour of his regiment and a drummer and fifer. In the Irish regiments the colour of the uniform was red, but musicians wore the colour of the regimental facings laced with red, and with red stockings.





## SECRETARY'S NOTES.

### I.—Council.

The following Members of the Council, all of whom have been duly nominated by the Council for re-election, retire at the Anniversary Meeting on Tuesday, March 5th, 1918, having completed three years' service :—

Commander C. W. Bellairs, M.P., R.N.  
Vice-Admiral Sir R. G. O. Tupper, K.C.B., C.V.O.  
Commander W. F. Caborne, C.B., R.D., R.N.R.  
General A. F. Gatliff, Royal Marines.  
General Sir E. H. H. Allenby, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.  
Major-General E. T. Dickson.  
Major-General M. H. Saward.  
Colonel Sir W. A. Hill, K.C.B.  
Lieut.-Colonel A. St. L. Glyn.  
Brigadier-General The Earl of Lucan.  
Colonel C. W. Trotter.

### II.—Anniversary Meeting.

The Anniversary Meeting will be held on Tuesday, March 5th, 1918, at 3 p.m., in the Crypt of the Museum (entrance : Public entrance to the Museum). The Council will present their Annual Report, and the election to the Council of new Members, and other business, will take place.

III. — The Council beg to report that during the past year 248 Officers joined the Institution (against 319 in 1916). There were 148 withdrawals and 134 deaths (of which 41 were Life Members), making a decrease of 34 on the year. The temporary suspension of the Entrance Fee and the reduction in the amount for Life Membership still remains in force; and the Council trust that Members will do their utmost to introduce new Members during the coming year.

The details of Members joining were :—

Regular Army	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	103
Territorial Force (including Yeomanry)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	43
Royal Navy	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	34
Cadet Battalions	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	18
Special Reserve	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	15
Service and Garrison Battalions	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	14
Colonial Forces	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	7
Royal Naval Reserve	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5
Royal Marines	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2
Reserve of Officers	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2
Cadets, R.M.A., Woolwich	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1
Admiralty (Civil) Staff	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1

248

The total number of Members on January 1st, 1918, was 4,946.

**IV.** — The following Officers joined the Institution during the months of November, December, and January :—

Lieutenant J. N. Alford, Royal Canadian Engineers.  
 Lieutenant D. A. C. Shephard, Royal Marines.  
 Captain H. R. Bently, Cheshire Regiment.  
 Lieutenant C. R. de Fraine, R.F.A. (T.F.).  
 Second-Lieutenant W. J. Colborne, 3rd (Reserve) Bn. Royal Lancaster Regiment.  
 Captain E. C. Hopkinson, M.C., East Lancashire Regiment.  
 Captain C. H. Wilkinson, Coldstream Guards (S.R.).  
 Lieutenant-Colonel A. Pownall, T.D., 20th Bn. London Regiment (T.F.).  
 Captain F. H. White, 12th (Service) Bn. K.O. Yorkshire Light Infantry.  
 Second-Lieutenant Lord Bingham, Coldstream Guards.  
 Lieut.-Colonel G. Mackie, D.S.O., R.A.M.C. (T.F.).  
 Captain G. C. Kitching, 5th Bn. London Regiment (T.F.).  
 Lieut.-Colonel K. A. Plimpton, D.S.O., East Yorkshire Regiment.  
 Lieutenant C. K. Edwards, 4th (Reserve) Bn. Royal Irish Rifles.  
 Captain W. N. J. Moscroft, M.C., 5th Bn. Durham Light Infantry (T.F.).  
 Naval-Instructor F. B. Eldridge, Royal Australian Navy.  
 Major N. S. Nesbitt, 1st Woolwich Cadet Corps (T.F.).  
 Lieut.-Colonel N. Luxmoore, D.S.O., Devonshire Regiment.  
 Assistant-Paymaster S. D. Newton, R.N.R.  
 Naval-Cadet R. Thomson.  
 Major D. A. Wauchope, D.S.O., T.D., Lothians and Border Horse Yeomanry.  
 Lieut.-Colonel G. H. Harlow, A.S.C.  
 Lieut.-Colonel M. R. Head, 5th Dragoon Guards.  
 Lieutenant S. Warne, R.F.A.  
 Lieutenant G. R. S. Wilson, R.E.  
 Lieut.-Colonel C. J. S. Green, D.S.O., M.C., 7th Bn. London Regiment (T.F.).  
 Commander H. T. Prichard, R.N.  
 Commander A. C. Goolden, late R.N.  
 Captain A. R. Murray, Seaforth Highlanders.  
 Sub-Lieutenant E. H. Longsdon, R.N.  
 Lieutenant-Colonel T. R. Caldwell, 6th Canadian Reserve Bn.  
 Sub-Lieutenant C. R. O. Burge, R.N.  
 Lieutenant R. A. Savory, M.C., I.A.  
 Captain W. D. Paton, M.V.O., D.S.O., R.N.  
 Commander V. S. Rashleigh, R.N.

**V.—The Museum.**

The amount taken for admission to the Museum during the past quarter was—

£30 7 6 in November.  
 £37 5 6 in December.  
 £43 9 0 in January.

ADDITIONS.

- (3437) Cap Badge worn by Company Sergt.-Major (now Lieutenant) H. Daniels, Rifle Brigade, at Neuve Chapelle, 12th March, 1915, when he was wounded and awarded the Victoria Cross for the following gallant action :—

The Battalion being impeded in its advance to the attack by wire entanglements, and being subject to a very heavy machine-gun fire, Company Sergt.-Major Daniels and Corporal C. R. Noble rushed out in front and succeeded in cutting the wire.

They were both wounded at once, and Corporal Noble died of the wounds he received. Both were awarded the Victoria Cross.

The badge has lost its crown, which was broken off through the roof of the building, in which C.S.M. Daniels was lying wounded, falling in.—Deposited by The Rifle Brigade Museum.

- (6880) An old coloured Mezzotint Engraving, "The Death of General Wolfe at Quebec," published by R. Sayer and J. Bennett, October, 1779. (Purchased.)
- (6881) Child's Shoe taken from the floor of the slaughter house at Cawnpore, 1857.—Given by G. W. White, Esq.
- (6882 & 6883) Two German Lances with hollow metal shafts.
- (6884) A German Mauser Rifle (Sporting), Oberndorf, 1912, taken by H.M. Navy in a boat action, date unknown.
- (6885) A Turkish Rifle with tubular magazine and Mauser action and short bayonet, sent from Alexandria.
- (6886) A German Mauser Carbine, marked "Erfurt, 1916," with short bayonet.
- (6887) A Turkish Mauser Carbine with tubular magazine, sent from Alexandria.
- (6888) A German Rifle Magazine (Automatic) with leather case for same.
- (6889) A German Sniperscope which has been penetrated by a bullet.
- (6890) A German Trench Club with pointed head.
- (6891) A double-barrelled Sporting Shot Gun, percussion action, taken from German East Africa.
- (6892) A German Bayonet; the blade is very narrow, with one groove, and 20 inches in length.
- (6893) A German Bayonet with one deep groove, 15 inches in length.
- (6894) A German Bayonet with one groove, 15 inches in length, with a broad blade.
- (6895) A German Bayonet, with one groove, 15 inches in length, with a pioneer's saw-back.
- (6896) A German Bayonet, metal throughout, ungrooved, 12 inches in length. This weapon shows signs of extreme urgency, as the workmanship is very rough.
- (6897) A German Bayonet, metal throughout, with one groove, 12 inches in length, in an unfinished state.
- (6898) A German Bayonet, 14 inches long, with one groove and without a guard.
- (6899) A Mauser Automatic German Pistol, made by Oberndorf, with shoulder butt.—Taken by H.M. Navy in a boat action, date unknown.
- (6900) A Steyr Automatic German Pistol, .320 bore, bearing the British patent mark.—Taken by H.M. Navy in a boat action, date unknown.
- (6901) A German Rifle Grenade Stand.

## SECRETARY'S NOTES

- (6902) A Russian Machine-Gun on wheeled mounting, taken in France from the Germans. The action is out of gear.
- (6903) A 75 mm. Trench Mortar with carriage taken from the Germans. The muzzle of the gun has been destroyed by shell fire.
- (6904-6906) A 90 mm. Trench Mortar with bed and carriage, with three recoil tubes, taken from the Germans. It has been much damaged by shell fire.
- (6907) A German Grenade Thrower (*Granatenwerfer*) used in trench warfare
- (6908) A German Spandau Machine-Gun, mounted on tripod stand with carrying sling, much damaged by shrapnel fire.
- (6909) A Breastplate of German Body Armour consisting of four pieces; it has been pierced by two bullets.
- (6910) A German Parabellum Machine-Gun, part of the breech action is missing.
- (6911) A German Signal Thrower (*Signalwerfer*) used for throwing signal lights.
- (6912) A pair of German Wire Cutters.
- (6913) A German Trench Club (Knobkerry), taken by the 2nd Canadian Brigade.
- (6914) A German Soldier's Canteen with cover.
- (6915) A German Soldier's Water Bottle.
- (6916) A German Infantry Soldier's Entrenching Tool in leather case.

The whole of the above-mentioned Exhibits have been presented by the Army Council (War Trophies Committee).

The attention of Members is drawn to the Museum Purchase Fund.

February 1st, 1918.



**THE JOURNAL**  
OF THE  
*Royal United Service Institution.*

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VOL. LXIII.

FEBRUARY, 1918.

No. 449.

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[Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers. All communications (except those for perusal by the Editor only) should be addressed to the Secretary, Royal United Service Institution.]

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**THE IRISH TROOPS IN THE SERVICE OF  
SPAIN, 1709-1818.**

By PROFESSOR C. OMAN.

---

I.

AN excellent article appeared in the JOURNAL for May last on the regimental history of the Irish troops in the service of the French Crown from 1691 to 1791, the year of the dissolution of the last Irish Brigade during the throes of the great Revolution. This article has inspired me with the ambition of drawing out a similar *précis* of the history of the Irish regiments in the Spanish service, whose annals are less copious than those of their compatriots who served north of the Pyrenees, but extend over a slightly longer term of years, from 1709 to 1818. The last of them, long Irish in name only, were disbanded at the general reduction of the Spanish army which followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars.

I have chosen the year 1709 as the starting point of this article, as being that in which the Irish regiments of the Spanish Army, which were to have a permanent existence, were first taken upon the muster-rolls of King Philip V. But, as we shall see, several of the corps had an earlier origin, and one of them belonged to the original Irish Army raised by King James II. after his expulsion from England by the Revolution of 1688, and preserved a continuous existence despite the reorganization of 1698, when, after the peace of Ryswick, the Irish serving under the French colours were drafted into new units. These points will be made clear when we come to deal with the history of the several regiments.

The continuous history of the Spanish-Irish regiments may be started on November 1st, 1709; but Irishmen had not only served under the Spanish colours, but had formed whole units in the Spanish army for short periods in the preceding century. The connection started with the rebellion of the Earl of Tyrone and Hugh Roe O'Donnell against Queen Elizabeth, and the sending of the Spanish expedition led by Juan de Aguila, to Kinsale in 1601. Aguila capitulated in January, 1602, and the back of the revolt was broken soon after. But not only O'Donnell and Tyrone, but thousands of other Irish rebels made their way, some to Spain and some to the Spanish Netherlands, where three ephemeral Irish regiments were raised from them under the names "Conde de Tyrone," Bostock, and Stanley. They only lasted a few years, drying up for want of recruits and being finally disbanded. There was a similar development in the reign of Charles I., when, from the moment of the sending of Strafford to govern Ireland in 1633 down to the extinction of the Irish rebellion by Cromwell in 1652, there was an enormous emigration of fighting men of the Catholic party from the island. Those of them who drifted to Spanish soil were welcomed, and embodied in the ephemeral regiments of O'Reilly, O'Brien, Gage, Murphy, Coghlan, Dugan, and Dempsey. All of these were extinct before Philip IV. was dead, and it is doubtful if any one of them existed for so much as twenty years. Being known only by their colonels' names, they are very difficult to follow or to identify, and it is possible that some of the regiments cited above are the same unit, with its title changed owing to the death or retirement of its commanding officer.

The permanent Irish regiments in the Spanish Army did not descend from any of the corps that arose from the emigrations under Elizabeth, or under Charles I. and the Commonwealth. All these had been long forgotten before Philip V. set to work to strengthen his tottering throne by raising as many regiments of any nationality as he could set on foot. He took Walloons, Italians, Germans, and Swiss into his service in large numbers, before he added Irish to the polyglot army which had to defend his kingdom from the equally heterogeneous invading force of Austrians, British, Dutch, Portuguese, and Catalan rebels, which was commanded by Peterborough and the Prince of Darmstadt, Galway, Stahremberg, and Das Minas.

The first Irish regiments taken into the Spanish service were those of the Marquis of Castelar and Dermot MacAuliffe, both of which received their patent of creation from the King of Spain at Saragossa on November 1st, 1709. Shortly after there were inscribed on the Spanish muster-rolls the regiments of the Duke of Vendôme [November 13th] and Comesford [December 13th]. The fifth Irish regiment of the Spanish Regular Army, that of Francis Wauchope, was only transferred from the French to the Spanish service six years later, after the conclusion of the peace of Rastadt and the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. Its patent was signed on May 15th, 1715.

Since the citing of a unit by the name of an ever-changing colonel is a most tiresome form of designation, it will spare the reader some mental labour if we speak of the regiments for the future by the

permanent local names which were afterwards conferred on them. When the Spanish War Office (long years before our own made the same reform) resolved to give every unit a permanent title, Castelar received the name of Hibernia; MacAuliffe that of Ultonia [Ulster]; Vendôme that of Limerick; Comesford that of Waterford; Wauchope that of Irlanda. But this sensible change was only made by a royal decree signed at Barcelona on May 15th, 1718, long after all the regiments had been some time in the Spanish service.

The Regiment of Castelar—or, to use its better-known name, Hibernia—owed its origin to a group of Irish-French officers, of whom the senior was a Lieut.-Colonel Reginald O'Donnell. They had all been “seconded” out of various regiments of the Irish brigades in the service of Louis XIV., which at that time abounded in supernumerary officers, but were very short of recruits for the rank and file. They made interest with a countryman, Doctor O'Higgins, Physician-in-Chief to the King of Spain, and, through him, with a Spanish grandee, the Marquis of Castelar, who brought their proposal before the King. The offer was to provide the whole of the officers for a regiment, Castelar nominating his son as the first Colonel; O'Donnell to be the Lieut.-Colonel, and all the rest to be men who had seen service and were of Irish nationality. It was hoped that the greater number of the rank and file could be raised from the same source: but if this proved impossible the Colonel undertook to enlist only foreigners, Spanish recruits being wanted for the native army. As a matter of fact a certain number of Swiss, Walloons, and Germans were incorporated. Foreign recruits of this sort were got from the prison camps, where numerous cosmopolitan adventurers who had served in the allied armies then fighting for the Archduke Charles in Spain were confined. It is probable that there were some Irish among them—soldiers who had been taken in the ranks of Galway's British battalions at Almanza (1707) and elsewhere.

Reginald O'Donnell was the real organizer of the regiment, to which Castelar contributed nothing but the colonel and the name. It was composed of two small battalions, each of thirteen companies of fifty men; the thirteenth company was the grenadier company, and often detached from its unit, as the Spanish Staff had a great love for making up special reserves, or advanced-guard battalions, from massed grenadier companies. For this small establishment of 1,300 rank and file there were no less than eighty-four officers, a very high proportion, viz., the Colonel, Lieut.-Colonel, Major (still called Sergt.-Major in the Spanish service), seventy-eight company officers, a Captain-Interpreter, a Provost-Captain, and a Quartermaster-Lieutenant.

As an inducement for rapid recruiting there was a bounty of one dubloon [sixteen dollars] for each recruit, and when the *cadres* should be completed each officer and soldier was to be given two months' pay, “gratis, and without deduction,” as an additional bounty. The recruiting would seem to have been quickly completed, as the two battalions took the field complete early in May, 1710, and joined the Army of Catalonia. The town at which the regiment had been embodied was Carineña, in Aragon, a spot chosen because of its

comparative nearness to France, from which many of the Irish recruits were expected to come. As the casualty lists of the officers show, it is certain that all through this war, and for many years after, every commission in Hibernia was given to a real Irishman. Except the Colonel's, we find no name that is not purely Irish till the 18th century was far spent.

The regiment of MacAuliffe, later Ultonia, was not formed on a composite *cadre* like Hibernia. It was the legitimate descendant of the old Jacobite Army of 1690, being formed entirely of officers drawn from the Franco-Irish Infantry Regiment of Galmoy, which was itself the representative of two old regiments of King James' original levy—the Infantry Regiment of Charlemont and the Queen's Dismounted Dragoons. Apparently Galmoy's must have been abounding in supernumerary officers in 1709, since Colonel Dermot MacAuliffe was able to draw the whole, or practically the whole, of his *cadre* from his old French regiment. It was, unlike Castelar-Hibernia, only a single-battalion corps of 650 men and 43 officers. With this exception the conditions of its formation were exactly the same as those of the sister-regiment—it was equally allowed to enlist non-Spanish recruits to fill up any deficiency in its ranks that could not be supplied by native Irish volunteers.

But MacAuliffe-Ultonia seems to have found it more difficult than Castelar-Hibernia to obtain recruits. At any rate it had only 408 men in the ranks when it was sent, in the spring of 1710, to join the corps which was blockading Monzon, then held for the Archduke Charles by Catalan rebels.

The third Irish regiment to appear in the Spanish service was that of Vendôme—a single-battalion unit—afterwards known as Limerick, whose patent was drawn out addressed to Colonel Cornelius O'Driscoll on November 13th, 1709, less than a fortnight after the admission of Hibernia and Ultonia into the Army of Philip V. As it continued no very long time in the Army of Spain, and passed into the Neapolitan service in 1733, its annals have been less well kept than those of other Spanish-Irish corps. Its later name of Limerick suggests that Colonel O'Driscoll, or a large number of the original officers of his corps, must have served in the old Jacobite infantry regiment of Limerick, which had been disbanded out of the French service in 1798. Its earlier designation as Vendôme shows that the great French marshal who served Philip V. so well must have been its titular Colonel during the first years of its existence.

The fourth Irish regiment was that of Colonel John Comesford, later known as Waterford. Its patent as Colonel Comesford's Regiment dates from December 13th, 1709. There was no corps named Waterford in the old Jacobite Army, so that the designation was not inherited from the French service, and may have been bestowed simply because its first batch of officers and men may have been drawn mainly from the Waterford side of the kingdom of Munster. It was a one-battalion unit, and had a short history, as in 1734 it was disbanded, and its officers and men were distributed between the three surviving Irish regiments of Hibernia, Ultonia, and Irlanda. Its first Colonel

(Comesford) left descendants in the Spanish service, one of whom was afterwards Colonel of Hibernia.

The fifth Spanish-Irish corps was the only one which passed complete, with its whole establishment of officers and men, from the French to the Spanish service. It had been the Queen's Regiment of Foot in the old Jacobite Army: its *cadre* of officers had been formed in France by the Marquis of Antrim, its first Colonel. It was sent to Ireland in 1699, where it was filled up with recruits in Dublin. After taking part in the siege of Derry and the battle of the Boyne, it shared in the defence of Limerick, and, after the subsequent capitulation, returned to France.<sup>1</sup> Reorganized in the camp of Vannes with drafts from other Irish corps then disbanded, it was sent to Italy in 1693 under its Lieut.-Colonel, Francis Wauchope, a Scotch Catholic officer, and was present under Catinat at Marsaglia and other noted fights. In 1697 it was transferred to the French Army of Catalonia, where it served under the Duke of Vendôme till the Peace of Ryswick ended the war. In 1698, when so many of the old Jacobite regiments were drafted or disbanded, the *cadre* of the Queen's Regiment served as the nucleus for the new Irish regiment of Colonel Walter Bourke, which remained under the name of that officer as a unit of the French Army till 1715, the actual command of the corps being still in the hands of Lieut.-Colonel Wauchope.

When the War of the Spanish Succession broke out in 1702 the Regiment of Bourke went once more to Italy, the scene of so much of its former campaigning, and took part in all the actions from the surprise of Cremona to the battle of Turin (1706). After suffering disabling losses in that disaster it was sent back to France to reorganize, and in 1708 took the field again with the Army of Flanders. It was present at Oudenarde, Malplaquet, and Denain, and saw out the whole of the war on the Flemish front, down to the Peace of Utrecht. It was then dispatched to Catalonia, as part of the French auxiliary force lent to Philip V. for the suppression of the Catalan rebellion, which still lingered on after all the members of the Anti-Bourbon league had come to terms with Louis XIV. The storm of Barcelona on September 11th, 1714, ended this last flicker of war, and the majority of the French troops returned across the Pyrenees. But the corps in which we are interested remained behind: with the permission of the King of France it was taken over whole into the service of his grandson, the King of Spain. Walter Bourke having died, Francis Wauchope was now its Colonel. He had been its actual commander in the field for twenty-two years before becoming its titular chief also. Accordingly it was as "Wauchope's Regiment" that it first appeared on the Spanish muster-rolls on May 18th, 1715. Soon afterwards it received the honorary appellation of the "Irish Regiment of the Prince of Asturias"—King Philip's eldest son and heir. But

<sup>1</sup> This account of the early services of the Queen's Regiment, *alias* the Marquis of Antrim's Regiment, *alias* Bourke's Regiment, is from the narrative of Colonel Felix Jones, who wrote a memoir of "Irlanda," which he commanded in the reign of Charles III. of Spain. It differs largely in detail from Colonel Watts' annals given in the JOURNAL of last May.

in 1718, when all the Spanish units received local appellations, the name of "Irlanda" was bestowed upon it, and remained its designation till the end of its career in 1818.

The patent issued to Wauchope's Regiment is a very curious document, differing considerably in its wording from those given to the four earlier Irish corps. It begins with a short ethnological statement to the effect that "from time immemorial the Spaniards have recognized the Irish to be their descendants, and as such have granted them the right to easy naturalization." After a great amount of stipulations about pay and promotion, the warrant promises that the regiment shall have "the same seniority that it had while in the service of the King of France." This concession by the Spanish Government led to immediate difficulties, as it made the Regiment of Wauchope senior to all the other four existing Irish regiments in the Army of King Philip. Its place in the French Army had been settled by the fact that it passed from the Jacobite muster-rolls to the French in 1698, when it dropped the name of the Queen's Regiment and became the Regiment of Bourke. It was therefore placed in the Spanish Army List as dating from that year, while the other Irish corps only dated from 1709. This they much resented, as they had done five years' hard fighting in Spain for King Philip, while Bourke's had been engaged in the wars of Italy and Flanders. But the Minister of War stood to the exact wording of the foundation-patent, and Wauchope's Regiment for the future counted as the senior Irish corps, and appears as such in all official documents, Castelar's and MacAuliffe's descending to the second and third places.

It may be worth noting that of the forty officers who passed into the Spanish service in Wauchope's, no less than seven, including the Major and two Captains, were Bourkes—it is clear that Walter Bourke had done well for his relations during the many years when he had held the colonelcy. It was a single-battalion corps of thirteen companies, Castelar (Hibernia) being the only one of the Irish regiments which started with a two-battalion formation.

All the five Irish corps kept the red uniform of the old Jacobite Army, though the Spanish native infantry of the line all wore white down to the end of the 18th century. MacAuliffe (Ultonia) and Wauchope (Irlanda) had blue facings; Castelar (Hibernia), Waterford, and Limerick green facings. All had the Irish harp as their regimental badge, and carried it also on their regimental Colour. The arrangement as to standards in the Spanish Army was at this time very similar to that which prevailed in the British Army in the 18th century. Each regiment had the usual pair: the one was the royal Colour and was uniform for all units, being white, with the "cross of Burgundy" (a sort of "saltire raguly") in scarlet, with a crown at the end of each limb: between the limbs were the castles and lions of Castille and Leon. The second, or regimental, Colour varied with the facings of the regiment, following their tincture, and bearing in the middle the badge and name of the unit. In the Spanish line the badge was generally the coat of arms of the town or province after which the regiment was named. But all the Irish regiments bore

the harp—there was no attempt to reproduce the arms of Ulster, Limerick, or Waterford.

In 1743 the regimental Colours of Hibernia, Ultonia, and Irlanda were ordered to show, in addition, a motto: "*in omnes terras exivit sonitus eorum*"—"their sound has gone out into all lands"—around the harp. This motto, the 4th verse of Psalm XIX., was intended to commemorate the courage shown by the three corps in the battle of Campo Santo, fought in Italy during the War of the Austrian Succession, when all three were nearly exterminated.

It remains to speak of the services of the five Irish regiments. During the War of the Spanish Succession, as we have seen, Irlanda served almost entirely in Italy and Flanders, only coming down to Catalonia in 1714, when the main conflict was over.

The other four corps all served from 1709 to 1714 in the Peninsula, and generally in the main Army which faced towards Catalonia and Valencia, the bases of the Anglo-Austro-Dutch Allies and their Spanish partisans who had espoused the cause of the Archduke Charles. They do not seem to have been united in any "Irish Brigade," as was sometimes the case in later wars. All four, however, were present in 1710 at the defeats of Almenara and Saragossa [July 26th and August 20th], when the Spanish armies were beaten by Stanhope and Stahremberg, and at the more decisive battle of Villaviciosa in the December of the same year, when Marshal Vendôme got his revenge, and the hopes of the Allies were broken for good and all. For after Villaviciosa there was never any real chance that Philip V. would lose the crown of Spain. The fighting in Catalonia and Valencia during the next four years was only the slow working-out of the inevitable. All the four Irish regiments were present at the last episode of the war—the long siege of Barcelona and its surrender in September, 1714. Here for the first time they had Wauchope's [Irlanda] at their side, among the French auxiliary troops.

The next Spanish war was that which was waged against Austria, France, and Great Britain, under the auspices of the able, energetic, and unlucky Cardinal Alberoni in 1718-20. Irlanda, Hibernia, and Ultonia all formed part of the Army under the Marquis of Lede which successfully overran Sicily, and defended it against all Austrian counter-attacks, till Admiral Byng intervened and cut off the Spanish communications by his naval victory off Cape Passaro. Limerick and Waterford did not go on the Sicilian expedition, but were detailed to the army which had to defend the line of the Pyrenees against the French invaders under the Duke of Berwick. Hence they escaped the inevitable capitulation of the isolated Sicilian force on March 6th, 1720, in which the other regiments were involved.

The war of 1718-20 was a daring but unlucky venture—the next which set the Spanish Armies in motion was a very different affair, begun in haste and relinquished with ignominy. This was the four months' struggle of 1727, when Spain, without any formal declaration of hostilities, suddenly attacked Gibraltar, failed to make any progress against it, and sued for peace immediately after the siege had proved a failure. Among the thirty-six battalions, under the Marquis de las

Torres, which formed the besieging force, were Hibernia, Ultonia, and Limerick.

Very different in its character and its results was the next war in which the Irish-Spanish regiments took part. It was one of the most successful undertakings that the younger house of Bourbon ever took in hand. Though generally called by historians the "War of the Polish Succession," the question of the rivalry of Stanislas Leczinsky and Augustus of Saxony for the Polish throne was but a side issue. From the point of view of Spain it was an attempt to overthrow the dominion of Austria in Italy, and to recover Milan, Naples, and Sicily, lost twenty years back at the Peaces of Utrecht and Rastadt. After three years of varied fighting the Spaniards achieved the greater half of their project, and Naples and Sicily were recovered and formed into a kingdom for Don Carlos, the third son of Philip V. This war saw the end of the two junior Spanish-Irish regiments. Limerick had formed part of the original expeditionary force with which Don Carlos landed in Italy. When he had established himself in Naples, his father made over to him five foreign regiments to form the nucleus of a new Neapolitan Army—four of these were Walloon corps—the fifth was Limerick, which now drops off the Spanish muster-rolls, and started a new life as a Neapolitan-Irish regiment, which was to continue for several generations.

On the other hand, the junior regiment of all, Waterford (once Comesford's), was disbanded in 1734 and drafted equally into Ultonia, Hibernia, and Irlanda. It would seem that it was already getting difficult to procure Irish recruits, and to bring up the older regiments to full strength the youngest was scrapped. A few years later we shall see that the problem had become still more hopeless, and for the first time non-Irish drafts were thrown into the units which had hitherto maintained in their rank and file, as well as in their *cadre* of officers, a truly national character.

Meanwhile we must note that Hibernia and Ultonia had no share in the Italian victories of the "War of the Polish Succession," because they were at the time holding the African fortresses of Marzalquivir and Oran, then much beset by the Moors, but that Irlanda took a distinguished part in the campaigns of 1733-34-35. The regiment is notably mentioned at the battle of Bitonto, which won for Don Carlos the crown of Naples (1734), and at the siege of Palermo, which fell in September, 1735, bringing to an end the Austrian dominion of Sicily.

The next war, that of the Austrian Succession (1740-47), was the first in which a real "Irish Brigade" appears in the Spanish Army, for the three surviving regiments, Ultonia, Hibernia, and Irlanda, acted together under a brigadier of their own nation for the greater part of the long Italian campaigns of this struggle. Their doings, therefore, can be better followed, and deserve a larger notice than has been given to the annals of the earlier wars of the 18th century in which they were engaged.

(*To be continued.*)

## THE BATTLE OF CHARLEROI.

By MAJOR T. E. COMPTON.

IF we follow on the map the trace of the French eastern and north-eastern frontier, from Belfort to Dunkirk, we find that there is a distinct angle near Longwy, where the trace leaves the Luxembourg frontier and is deflected about fifty degrees from the direction of the eastern frontier of France. From Longwy, the frontier line runs generally north-west; but if, in marking the trace, instead of following it beyond Mezières towards Dunkirk, we draw a line from the former place down the Meuse, through Givet and Namur, and thence westward through Charleroi and Mons to Lille, we find that we have described more angles, and at Namur a very pronounced one—even less than a right-angle.

This is the line shown in the accompanying diagram, and it represents roughly the Allied front on August 20th, 1914. The British Expeditionary Force occupied, of course, a very small part of this line, and, in conjunction with the four reserve divisions under General d'Amade, about Valenciennes and Lille, was included by the French Staff in the aggregate of troops available to prolong the line of their Fifth Army westwards from Charleroi.

This front appears on paper a rather extraordinary one to take up on account of the angles, especially that part of it forming a right-angled triangle, which has its apex at Namur and base between Mezières and Valenciennes, because the forcing by the enemy of one side of this triangle would have the effect of endangering the retreat of all the troops holding, or fighting, on the other side.

This is, as a matter of fact, what actually occurred, only the French 1st Corps, under General Franchet d'Esperey, which had taken no part in the battle of Charleroi, was at hand and saved the situation from becoming desperate. But it will be seen in the course of this study that the menace of a German Army from Luxembourg, attempting to cross the Meuse at Dinant and Givet, practically demobilized one *corps d'armée* during the fighting on the Sambre, and would have

NOTE.—In the December number of *La Revue* (December 16th to 31st, 1917) General Palet attacks the decision of the French Staff at the beginning of the war to concentrate, after mobilization, on the Eastern frontier, instead of on the Eastern and North-Eastern, and quotes in support of his argument a number of military writers, both French and Belgian, who in the years immediately preceding the actual event, predicted the German invasion of Belgium. It is true that everything pointed to this being the settled policy of the Great General Staff, but General Palet hardly gives sufficient weight to the fact that these writers were not by any means in agreement as to whether the Germans would move *in force* on both banks of the Meuse, or only on the right bank. It was exactly this point that was uncertain for the first fortnight after the declaration of war, and the delay in moving the French Fifth Army to the Sambre was due to this uncertainty.

rendered the communications of the Fifth French Army anything but secure, had the result of that fighting permitted of our Allies maintaining their positions.

At the time it looked as if the angular disposition of the Allied forces in the battles of the frontier might have originated in an attempt to prolong the Allied front through Namur to Antwerp, connecting with the Belgian Army holding the line of the Gette, which attempt had had to be abandoned owing to the German advance and the decision of the Belgian Government to retire their field army into the entrenched camp of Antwerp. But the true explanation of the angular front (as shown in the diagram) has at last been made clear—that is to say, during the year 1917—by the writings of the distinguished French historian, academician, and former minister, M. Gabriel



Hanotaux.<sup>1</sup> The French plan was a general offensive, and the angular front from Longwy to Lille was not intended to be a defensive one. While the Third and Fourth French Armies, from Longwy to Mezieres, attacked the enemy's columns moving through Belgian Luxembourg, the Fifth Army and British Expeditionary Force, pivoting on Namur (considered a strong fortress—at least as strong as Liège), were to have wheeled half right from the Sambre and attacked whatever German forces were found on the left bank of the Meuse.

<sup>1</sup> *Revue des Deux Mondes*, for February 15th, 1917. *L'Enigme de Charleroi* and *L'Histoire de la Guerre de 1914*, fascicules 64 and 65. Published by L'Edition Française Illustrée, 30, Rue de Provence, Paris.

Liége had held out for a fortnight, and it was confidently hoped that Namur would prove capable of resisting attack long enough to act as the pivot of this movement, the success of which would as a matter of course secure its safety. It proved a broken reed in this respect, and it is possible that if it could have held out for two days longer—it fell on August 23rd—the Second German Army might have experienced a rude check; but the situation, even then, could hardly have been materially modified on account of the defeat of the Third and Fourth Armies in the Ardennes and the menace by the German Third Army (von Hausen), thus set free, which would have forced the passages over the Meuse between Namur and Mezières by the 24th, and cut the French Fifth Army's communications.

M. Hanotaux's *L'Enigme de Charleroi*, published in September, 1917, supplemented soon after by his *Illustrated History of the War*, contained the first connected account of the dispositions on both sides in the battle of August 21st and 22nd on the Sambre, and corrected in some respects the narrative of the preliminary movements published more than two years ago in *De Liége à la Marne*, by M. Pierre Dauzat (Charles-Lavauzelle, Paris), and *Charleroi*, by M. Fleury-Lamure (Berger-Levrault, Paris). Of the five German Armies invading Belgium in August, 1914, three advanced on the right bank of the Meuse, south of that stretch of the river which runs eastwards from Namur to Liége; and two, the First (von Kluck) and Second (von Bülow), each five corps strong, reached Namur and the line of the Gette by the left bank, covered by a screen of four cavalry divisions, which effectually hid, until the battle had begun, their strength and movements. Thus, for instance, when Field-Marshal Sir John French reached the line Condé—Mons—Binche on the 22nd, he was at first led to believe that there was "little more than one, or at most two, of the enemy's army corps, with perhaps one cavalry division" in front of him. In his despatch, dated September 7th, 1914, from which the above is an extract, he also stated that he was "confirmed in this opinion by the fact that my patrols encountered no undue opposition in their reconnoitring operations. The observation of my aeroplanes seemed also to bear out this estimate." This was on the 22nd, and on the morning of the 23rd the Commander-in-Chief explained what he understood to be General Joffre's plan to his corps commanders, but apparently deemed it prudent to await further information before commencing its execution. In this he showed his accustomed prescience, for at five p.m. the "most unexpected message" arrived from General Joffre, by telegraph, informing him that at least three German corps were moving against the British front, while a fourth corps was engaged in a turning movement round his left flank, and the French were retreating on his right. Again, it was not till the 23rd that General Lanrezac was able to properly appreciate the situation. Till then, even with two of his corps heavily engaged on the Sambre, he seems to have hoped that he had time to begin the offensive movement ordered, after the arrival of the British Expeditionary Force on his left and the 51st Reserve Division on his right, which latter was to relieve his 1st Corps before Dinant. An Order, or memorandum,

issued by General Joffre directly after the battle, and dated August 24th, is instructive. After referring to the necessity of closer co-operation between artillery and infantry, it proceeds: "German cavalry divisions operate preceded always by some infantry battalions transported in automobiles. Up till now, our cavalry has never been able to approach the main body of the enemy's cavalry. They (the enemy's cavalry divisions) progress behind their infantry detachments, and from there launch their cavalry patrols, which invariably retire under cover of their infantry immediately they are attacked. Our cavalry pursuing these elements comes up against a solid barrage. It is necessary, therefore, that our cavalry divisions should always have infantry to support them, in order that they may have secure rallying points, and in order to increase their offensive qualities."

The advance of the First and Second German Armies to Valenciennes, Mons, and the Sambre was carried out in execution of a plan of campaign which, based on the recommendations of Marshal von Schlieffen, is as old as *Cannæ* (the title of his treatise), and is nothing more, in principle, than the horn tactics by which the Zulus conquered all the native races of South-East Africa. Nothing more in principle, but vastly greater, of course, in practice, for instead of twenty thousand men, the German Staff were directing in this theatre alone, which was almost one great battleground, fifteen hundred thousand.

At Ulundi (July 4th, 1879), the whole of the Zulu manœuvre could be seen from the square formation in which the British troops, under Lord Chelmsford, were waiting to defeat it in the centre of the plain. The German invasion of France and Belgium, although the same manœuvre, could only be followed on the map, with difficulty, by the perusal of official *communiqués* and reports, for it was on a front of three hundred miles. Of the seven armies engaged in it, two on each flank were the horns (this idea in the Zulu battle formation doubtless originated from observing the encircling shape of the horns of cattle), the remaining three armies filled the interval between them. The armies of the Crown Prince of Bavaria (Sixth) and General von Heeringen (Seventh), forming the left horn, made a determined attempt to force their way through the *trouée de Charmes*, between Toul and Epinal, and failed. The two armies forming the other horn, those of von Kluck (First) and von Bülow (Second), overcoming the opposition to their progress put up by the Allies at Namur and on the Sambre, prolonged the encircling movement of the right horn as far as Meaux, fifteen miles from Paris, the intention being to push the point (von Kluck), if necessary, to the Seine, and even south of that river, when General Joffre's masterly dispositions and generalship gained the victory of the Marne, which completely broke up and ruined the enemy's encircling horn tactics, or strategy, whichever the reader prefers to call it. Strategy is doubtless the correct word, but, with the masses of men now in the field, strategy and grand tactics are frequently more or less synonymous terms.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Germany tried the same manœuvre against Russia in 1915, and was so far successful that, to avoid encirclement, the Grand Duke Nicholas had to abandon an immense territory, including all the fortresses.

Blocked on his left by the French fortifications and the armies of Generals de Castelnau and Dubail, and defeated and forced back to the Aisne on his right, he abandoned the war of movement in the west, and proceeded to extend his line of entrenchments to the sea on one side and a neutral frontier on the other, since when siege warfare became, and has remained, the normal type in this theatre. But at the beginning of hostilities the German Great General Staff had every hope of another Sedan on a larger scale.

The German plan of campaign, as it developed, did not surprise the French Staff; the possibility of a violation of Belgian territory was too patent to all who knew the extent and direction of German railway preparations and the location of troops; but the wide extent of the sweeping movement of the right wing may not have been altogether anticipated, including as it did the occupation of Brussels and the complete subjugation of Belgium. Whether this was so or not, the French variant plan of campaign (after the enemy had shown his hand) was sufficiently broad to meet the actual situation, and it only failed on the Sambre because of the fall of Namur, and, perhaps even more so, because the movements of the Germans, when they did move (on August 18th), were unexpectedly rapid.

On the declaration of war, the French Government had at once notified its intention of observing Belgian neutrality, in consequence of which policy the French concentration had to be made in the direction of the eastern frontier. But as soon as the enemy's contrary decision was known, the *variant*, or alternative, plan of campaign came into force. Briefly, the details of this plan, already referred to, were as follows:—

On the strongly-fortified eastern frontier, to contain, with the armies of Generals de Castelnau and Dubail (reduced by the XVIIIth Corps), the left wing, or horn, of the enemy's advance, and elsewhere, with every available unit, to attack his centre and right while on the march on both banks of the Meuse. On the right bank, the Third and Fourth Armies, eleven corps strong, facing north between Mezières and Longwy, were to attack the centre in the Belgian Ardennes, while, on the left bank, the Fifth Army, under General Lanrezac (made up to a strength of practically six corps, by the addition of the 4th Group of Reserve Divisions and two Divisions d'Afrique), pivoting on the Belgian fortress of Namur and connecting on its left with the British Expeditionary Force (whose objectives were to be Soignies and Nivelles), attacked the enemy's right wing.

Unaware that the German Reserve Corps were already in the field, the French Staff, it is said, counted on having superiority of force on their side. In this estimate they were out about five corps, although not all, of course, at once in the front line, nor was there on the left bank any great disparity in the strength of the opposing forces engaged in the battle of Charleroi. It was only against the British, on August 23rd and 24th, when the French had retreated, that the enemy's strength was out of all proportion to that of his adversary.

The execution of this plan began on August 15th, on which date the Fifth Army received its orders to move into Belgium in the direction of Namur, and the XVIIth Corps and Divisions d'Afrique were in movement from the eastern frontier to join it.<sup>1</sup> The Belgian Field Army (four divisions and cavalry) was on this date holding the line of the Gette from about Jodoigne (fifteen miles north of Namur) to Diest (about twenty-five miles south-east of the entrenched camp of Antwerp).

The enemy's cavalry, supported by his *troupes de couverture*, had been raiding Belgian territory since the second week of August, and Dinant had been unsuccessfully attacked on the 15th; but up to August 19th there was no sign of the German mobilized armies having begun their advance, and the French Staff on this date must have had every hope of the plan succeeding. For the leading troops of the Fifth Army had already crossed the frontier, and Charleroi was occupied on the morning of the 20th by the 38th Division d'Afrique. M. Fleury-Lamure, who slept in the town on the night of the 19th-20th, records<sup>2</sup> that he was awakened by the noise of Belgian artillery rumbling over the cobbles, and soon after he saw French troops come in : Chasseurs d'Afrique, Turcos, and the 133rd Regiment of the Line. They were surrounded by the cheering inhabitants. At 10 p.m. the Brussels newspapers reached Charleroi. They announced the intention of the Government to evacuate the capital and retire with the field army into Antwerp, the fortified redit of the defences of the country designed by Brialmont for this purpose, and believed to be impregnable. The German masses were reported advancing in three columns on Diest, Tirlemont, and Namur.

For the reasons given in General Joffre's Memorandum of August 24th, already referred to, Sordet's cavalry corps of three divisions had explored all the east of Belgium without having sent back any certain news of the enemy. "*Les armées allemandes sont toujours immobiles, voilées par le rideau mouvant et impénétrable de leur nombreuse cavalerie.*"<sup>3</sup>

On the 19th, however, the French cavalry corps was heavily engaged at Perwez, near Gembloux, and retired on the 20th to the Charleroi—Brussels canal, Gosselies, and Fontaine-l'Evéque, names familiar to students of the Waterloo campaign. On this date, the 20th, the various corps and divisions of the Fifth Army had reached positions as under :—

*The 1st Corps* (General Franchet d'Esperey) was opposite Dinant, with orders to guard the bridges over the Meuse till relieved by the 51st Reserve Division from Givet (which

<sup>1</sup> On the 16th General d'Amade received orders to proceed from Lyons to Arras to take command of four divisions of Territorials (to which was added on August 25th the 61st and 62nd Reserve Divisions). These dispositions were invaluable in preventing the German IIInd Corps and cavalry divisions from turning the Allied left.

<sup>2</sup> *Charleroi*. Librairie Berger-Levrault, Paris.

<sup>3</sup> *L'Enigme de Charleroi*, p. 45.

would be relieved in turn by the 52nd Reserve Division from the region of Rocroi).

*The Xth Corps* (General Defforges) was on the Sambre, in position on the heights of the right bank, opposite Auvelais and Tamines.

*The 37th Division d'Afrique* was attached to the Xth Corps.

*The IIIrd Corps* (General Sauret) continued the line to the left, and was in position opposite Châtelet and Charleroi.

*The 38th Division d'Afrique* was attached to the IIIrd Corps.

*The XVIIIth Corps* (General de Mas-Latrie) had only detrained on this day, coming from Toul. Headquarters were at Sobre-le-Château (about seven miles north-east of Avesnes), nearly twenty miles from Charleroi.

*The 4th Group of Reserve Divisions* (53rd and 69th) (General Valabrége) was still further behind.

In *L'Enigme de Charleroi*, page 65, they are said to have only left the region of Vervins, twenty miles to the south of Avesnes, on August 21st, and in *L'Histoire de la Guerre de 1914*, page 286 (fascicule 65), they are referred to as follows, under the date of August 22nd (second day of the battle of Charleroi): "Il n'est pas encore question de l'entrée en ligne du groupe des divisions de réserve du General Valabrége. Celui-ci a encore son quartier-général à Avesnes. La 69th division a commencé, le 21 Août au soir, son mouvement dans la direction de Beaumont. Mais c'est seulement le 22 à 9 heures du matin que la groupe reçoit de la 5<sup>e</sup> armée, l'ordre 'de se porter sur la Sambre.'"<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> After reading these references to the 4th Group of Reserve Divisions, which seem to place it definitely in the region of Avesnes late on the 21st, after a forced march, it is rather disconcerting to find on the map (pages 272-3, fascicule 64), given in M. Hanotaux's "*Histoire de la Guerre*," and headed *Positions des Armées le 21 Août, 1914, au matin*, both these Reserve Divisions, the 53rd and 69th, shown north of Avesnes, the leading regiments even north of Sobre-le-Château, and to all appearance marching forward. As the British Army on the same map is shown in its proper place—a couple of marches in rear of that part of the French line which was in position between Namur and Charleroi, and as M. Hanotaux, in his popular account of the battle and movements before and after the battle, entitled *L'Enigme de Charleroi*, complains somewhat bitterly (pages 49, 50, and 54) of the non-arrival of the British on the 20th, the day he says they were expected, it seems rather a pity that the position of the 4th Group of Reserve Divisions on the map should not agree with the text.

It is only fair to add, however, that, in *L'Enigme de Charleroi*, M. Hanotaux has placed them correctly on his sketch-map (pages 24-5), entitled "*Positions le 22 Août*," that is to say, the 69th Reserve Division on the Helpe stream, just north of Avesnes, and the 53rd Reserve Division south of that place; and this date, it should be remarked, is the 22nd. Consequently, for the 21st, morning, it is obvious that their position on the map in the History (pages 272-3) is a fancy one, giving the impression, unintentionally, of course, to anyone looking at this map and not intimately acquainted with the text, that on the morning of the 21st the French Fifth Army was concentrated and the British hopelessly in the rear.

General Sordet's cavalry corps was, as already stated, a few miles to the north of the Sambre, about Gosselies and Fontaine-l'Evêque, covering the approaches.

It will be seen from these dispositions, which are marked on the accompanying sketch map, that only the Xth and IIIrd French Corps, with the 37th and 38th Divisions d'Afrique, were in position on the Sambre on the morning of August 21st. But the XVIIIth Corps was not more than, at most, a forced march from the Charleroi—Mons road, and might have been hurried up on the left of the IIIrd Corps, as *at least one division* of the Ist Corps, from opposite Dinant, might, it would seem, have been pushed up to the right of the Xth Corps, had it been so ordered; for if the 51st Reserve Division was considered sufficient strength to guard the crossings at Dinant (when it arrived), why leave the whole of the Ist Corps there and out of action during the battle?

With regard to the XVIIIth Corps, M. Hanotaux states in his *Histoire de la Guerre de 1914* (page 286) that General Lanrezac counted on it occupying the Charleroi—Mons road on the left of the IIIrd Corps; but with the exception of one brigade of the IIIrd Corps, thrown forward in support of General Sordet's cavalry, no infantry crossed the river, and the whole of the XVIIIth Corps halted and took position on the right, or southern bank of the Sambre, opposite Thuin and Merbes-le Château, and remained there. Consequently, as the Sambre, between Maubeuge and Charleroi, runs in a north-easterly direction, whereas from Charleroi to Namur its course is almost east, the Fifth Army, instead of taking up the line Mons—Namur, had its left flank thrown back fully ten miles, resting, when its cavalry retired behind the river on the 22nd, on the fortress of Maubeuge.

Thus, the French position on August 21st, at the beginning of the battle of Charleroi, faced north from Auvelais (nine miles west of Namur) to Marchienne (three miles west of Charleroi), on the Sambre, with the left refused as already described. Counting the two Divisions d'Afrique as a corps, four corps were available, three on the main front and one on the refused flank.

The Army Commander, however, was not contemplating a defensive battle. His orders were to organize an offensive movement half-right, pivoting on Namur, and the positions occupied by the various corps on the night of the 20th-21st were merely waiting ones, pending the complete concentration of the Allied forces. At the same time the halting of the XVIIIth Corps on the right bank of the Sambre was so obviously unsuited to any possible situation, that one can only suppose the Corps Commander, having only just arrived from Toul (in Lorraine), ignorant of the proposed plan.<sup>1</sup>

If an advance was to be made, wheeling half-right, pivoting on Namur, the XVIIIth Corps' place was on the Mons—Charleroi road; and if the enemy, on the other hand, seized the initiative and attacked first, this attack, it was well known, must come by Perwez and

<sup>1</sup> Fifth Army Order of the 21st assigned to him these positions south of the Sambre, and it is not clear that he received any other definite orders.

Gembloix : that is to say, from the north-east, yet the western flank was refused. M. Hanotaux likens the Fifth Army dispositions at the moment when the struggle was about to commence, to "a sort of pyramid, the point of which was the IIIrd Corps. Whether for the offensive or defensive," he adds, "this disposition was very dangerous." He also remarks on a certain heaviness of movement on the Allied side, which compared unfavourably with the remarkable speed of the enemy, whose infantry, from the 19th to the 21st, made marches of from twenty to thirty miles a day in extremely hot weather.

On the morning of August 21st, while the Xth and IIIrd Corps and 37th and 38th Divisions d'Afrique, as already stated, were in position on the Sambre in an expectant attitude, and the XVIIIth Corps was taking up the line thrown back, from opposite Thuin towards Maubeuge, the orders of the Generalissimo, drafted apparently on the supposition that they would find the Fifth Army and British Expeditionary Force concentrated, reached General Lanrezac.

It is probable that in these orders, or general instructions, some latitude as to the date of their execution was left to the commanders on the spot, but M. Hanotaux does not quote them *in extenso*. The enemy was said to be marching westwards with the intention of outflanking the French front by the north. In these circumstances, the Third and Fourth Armies had been ordered to advance in the direction of Neufchâteau—Arlon (in Belgian Luxembourg), and the Fifth Army, resting its right on the Meuse and Namur, was to take for its objective "*le groupement enemi du nord.*"

The Commander of the British forces was to march by Soignies in the direction of Nivelles.

General Lanrezac thereupon proceeded to issue his own orders, based on the foregoing; but on account of the delays in his own concentration, the advance ordered in the first paragraph was suspended indefinitely by the succeeding paragraphs :—

"The various corps will move forward<sup>1</sup> between Namur and Nivelles.

"The 1st Corps will remain guarding the Meuse until it has been relieved by the Division Bouttegourd (51st Reserve Division), when it will take position from Namur to Sart-St. Laurent. The General Franchet d'Esperey will send, as soon as possible, a regiment (of the active army) to Namur.

"The Xth Corps, reinforced by a Division d'Afrique, will organize on the left Fosse, Vitrival, St. Eustache : that is to say, the region between the circle of defence of Namur and Charleroi. The IIIrd Corps, reinforced also by a Division d'Afrique, will deny the crossing at Châtelet to the enemy, and will hold Nalinnes and Farcienne (about two miles east of Châtelet, near Roselies).

"The XVIIIth Corps, following the course of the Sambre, to the south of it, will hold Ham-sur-Heure, Gozée, Thuin. The group of reserve divisions of General Valabrègue will push forward its right

<sup>1</sup> *Se porteront en avant.*

division on Sobre-le-Château, so as to be able to reach Consobre by Beaumont, and will send its left division into the region south-east of Maubeuge. The cavalry corps has only to keep its present positions at Gosselies—Fontaine l'Évêque."

The above Army Orders were supplemented at 5.25 p.m. by after-orders, prescribing an attack *à fond* by the Ist and Xth Corps, for the afternoon of the 22nd, "to the west of Namur, where the ground is relatively open and where the guns of the fortress will be able to co-operate." The IIIrd and XVIIIth Corps were to remain in the positions assigned to them until the British Army arrived. Detachments were to be posted on the bridges over the Sambre, and reinforced, in readiness for the forward movement.

The general instructions issued from the French Grand Quartier Général on August 21st, with respect to operations on the left bank of the Meuse, dealt with no detail except as regards the pivot of the proposed offensive movement: *the Meuse and Namur*, and the outer flank: *Nivelles*. But in naming the locality for the outer flank the Generalissimo definitely mentioned the British as the troops who were intended to occupy it. The instructions were clear enough, but when could they be executed? Evidently not until the British Army was within a day's march of Nivelles. In these circumstances, General Lanrezac, according to M. Hanotaux, asked Headquarters, by telegram, on what date he was expected to cross the Sambre. In order to act with the British he calculated that he must wait "at least until the 24th." The reply was to the effect that the date of the advance was left to his judgment.

It was then, apparently, that he issued the after-order prescribing an advance by the Ist and Xth Corps for the afternoon of the 22nd; which, we may remark in passing, would have had, in any case, to be postponed, because the Ist Corps was not relieved at Dinant till the evening of the 22nd. The left flank was, in these after-orders, still left refused, but not so much for defence, apparently, as to more easily establish connection with the British through Maubeuge. But that this was a most unfortunate mistake is admitted, for M. Hanotaux, as already mentioned, states<sup>1</sup> that General Lanrezac expected the XVIIIth Corps to take position on the Charleroi—Mons road when the IIIrd and Xth Corps had become engaged. It is not stated, however, how the mistake occurred, or which Staff, army, or corps was to blame. Nor is the case of the assumed non-arrival of the British at the proper time elucidated by M. Hanotaux, at least in either fascicles 64 and 65 of his History, or *L'Enigme de Charleroi*, where he several times refers to this non-arrival as having spoilt General Joffre's plan. He assumes that they should have been at Maubeuge on the 20th, but gives no references in support of this statement; and when we consider the proved excellence of the first British Expeditionary Force, from Army Staff to the private soldier,

<sup>1</sup> "Ce corps se tenant sur la rive sud de la Sambre, et non sur la route de Charleroi à Mons, vers Fontaine l'Évêque ou Binche, comme y comptait le Général Commandant l'armée." P. 286, *Histoire de la Guerre de 1914*.

there cannot be the least doubt that if there was really this three days' delay in its reaching its assigned position on the Belgian frontier, this retardation must have been due to altogether unavoidable causes, as to which it would be useless to speculate, having no data to refer to; and the French railways were then, presumably, under French management.

The fact remains, that on the afternoon of August 21st, 1914, while the Commander of the French Fifth Army was puzzling over the awkward problem of how to carry out General Joffre's instructions for a general advance of the Allied forces, with about two-thirds of these same forces absent—not unlike being called upon to make bricks without straw—and issuing tentative and unsatisfactory orders in consequence (but all with an offensive object), the German Second Army attacked the Xth and IIIrd Corps on the Sambre, and the battle of Charleroi had begun.

#### THE FIRST DAY, AUGUST 21ST, 1914.

It was about 12.45 p.m. that the first infantry attack was delivered on Auvelais, by advanced troops of the Prussian Guard Corps, which was repulsed. Tamines and Auvelais, situated at the bottom of the Sambre valley, were soon exposed to the plunging fire of the enemy's artillery posted on the heights of the left bank; and the French 38th Brigade (19th Division) of the Xth Corps, entrusted with the defence of the bridges in these villages, held the barricades with small bodies detached from battalions retired to positions about 600 yards in rear.

The 37th Brigade of the 19th Division, and artillery, were on the heights above them, between Aisemont and Arsimont.

At 2.30 p.m. an attack in force carried Auvelais, and the Germans were now masters of one bridge over the river, although those of Tamines and Ham-sur-Sambre were still in possession of the French. General Defforges, commanding the Xth Corps, thereupon ordered the 20th Division to be brought up in support, and the 19th Division to retake Auvelais *coute que coute*.

After an artillery preparation—very ineffective, as was the case generally in the French counter-attacks on the Sambre bridges, on account of the difficulty of directing plunging fire from high-velocity guns, and they had no howitzers—the 71st Regiment (37th Brigade) made a determined attempt, towards evening, to retake Auvelais, but failed, losing 16 officers and 560 men killed and wounded.

Between Auvelais and Namur the Germans made no attempt to cross the Sambre except after the defeat of this attack, when they attacked Ham from the right bank. By nightfall Tamines and Ham were lost to the French, and the Germans continuing their advance, even after dark, the 19th Division, greatly exhausted, fell back at 9.15 p.m. to Aisemont, and later in the night to the line Fosse-Vitreval—Saint Eustache, where the whole of the Xth Corps took position in readiness for the continuation of the battle in the early hours of August 22nd.

The corps had not only lost the bridges at Tamines, Auvelais, and Ham, but the high ground commanding them.

For this contretemps, as also for the ill success of the IIIrd Corps, on the left of the Xth Corps, the Army Orders of August 21st were in great measure responsible, as it was not till the receipt of the after-orders of the same date, only issued late in the afternoon, that the corps commanders were in possession of even partial instructions to secure the bridges against infantry attack. Up to the time that Tamines and Auvelais had been lost no orders had been issued of a clearly defensive nature: the bridges were only to be secured by small parties against cavalry reconnoitring patrols. The costly and futile counter-attacks of the late evening were the result of these belated after-orders reaching the troops much too late to be of any good.

The IIIrd Corps at the beginning of the battle had its posts on the bridges over the Sambre from Farcienne and Roselies to Marchienne, including, therefore, those of Charleroi and Châtelet, where there are numerous crossings.

The 5th Division found these little posts and had its main body in the faubourgs of the aforesaid towns.

The 6th Division and artillery were on the heights of Villers-Poterie, with the 38th (Algerian) Division behind them, at Somzée, in reserve.

Attacked by the German Xth Active and Xth Reserve Corps—the bridges being by express order, as already explained, defended only as against cavalry patrols—the 5th Division, after desperate fighting throughout the evening and far into the night, including costly counter-attacks on Roselies and Aiseau, was forced back about two miles to a front between Loverval and Presles.

To the west of Charleroi, the (11th) Brigade Hollender of the 6th Division was engaged at Anderlues (on the road to Mons), in support of General Sordet's cavalry, with the German VIIth Corps. At 1 a.m. on the 22nd the cavalry corps retired to Merbes le Château, but the gallant 11th Brigade remained on the left bank of the Sambre throughout the night and the whole of the following day. The remainder of the 6th Division was still in the neighbourhood of Villers-Poterie. The IIIrd Corps, with three brigades still unengaged, although it had lost the bridges and evacuated the faubourgs of Charleroi, had not retired nearly so far from the river as had the Xth Corps.

Its front line ran from Loverval to Presles, while its second line at about Villers-Poterie connected with Xth Corps first line, Vitrival-Fosse, which again connected with a detachment of the 1st Corps, ordered during the evening of the 1st to occupy Sart-St. Laurent, these latter villages being over four miles from the Sambre as the crow flies.

The XVIIIth Corps in the course of the day (21st) occupied with its cavalry the bridges at Thuin and Merbes le Château and organized a defensive position on the heights of the right bank between Gozée and Ham-sur-Heure, where it remained throughout the night and following day, although the Army Commander (according to

M. Hanotaux) intended that it should have prolonged the northern front towards Mons, where was only the isolated 11th Brigade (General Hollender) of the IIIrd Corps. The Corps Commander (General de Mas-Latrie) had been ordered to make his presence felt without a moment's delay, and the best way to do that would obviously have been to have crossed the Sambre at Thuin and operated in conjunction with the cavalry corps and brigade Hollender against the enemy's flank. On the other hand, in the Army Orders of the 21st, the XVIIIth Corps was distinctly ordered to hold the position it had proceeded to organize, viz., "Ham-sur-Heure, Gozée, Thuin." Consequently, without other definite orders reached the Corps Commander, he can hardly be blamed.

It will be remembered that in the Generalissimo's instructions, Namur and the Meuse were named as the pivot for all the Allied operations on and beyond the Sambre. To make the Meuse from Namur southwards a sure and efficient barrier, two reserve divisions, the 51st and 52nd, had been detailed to guard the bridges at Dinant and Givet respectively. The 51st, however, had not yet arrived opposite Dinant, and until it had taken over the duty assigned to it, the Ist Corps, by General Lanrezac's orders, was out of action. Nevertheless, as long as the fortress of Namur stood firm, there were always possibilities of the Ist Corps eventually operating with effect against the left flank of the German forces that were attacking the French Xth and IIIrd Corps on and south of the Sambre.

But Namur was attacked also on the 21st, and with alarming results. It was von Bülow's army (the Second) that was executing these attacks. The First Army (von Kluck) was at this time still marching some miles to the north of the Sambre, in a south-westerly direction, through Louvain and Brussels, on Tournai, Condé, and Mons. Of von Bülow's army, the Guard, Xth, Xth Reserve, and VIIth Corps, were attacking the French on the Sambre, while the VIIth Reserve Corps attacked Namur.

At nightfall, on August 21st, the length of time from then that the fortress could be depended on to hold out, on the extent of which so much depended, was doubtful, on account of the extraordinarily destructive effect of the enemy's artillery fire. Two forts had been practically knocked out, and others had suffered; but the garrison, reinforced by a French regiment (three battalions) of the Ist Corps, was intact, and the fortress was by no means *hors de combat*. It was hoped, at least by the commander of the Fifth Army, that it would be able to resist for some days yet.

#### THE SECOND DAY, AUGUST 22ND.

The fortress of Namur, situated at the confluence of the rivers Sambre and Meuse, consisted of a citadel surrounded by nine cupola-mounted detached forts,<sup>1</sup> of which four were north and east of the

<sup>1</sup> The fortified perimeter was thirty miles. Each fort was armed with two 8-inch, four 6-inch guns, and two 12-inch howitzers, with four lighter quick-firing guns. Each redoubt had two 8-inch, two 6-inch, one 12-inch howitzer, and three lighter quick-firing guns. All these guns were mounted in cupolas.

town, three in the angle formed by the Meuse to the south and south-east, and two to the west in the angle formed by the Meuse and the Sambre. The German VIIth Reserve Corps made no attempt to surround the place. Confident in his superior armament, the enemy's system was to attack one or two forts at a time, and, having silenced them, to push in his assaulting parties between them.

On the 22nd, two of the forts on the northern sector, Marchovelle and Cognelée, were silenced, as was also Maizeret, situated farthest from the town on the south-east. The bombardment was effected by 8-inch and 12-inch howitzers, and by the famous 420-mm. (roughly 17-inch) mortar. The garrison, reinforced by three French battalions under General Mangin, attempted a sortie towards the north-east, which failed, and by the evening, under an intense bombardment, Namur had ceased to be a safe *point d'appui*, or pivot of manoeuvre.

The Ist Corps of the Fifth Army still awaited, opposite Dinant, its relief by the 51st Reserve Division; but in the course of the day Sart-St. Laurent and the bridges over the Sambre at Floreffe and Floriffoux, close to Fort Malonne (south-west of Namur), were occupied by detachments from the 2nd Brigade. They took, however, no part in the fighting.

The Xth and IIIrd Corps received orders during the night to combine their action with the object of regaining the initiative, which at the close of the battle on the first day had passed entirely to the side of the enemy. In order to get in touch with the first line of the IIIrd Corps, the 19th and 20th Divisions paraded at 3.30 a.m. for an advance, respectively, in the direction of Auvelais and Tamines. To support this advance, all the artillery of the Xth Corps was in position on the high ground north of Fosse and Vitrival.

The IIIrd Corps, after the desperate night attacks, before referred to, had its first line much nearer to the bridges of Châtelet and Charleroi than that of the Xth Corps from Tamines and Auvelais. The 5th Division, therefore, after its exhausting efforts, remained where it was till the Xth Corps had come into action. About 8 a.m. the 38th Division d'Afrique was brought up from Somzée, and orders were issued for an attack on Châtelet. At that hour the 20th Division of the Xth Corps attacked and took Falisolle (north of Aiseau), while the 19th Division occupied Arsimont.

The fortunes of the day were very similar to those of the 21st. The Xth Corps, having suffered so heavily on the preceding day, was more cautious with regard to forlorn hopes, and the same may be said of the IIIrd Corps (5th Division and 6th Division, less the Brigade Hollender); but the two Divisions d'Afrique (composed partly of Algerian coloured troops), which had been held in reserve on the first day of the battle, now came to the front and charged home in magnificent although fruitless attempts to retake the bridges. The 37th Division attacked the German Guard at Arsimont after the 19th Division had been forced to evacuate that place about 11 a.m., and suffered heavy losses without result.

The 38th Brigade, as previously stated, had been brought up from Somzée much earlier, about 8 a.m.; and its gallant attack on Châtelet is thus described by an eye-witness who was at the corps post of observation at Bultia (a mile or so to the north of Nalinnes):—

"The 5th Division was engaged towards Châtelet. To the west of it the 6th Division (less 11th Brigade) guarded the slopes towards Charleroi. Already it was under consideration to engage the Brigade Schwartz (38th Division) in an attack on Châtelet. The proposition came from the Staff of the Fifth Army: the artillery officers consulted remarked that Châtelet was in a hollow which made artillery preparation by cannon (low trajectory) very difficult. In spite of this, the proposition was maintained and General Schwartz received orders to attack Châtelet. The artillery was ordered to support the movement *en baissant son tir*. It sent some *rafales* on Châtelet. But before the fire had had time to render the position of Châtelet untenable, the brigade began its advance: *elle 'courre.'*

"The attack was pushed with admirable 'go' and enthusiasm right up to the outskirts of Châtelet. The Germans, sheltered behind barricades, or loopholed walls, met it with rifle and machine-gun fire almost at point-blank range.

"The 1st Tirailleurs (Algerians) lost 70 per cent. of its strength and thirty officers, of whom two were battalion commanders. The 1st Zouaves lost less heavily, but, nevertheless, its casualties were serious. The survivors retired to the shelter of the woods, covered by the 76th Brigade."

This disaster had a depressing effect upon the already severely tried 5th Division, and the retreat of the IIIrd Corps was ordered on Nalinnes and Somzée.

The Xth Corps, with its left flank uncovered by the retreat of the IIIrd Corps and closely pressed by the German Xth and Guard Corps, fell back to its original position: Fosse—Vitival—Sart—Eustache. General Boë, commanding the 20th Division, was wounded. General Ménissier (39th Brigade), who succeeded him, received mention in Army Orders for his coolness and energy. Retreat was resumed towards evening to a line in the neighbourhood of Mettet, which had been the Xth Corps headquarters, from eight to ten miles south of the Sambre, in touch with the IIIrd Corps (at Nalinnes and Somzée) by Hanzienne. The XVIIIth Corps carried on the line, at Gozée, and was still holding the Sambre bridges at Thuin and Merbes. Its artillery had come into action during the day, firing from the high ground north of Beaumont, west of the Heure stream, on the enemy advancing from Charleroi. Otherwise it had taken no part in the battle beyond sending by order, at 7 p.m., a brigade to Nalinnes to join the IIIrd Corps. How far it could, or should, have made its presence more effectively felt is far from clear.

On page 274 of his "History," M. Hanotaux states that the XVIIIth Corps detrained at Avesnes *on the 18th, 19th, and 20th*, and came into line on the left of the Fifth Army, with its advanced guard at Thuin, on August 21st. But on page 286 he represents the case of the XVIIIth Corps as follows:—

"The XVIIIth Corps, as we have seen, detrained *from the 20th to the 21st*. The 36th Division occupied on the 22nd the front Thuin—Gozée—Ham-sur-Heure."

These two statements hardly agree; but as it was not till 7 p.m. on the 22nd that the corps was ordered to send a brigade to Nalinnes, the second statement is possibly the correct one, and it may not have been till the 22nd that the corps got into the position assigned to it by Army Orders of the 21st. Yet M. Hanotaux, on this same page —286—complains that as the XVIIIth Corps "remained on the south bank of the Sambre and not on the Charleroi—Mons road, near Fontaine l'Evèque, or Binche, as the General commanding the Army intended, it made on this side a break, or gap, *qui aura les plus graves conséquences sur l'entrée en ligne de l'armée britannique le lendemain, 23 Août.*"

To have acted on the Mons—Charleroi road effectively, the XVIIIth Corps should have had its advanced guard there with the Brigade Hollender on the 21st, and its main body the first thing on the 22nd. Perhaps it ought to have been able to do this and received the necessary orders; but it does not seem to be certain, from M. Hanotaux's account of the battle, that such was the case. The gallant 11th Brigade, under General Hollender, retired in the evening, but only on receiving an express order to do so, on Thuin, and joined for the time being the XVIIIth Corps. It suffered a good deal of loss in its retirement.

The 4th Group of Reserve Divisions moved up from Avesnes at nightfall and took up a position on the left of the XVIIIth Corps from Montignies to Maubeuge, facing north.

The battle of Charleroi had ended with the retreat of the French. But there was no rout.

Two corps, plus two African divisions, had been beaten and had suffered heavy losses; but they had been able to fall back between two other corps that had not been engaged at all. Moreover, on the right there was the 51st Reserve Division, and on the left the 4th Group Reserve Division—all fresh troops. Consequently, had the situation been uncomplicated by other military events, the French might have renewed the battle on the 23rd with considerable prospect of, at least, temporary success. Indeed, General Lanrezac had actually contemplated an enveloping movement by the 1st Corps against the German left, and this movement had, in fact, begun, about 1 p.m. on the 23rd, by Graux on St. Gerard, and the 1st Division was already engaged when news arrived of the fall of Namur and the passage of the Meuse at Dinant by the German XIIth Corps.

The fall of Namur at once released the enemy's VIIth Reserve Corps, and allowed his Third Army to attack the passages of the Meuse south of the fortress without fear of interference on its flank. The XIIth Corps had begun operations without delay, and the French 1st Corps was now required to make head against it, in reinforcing the 51st Reserve Division, which had been driven in, and preventing, at all hazards, any further advance of the enemy against the communications of the Fifth Army. This duty it successfully accomplished.

On the evening of the 23rd, the Fifth Army lay extended in a line roughly between Dinant and Maubeuge, the XVIIIth Corps having fallen back from Gozée after a combat with the German VIIth and Xth Corps. Thus, when the British Army reached the Condé—Mons—Binche front, it was completely *en l'air*, and exposed to attack by the whole of the German First Army (five corps strong) with three cavalry divisions. It fought on the afternoon of the 23rd and on the morning of the 24th, but retreat was imperative, and, in the words of the Field-Marshal Commanding, "when the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy German threatening on my front reached me, I determined to effect a retirement (after aeroplane reconnaissance) to the Maubeuge position at daybreak on the 24th."

It was the only thing to be done in the circumstances, and while the Fifth Army retired on the line Maroilles (four miles east of Landrecies)—Avesnes—Fournies—Regmowez (five miles west of Rocroi), the British Expeditionary Force began its famous retreat to the Seine, described by many pens, of which none is more realistic, or more admirable in its own particular way, than that of Major Corbett-Smith in his "The Retreat from Mons." (Cassell.)

With regard to the tactics displayed, on both sides, at the battle of Charleroi, the Germans attacked unexpectedly, when the orders for an offensive movement on the part of the French were in course of being drafted at the Fifth Army Headquarters, at Chimay, thirty miles south of the Sambre. The French plan thereupon resolved itself into a general attempt on the part of the IIIrd and Xth Corps to regain the bridges over the river between Ham and Charleroi (a stretch of twelve miles), and, with them, the initiative.

The non-employment of any part of the Ist Corps in the battle (although, seeing that a single reserve division was to relieve it from the duty of guarding the bridges about Dinant, one division of the corps was evidently enough to leave behind there), and the absence of initiative on the part of the XVIIIth Corps, which remained out of action, except for its artillery, although the Army Commander counted on its crossing the Sambre and advancing to the Charleroi—Mons road, were due to this sudden loss of the initiative and the want of a carefully prepared defensive plan, until it was too late to put it into execution.


The Germans, as in 1870, attacked boldly, accepting risks, in full confidence that superior armament and readiness would prevail against an unconcentrated enemy.

In minor tactics they showed superior training in entrenching and preparing for defence positions captured. The faults of the French are summed up in Marshal Joffre's memorandum of August 24th, issued to the French Armies immediately after their reverses in the battles of the frontier:—

"It results from information and reports concerning the combats that have taken place up to this date, that attacks are not executed by a close combination between artillery and infantry. . . . Whenever it is desired to capture a *point d'appui* the attack must be prepared by the artillery, the infantry being kept back; and never

## THE BATTLE OF CHARLEROI

launched to an assault unless the distance to be covered is such as will allow of it reaching the objective. . . . When a *point d'appui* has been conquered it must be organized immediately: entrenched,



and artillery brought up to prevent an offensive return on the part of the enemy. The infantry seems to ignore the necessity of organizing positions during the battle in order to keep them."

On the side of the French, the battle of Charleroi, owing to adverse circumstances already explained, undoubtedly furnishes an example of want of combination and mutual support as complete almost as the battle of the Marne, fought a fortnight later, is an example of the exact contrary. But whatever temporary success might have been gained by the French under more fortunate direction, or if Namur had not fallen, the defeat of their Fourth and Fifth Armies in the Ardennes, and the consequent pressure of the German Third Army on the right flank and rear of the French Fifth Army, must, in any case, have necessitated eventual retreat from the Sambre and into French territory, in order to maintain connection with the remainder of the French forces. Even if all the units of the Fifth Army and the British Army had been in position on the 20th, ready to carry out the movement indicated by the Generalissimo, the execution of this plan, however successful, was fatally tied to the fortunes of the French in the Ardennes. Only success there could make the communications of the Fifth Army safe against attack from the direction of Dinant or Givet.

Therefore, in shouting "Charleroi!" during the debate of October 25th, 1917, in derision, with reference to the supposed inefficiency of the three years' law, the French Socialist deputies showed their ignorance both of the reasons for the retreat from the Sambre, and of the object of the three years' law.

As a matter of fact, the three years' law was more particularly intended to secure the uninterrupted mobilization of the French Armies, and, although there had been hardly time since it was passed for it to take its full effect, the French mobilization proceeded, undisturbed by *attaques brusquées*, under the protection of the standing force of covering troops. The Germans undoubtedly seized the initiative, but not till three weeks after the declaration of war, when not only was the French mobilization complete, but the French Armies had advanced across their own frontier into Belgium.

The Generalissimo's plan was a good one. It was a bold attempt to carry the war beyond French territory from the outset. Something must be risked in war. It failed because the enemy proved to be in greater strength and readiness for battle than was anticipated.

## SOME OBSCURE PASSAGES IN THE LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT CRAUFURD.

By COLONEL WILLOUGHBY VERNER.

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SOME ten years ago, when writing about some of Robert Craufurd's work during the Peninsular War, I had occasion to refer to his earlier services, and was puzzled to find that his name did not appear for several years in the Annual Army Lists, namely, from 1794 to 1798. As, however, there were several "Crawfords," "Crawfurd," and "Craufurds" in the Lists I concluded that it was a case of mis-spelling and that I had overlooked his name, for the idea that the famous Craufurd should leave the Army altogether in the middle of his career seemed to be out of the question. Later on I went carefully into the matter and looked up all available accounts of his life. The earliest of these is a memoir which appeared in the "Royal Military Calendar" (Vol. III. pp. 522-525), published in March, 1812, which, although inaccurate in some minor points as to the regiments he was successively gazetted to, records some interesting particulars of his early life.

In this memoir, however, there is nothing to show that Craufurd at one time left the Army altogether, or how, as the obvious result of such an act, he managed to return to it. Some six months after this account was published, an article appeared in "The Military Panorama" of 1812. In this again no allusion whatever is made to his having left the Army. This was reprinted in book form in 1842, together with an account of Craufurd's funeral by Gleig which had originally appeared in the "Gem Magazine" of 1829.

In the account in the "Military Panorama" it was stated (incorrectly) that Craufurd had first joined the Army in 1779, his first regiment being the 25th Foot (which was wrong). It, however, for the first time gave a connected account of the services and death of Robert Craufurd in book form. The memoir in the "Royal Military Calendar" had shown him as beginning life in the 21st Foot (which was equally wrong). As far as I can discover, nothing fresh was published about Craufurd's career, with the exception of a biography of him in Cole's "Peninsular Generals" in 1856 (where nothing is mentioned of his services between 1799 and 1807) until Volume VIII. of the "Dictionary of National Biography" appeared in 1888. Here, several of the old mistakes in the earlier accounts were unfortunately repeated.

About 1890 a grandson of Craufurd's, the late Rev. Alexander H. Craufurd, published "General Craufurd and his Light Division." In this the author stated that he "had the advantage of an intimate acquaintance with letters relating to the General's private and public life." All the same, he made no allusion whatever to his having left the Army for some years, and epitomized this period of his services

by saying that "he returned to England in 1794," and that, "after being employed at the Austrian Headquarters, he was promoted Lieut.-Colonel in December, 1797."

In the JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION for March, 1898, a brief account of Robert Craufurd's career was given, and his disappearance from the roll of the 75th, in 1794, was accounted for by the statement that he had "gone on half-pay" that year.

The fact that his name did not figure in the half-pay lists during the subsequent years made the matter still more mysterious. Having known the Rev. Alexander Craufurd for many years, I now appealed to him for information as to his grandfather's whereabouts in 1794, after he was said to have gone on half-pay. He, however, could give me no further information than was to be found in his book on the Light Division, namely, that the year after his mysterious disappearance from the Army List he had accompanied his brother, Sir Charles Craufurd on his mission to the Austrian Headquarters, after which he again disappeared from view, only to reappear unexpectedly as a Lieut.-Colonel in the 60th (or Royal American) Regiment in the Army List of 1799.

If his sudden disappearance as a Captain was a mystery, his rank during the years he was in Austria was even more so, and his sudden re-appearance as a Lieut.-Colonel in the 60th was the most perplexing of all. At any rate it was abundantly clear that there was a wide field for investigation, and so it was that I set to work to endeavour to disentangle the conflicting threads of the various narratives I have here mentioned. It was not until the year 1913, when Mr. John Fortescue brought out the seventh volume of his "History of the British Army," that the world learnt that a letter was in existence from Craufurd to Windham (the Secretary for War in 1806), in which he said he had at one time left the Army for three years. Once again I wrote to the Rev. Alexander Craufurd, who, however, stuck to his guns, and replied: "Oman and I both doubt whether Craufurd really retired from the Army, we think he probably only went on half-pay." There was clearly nothing to be done except to follow out Craufurd's career in the *London Gazettes* and Army Lists, and, although these are no evidence that an officer actually served with a corps in which he is shown, they enable an investigator in most cases to trace other documents which definitely settle the status and employment of an officer at any time of his career.

Before going into the vexed question of his actual employment during the ten years from 1794 to 1804, which is the period I deal with, I will briefly outline his early military life.

The third son of Sir Alexander Craufurd, Bart., of Newark Castle, Ayrshire, Robert Craufurd was born May 5th, 1764, and when still in his sixteenth year was gazetted an Ensign in the Army. His first appearance in the *Gazette* may be taken as a fair example of the pitfalls that beset the military writer. For in the *London Gazette* of May 6th, 1780, there appears: "65th Regiment of Foot. Robert Craufurd. Gent, to be Ensign." In the same *Gazette* and in another

column we see: "26th *Regiment of Foot*. Ensign Robert Craufurd, of the 65th Foot, to be Ensign."

Small wonder that some of his biographers, upon reading the last notice (which of course appeared, owing to the seniority of the regiments, *before* the first one), noted that he began his career in the 65th Foot, a corps he never joined. According to the Army List of 1780, the date of his first commission in the Army in the 65th Foot was April 20th, 1780, whilst his name figures as a junior Ensign in the 26th Foot (present 1st Battalion, Scottish Rifles) on April 28th, 1780. On February 24th, 1781, he was gazetted Lieutenant in the 98th Foot, and next month he was transferred back to his old corps, the 26th, and appears in the Army List as the junior Lieutenant, dated March 7th, 1781. He was promoted Captain in the 92nd Foot on December 11th, 1782, and was made Captain and Captain-Lieutenant in the 45th Foot on March 19th, 1783, in which rank he appears in the Army Lists of 1784 and 1785.

In the *Gazette* of December 24th, 1785, he was again transferred as a Captain to the 101st Foot and, upon that regiment being reduced in 1787, was put on half-pay. On October 6th, 1787, he was gazetted "from the half-pay of the late 101st" to a company in the 33rd Regiment, and a few weeks later on—November 1st—he was transferred to the 75th Foot. In the Army List of 1788 he is shown as the senior Captain of the 75th Foot (now the 1st Battalion, Gordon Highlanders). Here we must leave him for the present and describe, as far as is possible, what he was doing during those seven years of kaleidoscopic change.

His own history would seem to be as follows: He served with the 26th, off and on, from the summer of 1780 till the end of 1782, about two and a half years, and, soon after being promoted to Captain, he went on half-pay. He was now nearly nineteen years of age, when many young fellows of the present day are joining Sandhurst. During the summer of 1783 he went abroad to study military art. The "Royal Military Chronicle" gives full details how, "for over three entire years," he was in Germany, wintering at Magdeburg, at Dresden, and at Strasburg, where he learnt languages, engineering, and artillery, became a complete military draughtsman, and studied strategy and military history. He returned to England in 1787. It can be easily imagined that an officer with so thorough a military education was very rare in the British Army in those days, and it is highly probable that the knowledge he possessed did not make him very tolerant of the mass of uneducated officers around him, and in later years may have accounted for his bitterness at seeing them steadily promoted over him, an early example of "the conspiracy of mediocrity" under which so many of the best men in our Army have suffered for so many years past.

And now, for the first time, he got an opening and was not slow at making the most of it. The 75th Foot was being raised in 1787, when he at the age of twenty-three and a half years found himself "eldest Captain" (as the senior was then called) of it. Both field officers were at the time employed on the Staff, and in consequence

he got command of the regiment from the day it was raised. Very shortly it was sent out to India, and it was here that "he formed it very soon in so perfect a manner as to draw upon himself the highest commendation. He then commanded the 71st<sup>1</sup> in the field under Lord Cornwallis with great distinction during two campaigns."

Now comes the time when Craufurd, according to some of his chroniclers, "went on half-pay." This has been the starting point for much misconception. The following proves that when he left the 75th in India he *retired altogether* from the Service: *London Gazette*, August 9th, 1794. "75th Regiment of Foot. Lieutenant Adam Davies to be Captain of a company by purchase, vice Craufurd, who retires."<sup>2</sup>

The date of Craufurd's departure from India is unknown, as well as the exact cause of his retirement. In the letter quoted by Fortescue he says: "I left the Service to pursue what seemed a promising employment in India." He must have been quickly disillusioned about the employment, for, although he only left the 75th on October 16th, 1793, he returned to England the following year. Meanwhile his elder brother, Lieut.-Colonel Charles Craufurd, of the 2nd Dragoon Guards, had been sent as a special military commissioner with the Archduke Charles of Austria during the campaigns in Italy and Austria. When Robert Craufurd joined his brother is uncertain, but it is clear that it was before August 29th, 1795, since he wrote on that day from the Austrian Headquarters to Sir Morton Eden at Vienna. "The Military Chronicle" records that "during the campaigns of 1795, 1796, and 1797, he had an opportunity of seeing incessantly active service on the greatest scale and in the most advantageous manner."

In the *London Gazette* of August 6th, and again in that of August 14th, 1796, are "Despatches received by the Rt. Hon. Lord Grenville, H.M. Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs," describing the Austrian operations, signed "C. Craufurd." The next despatch is from Lauffen, dated August 27th, 1796, and is signed "Robert Craufurd"; in it he reports that "Lieut.-Colonel Craufurd (my brother) was unfortunately wounded and taken on August 25th," and adds that "in case of absence Captain Anstruther of the Guards will do my work." It is noteworthy that in this *London Gazette* he is described as "Robert Craufurd, Esquire," and is not given his military title. On September 4th a despatch was received from Captain Robert Anstruther, whilst the two following despatches, dated October 25th and 27th respectively, are shown in the *Gazette* as from "Robert Craufurd, Esquire." On November 23rd, 27th, and 28th Craufurd writes from "H.Q. of H.R.H. the Archduke at Offenburg." After this his name no longer appears, the despatches from April, 1797, onward being from "Colonel Graham."

<sup>1</sup> In the "Royal Military Chronicle," Vol. III., from which these are extracts, this is shown as "71st," an obvious misprint for 75th. The 71st was apparently commanded by David Baird.

<sup>2</sup> For this, and also for the verification of many of the dates here given, I am indebted to Mr. A. Lucius Cary, the Parliamentary Librarian at the War Office.

The "Military Chronicle" tells us that "after his brother was wounded he remained at the head of the mission, the duties of which he discharged with very distinguished ability, and his despatches to Government were perfect models of composition."

And now comes another puzzling interval in Craufurd's life. We have seen how he had retired from the Service as a Captain in 1793, and how during the years 1795 and 1796 he had been styled "Robert Craufurd, Esquire." In January, 1798, he suddenly appears in the *London Gazette* as a Lieut.-Colonel in Hompesch's Regiment, from which he is gazetted to be a Lieut.-Colonel in the 60th Foot. At this time there were several regiments of foreigners in the service of the British Crown; some were French Royalists and others were of German nationality. Amongst the latter was a corps raised by Baron Ferdinand de Hompesch in 1795-96, consisting of both cavalry and infantry, or, rather, of mounted riflemen and of riflemen on foot.

"Robert Craufurd, Esquire," apparently was appointed to this corps and was given the rank of Lieut.-Colonel. It is, of course, only a surmise, but I would suggest that, being aware that this regiment was about to be taken on the British establishment, he got taken on its strength in order by this means to recover his commission in the British Army. Anyway he did get reinstated in the Army.

One of his grandsons, Mr. H. R. Craufurd, of Tring, has a miniature of Craufurd in the uniform of Hompesch's Regiment—a green coat with red facings and white buttons. This, in the opinion both of Mr. Craufurd and of his cousin, the late Rev. A. Craufurd, was painted "about 1795." For a long time it was imagined that it represented Craufurd when he was shown in the Army Lists as being in the 60th (1798—1802). But that was before his connection with Hompesch was known.

By a curious chance, an officer who served both in Hompesch's and in the 60th happened also to be an artist, and has left us records of the uniforms of both corps. This was Colonel Charles Hamilton Smith, the author of the well-known "Costumes of the Army of the British Empire," published in 1815, and whose excellent original water-colour sketches can be seen at the South Kensington Museum. Hamilton Smith joined the 8th Light Dragoons as a volunteer in 1794, and was subsequently appointed to a cornetcy in Hompesch's Hussars. In December, 1797, he was transferred to the 4th Battalion of the 60th, and joined it in the West Indies in 1798.<sup>1</sup>

Among his drawings of various uniforms are those of *Hompesch-husar*, Hompesch Mounted Rifleman, Hompesch's Riflemen, and the 5th Battalion, 60th.

These sketches show the similarity of the uniforms of the 5th Battalion, 60th, and that of Hompesch's Corps. But I have been lucky enough to obtain further proof of this. For in a German magazine, styled "*Uniformenkunde*," pictures of Hompesch's Regiment are given. These are based on a packet of hand-coloured drawings

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<sup>1</sup> Memoir of Lieut.-Colonel C. Hamilton Smith, K.H., F.R.S., F.L.S. (South Kensington Museum.)

in the library of the Great General Staff in Berlin. On this packet is written : " *Dessins d'uniformes des régiments d'Emigrés français au service de l'Angleterre en l'année, 1795, par J. Henry Brecht.*" Among these coloured figures is one of *Hompesch-husar* and one of *Hompesch-jäger*. Lastly, in the " Annals of the 60th," published in 1913, a plate of an officer of the 60th, in the year 1816, in full dress is given with a big red plastron, like a lancer's, which much resembles Henry Brecht's picture of *Hompesch-husar* in 1795, over twenty years earlier. It will thus be seen that the mistake in imagining that the miniature of Craufurd when in Hompesch's Regiment represented him in the uniform of the 5th Battalion, 60th, was a very natural one. It is at any rate fortunate that the error has been discovered.

And now comes a fresh puzzle in Craufurd's career, which has been rendered doubly puzzling by the fact that for many years erroneous accounts of his employment had been accepted, alike by his biographers, and by those interested in his career, to the effect that he had "joined the 60th" in 1797, and had served in it until he went into Parliament in 1802. That he was gazetted as a Lieut.-Colonel in the 60th, and belonged to it for nearly four years, is proved by the Army Lists of 1799 to 1802. This was apparently conclusive, for although it was well known that he had served on the Staff in 1798 in Ireland, and was at the Helder in 1799, it was reasonably supposed that until he entered Parliament in 1802 he had served more or less with his own regiment. In fact, he never joined it, as I shall now proceed to prove. In 1912 a " Brief History of the King's Royal Rifles" appeared, in which it was stated that Robert Craufurd (*sic*) was the 2nd Lieut.-Colonel of the 5th Battalion of the 60th, upon it being raised towards the end of the eighteenth century. I saw at a glance that there was some mistake here, and so wrote to the present historian of that regiment. In reply I received a letter from another old friend in the 60th, Lieut.-General Sir Edward Hutton, challenging me to show that he (Craufurd) did not join the 5th Battalion, 60th, when newly raised, to which, he said, he was appointed to help doubtless de Rottenburg in introducing Light Infantry duties and system of training into the British Army. In my original letter I had called attention to several other mistakes in the same paragraph, some of which affected the story of Craufurd's career or ran counter to all the information I had collected about this period of his life. In the account I thus criticized it was said that the 5th Battalion was raised in 1797 in the Isle of Wight "upon the German model," and consisted of "400 of Hompesch's Mounted Riflemen, a German corps," and that "The 2nd Lieut.-Colonel was the celebrated Robert Craufurd" (*sic*). The actual facts of the case, as can be abundantly proved by existing documents at the Public Record Office (which I quote here) are that the 5th Battalion was *not* raised in 1797, but in 1798, and was *not* formed in the Isle of Wight, but in the West Indies; that the detachment from the Isle of Wight which joined the battalion later on did *not* consist of "400 of Hompesch's Mounted Riflemen," but of 300 of Hompesch's Regiment, mostly Light Infantry and last, but not least, that the celebrated Robert Craufurd was *not* the 2nd Lieut.-

Colonel on its first formation or at any other time. Even later on, when de Rottenburg got command as Lieut.-Colonel the 2nd Lieut.-Colonel was *not* Craufurd, but one Henry Couper, of another mysterious corps, styled "The Royal Foreigners."

There the matter rested, for I naturally concluded that in due course, when the time came for a fresh edition, the errors, especially those about Craufurd, would be eliminated. Here I was wrong, for in a second edition of "The Brief History of the King's Royal Rifle Corps" which has recently appeared every one of these mistakes has been repeated, with the sole exception that the first statement that the battalion was formed "upon the German model as a special corps of Riflemen" has been altered to "upon the Austrian model as a special corps of Jägers (*sic*) or riflemen." Whether this modification is due to our recent war experience I am unable to say.

I must now ask my readers to submit to a seeming digression, but one which is essential to prove my points. The 5th Battalion of the 60th (or Royal American) Regiment was raised under a Special Act of Parliament<sup>1</sup> to enable the Crown "to enlist or serve in the said 5th Battalion in America any of the Foreign troops now in His Majesty's pay or other Foreigners. . . ."

It must be remembered that in those days Parliament was extremely jealous of the employment by the Crown of foreign troops in Great Britain. At this time a considerable number of foreign corps in the British pay were serving in the West Indies, the "Foreign Dépôt," where their recruits were collected and whence they were shipped abroad, being in the Isle of Wight. Among the regiments in the West Indies were two raised by Prince Löwenstein, serving in Barbadoes. There was also in the Isle of Wight Baron Ferdinand de Hompesch's regiment. It was mainly from these corps—Lowenstein's and Hompesch's—that the 5th Battalion was formed early in 1798.

On January 9th, 1798, H.R.H. Frederick, Duke of York, then Commander-in-Chief, wrote to the Secretary of State for War, the Right Hon. W. Windham, a letter which is too long to quote here, but may be viewed as the birth-certificate of the 5th Battalion, 60th.<sup>2</sup> Briefly, the battalion was to be "composed of Germans (both Officers and Men), to be incorporated from the several Foreign Regiments now in the Pay of Great Britain. The Officers' Commissions to bear Date from the Establishment of the Battalion" (December 30th, 1797). The letter goes on to say that when these Foreign Corps are disbanded there would be "more officers to be provided for than the Establishment of the 5th Battalion, together with any vacancies in the other four battalions would admit of; in which case (as I consider it highly expedient that all the German Officers should be retained) the overplus Number will be provided for as Supernumeraries until vacancies occur in the Regiment." The same letter contains instructions for Colonel Baron F. Hompesch to form a Regiment of Mounted

<sup>1</sup> 38 Geo. III., c. 13, Augmentation of the 60th Foot, December 30th, 1797.

<sup>2</sup> Public Record Office. W.O. 40/ 1798 B. (bundle of "Un-numbered papers"). I am indebted to Colonel Gerald Boyle for first calling my attention to this packet.

Riflemen which was to be taken on the Establishment on December 25th, 1797, and to consist of four troops, each of 103 Private Men.

We will now see how the formation was carried out. Nearly two weeks before the Duke wrote to Windham, instructions had been received by Brigadier-General Cameron at Martinique<sup>1</sup> to go to Barbadoes to superintend the formation of the 5th Battalion of the 60th.

"The two Corps of Löwenstein's Chasseurs and Fusillers (*sic*) are to form a 5th Battalion of the 60th. . . . on the same footing in every respect as the other four, and for the present are to retain the *Arms* the soldiers that are incorporated in it are furnished with. The Colonel of the 5th Battalion is to be a British Officer."

On January 22nd, 1798, a General Order was issued that "In pursuance of H.M.'s Commands the following Appointments are to take place :—

"5th Battalion, 60th Regiment.

"Colonel-in-Chief, H.R.H. F.M. The Duke of York, Colonel Commandant.

"Lieutenant-Colonel :—Frederick de Schlammersdorff."

Then follows a roll of three Majors, ten Captains, and 24 other officers; all to date December 25th, 1797.

On January 19th it was announced in General Orders at Barbadoes that "the Commander-in-Chief will review the 5th Battalion of the 60th Regiment on Monday next at 8 o'clock." After this inspection the following General Order was published :—

"The Commander-in-Chief desires to express his entire satisfaction which he has received from the appearance of the 5th Battalion of the 60th Regiment and will make a favourable report thereof to the King. H.E. requests Lieutenant-Colonel Schlammersdorff to accept his best thanks and to communicate the same to the Officers and Men under his command."

It is hardly necessary to add that these letters and General Orders are conclusive evidence that the battalion *was* first formed in the year and in the place I asserted, and that its first Lieutenant-Colonel was *not* de Rottenburg but de Schlammersdorff.

The Pay List and Muster Roll of the 5th Battalion at this time is a most interesting document, and contains the names of 62 officers, 72 sergeants, 93 corporals, 22 Drummers, and 752 rank and file. It is signed by Major C. W. Crezielsky, Commanding Officer (de Schlammersdorff was apparently sick). Naturally Robert Craufurd's name does not figure in this roll.

So much for the formation of the Headquarter Companies of the 5th Battalion in the far distant isle of Barbadoes. We must now see what was happening with Hompesch's Regiment, quartered at Cowes, Isle of Wight.

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<sup>1</sup> Martinico (*sic*), December 28th, 1797.

It was on almost the same day of the events described as having taken place in Barbadoes that the *London Gazette* of January 23rd, 1798, contained the following announcement :—

*"60th Regiment of Foot.*

To be Lieutenant-Colonels.

Lieut.-Colonel Frederick de Schlammersdorff,  
*from Löwenstein's Chasseurs.*

Lieutenant-Colonel George William Ramsay,  
*from the York Rangers.*

Lieutenant-Colonel Francis, Baron de Rottenburg,  
*from Hompesch's Regiment.*

Lieut.-Colonel Robert Craufurd,  
*from Hompesch's Regiment.*

Lieut.-Colonel Henry Couper,  
*from The Royal Foreigners."*

It is small wonder that it was found impossible to place all these Lieut.-Colonels on the strength of the 5th Battalion or any other battalion of the 60th. After these names follows that of Major George de Verna and six other officers from Hompesch's Light Infantry and over twenty others from Löwenstein's "Chasseurs" and "Fuzileers," Waldstein's Regiment, etc., etc. Of the foregoing list of five Lieut.-Colonels, the senior, de Schlammersdorff, as we have seen, got command of the 5th Battalion; the second, George William Ramsay, was posted to the 3rd Battalion, 60th, and signs for his pay in July, 1798.<sup>1</sup> The third, de Rottenburg, signs the Muster Roll of the three companies of the 5th Battalion in March, 1798, as "Commandant" of the detachment at Cowes; whilst the fifth, Henry Couper, signs the same roll as "2nd Lieut.-Colonel."<sup>2</sup> Robert Craufurd alone, the fourth on the list, does not figure in the Muster Rolls, the only one of the five gazetted who was not "posted" to a battalion. Thus it is *certain* that he was *not* "2nd Lieut.-Colonel" of the 5th Battalion, either in the West Indies, under de Schlammersdorff; or with the detachment in the Isle of Wight, under de Rottenburg, on its first formation. If further proof were wanted, reference to the Army List of 1799 shows eleven Lieut.-Colonels in the 60th, of which ten can be traced in the Muster Rolls as borne on the strength of the existing five battalions, leaving Craufurd as a supernumerary. Again, in the Army List for 1800, when the newly-raised 6th Battalion of the 60th first appears, thirteen Lieut.-Colonels are given, allowing two to each battalion, Craufurd once again being a supernumerary. Lastly we have the evidence of the "Book of Regimental Successions," Volume 8, from January 1st, 1797, to January 1st, 1799<sup>3</sup> where the foregoing roll of Lieut.-Colonels will be found, under "60th Foot, dated December 30th, 1797," as follows :—

<sup>1</sup> Pay Lists and Muster Rolls, 3rd Battalion, 60th Regiment of Foot, 1798.

<sup>2</sup> Pay List and Muster Roll, 5th Battalion, 60th Regiment, 1798.

<sup>3</sup> W.O. 25/216 (P.R.O.).

" Lt.-Colonel Frederick de Schlammersdorff (of Löwenstein's Chasseurs).

..	Geo. Wm. Ramsay (of York Rangers).
..	Frs. Baron de Rottenburg (of Hompesch's) Lt.-Col.
..	Robert Craufurd (of Hompesch) Lt.-Col.
..	Henry Couper (of Royal Foreigners) Lt.-Col.
..	Geo. Lewis de Verna (of Hompesch) Major.

When Hompesch's Regiment, in the Isle of Wight, was broken up, about 300 men were formed into a detachment of three companies under de Rottenburg as Lieut.-Colonel, with Couper as 2nd Lieut.-Colonel, and de Verna as "Major without a Company."<sup>1</sup>

This detachment, some weeks after it was formed, embarked, it is said, for the West Indies, but was landed at Cork in April, 1798, and took part in the suppression of the Irish Rebellion. In January, 1799, it returned to Cork and re-embarked for Martinique. The Monthly Return for February 1st, 1799, shows four companies (equalized) with a total strength of 315. It is most significant that this Monthly Return of February 1st, 1799, over a year after the formation of the battalion, is headed: "Return of a Detachement (*sic*) of His Majesty's 5th Battalion, 60th Foot, comanded (*sic*) by Lt.-Colonel de Rottenburg." During the time de Rottenburg's detachment was assisting in crushing the rebellion, Lieut.-Colonel de Schlammersdorff, the senior Lieut.-Colonel of the 5th Battalion, had, on September 28th, 1798, conveniently died. Hence when de Rottenburg at last reached Martinique, and later, Surinam, in the West Indies, with his "Detachement," he found himself Lieut.-Colonel in Command. Also in the interval "2nd Lieut.-Colonel" Henry Couper had obtained Staff employ, and Major de Verna had been promoted "2nd Lieut.-Colonel" in his place.

According to the Muster Rolls, "a fresh formation took place," and the 5th Battalion, for the first time, was mustered complete. De Rottenburg had during the previous year translated from the German a small book on the "Training of Riflemen and Light Infantry." In this book he is officially described as "A German officer of distinction," although in recent accounts he is described as "an Austrian." It was upon this book that de Rottenburg trained the 5th Battalion at Surinam. Whether the climate was unsuited for intensive training I cannot say, but with unconscious humour it is recorded that during their four years' stay in the island "so miserable were the men that they were seized with a regular attack of nostalgia and suicides became frequent. . . ."<sup>2</sup>

As is well known, the Pay Lists and Muster Rolls bear the signatures of all officers present, and from first to last, during the years 1798 to 1802, there is no entry of Robert Craufurd's name, proof conclusive that he *never was posted, much less joined*, the 5th

<sup>1</sup> Pay Lists and Muster Rolls, 5th Battalion, 60th Foot, dated March 24th, 1798. W.O. 12/7066.

<sup>2</sup> "Celer et Audax," p. 9. Pay List and Muster Roll, June, 1799.

Battalion of the 60th. In order to clear the matter up I subsequently went through the Pay Lists and Monthly Returns of the whole of the other five battalions of the 60th, and established the fact that Craufurd had *never* joined the 60th *at all!* In fact he was one of the officers who, as the original letter of Service stated, would be "provided as supernumerary." How soon he was provided for, and in what manner, opens out another chapter in our story.

All who have studied Craufurd's temperament, as shown by his conduct on many occasions and from his letters to Wellington and to others, can readily perceive that in getting a commission in the 60th he was simply manoeuvring with a view to regain his position in the Army, and thus be eligible for employment suited to his military knowledge and wide experience. He was now thirty-four years of age, and, as we have seen, had commanded a battalion with ability on service, and was thoroughly versed in every branch of military art. It is very clear that he was a man of great character and determination and thoroughly aware of his own capabilities, and was not likely to hide his light from the world. In those days, in fact ever since the revolt of the American colonies, the 60th had been condemned to almost unlimited service in the West Indies, where the health conditions were simply appalling. Craufurd obviously had no intention of doing garrison duty in the West Indies, and so lost no time in pressing his claims for Staff employment. The serious condition of affairs in Ireland gave him the needed opportunity and circumstances were all in his favour. For his old chief in India, Lord Cornwallis, almost at once got him appointed Deputy-Quarter-Master-General to the Forces in Ireland. On February 16th, 1798, he took up his new duties, just *three weeks* after his name had appeared in the *Gazette* as a Lieutenant-Colonel in the 60th, and *two months before* the detachment of the 5th Battalion arrived in Ireland from the Isle of Wight. It may be remarked that the first Muster Roll of the detachment dates from February 25th, *nine days after* Craufurd's appointment.<sup>1</sup>

On April 25th General Lake was appointed Commander-in-Chief in Ireland. A month later, on May 24th, the Rebellion broke out, and our motley forces, Regulars, Fencibles, Militia, Yeomanry, Volunteers, and some foreign troops, took the field. On June 21st the rebels were defeated at Vinegar Hill, and the bands of fugitives were pursued and broken up in all directions. In all accounts of these operations Craufurd's name repeatedly occurs as in command of a flying column, usually composed of mounted troops only. Later, when the French under General Humbert landed in County Mayo, we read how "Lt.-Colonel Craufurd (Deputy-Quarter-Master-General) was sent forward to Castlebar with a strong patrol of Lord Roden's Fencibles and Hompesch's Dragoons, but not having any Infantry with him, he did not push any further that day." There is much more about "the Corps under Craufurd's orders" near Ballinrobe and Castlebar, and how "Lt.-Colonel Craufurd, who had never lost sight of the Enemy,

<sup>1</sup> W.O. 12/7066. 1798-99. (P.R.O.).

came up close to their rear-guard on the 7 September." Humbert was surrounded and surrendered on the following day. Lord Cornwallis, in his despatches to the Duke of Portland of September 9th, 1798, writes that "Lieut.-General Lord Lake particularly mentions Lieut.-Colonel Craufurd, of whose zeal, spirit, and abilities too much indeed cannot be said, and whose exertions were admirably seconded by a Detachment of Hompesch's Dragoons."

After the Rebellion was crushed Craufurd reverted to his duties as D.Q.M.G., and a few months later, in 1799, he was selected to go once again on a military mission to the Austrian Headquarters during Suvaroff's campaign in Switzerland. How long he was there is uncertain, but it could not have been many months, for upon the British Expedition to the Helder being decided upon, Craufurd was recalled from Switzerland and appointed to the Duke of York's Staff in Holland. In this ill-fated expedition the first troops landed in August, 1799, and the last were withdrawn in November.

After the Helder Expedition Craufurd returned to his duties as D.Q.M.G. in Ireland. On January 11th, 1801, his brother Charles writes to him in Dublin asking him if he does not think it would be worth his while to persevere in his intention to raise a foreign regiment for East Indian service.<sup>1</sup> From this it is clear that at the time he had some idea of returning to the East Indies. Some eight months later the following appeared in the *Gazette* :—

"STAFF.

*War Office, September 26th, 1801.*

"Lieut.-Colonel Robert Craufurd of the 60th Foot (Deputy Quarter-Master-General in Ireland) to be Adjutant-General to His Majesty's Troops stationed in the East Indies."

At this time Craufurd had been borne on the roll of the 60th for close upon four years, and, as we have seen, he had never done a day's duty with them. Apparently this fresh Staff appointment was the limit of their endurance, for on February 11th, 1802, he was transferred as a Lieut.-Colonel from the 60th to the 86th Regiment, and as such he appears in the Army List of 1803.

Nothing is known about his appointment of A.A.G. beyond that he never went to India, for in the *Gazette* of July 10th, 1802, we find : "Lieut.-Colonel Henry Clinton of the 1st Foot Guards to be Adjutant-General to the King's Troops serving in the East Indies, *vice* Craufurd, who resigns."

We must now trace the reasons for this change. Craufurd's elder brother, Sir Charles, had married in 1800 the widow of Thomas, third Duke of Newcastle. (Robert himself was married on the same day.) Owing to the young Duke being a minor, Sir Charles, as his guardian, acquired considerable political influence, and, ever ready to help his brother, arranged for him to have a seat in the House of Commons. Accordingly, on July 5th, 1802, Robert Craufurd was elected M.P.

<sup>1</sup> "General Craufurd and his Light Division," p. 10.

for East Retford. He sat for that borough for over four years, and throughout that time was a regular attendant at the House and frequently spoke on military matters.

At this time Parliament was so full of gentlemen with commissions in the Militia, Fencibles, and Volunteers, many of whom rejoiced in the title of "Colonel," that Robert Craufurd, as the one genuine Colonel among them, was known as "*The Colonel*." Craufurd had in Windham a staunch and powerful friend. It was owing to this friendship that Craufurd wrote the letter in which he definitely states that at one time he had left the Army. I am indebted to Mr. John Fortescue for this information about Craufurd's Parliamentary career, and also for most kindly sending me copies of Craufurd's correspondence with Windham. The letter<sup>1</sup> in question ran as follows:—

"... I hope you will be a member of the new Cabinet and help to get me employment. My rank in the Army is much lower than it should be, because *I once left the Service to pursue what seemed a promising employment in India*. Thus younger men went over my head, and in spite of all the Duke of York's good will I have no chance of being employed in work of distinction, or of avoiding the mortification of serving under men who should be much my junior. Till I went into Parliament all at the Horse Guards did their best to prevent my feeling this lowness of rank. When I censured the military measures of the late (Addington's) administration, I knew that I risked giving offence to the Duke of York and spoiling my professional career, but I could not let such considerations carry weight with me; and my present unemployment, together with information from the best quarters, show me that what I expected has happened. I must therefore abandon hope of military employment, except in case of invasion, and I ask you to secure me work in some other department. If you become Sec. for War my military training may be of service."

Later on Windham did become Secretary of State for War, and on October 30th, 1805, he got Craufurd promoted to the rank of Colonel. He was now forty-one years of age, and a disappointed man and very sore at the lack of recognition he had received for his undoubtedly good services and great abilities. Early in 1806 Windham offered him the post of Under-Secretary of State for War—but apparently the work was not to Craufurd's liking. Later in the same year the news reached England of Beresford touching at St. Helena on his way to La Plata. Craufurd wrote to Windham and asked to be given the command of the forces in South America with the local rank of Major-General. He pointed out that he had been "26 years in the Army, deducting *three years' absence when I left it*." The outcome of this was that Windham obtained for him the command of the expedition to the River Plate, but in this post he was superseded by Lieut.-General Whitelocke, and so reverted to the command of the Light Brigade only.

The story of the disastrous attack on Buenos Ayres need not be repeated here. The year following Craufurd's return from South

<sup>1</sup> Craufurd to Windham, May 4th, 1804.

America he served under Sir John Moore as Brigadier-General Commanding the Light Brigade in the Corunna campaign. In 1809 he went out to Portugal in command of the Light Brigade, joining Wellington after Talavera. In 1810 the Light Brigade became the Light Division, and in 1811 Craufurd at last became a Major-General. A few months later he fell at the head of the Light Division at the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo in January, 1812.

A few concluding words on the correct spelling of Craufurd's name. At the time that I first pointed out the mistake as to his having trained the 5th Battalion, 60th, I also called Sir Edward Hutton's attention to the fact that he had incorrectly spelt the famous soldier's name as "Crauford." My old friend replied that he had advisedly adopted the official method of spelling found in the Wellington Despatches, since it was obviously necessary for his purpose to connect "our Crauford" with the distinguished Craufurd of Wellington's Despatches of Light Division fame.

The matter is unimportant, but has given rise to some discussion, and it has even been stated by some that "Craufurd" is a modern rendering of the name.

It is perfectly true that in many of the books dealing with the Peninsular War it appears as "Crawford," the natural rendering of it to the uneducated mind. Many of the officers of the Light Division spelt it thus in their diaries and letters to their friends in England. Small wonder then that a careless public adopted the style.

But against this I can cite the following, which I think is conclusive proof that the correct spelling is, and always has been, "Craufurd."

1. All Robert Craufurd's letters, papers, etc., bearing his signature. Also all those of his brother, Sir Charles Craufurd.
2. The testimony of his grandsons that the family have *always* spelt it "Craufurd."
3. In the *London Gazettes* dealing with his many appointments and promotions (1780-1812); also in those in which his Despatches from Austria appear (1795-97).
4. In the Annual Army Lists, 1781-1812.
5. In the Duke of Wellington's *written* Despatches. The Duke's writing was not clear, and sometimes the first "u" might be a "w," but *never*, so far as I have seen, does he write the second "u" as an "o."
6. In Wellington's Despatches, Edition 1838.
7. In Napier's "Peninsular War," Edition 1857. Napier in his first edition (1834) mis-spelt it thus: "Crawfurd," but *never* "Crauford."
8. Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, 1860.

I can only say, in conclusion, that if "Craufurd" did train the 5th Battalion of the 60th, he must have been entirely a different person to "Craufurd" of Light Division fame, who did *not* train it!

## SALUTES AND SALUTING, NAVAL AND MILITARY.

By COLONEL C. FIELD.

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NOWADAYS one sees more soldiers in an inland town in the course of half an hour than were to be seen in three months in pre-war days. The khaki-clad warriors are continually passing and re-passing, and our latest formations have been quick to put on the martial air with their new uniforms and salute their officers with the smartness of veterans. If we are to believe some people, this salute is paid not to the officer but to the King's commission which he has the honour to bear. Personally I do not think this contention will bear close inspection, but that it was put forward at a time when "Militarism" was unpopular, as it were, to *excuse*—save the mark!—such an undemocratic procedure as the paying deference by one man to another. But our British democrats have always had weird and extraordinary ideas of what democracy means. There is no more truly democratic country than France, and just listen what a French writer has to say with regard to the soldier's salute to his superior—not necessarily a commissioned officer. "The salute and other military compliments," he says, "have their *raison d'être*. They encourage a proper pride in the uniform, they effectually combine discipline with the respect due to superiors, while at the same time elevating the soldier in his own eyes, by reminding him of all that is implied by the profession of arms and its traditions of chivalry and courtesy."

I do not think that the reason for the salute has ever been put in better words. As to its being paid to the "King's commission," it may be noted that in the Navy warrant officers and midshipmen are entitled to the salute, neither of whom are commissioned officers.

The latest explanation of the signification of the military salute has been given by General Pershing, in command of the United States troops in Europe, in a cablegram sent to the War Bureau at Washington. In this he insists that "salutes should be rendered by both officers and men in most military manner, with especial emphasis on rigid position of soldiers in saluting and when at attention. A prompt military salute," he continues, "is often misunderstood by our people, but it simply emphasizes an aggressive attitude of mind and of body that marks the true soldier. The loyalty, readiness, and alertness indicated by strict adherence to this principle will immensely increase the pride and fighting spirit of our soldiers." These are words of wisdom which may well be taken to heart by every soldier.

The salute made by raising the hand to the head is traditionally supposed to have had its origin in the custom of the tournament.

The victors, on appearing before the Queen of Beauty, who presided over the jousts, to receive their prizes, were accustomed to shade their eyes with their hands, the idea being that otherwise they might be blinded by her dazzling loveliness. It was a courteous and chivalrous custom; but if our modern salute is derived from it, it is by a very devious and roundabout way. We may note in passing that the very modern naval salute, which has superseded the "touch of the forelock" with which we are familiar in the pages of Marryat, is much more like the knightly salute to the Queen of Beauty than the military one which we so often see, and which, sad to say, probably came over with close-fitting military uniforms from Prussia, the land of Kultur, towards the end of the 18th century. In those days we thought a deal of the Prussians and their wicked old atheist of a king, who, in this country, was long commemorated on many a public-house signboard as "The Protestant Hero!"

In Christendom, since its foundation, the uncovering of the head has been a universal form of salutation or obeisance, and throughout the 16th, 17th, and most of the 18th centuries it was used as a salute—especially in this country—in the Army as well as in civil life. Indeed more so, if we may accept the evidence of the French Huguenot refugee, Maximilian Musson, who visited England in 1698. "Englishmen, when they meet," he says, "no more dream of pulling off their hats than women would think of pulling off their head-gear; they salute one another by giving one another their hands and shaking them heartily." But, as regards the Army, he says: "I saw the King of England reviewing above 12,000 men, surrounded by a large attendance, *all with hat in hand*," whereas the officers in attendance on Louis XIV., at French reviews, were allowed to keep their hats on. But they were removed as a salute, for we have it from the famous John Locke, who witnessed a review of the Gardes du Corps in Paris in 1678, that "The King passed at the head of the line as they stood drawn up; the officers at the head of their companies and regiments in armour, with pikes in their hands, saluting him with their pikes, *then with their hats*. He very courteously put off his hat to them again; so he did, when, taking his stand, they marched before him." It is said that the Coldstream Guards were the first to initiate the modern salute, in 1745, in which year appeared a Regimental Order that runs: "The men ordered not to pull off their hats when they pass an officer, or speak to them, *but only to clap up their hands to their hats*, and bow as they pass by."

It may be noted that the famous Corps of Janissaries, at the zenith of Turkey's military power, saluted by folding their hands across the breast and bowing to their superior officers.

The Order in the Coldstreams may, however, have been merely intended to establish a regimental custom, for a similar Order does not appear to have been issued to the Marines—though in 1745 they formed a part of the Army—till 1779, when the following directions were given: "The non-commissioned officers and private men are never on any occasion in paying the proper respect to their officers, or any other, to take off their hats or caps. They are, when without

arms, to put their right hand (in a graceful manner) on the right side of their hats, with the palm outwards."<sup>1</sup>

The officers, however, would still seem to have removed their hats in saluting, at any rate during a ceremonial, for in "Smith's Military Dictionary," published the same year, we are told that when a regiment is reviewed by a General, "the drums beat a march as he passes along the line, and the officers salute, one after the other, bowing their half-pikes or swords to the ground; then recover and take off their hats."

By 1790 this custom had disappeared, officers saluting as before with their arms—half-pikes, or fusils, in the Fusiliers, Marines, and Grenadier and Light Infantry companies—but with the hand as well, in place of removing the head-dress. In the Navy, however, the custom of taking off the hat or cap still remains. For instance, when the Captain goes round the ship's company when fallen in at divisions on Sunday, the bluejacket and stoker divisions are ordered to "Off caps," when he approaches, while the Marines are called to "Attention," and keep theirs on. While referring to the Navy the custom of "saluting the quarter-deck" must not be overlooked. The origin of this punctiliously observed salute has been stated to be derived from the days when each ship carried a shrine or crucifix on her quarter-deck. We know that the ships of the Spanish Armada carried crucifixes, and that a large cross was placed at the stern of Spanish ships as late as the Battle of Trafalgar. But is there any evidence that crucifixes or shrines were to be found in English ships? Figures of saints are mentioned in connection with 15th century vessels—before the days of quarter-decks—but no one has discovered just where they were placed, and, as far as I can ascertain, no mention is anywhere made of a crucifix. If they ever were erected in our Navy, the latest date must have been in the days of Philip and Mary, for we may be very certain that immediately the Protestants got the upper hand on the accession of "Good Queen Bess," they were removed, and the salute with them, as redolent of "Popery." People were not contented with half measures in those days. My own opinion is that the salute was originally paid to the flag bearing the arms of the royal, noble, or knightly owner or hirer of a ship employed for war or transport, which, in mediæval times, was invariably placed at the starboard foremost corner of the fighting platform built at the stern. This is borne out to some extent by the United States Naval Regulations, which lay down that the salute in question is really paid to the national ensign. Our own Naval Regulations do not refer to the "quarter-deck salute" at all.

Flags, it must be remembered, are not only used for saluting, as when the Colours of a regiment are lowered before royalty, or when

<sup>1</sup> A very curious Order as to saluting is to be found in the Order Book of the Plymouth Division of the Royal Marines, dated September 1st, 1796. Blue or grey pantaloons were beginning to be worn at this period, probably much in the same way as "slacks" at the present time. But it would seem that they did not always commend themselves to Commanding Officers, for the Order referred to lays down that: "Centinels . . . are forbid to carry their arms or the soldiers to touch their hats to any Marine officer they meet in so mean and unmilitary a dress."

a ship's ensign is "dipped" in salutation, but are entitled to be saluted themselves.

Thus the Colours are always saluted when brought out to their battalion or when being taken back to their usual resting place in the officers' mess, and must be saluted by all officers and soldiers when passing. Afloat, the ensign is saluted with considerable ceremony when hoisted in the morning, and royal, national, and flag-officers' flags have a regular scale of the number of guns which are to be fired in their honour.

The salute with arms, which has been already referred to, is probably of much greater antiquity than that made with the hand, which, in all probability, is merely "going through the motion" of raising the hat.

A French writer states that in the Middle Ages it was considered the height of courtesy to hand a missive to a superior on the point of sword or pike. However this may have been, it does not seem to have anything in common with the time-honoured method of saluting by lowering the point of one's weapon, with the obvious significance of submission and of exhibiting confidence by holding it so that it does not in any way cover or guard the body.

The officers' salute with the sword has an additional signification. Before being lowered to the actual salute the weapon is "recovered," that is to say, it is raised with the point upward till the hilt is in line with the mouth, a motion derived from the crusader's action in kissing the cross-handle of his sword in token of faith and fealty.

In short, "defencelessness" is the keynote of all salutes with weapons. Possibly the "shouldering" and "presenting" of the rifle have some connection with this idea, and most certainly the firing of salutes has.

Gun salutes were originally always fired with shot, so that after firing away their projectiles the ship or fort saluting was, for the moment, defenceless. It was a dangerous custom, sometimes even to the personage in whose honour they were fired, as for instance when Fort de la Scarpe, at Douai, fired a shotted salute in honour of Louis XIV., who was passing, and very nearly hit his coach. Pepys tells us that on May 3rd, 1660, when the fleet in the Downs fired a salute on receipt of the news of Charles II. having made his declaration at Breda, prior to the Restoration, that, "As I was going on board the 'Vice-Admiral,' the General began to fire his guns, and so did all the rest of the commanders, which was very gallant, and to hear the bullets go hissing over our heads as we were in the boat!"

Sometimes, however, they did not "hiss over," but struck. In 1602 it is related that "The master's mate of the 'Dragon' being carried ashore to be buried, the Captain of the 'Ascension' took his boat to attend the ceremony, and, as it was the custom at sea to discharge some pieces of ordnance at the interment of any officer, the gunner fired three guns; but some bullets being left in them, one struck the 'Ascension's' boat, and killed the Captain and boatswain's mate; who thus found a grave for themselves by going to pay the last honours to another."

Such incidents as these led naturally to the custom of firing blank charges in salute. After the breech-loading guns had superseded the muzzle-loader in this country, several of the later obsolete weapons were specially retained as saluting batteries both ashore and afloat. This led to various fatal accidents, probably on account of the gunners not being generally accustomed to the handling of muzzle-loading guns, so that a number of these were cut across at the breech and fitted with breech-closing blocks, to obviate further mishaps.

Space precludes the enumeration of the different numbers of guns which are apportioned to the payment of the honours due to different personages, though all consist of an odd number. It may, however, be noted that the Royal Salute is twenty-one guns in this country and 101 to the King-Emperor in India. The table of salutes falls in a gradually decreasing scale to seven guns for a consul.

In these days, when every ship carries a large number of light, rapid-fire guns, salutes are rattled off with great rapidity, but before their advent, when salutes had to be fired from small muzzle-loading or slowly-manipulated breech-loading guns, a certain period had to be allowed between each round in order to give the gunners time to reload, and so to keep a regular interval between discharges. The gunner used generally to walk up and down with a small sand-glass, and after the first order—"Fire One!"—was popularly supposed to mutter to himself :—

"If I wasn't a gunner I shouldn't be here."

Then aloud—"Fire Two!" Then the same process again, and "Fire Three!" and so on. Sometimes, but very rarely, there is a hitch in the ceremony of saluting, as for instance when one of H.M. ships some years back steamed into a Colonial harbour, saluting the Governor of the Colony, with the usual seventeen guns, in fine style. But no answering salute came from the fort perched high up on a hill on the starboard side, much to the bewilderment, not to say scandalization, of the visitors. Presently, however, a boat came out with profuse apologies, to the effect that the fort had been unable to reply as there was no powder, but if the ship would be good enough to let its gunners have some, the return salute should be at once fired!

A more awkward case was in 1850, when the captain of H.M.S. "Meander," just before arriving at Tahiti, was informed by an American whaler that war had broken out between France and England. On receipt of this false intelligence he stood into the harbour with all his guns loaded ready for action. So it came about that when he found the story untrue, he had not a single gun with which he could salute the French flag!

While dealing with naval salutes we must not omit to mention the "one-gun salute," as it is generally called. This is not really a salute at all, but a single signal gun fired at the opening of a court-martial.

I have referred to the "dipping of the flag" as a courtesy, but in old times it was a much more significant salute. It had superseded the "striking" or lowering of the sail which was a mark of respect

absolutely insisted on in the case of all foreign vessels when meeting a British man-of-war in what were then known as the British seas, which were supposed to extend from Cape Finisterre to Cape Van Staten, in Norway. It was understood to imply an acknowledgment of the British sovereignty of these seas, and is claimed to have been exacted since the time of the Saxon kings. In all probability it dates from somewhere about the Norman Conquest, for from thenceforward and for some centuries the British Channel actually ran through the dominions of the King of England—Normandy and Aquitaine on the south and England on the north. In those days the lowering of the sail was no mere compliment, for in the ships of the period, not only were they brought to a standstill by striking the big one and only sail that they carried, but they were pretty well defenceless as well, as it cumbered the greater part of the upper works of the vessel.

To "strike the sail," therefore, was tantamount to placing a ship in a posture in which she could be easily and closely examined by the English warships, and, if necessary, taken possession of.

In the days of more extensively and fully-rigged ships, the "striking of the sail" was not of equal moment, but was enforced with at least equal determination by English sea commanders. Lord Howard of Effingham even insisted on this token of submission being made by the ships which brought Philip of Spain to this country in order to espouse Queen Mary. A slight hesitation in compliance on the part of the Spanish Prince brought an iron messenger from the English flagship humming through his rigging. This procedure was followed with greater or less insistence right up to the time of Trafalgar, when for some reason or other the claim to the acknowledgment of the British sovereignty of the seas was abandoned. But in the interim, many a shot was fired and many an unwilling salute extorted, to say nothing of regular fights, and at least two big naval wars with the Dutch. The British Government, whether Tudor, Stuart, Commonwealth, Orange, or Hannoverian, consistently upheld its naval officers in their determination to exact this salute—high-handed as it appeared to foreigners—till the latter part of the 18th century, when, in 1781, Lieutenant Townsend, of the "Rover," privateer, of Bristol, was executed for the "wilful murder" of Captain Giraldo Silvestini, of the "Victoria," a Venetian ship, by ordering a gun to be fired into the vessel, which killed the captain. Although he acknowledged the gun to have been fired by his order, but without the least intention of killing anybody, he suffered the extreme penalty. The account does not actually say that the gun was fired in order to make the Venetian strike her sail or lower her flag, but it is hardly likely to have been fired for any other reason. Possibly it was *ultra vires* for a privateer to take the usual course taken by a man-of-war.

Another curious naval salute was that fired on November 5th for many years in commemoration of the failure of the Gunpowder Plot.

There is, and probably has been for many centuries, a series of salutes which are paid by boats when passing other boats carrying a superior officer. Royalty or flag-officers are saluted by tossing the oars, that is, each man holds his oar perpendicularly between his

knees. In the case of captains or military officers of similar rank the boat's crew is ordered to "lay on their oars," *i.e.*, to cease rowing. Sailing boats salute by letting fly the sheet, and steamboats by stopping their engines.

The *feu de joie* may be regarded as a special salute, as it is only fired on occasions like the King's birthday or to commemorate some famous victory. If there is artillery present it fires gun after gun in succession, after which the fire is taken up by the infantry. The right-hand man of the front rank of the line fires, then the man next to him, and so on, right away to the left. Then the left-hand man of the rear rank fires, and so the rifle-reports return in quick succession to the right of the rear rank, when the guns take it up again. Three rounds are fired, the rifles being pointed up in the air and the sound being reminiscent of that made by a boy rattling his stick along a row of iron railings. The origin of this custom is probably to be found in the indiscriminate firing of guns and crackers to celebrate some joyful event, in the same way as is still done on Independence Day in the United States. The term *feu de joie* is an appropriate one, but it is doubtful how long it has been in use. A contemporary account of the events attending the capture of Gibraltar in 1704 relates that to celebrate the victory over the French Fleet off Malaga, when Sir George Rooke returned to the rock: "As soon as it was dark, the guns were discharged quite round the town, and the Marines made a fuge-fire and bone-fires." Is there any connection between "fuge-fire" and *feu de joie*? It would seem possible that there is.

Funeral salutes with shotted guns have been already mentioned. These have been abandoned, but a regulated number of guns are fired at the funerals of naval and military officers of high rank, and in all naval and military funerals three successive rifle-volleys are fired in the air as a salute to the departed warrior. It is probable that the origin of this may be found in the immemorably old superstition that it was advisable to make as much noise as possible upon such occasions in order to scare away the evil spirits whose presence was neither necessary nor desirable at the obsequies of the deceased.

The three volleys are now always fired out of doors and over the grave, but formerly they were sometimes fired in church. At the funeral of Sir Peter Carewe at Waterford in 1575, we are told that after the trumpets had sounded for nearly a "quarter of an hower," that "the drummes strake up and therewith all the soylders dyschardged ther peces four or fyve tymes together, wherewith the Churche was soe full of smoke that one coulde scarce discirne another."


This reminds us that to the present day trumpets or bugles sound the "Last Post" as a salute at funerals. This bugle-call has also been combined with the hymn "Abide with Me" into a most beautiful piece of military music which can be played by the band upon such occasions.

It may be noted in passing that there are many other musical salutes appropriated to various occasions, from the playing of "God

save the King " to the flourish on a single bugle at the relieving of a regimental guard, but space forbids further reference to these.

The firing of minute guns on the occasion of the death of a royal personage may also be regarded as a species of funeral salute. When three or four ships of different nationalities are together and the decease of an aged potentate is to be saluted in this way, by firing a gun for each year that the dead monarch had spent on earth, as each ship fires in turn, the dull and dreary booming of guns at one minute interval may go on striking heavily on the ear for the greater part of the morning or afternoon.

There are, and have been, many variations in the salutes which have been briefly touched upon in this article, such as the kneeling salute made with the hand while the weapon is held in the other; the salute by turning the head; grounding arms and saluting with the hand, to mention only a few, but it would require many more pages to deal with these. Enough, however, has been said to demonstrate that the study of the origin and development of this military r<sup>i</sup>tion of respect is by no means devoid of interest.



## UNIFORM FOR THE FUTURE ARMY.

By "CLERICUS."

THE appearance of an article in the August number of the JOURNAL, on the subject of "Military Uniform," by "Snipster," has prompted the writer to contribute another one on the same subject, but to develop the theme on somewhat different lines. "Snipster" advocates a general simplification of military uniform and consequent reduction of expense to the individual (in the case of the officer) and to the State (in the case of "other ranks"). He, however, proposes the retention of the full or "ceremonial" dress of scarlet or blue for all ranks and arms, while admitting that the attractions of a brilliant uniform should no longer be an essential for the *post bellum* Army, which he piously hopes (as we all do) will not be dependent on voluntary effort for its recruitment.

In the writer's opinion, the retention of the so-called "time-honoured" scarlet and blue for the full-dress uniform would be, and indeed already is, an anachronism, and that they should therefore be abolished (except for Field-Marshal and Household troops).

As "Snipster" points out, the question of the uniform for the future Army is by no means a trivial one, and should be carefully considered now just as much as demobilization and other questions, which will affect the officer and man when the present world war comes to an end!

It is open to question whether any Continental Power will retain any other uniform after the war except the "service" dress, and that possibly no other colour will be seen, even in the full-dress uniform, than the now "time- and battle-honoured" khaki of the British and Belgians, the *bleu d'horizon* of the French, and the "field-grey" of the Central Powers.

There can be no question but that the abolition of the scarlet and blue full-dress tunics, doublets, and jackets for all ranks of the future British Army would effect a very considerable saving to the State and to the pockets of the individual officer.

A necessary corollary to such abolition would be the wearing of full-size orders, decorations, and medals in "service" dress on special occasions. This is already in vogue with our French Allies, and the practice would have the not inconsiderable advantage (if introduced at once) of allowing our splendid troops to wear their hard-earned and much coveted distinctions (and not merely an inch or so of ribbon) when home on leave or when serving with the Home Forces. At present the large majority of our officers receive any orders or decorations that may have been awarded to them at the hands of His Majesty the King, who attaches them to the "service dress" jacket of the

recipient at an investiture; directly the wearer has left the presence the decoration is put away in a leather case, and, except now and then when shown to admiring relations, probably never sees the light of day. In the case of the non-commissioned ranks and private soldiers, a few have their Distinguished Conduct or Military or Meritorious Service Medals presented by a General Officer at a parade of troops at a home station, while more receive the ribbon only at the hands of a Corps or Divisional Commander at the Front. Of course, the heroes that have been awarded the Victoria Cross, and survive, are specially invested by His Majesty the King himself, or their next-of-kin receive the coveted honour in case of non-survival. In some cases recipients of the D.C.M., M.S.M., and M.M., may never have their decorations publicly presented at all. In all the above cases, however, the same drawback applies at present, viz., that once the decoration has been presented or received, it is then put away and kept either by the soldier himself (at his own risk) or sent to his Record Office for safe custody. The writer considers, therefore, that the permission to wear orders, decorations, and medals in "service" dress at home on special occasions would not only be a greatly valued privilege but would tend to preserve and accentuate the martial spirit of the nation, both during the remainder of the duration of the war and afterwards.

The writer proposes to summarize his suggestions on this subject under the following headings, and then to briefly discuss each heading in greater detail.

N.B.—It is to be clearly understood that none of these suggestions are to be considered as applicable to Field-Marshal or to the Household troops, both Cavalry and Foot Guards, or to any units or formations that may be added to them in the future, should, for instance, it ever be decided to form a "Guard Corps." These Household troops would retain the splendours of the old "scarlet and blue," and provide all that would be necessary in the way of military pageantry either in London or elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Field-Marshal would have a special distinction over General Officers in retaining the scarlet tunic, white buckskin breeches, and high jacked boots which they now wear on special occasions.

#### SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS.

##### *A.—With reference to Officers.*

- (1) Abolition of the full-dress tunic, doublet, or jacket.
- (2) Abolition of mess jackets and waistcoats.
- (3) Retention of full-dress head-dress.
- (4) Abolition of the blue cloth helmet and introduction of the shako in lieu.
- (5) "Review order" and "full-dress with troops" to consist for Regimental Officers of the present service dress *with* full-dress head-dress. In the case of General and Staff Officers, the present order of dress, "review order" (Staff in blue), to be retained.
- (6) "Full-dress without troops" to consist, for Regimental Officers, of the present pattern blue frock-coat with full-dress head-dress

and present pattern overalls or pantaloons. In the case of General and Staff Officers it would be also the present "review order" (Staff in blue).

(7) Institution of the practice of wearing full-size orders, decorations, and medals on the service dress jacket in "review order," and on the blue frock-coat on all occasions when that garment is worn.

N.B.—For the duration of the war only these proposed regulations might be made applicable to service dress worn when not on duty with troops as well as in "review order."

(8) Buttons on service dress jackets to be removable so that the present brass buttons could be worn in "review order," while *leather* ones would be worn in all other orders of dress and on active service, musketry training, and manœuvres, etc.

(9) Collar and cap badges and badges of rank similarly to be of gilt metal or gold embroidery for "review order," and of bronze metal or khaki embroidery for all other orders of dress when service dress is worn.

(10) Ribands only of orders, decorations, and medals to be worn with service dress jackets as at present, except as noted in proposal (7).

(11) Mess dress to consist of the present pattern blue serge frock with roll collar, and to be worn with white shirt, white linen collar, and black sailor's knot tie. Overalls and boots as at present.

(12) Miniature orders, decorations, and medals to be worn with the blue serge frock in mess dress and on other occasions when that garment is worn. Regimental Officers to wear on the lapel of the blue serge frock the collar badges formerly worn on mess jackets, while General and Staff Officers would wear the scarlet gorget patch.

(13) Undress order to be of two kinds, viz.:—

(a) Blue forage cap, frock coat, overalls or pantaloons, with or without swords.

(b) Blue forage cap, blue serge frock, overalls or pantaloons, with or without swords. In the former case swords would be worn under the frock.

Full-size medals, etc., with (a); miniature medals, etc., with (b).

N.B.—The occasions on which undress orders (a) or (b) should be worn would be laid down in the King's Regulations and Dress Regulations.

#### *B.—With reference to Other Ranks.*

(1) Abolition of full dress tunics, doublets, jackets, and blue cloth trousers.

(2) Retention of present full-dress head-dress, except the blue cloth helmet, which should be replaced by a shako.

(3) "Review order" to consist of the present service dress with full-dress head-dress and full-size decorations and medals.

(4) Buttons and cap and collar badges in "review order" to be of brass or gilt metal and removable. Decorations and medals to be mounted on removable bar brooches.

(5) "Walking out" dress to be the same as "review order," substituting the present pattern blue forage cap or Glengarry for the full-dress head-dress.

(6) Leather buttons and bronze cap and collar badges to be introduced for wear with service dress jackets and caps in all orders of dress other than "review order" and "walking out."

(7) Ribands only of decorations and medals to be worn on the service jacket (except in "review order" and "walking out"). These should be mounted on removable bar brooches.

Now to discuss the foregoing proposals in greater detail.

#### A.—Officers.

(1) Proposals (1) and (2) are of course those that entail drastic changes and on which most of the others hinge. No doubt considerable outcry will be raised by many officers of the Old Army, more especially those whose full-dress garments were a pleasure to the eye and to the fair sex! Even the writer feels a twinge of regret and some compunction at advocating the disappearance of the brilliant Hussar tunic, the plastron of the Lancers, the very smart and jaunty Horse Artillery jacket, not to mention the gorgeous and resplendent trappings of some of the old Yeomanry regiments. Reforms, however, are bound to be displeasing to some and to meet with a good deal of adverse criticism. The somewhat plain scarlet tunics of Dragoons, Royal Engineers, and Infantry of the Line would not be very much missed if relegated to the limbo of the past, while the same might be said for the blue tunics of the Royal Field and Garrison Artillery, the Army Service Corps, the Royal Army Medical Corps, etc.

(2) As regards mess dress, the short mess jacket has never been over-popular, especially with officers of high rank, advancing years, and increasing proportions! How frequently in old peace days has not one read of the evening hunting coat being advocated for mess uniform? When, soon after the South African War, nearly all the gold lace was stripped off mess jackets and waistcoats, the glories of mess dress departed, and now that the blue serge frock (or jumper, as it was sometimes somewhat disrespectfully called) has been so frequently worn at mess in camp, on board ship, and behind the line in France, and also at home stations, its permanent adoption for mess uniform would not be so great an innovation after all. Moreover, the eminently desirable factor of cleanliness beneath would be preserved by the white shirt and linen collar!

(3) Many will consider the wearing of full-dress head-dress with the service dress and frock coat as an undesirable innovation, and will deem it to be incongruous and unsightly. As a matter of fact the full-dress head-dress has been quite often worn with service dress in peace time; as, for instance, by mounted troops on the march in the United Kingdom and by all troops employed during the railway and coal strikes of 1911. Furthermore, General and Staff Officers have worn the cocked hat with the frock coat in the order of dress known as "review order (Staff in blue)" for many years past, and there seems no legitimate reason why the Dragoon helmet, the Lancer

cap, and the Hussar and Horse Artillery busby should not be worn with it and yet not look out of place, though no doubt it would be unfamiliar and perhaps unpopular to begin with. In the Infantry and in corps and departments, the Fusilier busby and the shako might also appear strange at first, but that would soon wear off. Of course Highland regiments and Rifle regiments would continue to wear their present bonnets and caps with the white jacket and patrol jacket respectively, while the unskirted Scottish regiments would conform to the proposals for the remainder of the Infantry.

(4) The abolition of the blue cloth helmet would be welcomed, the writer feels assured, throughout the Service by those officers whose misfortune it has hitherto been to wear this unsightly and uncomfortable head-dress.

It is suggested that the shako be revived for the Infantry of the Line (other than Fusilier, Rifle, Highland, and Scottish regiments, who would retain their present full-dress head-dress), and for the A.S.C., R.A.M.C., A.O.C., A.P.C., etc.

In the case of the Royal Field and Garrison Artillery and Royal Engineers, the busby with plumes at the side, as worn by them some years prior to 1881, might well be introduced in preference to a shako. The pattern of the shako might be that now worn by the Highland Light Infantry or a modification of the pattern worn before 1881. To ensure simplification in manufacture, however, the pattern should be a universal one—distinction between royal, light infantry, and other regiments being made by the nature of the plume or “tuft” worn with it and by each regiment having the “plate,” as now worn on the blue cloth helmet, in front. The writer suggests that “Royal” regiments should have a falling horse-hair plume, light infantry regiments an upright plume, similar to what rifle regiments now have, and other regiments a “tuft” of various colours. Corps and departments to be similarly treated.

(5) This proposal needs no further comment, having been already dealt with under (3) and (4), except to observe that at full-dress ceremonial parades, General and Staff Officers would be conspicuous by their blue frock coats, which would be more advantageous than otherwise.

(6) This would be the order of dress for officers attending levees, Courts, and State balls, etc. It is considered that the frock coat would be just as smart in most cases as the tunic, and rather more comfortable for dancing in! It would also be worn by officers attending church parades when not actually in command of, or parading with, troops.

(7) This proposal entails orders, decorations, and medals being mounted on bar brooches so as to be easily transferable from the service jacket to the frock coat as occasion demands. The majority of officers have their medals, etc., mounted in this way, so no great expense or innovation would be involved in the proposal.

(8) and (9) Officers would, as a rule, have more than one service jacket, and then the best of these could be kept for review order,

parades, etc., so that it would not be necessary to change buttons, collar badges, and badges of rank.

(10) The same remark as in the preceding paragraph applies to this proposal, so that officers in possession of more than one service jacket could have the best one prepared with loops in which to insert the pin of their bar brooches, while the other, or others, could have either the ribands sewn on or prepared with loops to take the "riband brooch."

(11) This proposal needs no further comment, having been fully discussed under (2).

(12) The appearance of the blue serge frock would be greatly enhanced by the wearing of miniature medals, etc., and by the addition of collar badges. A further embellishment would be for the badges of rank to be in gold embroidery instead of gilt metal.

(13) It might be mentioned here that the order of dress for wear on general courts-martial might be "undress order (a)," while that for district courts-martial might be "undress order (b)."

From the foregoing notes it will be observed that the writer advocates the retention of three forms of head-dress for the officer on home service, viz., (1) the full-dress head-dress; (2) the blue forage cap; (3) the khaki service cap. In the case of General and Staff Officers they would be (1) the cocked hat and plume; (2) the blue forage cap with scarlet band and black peak with gold embroidery; (3) the khaki cap with scarlet band and khaki peak.

Administrative and technical staff would retain the dark blue or green bands as at present, and, if authorized to wear the cocked hat in full dress, should have different coloured plumes. The Staff aiguillette to be retained for wear with the frock coat by those as at present authorized to wear it.

#### B.—*Other Ranks.*

(1) The writer is of opinion that there would not be any great lamentation among the rank and file over the disappearance of the tunic, doublet, or jacket. Few of the Old Army who wore the "scarlet or blue" are now left, and many of them will have been discharged by the time peace is restored. A very great saving would be effected thereby, and in the disappearance of the blue cloth trousers.

N.B.—Highland regiments would of course be permitted to retain their tartan kilts and Scottish regiments their trews.

(2) The same arguments apply here as in the case of officers under headings A (3) and (4), and it is felt that the shako would be welcomed by the men as a more comfortable and smarter looking head-dress than the present hideous and uncomfortable blue cloth helmet.

(3) This heading calls for no special comment.

(4) This proposal involves the making-up of service dress jackets with eyelet holes and the provision of fasteners, so that the soldier can easily remove the brass buttons and gilt badges and put leather buttons and bronze badges in their place. A certain amount of expenditure would be incurred under this head, but it would be a

move in the right direction and would tend to similarity in the dress of officers and other ranks. At present the officer in service dress wears bronze cap and collar badges with brass buttons, while the soldier wears gilt metal cap badges and brass buttons, both of which seem somewhat inconsistent and meaningless.

(5) This proposal introduces the practice of the soldier displaying on the breast of his service jacket his decorations or medals when off duty and when mixing with his civilian friends, and, in the opinion of the writer, it is one of the most important of his proposed innovations, and probably one of the most popular.

It will be observed that the soldier will still retain three forms of head-dress: (a) the full-dress head-dress; (b) the blue forage cap; (c) the khaki service cap.

The gilt metal cap badge would be worn as at present with the blue forage cap, while a bronze cap badge should be introduced for wear on the khaki service cap.

(6) Leather buttons and bronze cap badges would be a distinct advantage for drill, training, and manoeuvres, etc., and would save the soldier a considerable amount of time now spent in polishing the brass buttons and gilt cap badges of his present service dress.

(7) The proposal that ribands of decorations and medals should be mounted on removable bar brooches is put forward partly because they look smarter and are more easily renewable when soiled or faded than if sewn on to the jacket, and partly to provide for the man who is only in possession of one service jacket. As a matter of fact this would seldom be the case, and the soldier would almost always in peace time own at least two jackets, on the best of which he could put his full-size medals and on the other one the ribands only.

The Government should make an original free issue to all ranks of bar brooches for medals and ribands: this would no doubt be a largish item of expense, but would only be a set-off against the very great saving effected by the abolition of the scarlet and blue clothing.

It is hoped that the foregoing proposals may meet with the consideration they deserve, for the subject is not unimportant, and is one that should be carefully gone into now before the war comes to an end. In conclusion the writer trusts that he will be pardoned if the susceptibilities of any particular corps or unit are grievously hurt by any of his suggestions.

## LETTERS WRITTEN BY AN OFFICER, GEORGE CORNISH, OF THE MARINES, 1782-1789.

Edited by COMMANDER LORD TEIGNMOUTH, R.N. (Retd.).

THE writer of these letters had a singular career. At the age of 17, while at the Exeter Grammar School, he obtained an Ensigncy in the Sussex Militia, then quartered in the town; and shortly afterwards was offered a commission in the 25th Regiment, which, however, owing to lack of private means, he was unable to accept. Thereupon, Lord Mulgrave, a friend of the family, commanding a ship of war then lying in Torbay, procured the lad a commission in the Marines. He served first in the "Royal George," only escaping from the disaster that befell this ship at Spithead, August, 1782, by having landed just previously. He then served in the "Ocean," a 90-gun ship attached to the Channel Fleet, under Lord Howe, who had been ordered to throw supplies into Gibraltar, then besieged. It was while employed on this important service that the first letter was written. The situation of the Fleet, therein referred to, was as follows.

After the supply-ships had safely landed their much-needed reinforcements and stores—notwithstanding the presence in the adjacent waters of a combined force of enemy ships greatly exceeding in numbers and strength the Fleet under Lord Howe, the English admiral put to sea, and waited outside the Straits for the enemy to attack. But the latter showed no particular anxiety to accept battle, until too late in the day to fight a decisive action. Darkness put an end to the contest; and next day, while in momentary expectation of the enemy renewing the battle, the following letter was penned:—

TO HIS FATHER—"MR C., TINGMOUTH,<sup>1</sup> DEVON."

"HOND. SR.— "October 21st, 1788, 'Ocean,' off Cape Spartell.

"I take the opportunity of a ship wh. is going to England, to tell you that I have escap'd unhurt, from those Gasconading Rascals, who were to windward of us, & according to Custom kept a most respectfull distance tho' very superior. The cannonading began at haft past five in the evening & became General at haft past seven, at half after eleven the firing ceas'd, during wh. time the 'Ocean' had twice the honor (with the assistance of the 'Union') of beating off the 'Santissimi Trinidad' & another Three Deck ship who

<sup>1</sup> The spelling, punctuation, etc., are as in the originals. In the family letters, the town of Teignmouth is often spelt Tingmouth—doubtless according to the local pronunciation.—EDITOR.

Bore up twice and attempted to cut off our Rear. I dont recollect a much more awfull or tremendous sight than the fire of the whole Line at one time, particularly at Night. But in General it was merely a Cannonade, as they were too farr off to do much execution. Previous to this, they had attack'd Gibralter but were repuls'd with the Loss of the 'St. Miguel' a seventy Gun ship and about three thousand Men, who were permitted to land & get nearly up the Walls, when our Men very deliberately cut off their hands & let them tumble back again. The Spanish *Gazette* speaks very highly of General Elliott's humanity, who after having destroyed Ten of their (Bumb proofs) Seventy Gun Ships cut down & suppos'd to have been Impregnable, sent out Boats & sav'd about three hundred Men, who must otherwise inevitably have perish'd. The night we landed our Troops and Stores (Three days before our Cannonade) one of the Transports blew up But I do not know yet which, Nor have I yet been able to learn our Loss, but I believe very trifling. We are now in sight of them, and expect to engage again immediately if a Breeze shou'd spring up, I hope to God we shall get the *Wind* of them, or we shall not do much, As from their Artillery Men and the present Calmness of the Weather they will derive greater advantage from engaging at a distance. . . . I believe I have just room enough to beg of you to give my Duty to my Mother & Aunt, believe me to be honour'd Sr.

"Your Dutl. son GEO."

The particular incident of the siege which elicited the enemy's praise of British humanity, is thus described in his despatch by Captain Curtis, of H.M.S. "Brilliant," who had charge of the naval defences :—" At 8 o'clock in the morning of the 13th, the ten battering ships of the enemy lying at the head of the Bay, under the command of Admiral Moreno, began to get under sail, in order to come against the garrison: everything was in readiness for their reception. At ten the admiral's ship was placed about 1,000 yards from the King's Bastion, and commenced his fire. The others were very shortly afterwards posted to the north and south of him, at small distances asunder, and began their cannonade. They were all fixed to the stations allotted to them in a masterly manner. Our batteries opened as the enemy came before them: the fire was very heavy on both sides: the red-hot shots were sent with such precision by the garrison, that in the afternoon the smoke was seen to issue from the upper part of the admiral; and men were perceived to be using fire engines and pouring water into the holes, endeavouring to extinguish the fire. By one o'clock in the morning two were in flames and several others actually on fire. Confusion was now plainly observed among them, and the numerous rockets thrown up from each of the ships was a clear demonstration of their great distress; and they immediately began to take away the men, its being impossible to remove the ships. I thought this a fit opportunity to employ my gun-boats; and I advanced with the whole (12 in number, each carrying a 24 or 18-pr) and drew them up so as to flank the line of the enemy's battering ships, while they were annoyed extremely by an excessive and well

directed fire from the garrison. The boats of the enemy durst not approach; they abandoned their ships, and the men that were in them to our mercy, or to the flames. The day-light now appeared, and the scene at this time before me was dreadful to a high degree: numbers of men crying from amidst the flames, some from pieces of wood in the water, some appearing in the ships where the fire had as yet made but little progress, all expressing by speech and gesture the deepest distress, and all imploring assistance, formed a spectacle of horror not easily to be described. Every exertion was made to relieve them; and I have inexpressible happiness in informing my lords, that the number saved amounts to 13 officers and 344 men. One officer and 29 wounded (some of them dreadfully) taken from among the slain in the holds, are in our hospital, and many of them are in a fair way. The blowing up of the ships around us as the fire got to the magazines, and the firing of the cannons of others, as the metal became heated by the flames, rendered this a very perilous employment; *but we felt it as much a duty to make every effort to relieve our enemies from so shocking a situation, as an hour before we did to assist in conquering them.*<sup>1</sup> (The italics are the Editor's.)

Contrary to general expectation in the British Fleet, the combined enemy force declined battle, whereupon Lord Howe, having accomplished his mission, bore up for England. The British loss in the action was 68 killed and 208 wounded; that of the enemy, 60 killed and 320 wounded. The "Ocean," in which the writer of the letters was serving, suffered no casualties—which says little for the enemy's gunnery. The "Union," which supported her, had five killed and 15 wounded.

A blank of six years now occurs. We next find the writer employed on recruiting service, in a cathedral town:—

#### ON RECRUITING SERVICE AT SALISBURY, 1788.

"MY DEAR H.—

"Salisbury.

"I have drummed, trumpeted, given the boys halfpence to hollow, and made every description of noise, but not a shadow of a recruit have I seen. Six other recruiting parties belonging to different regiments, sent here since the armament, have infinitely exceeded me in every mode of trapan, but with no better success: no youthful ardour, no breast panting with the spirit, not a bit of glory in this whole town or its neighbourhood: the leaden hand of stupidity seems to have waved its torpid influence over it. Since my arrival here, I have not articulated a single syllable to any one soul. I have eaten by myself, and I had rather starve, drank by myself, and I had rather famish, walked by myself, which makes me sad, read by myself, which makes me stupid, wrote by myself which makes my eyes ache, slept by myself which gives me the horrors: the people stare at me as they would at the Monster; but not a word, no one civil attempt

<sup>1</sup> Compare this with the conduct of German naval officers in the present war—sinking passenger-vessels in mid-ocean, and firing at the survivors in boats, as well as on those struggling in the water, without ever an attempt at rescue.

towards communication : all this affliction and weight of woe I feel, and if you can conceive two members of Parliament elected since I have been here, without my knowing a word of the matter. A melancholy sort of Coffee House that they have here is rendered still more so by the silent automatons stuck about in the corners of it : the brutes do not communicate even with each other. Two or three Priests enveloped in their own fat stalk about it in stately stare which adds to the horror of the scene. If you write my lamentations in verse, or a Satyr (satire?) . . . . .

The remainder of the letters are written from the "Pearl," a 32-gun frigate on the Mediterranean station, commanded by Captain Hon. W. C. Finch.

To HIS MOTHER.

"Thesalonica [now Salonica],

"MY DEAREST MOTHER—

"June 16th, 1788.

"In the seventeenth Chapter of the Acts of the Apostles you will find an account of St. Paul's Preaching at this place as his manner was, and I have been just looking at the Pulpit in which he reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, but which now is profaned and belongs to the followers of one Mahomet, it is of one solid block of Verd antique and is of an immense value. Indeed we have lately been performing nearly the same voyage as St. Paul did some few years ago, his description in the twenty-seventh Chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, with a few alterations of circumstances will nearly do for our voyage lately. I acknowledged the last letter, from Naples, since which time we have been wandering about seeking a resting place wherein we might hide our heads. At last we espied out this Port which is scarcely ever afflicted with the Plague and which is now perfectly healthy. We have no apprehensions of the Plague ourselves, but Finch thinks he might as well avoid communication with infectious places as not; and assure yourself our cautions are such that you have not the slightest cause of apprehension. We left Smyrna on this occasion, tho' the Frigate we relieved had been there five months while the Plague raged violently & with a few precautions received not the slightest injury. We were glad of this excuse to leave Smyrna as by this means we have an opportunity of seeing more of the antiquities of this Country. Since we left Naples last we have been at Palermo in Sicilly, at Agrigentum, at Malta or Melita where the good people shewed us no little kindness, it proved a comfortable haven to us as it did to our friend Paul for we avoided by it a terrible storm. At Palermo we were magnificently entertained by the Vice Roi : at Malta by the Grand Marshal not Master, the etiquette to an English Officer would not allow of that, we have to thank Harry the Eighth for this. But however he abundantly made up for this by giving us his carriages &c. and feeding us at the Grand Marshal's instead of his own. . . . . The antiquities of this country have led me into the study of them which a man may do without being well acquainted with the learned languages. I begin to grow

fond of it. I shall conceive I have obtained a great point when it takes the place of other pleasures more expensive, if it be not positive pleasure it is an exemption from that mortification which attends the privation of an appetite one has been accustomed to indulge, and as I have more appetites than guineas I must endeavour to exterminate some of them by Philosophy and Study, but I believe if I had the one I should be but inclined to the other, for I have high health and good spirits except now and then a gloomy fit which comes across me. This I attribute to constitution an easy way of accounting for sulkiness or ill humour but I endeavour to stifle it as much as possible. I find four or five dismal lines of Rhyme relieve me frequently on those occasions. I am occupied in the composition for a time and my mind is relieved by it. If this part of my letter does put you to sleep may it be gentle and sweet which I look upon the first blessing the Gods have in store for us. . . . I hope to find you looking well and as handsome as ever. Adieu, adieu my dearest Mother & believe your most affectionate son

"G. C."

TO HIS BROTHER.

" Smyrna, Nov. 12th, 1788.

" We were sent up here in consequence of a petition from the Levant Company, who are in imminent danger from the capricious and cruel disposition of the Turks, who, in warr almost entirely change their nature, attributing any ill-success of their arms to the number of unbelievers who reside among them. A shocking instance of this kind happened in the last Russian warr, on receiving the news of the total destruction, by the Russians, of their fleet, they assembled, and massacred promiscuously all the Christians who were so unhappy as to fall in their way. As the Jannisaries have peculiar privileges, many men get themselves enrolled among them, who do not serve, or receive pay. On the approach of a warr these people arm themselves, neglect their business, and affect the insolence of a Jannary. A few days ago, these people were extremely riotous, and a few lives were lost; among the number was a French merchant, who was shot at his window. You may suppose that in consequence of these tumults, the English merchants feel themselves very happy and assured at the presence of an English frigate, which will serve them, at the worst, for a refuge. But as the Turks have a respect for the English, and in general are awed at their presence, it will be the means, in a great measure of preventing any of the sort for the future."

The greater part of the letter that follows—and which appears to have been written from Constantinople, early in November, 1788, is missing.

" The Turks at present have an objection to frigates of any nation being at Constantinople; and it was impossible, you know, not to see this wondrous place after being so near it, so I e'en got Mr. Finch to give me leave, and embarked on board a French Brig. On our route we were at Lesbos. The moment I saw the Island, of course I felt everything a man ought to feel upon the sight of such an Island. I began sighing and landed at Mitylene with all the passion of Sapho, but Oh ! oh ! !—*Quid non Græcia mendax audet in historia?*

—which is, being interpreted, ‘ what does not lying Greece in history insert ? ’ Instead of the *Æoliis fidibus querentum—innocentis pocula Lesbii.* But here also I was disappointed. I heard nothing but the most barbarous hum strum. We went thence to Lemnos—sea-sickness, *vix est vis ulla reicta—at Tenedos notissima fama insula (Ovid).* *Nunc humiles veteres tantumodo Troja ruinas; et pro divitiis tumulos ortendit avorum.* (Tenedos, that island of far-reaching fame—now like Troy, displays only the prone ruins of the ancient city, and for its rich possessions shows only the tombs of its ancestors.’)

## TO HIS BROTHER.

“ MY DEAR H.—

“ Constantinople, 15th Nov. 1788.

“ Since my last letters from hence, which I trust you received as they were enclosed in the Ambassador’s Pacquet for the Secretary of State, the ‘ Pearl ’ received an order from the Commander in Chief brought by the ‘ Southampton,’ to go immediately to Gibraltar. In consequence of which an express was immediately dispatched for us with an order for us instantly to join the ship, and recommending us to come by land as the most certain way, we set out bag and baggage and travelled on Horseback about four hundred miles the distance nearly between Constantinople and Smyrna. On our route we crossed the ‘ Rhyndacus ’ the ‘ Asopus,’ passed by the ‘ Granicus ’ and crossed over those Plains of Magnesia which have so often held those armies which have decided the fate of Asia. We had a Quintus Curtius with us and two or three other fellows that particularly describe those Battles and particularly that part of the Granicus. You have seen thousands of Prints describing Alexander crossing this river, it was a famous fête, but I did it. I mean to draw a comparison after the manner of Plutarch between me and Alexander we were at Pergamos &c. On our arrival at Smyrna, we informed Finch that we had seen some drunken English Sailors rolling about the Streets of Constantinople, and that the Ambassador hardly knew what to do with them. Happy to evade his orders which were cruel and originated in a mistake occasioned by some misrepresentation of Finch’s conduct at Palermo, he wrote to the Ambassador at Constantinople and requested him to obtain admission for the ‘ Pearl ’ there, that he might take care of the Seamen which belonged to two Frigates which the Merchants sent up there to be sold but as yet are not so. But the Captain Bashaw is expected from O—(?) every day and there is no doubt but he will purchase them. The Ambassador obtained permission but not on this account—though it was twice refused a French Frigate lying at the Dardanelles at the time we were there, commanded by the Viscount D’Orleans. This is another decided preference among the many which the Turks show for us. Walking the streets the other day with some Frenchmen a Turk asked one of the Frenchmen what countryman he was. He told of course, French, upon which the Turk looked at him with the most ineffable contempt and cryed—‘ whew ! ’ Paget who felt himself hurt at this insult, said ‘ English,’ upon which the Turk said ‘ Bono ’ smiled and tapped him on the back. I am lodged again in the Ambassador’s house, who,

I suppose has discovered a certain something about me which is irresistible and which I find to be commonly the case, but joking apart, he has certainly treated me with wonderful attention and kindness. The houses are all open to us here as at Smyrna, but as they are here Ambassadors instead of Consuls, consequently everything goes on in a higher stile. Balls and dinners fill up our time; but I have a great weight that hangs over me, which is the voyage of seven hundred leagues from hence to Gibraltar during the whole of which I shall be sea sick which I cannot conquer. Do I beg of you write me. We shall certainly go from hence directly to Gibraltar where we shall stay some time, on the reception of this direct to me there. . . . My dear H.

"Yours affectionately G.C."

"(Postscript).—Strange to say I left this place before without seeing St. Sophia the next thing in the world to be seen after the view of Constantinople from the sea but I shall now have an opportunity of doing it. I have been living in an atmosphere in which the thermometer stood in general at 96 sometimes at an 104 and never lower than 82 for the last three months, and I never wish a colder climate. It is now sometimes below the freezing point. I wear 7 flannell waistcoats. . . . I wish to God Charlotte would write me about her little maid and all about herself; all this news after an absence of two years she may easily conceive how interesting.<sup>1</sup> Remember me affectionately to all my Friends at Tingmouth."

#### TO THE SAME.

"MY DEAR HUBERT—

"Gibraltar, April 6th, 1789.

"I arrived here panting with the hope of hearing from all my friends, but how am I disappointed! Not a single sylable from any body. This would have been some alleviation for the miseries I experienced during a voyage of seven hundred leagues and of six weeks continuance, the whole of which I was cursed with convulsions from sea sickness; this malady persecutes me, but contrary to the effect of persecution in general I am overcome by it. My health was a good deal impaired when I left Constantinople in consequence of the too frequent use of their baths which I found a superlative luxury, and if my death had been the inevitable consequence I should certainly not have resisted: for the mode of dying was so pleasant that I should not have thought it worth while to have lived. If this resource were within our reach in England, every man must be a fool to suffer the *tedium vitae* but for two hours, could he attain it. It is a wonderful discovery. I have divested this last convulsive struggle of all its horrors and even think of it now with pleasure. There is a degree of Luxurious langour which unlocks the cells of the brain and sets the imagination afloat; whoever has a talent for Poesy to describe certain scenes should certainly undergo this process. A man dying in this delirium would bring all heaven before his eyes, and might contemplate by what wonderful magic his yellow lank cheeks (which

<sup>1</sup> This refers to her marriage with the Governor-General of India.

are just what mine are at this moment) may be converted into a fine round fair plump little cherubim with blue wings. The desire increases the nearer we are to the attainment of our wishes. I never felt this more strongly as I ardently wish to return to England, though I had but yesterday the narrowest escape of being again trapanned for another three years, in consequence of an order from the Admiral who has lately broke one of his Marine Officers. I am not as yet fairly out of the scrape, but if it happens I most certainly shall have recourse to the Bath—‘*Opi nor—Mors ultima linea serum est.*<sup>1</sup> . . . . We were in high expectation to go immediately from hence to England, but it has all vanished. We have seen all worth seeing here. I did not leave Constantinople with much regret, we were near four months there. I began to grow tired of the prating petulancy of the Greeks, and the sulky silence of the Turks, and the insufferable trash of the Corps Diplomatique who are a vile assemblage of all the vagrants on the face of God’s earth—except the Ambassadors themselves who are some of them famous especially our own who is truly superbe. I am afraid you will discover the flat third in this, but I cannot help it just now, tho’ I never was better in my life and am getting again as fat as a fool—but ‘*odio . . . .*’ I expected in the letters I was to receive here all the questions that Horace asks Bullatius. I would have answered them, but I hardly know whether I am writing to the dead or living. Every question would take up a long letter: look at the list of them—

‘*Quid tibi visa Chios, Bullatius, notaque Lesbos?*’<sup>2</sup>

‘*Quid ioncinna Samos? quid Erasi regia Sardis?*’<sup>2</sup>

‘*Smyrna quid, et Colophon? majora minorane fama?*’<sup>2</sup>

“ ‘*Sui Lebedos quid sil?*’ I do, and nothing but the idea of what they have been, and if I may be allowed the expression, putting in practice a part of History, can compensate one for the trouble of seeing them. . . . . We shall certainly stay here long enough to receive an answer to this. Adieu, adieu, My dear Brother most affectionately yours,

“ GEORGE C.”

In 1792 the writer married an heiress. Two years later, leaving his wife at home, he undertook to escort a sister to India, where Sir John Shore, to whom she had been married, was Governor-General. Soon after arrival at Calcutta, in order to be able to accept the post of A.D.C. to his brother-in-law, he obtained a commission in the 76th Regiment; and the following year obtained the appointment of Brigade-Major to H.M. troops in the Presidency of Fort St. George. On the retirement of Sir John Shore from the Governor-Generalship, in 1797, he returned home; and became a country gentleman, J.P. and D.L. for the County of Devon. He left numerous descendants.

<sup>1</sup> “I think death is the last good of all things.”—Horace.

<sup>2</sup> “What did you think of Chios, O Bullatius, and of far famed Lesbos? What of beauteous Samos? What of Royal Sardis? Of Smyrna, too? and Colophon? More or less than report had said? Do you know Lebedos?”

## "AYESHA."

*From the account by Kapitän Leutnant Hellmuth von Mücke,  
First Lieutenant of the "Emden."*

Translated and paraphrased by A. C. HEARN.

IN a preceding account<sup>1</sup> the activities of the *Emden* were recorded from August 2nd, 1914, to that fateful day, little more than three months later, when she met her fate from the guns of the *Sydney* off the Cocos Islands. On the early morning of November 9th the *Emden* was lying in Port Refuge, and a party consisting of three officers and forty-nine petty officers and seamen under the command of Lieut.-Commander von Mücke had received orders to land on Direction Island, destroy the telegraph station, and bring off all confidential documents.

This party was sent ashore in two cutters in tow of the steam pinnace. In addition to rifles and side-arms, all the four machine-guns of the *Emden* were taken, as it was anticipated that the landing might be opposed in force.

The *Emden* lay about 3,000 yards from the shore, which had to be approached with caution, as the harbour was studded with patches of coral barely submerged below the water. Close inshore lay a small white sailing ship at anchor. Postponing its destruction until a later stage, the party landed at a small jetty from whence the roofs of houses and the towering wireless mast could be seen amongst the crowns of the palms.

No resistance was offered, and shortly afterwards the station was surrounded, and one of the employés ordered to find the Director, to whom the object of the mission was announced. He was warned against resistance, and ordered to surrender all weapons as well as to assemble the Europeans in an open space in front of the buildings.

The Director took matters very calmly, handed over the keys, pointed out the buildings in which the apparatus was installed, and finally, much to Lieut. von Mücke's astonishment, congratulated him on having received the Iron Cross, notification of which had just come through by Reuter.

The first attack was made on the wireless mast, which was levelled with the assistance of explosive cartridges. Attention was then directed to the telegraph house, and all apparatus which could possibly be of value was smashed with hatchets or otherwise destroyed. Through ignorance on the part of the seamen the island seismometer shared the fate of the rest.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Emden*, in November issue of this JOURNAL.

The most difficult task was the destruction of the cables, of which there were three; one to Mauritius, one to Perth, in Western Australia, and a third to Batavia. No chart showing the precise run of the cables could be found, but certain boards erected on the beach appeared to indicate their position. The cables, which were visible in the water, were dragged for with grapnels from the pinnace, and so raised from the bottom, but it was only possible to get them inboard by sending men over the side to fix tackles on to the bight. Two of them were eventually severed and the dead ends dragged out of position. Notwithstanding careful search, the third remained undiscovered.

The party had completed the destruction of a small reserve store of general apparatus and spare parts, and were preparing to re-embark, when the *Emden* signalled them to speed up. Von Mücke had just decided to complete his task by blowing up the schooner before proceeding on board, but was anticipated by a signal on the siren to return forthwith. Well before this could be accomplished, however, the *Emden* was steaming from the harbour at sixteen or seventeen knots, and left the pinnace and the two heavily laden cutters far behind. The reason for the manœuvre was not clear, even when the "action" flag was hoisted, and fire was opened from the starboard batteries. It was at first conjectured that a possible prize had been sighted, but this illusion was dispelled by five mighty columns of water behind the *Emden*, where the shells from an enemy salvo struck the water. A severe fight was evidently in prospect, but the palms and the island hid her opponent from view. The *Emden* was now some thousands of yards away, and increasing her speed. As it was obviously useless to follow her, Von Mücke and his party turned back to the island.

## II.

On landing, the inhabitants were summoned together, disarmed, and strictly forbidden to make signals. Martial law was proclaimed, the German flag hoisted, and preparations made to dig trenches, fix up machine-gun positions, and to put the island in a state of defence against a possible landing from the hostile cruiser. The English asked that, in the event of an attack taking place, they might be allowed to repair to one of the other islands, and this was promised them.

From the roof of the largest house, von Mücke, accompanied by two signal ratings, obtained his first view of the battle between the *Emden* and the *Sydney*, a description of which is given in his earlier account. As the ships disappeared over the horizon, it was evident to him that, at the best, the *Emden* could only hope to get away to another harbour to refit, and it was more than likely that the island would soon be visited by a British cruiser whose guns would make short work of any resistance the party could offer.

Happily there had been no time to destroy the small schooner lying in the harbour, and von Mücke decided to leave the island in her. Her name was the *Ayesha*, and she had once been employed in carrying copra to Batavia. The introduction of a steamship service had put a term to her usefulness, and she now lay dismantled and slowly rotting at her moorings.

A cursory inspection showed her to be seaworthy, and officers and men were therefore embarked, ordered to overhaul and refit the rigging, and to prepare for sea. When the English inhabitants got wind of von Mücke's intention they at first warned him solemnly that the vessel was in a rotten condition and could not face the open water. Apart from this he was informed that the *Minotaur* and a Japanese cruiser were in the neighbourhood of the island, and could hardly fail to capture him. Seeing that he was resolute in his purpose, they gave every assistance in provisioning the ship, supplying a stock of food, water, petroleum, old clothes and bedding, and offered advice, which experience proved to be sound, regarding weather, winds, and currents. As the last boat put off from the shore the islanders gave three hearty cheers, wished the men a pleasant voyage, and thanked them for the generosity and moderation of their conduct.

From the masthead of the *Ayesha* von Mücke got a last view of the combat between the two cruisers—the *Emden* being then in a very sorry condition—and finally saw both ships disappear towards dusk below the horizon.

In the meantime four weeks' supply of water and eight weeks' of provisions had been taken on board the *Ayesha*, and rapid preparations had been made to get her ready to leave the harbour before the advent of night. The German ensign was hoisted, and, at the conclusion of a short address, the men gave three cheers for the Kaiser. The steam pinnace then took the *Ayesha* and both cutters in tow, and the small squadron was slowly conned out of the harbour between the numerous shoals and reefs by von Mücke, who gave his orders by whistle from the foretop. The tropical night had fallen whilst the *Ayesha* was still groping a way through shoal water, and sail was set on board in order to lighten the task of the pinnace. Some very anxious moments were passed before the vessel cleared the danger zone and rolled at last in the long movement of the ocean swell.

As soon as they were clear of the surf, and had sufficient sea room to manoeuvre, the pinnace was ordered alongside, and the crew were eventually transferred without mishap to the schooner. The pinnace was bumping heavily alongside, and it was with some difficulty that she was eventually got clear. She then swung round into the darkness astern, and was seen no more. Doubtless she found her grave in the surf breaking but a few hundred yards away, but perhaps she is still cruising the ocean, and privateering on her own account.

### III.

The next morning was spent in taking stock of the *Ayesha*, which was a three-masted topsail schooner, of 97 tons gross, her length being about 90 feet and beam 24 feet. The crew normally consisted of six men, and the problem was now to find room for fifty. In the beginning the men slept on a spare sail laid on the iron ballast in the hold, but rope, yarn, and sail rags were gradually accumulated sufficient to enable hammocks to be made for all hands.

In the after part of the cargo hold were two small cabins overrun by cockroaches, which were appropriated as a lazaret for the stocks of

provisions. A small deckhouse with three compartments served von Mücke and his two lieutenants as sleeping quarters, mess room, etc., and the petty officers found accommodation in the schooner's charthouse right aft.

The ship's culinary appliances were too diminutive to be of much use, and cooking was carried out over a large open hearth built up with iron ballast from the hold. Fresh water was often too precious to be used for other than drinking purposes, and the cook had then to do his best with sea water. For the most part the crew lived on fruit, rice, and corned beef, and fared moderately well.

Of the four small water tanks, three proved to be foul, and the original stock of water was spoilt. A small supply of Seltzer mineral water had been taken in at Keeling, but this was kept as a standby in the event of the *Ayesha* proving unseaworthy, and the crew having to take to the boats. Fortunately heavy tropical rains were experienced within a few days, and, by means of rain sails and other contrivances, the tanks were soon refilled, as well as every other available receptacle, including the stock of petroleum tins. The potable qualities of the water were much improved by the addition of a little lime juice. The men also took every advantage of the rain squalls to bathe and wash their clothes, fresh water being collected in large quantities by blocking the scupper holes. A good deal of water for washing purposes was also collected in the two small dinghies belonging to the schooner.

The crew were divided into the usual watches, and a select nucleus who had previously been fishermen or deep water sailors undertook the education of the stokers and others to whom the art of sailing was yet unknown.

A good deal of trouble was occasioned by the deplorable condition of the sails and rigging generally, which kept a repair party busily at work. The utmost care was necessary to prevent the ship receiving damage during squally weather, more particularly as it was doubtful whether the masts could stand any considerable strain.

The general condition of the hull also left much to be desired, and a casual examination of the planking at the bottom of the hold showed the timber to be in so rotten a condition that it would be no difficult matter to pass the knife point through into the Indian Ocean! All things considered, much circumspection was necessary.

On the first few days there was a heavy swell from aft, and the two cutters became unmanageable. One surged in under the stern, inflicting considerable damage before it could be cut adrift. A few nights later the surviving cutter, filled perhaps with a longing to join its comrade drifting far astern, took its fate into its own hands, together with a goodly portion of the *Ayesha's* taffrail, and also parted company.

The schooner made a good deal of water, and it was not long before the hold was awash well over the ballast. The pump was out of order and the rubber washers perished. It was put together again, strips of clothing steeped in fat improvised as washers, and the hold was finally sucking dry. All things considered, the *Ayesha* was no paragon. Nor was the attire of the crew quite *de règle*. They had landed on Keeling in the very lightest of kits, the strenuous service

of the sea had done its worst, and the old clothes presented at Keeling fitted so ill that they were much more a source of amusement than of comfort.

No whistle was needed to wake the crew with the sun. They were packed together like herrings in a barrel, and when one man rose, the movement was communicated through the whole party and all were speedily afoot. If there was a stock of rain water in the dinghies the men washed themselves; if not, they took the disappointment philosophically, and did without. A single comb did duty for all, and the dandies of the party operated gingerly on themselves with a rusty razor. The deck was then washed down, the hold pumped dry, and the rigging overhauled by the seamen for new defects, whilst the cook and his chosen associates were preparing a frugal breakfast of rice, tea, and coffee. Thereafter little remained to be done, but the opportunity was taken to train the stokers in the elements of seamanship by inducting them into the mysteries of the compass, halliards, sheets, and steering gear. Plans were discussed for the future, and the position of the ship explained by means of the one solitary oceanic chart on board. This chart extended from Hong Kong and Borneo in the east, to Suez, Zanzibar, and Mozambique in the west, and was therefore only on a very small scale. A handsbreadth sufficed to cover the 700 sea miles lying between the *Ayesha* and Padang, to which it had been decided to proceed.

In the afternoon the men usually broke up into parties, and indulged in sleep, cards, yarning, or fishing, according to their bent. Fishing lines were much in evidence, but nothing was ever caught, doubtless owing to the fact that cooked rice was the only available bait. After sunset the men gathered forward and sang their favourite songs and ballads. True to the custom of German sailors in their happier moods, the songs chosen, such as "Loreley," were usually of a lugubrious or tragic character.

The men went off to their hammocks as it suited them, and it was left to the initiative of the watch forward, and the quartermaster aft, to get their reliefs at the proper time. There were only two petroleum lamps on board, both of which gave little illumination but a great deal of smoke, and the schooner showed no lights.

The days, however, were not always spent in so peaceful a fashion. Heavy squalls swept over the tropical seas, and though they were welcome for the rain they brought, they proved a very severe trial to the ill-found schooner. Fortunately these squalls could be despaired from a long distance. Black clouds formed on the horizon, from whose ragged edges broad bands of rain could be seen slanting down to the sea. Their progress was closely watched, and when they approached in the direction of the schooner, the order was given to luff, sail was rapidly shortened, and the vessel rode with storm canvas close hauled until the squall of wind and rain had passed on. On one occasion the *Ayesha* was caught by a squall before she had been prepared to meet it, and the mizen topsail carried away. With much difficulty the rest of the canvas was taken in, and the ship snugged down to face the fury of a cyclone.

The clouds cast the blackness of night on the raging sea; the shriek of the wind was punctuated by the deafening crash of thunder, the air was slashed with vivid lightning. In the storm centre, where the air was still, the ship pitched so violently that it was feared the masts would go overboard at any moment. Here the atmosphere was tense with electricity, and corposants burnt brightly at each of the masthead trucks. In the end the *Ayesha* won clear of the storm without further mishap, and again set sail. The wind, unfortunately, soon fell, and she then found herself becalmed and rolling very unpleasantly in the swell. Whilst labouring in this predicament, the smoke of a steamer was seen away on the horizon. Being well off the ordinary steamship track the strange ship must have been on some special mission. Whether it was an enemy cruiser on the trail, or one of the *Emden*'s two colliers (*Buresk* and *Exford*) proceeding to Padang for orders and information was a matter for lively conjecture. Soon, however, the smoke disappeared and the *Ayesha*, now favoured with a breeze, again proceeded on her course.

She now found herself in waters where the south-east and north-west monsoons strive for mastery. Here the wind backed and veered in a very frenzy of uncertainty. Hardly had one squall been met from ahead than another came up astern. In such conditions sailing afforded a bewildering, and, at times, a comic experience. On one occasion a heavy rain squall from the north came up on the port bow, whilst almost at the same moment another followed the ship up astern; all sails forward were close hauled, whilst those aft were filling to a stern wind. Each of these two squalls brought a shower-bath, but whereas that from the south was warm and comforting, the north-wester was so bitterly cold that the men forward scurried off to take cover as quickly as they could!

#### IV.

Early on the 23rd November, being then in the neighbourhood of land, the ship was cleared for action, as it was by no means improbable that a British or Japanese destroyer would be found between the islands engaged in coaling. In this event Lieutenant von Mücke had determined—always provided the destroyer was not visibly prepared for a surprise attack—to manoeuvre the schooner in so apparently clumsy a fashion as to bring her alongside the enemy, and to board her. Portholes had been cut in the gunwales in order to provide points of vantage for the four machine-guns. Rifles and pistols were brought on deck, and ammunition prepared. A few trial rounds were fired from the machine-guns, which had not been used for a long time, in order to test their readiness for service.

At 10 a.m. the vessel made her landfall, and a number of islands came in sight. In the afternoon it was realized that the ship was off the Seaflower Channel, about eighty miles from Padang.

As the evening was now coming on, and no charts were available, the *Ayesha* cruised off and on till sunrise, when she entered the channel with all sail set and steered warily between the discoloured patches of water, which denoted the presence of shoal water. The

log recorded a total journey of 800 knots from Keeling by 7 o'clock in the evening.

In the meantime, the ship's stock of tobacco had been entirely exhausted, and the crew took to smoking tea. Even the officers tried this new substitute, but found it "the very devil." The men, however, seemed to enjoy it.

The next morning brought a glimpse of the high mountains of Sumatra, and during the following night the flashing light of Padang came in sight. The wind was weak and off the land, and, as little progress was made, and the ship was now in waters where an enemy cruiser might be encountered at any moment, an attempt was made to tow her by means of the two dinghies. The oars of the two cutters, which had been retained on board, were lashed in pairs in order to lengthen them, and used on board as sweeps.

The next day, whilst under sail with a light breeze, various steamers were seen either making for Padang or leaving it, and also another vessel, apparently a gun-boat or destroyer, which lay with engines stopped in water too deep for anchorage. She was then too far distant to admit of her flag being identified, but soon after she woke to life and came steaming up at full speed. On her nearer approach it could be seen that she was a destroyer flying the Dutch ensign.

Von Mücke, judging it premature to discard his incognito, sent below all but a few of the roughest specimens in the crew, and, with them, all the small arms and the four machine-guns.

The destroyer passed fifty yards astern of the *Ayesha*, and her officers could be seen eagerly scanning the stern for her name, which, however, was covered with a thick coating of paint. She then slowly proceeded on her course, but stopped at about 5,000 yards distance, and von Mücke felt that he was expected! In readiness for eventualities one of the seamen therefore stood by to hoist the German ensign in lieu of a visiting card.

In the course of the afternoon the destroyer, which had been seen to be the *Lynx*, went off and disappeared in the direction of Padang, but was again encountered at night in the neighbourhood of the small island off the port. Though the *Ayesha* had all lights out, she was promptly detected, and followed at a snail's pace by the green and red lights of the destroyer, much as a vagabond might be dogged home by the police! This did not please von Mücke, and a Morse signal was made by him, first in English, then in German, "*Why are you following us?*" The British enquiry was answered by the *Understood* signal, but that in German only resulted in the *Lynx* increasing her distance. On the next day the *Ayesha* found herself in Dutch territorial waters, and the German ensign and pendant were accordingly hoisted. At midday a Malay sailing boat came alongside and a native pilot was taken on board. He agreed to payment being made through the German consul, which saved a good deal of embarrassment. The total amount of available money was 1s. 2d., which sum, having been inadvertently left on board by the late master, had been requisitioned for the use of the Imperial Exchequer.

Just before entering the harbour von Mücke signalled to the *Lynx*, which had again closed in on the *Ayesha*, that he was sending a boat, and having donned the khaki uniform in which he had landed from the *Emden*, he proceeded on board.

He was received at the gangway, and conducted to the mess, where he suitably acknowledged the interest taken in his welfare during the last thirty-six hours. He explained that he intended, as being in command of an Imperial German ship, to enter Padang to repair and revictual. The Dutch commandant informed him that no objection would be taken to his entry, but it was presumed that he did not intend to put to sea again. In any case matters would be regulated by the civil authorities, as they were outside the commandant's province.

Von Mücke replied that, as the *Ayesha* was a warship he must reserve to himself the right to leave, and there could be no justification for detaining him, adding, in jest, that he trusted there would be no need for an action between the *Lynx* and the *Ayesha* when the latter was leaving.

Von Mücke then left the *Lynx*, and the *Ayesha*, on nearing the harbour, was boarded by the harbour master, and finally came to anchor in the neighbourhood of a large number of steamers, some of which were seen to be flying the German and Austrian flags. The harbour master had wished to anchor the vessel farther out, but a little guile regarding the sufficiency of the cable on board for a deep water anchorage, and a certain amount of fumbling in taking in the fore topsails, enabled her to be brought well in, despite the harbour master's protestations.

As soon as the anchor was down, Lieut. Schmidt was sent on shore to pay official visits, and a request was sent to the German Consul to come on board. In accordance with international usage, von Mücke gave orders that no one was to be allowed to enter or leave the ship pending an understanding with the local Government authorities.

The Lloyd steamers, *Kleist*, *Rheinland*, and *Choising*, and an Austrian vessel were lying in harbour, and were decorated with bunting for the occasion. Many boats from these vessels surrounded the new arrival, and a shower of cigars, cigarettes, tobacco, clothes, poems, letters, and newspapers fell on her deck.

None of the newspapers was later than October 2nd, and it was now November 27th, but they were eagerly perused and formed a welcome corrective to the tales of German disaster by land and sea which flooded the English papers—hitherto their sole reading—which had been found on board the *Emden's* prizes.

The Dutch authorities showed great reluctance in conceding to the *Ayesha* the status of a warship, and were evidently intent on treating her as a "prize" vessel, and on interning ship and crew, though Lieut. von Mücke insisted vigorously on the military rank of his ship. The authorities evidently feared difficulties from the English or Japanese Governments should she be allowed to leave the harbour.

The German Consul had been charged with the task of providing the many necessaries required on board, from charts to toothbrushes, but obstacles were put in his way, and in the end only a portion of them were actually delivered. Charts, nautical books, and even clothes, could not be obtained.

The harbour master used all his powers of persuasion to induce Lieut. von Mücke to remain, pointed out the grave danger of capture by one of the many British or Japanese ships cruising at sea, and hinted that the *Emden* and her crew had done enough for glory; it was unwise to tempt fate further. His words fell on deaf ears. At 8 o'clock anchor was weighed, and the ship prepared for sea.

The Dutch papers, received some weeks later, were full of conjecture as to where the *Ayesha* was bound, and what were her intentions. Had they listened when she left the harbour, and vanished into the shadows of the night, they would have heard the answer clearly enough—

*"Zum Rhein, zum Rhein, zum deutschen Rhein:  
Wir alle wollen Hüter sein."*

#### V.

Early the next morning, when the ship was outside territorial waters, a small boat came alongside, and two men clambered on board, who proved to be an officer and an engine-room artificer of the reserve.

In the evening, whilst sailing with a fair breeze near the Seaflower Channel, much perturbation was caused on board by the sight of a large steamship steering east. The schooner was at once put over on the starboard tack, and hugged the shore as closely as the surf permitted. The small islands off this coast rise sheer from the depths of the sea, and the depth of the water was therefore too great to permit of anchoring. The stranger was seen to exchange heliographic messages with an invisible consort, and it appeared evident that the two vessels must be warships. The breeze died down in the evening and deprived the *Ayesha* of any chance of stealing away under cover of night. Dawn again brought discovery, and the stranger, then some miles distant, was observed to be approaching at high speed. Fortunately the alarm was groundless, as the vessel proved to be the Dutch flagship, *De zeven Provincien*, which confined herself to accompanying the *Ayesha* at a distance until territorial waters were left behind.

It was hoped to encounter, at a particular point at sea, one or other of the German steamers recently lying in Padang. It had not been possible to make any definite arrangement, but the course which it was intended to take after leaving that port was known to the captains of these ships, and hopes were therefore entertained that one of them would follow. For three weeks the *Ayesha* cruised in the neighbourhood, and sighted only two ships, both British. One of these did not come near, but the other appeared to desire the closer acquaintance of the schooner, which was accordingly cleared for action,

as it was feared she might prove to be an auxiliary cruiser. As a token of innocence, the signal was made, "*What is the longitude?*" The steamship duly replied, but added the embarrassing question, "*Who are you?*" In response the *Ayesha* hoisted four flags selected at random, the two upper ones being knotted in the middle. Half an hour later the steamer disappeared from sight, still querulously flying the reply, "*I see your signal but cannot recognize.*"

On December 14th—the *Ayesha* being then under close canvas in cloudy, rainy weather, with a fairly high sea—a steamer with two masts and one funnel suddenly came in sight about 4,000 yards distant off the port beam.

She was steering an easterly course, which showed her to be on a special mission, as the trade routes in these waters run north and south. She was speedily recognized to be the *Choising*. As much sail was set as the schooner could carry, and red and white rockets were fired to attract her attention. After a short time she sighted the *Ayesha*, and turned in her direction, hoisting the German ensign as she did so. The crew of the *Ayesha* were in their normal paradiacal costume, and their compatriots in the *Choising*, as she sheered up through the mist, gazed with astonishment on the crowd of half naked men cheering them from the schooner's deck.

A very heavy sea was running at the time, and, as it was not possible to board, the *Choising* was ordered to follow south.

The weather grew worse, and though the *Ayesha* rode the waters like a duck, the *Choising*, which was of 1,700 tons gross, finally signalled that she could not keep on her course. Von Mücke thereupon ordered her to an appointed rendezvous near the land, and parted company.

After a furious night of storm, in which the *Ayesha* lost a good deal of her canvas, and was forced to heave to, uncertain in the blackness of the night whether she was not drifting to destruction on the islands away to leeward, the dawn broke and the storm blew itself out in a final squall.

At 9 o'clock, it being then a dead calm, the *Choising* was again sighted, and the *Ayesha* was taken in tow for the nearest island, there to transfer her crew in the lee of the land. Whilst under tow all gear was brought on deck, and the vessel prepared for sinking. Having arrived at her destination, the men and gear were duly transferred, two holes were bored in the hold, and from the security of the *Choising*'s deck, they watched the *Ayesha* slowly fill by the head until, as the ballast shifted, her stern rose almost perpendicularly in the air. A moment later and she went down like a stone and disappeared for ever. She had been their home for six weeks, and had carried them 1,700 miles in the long search for freedom.

Orders were given for the *Choising* to proceed first on a westerly and then a southerly course, and arrangements were made for housing the new additions to the crew by cleaning out one of the holds.

The steamer was not an express. At her best she could do seven and a half knots, but she was now only capable of four. This was

partly due to bad coal. The *Choising* had originally been provided for the use of the *Emden* as a collier, and had long awaited her orders at a secret rendezvous.

“Since, however, the British Admiralty had been so good as to keep the ‘Emden’ fully supplied, in the most obliging and disinterested fashion, with the best Welsh coal, destined originally for their own use at Hong Kong, there was no earthly need for us in the ‘Emden’ to make use of the bad Indian and Australian coal waiting our orders in the ‘Choising.’ In the course of detention this coal cargo had taken fire, and we were now obliged to make use of a fuel which was already half burnt.

“The ‘Choising’ also brought us some news. When we first left Padang in the ‘Ayesha’ we had no idea where we should direct our course. My first plan had been to proceed to Tsingtau, but this plan was negatived by the news received at Padang of the fall of that colony. I then thought of joining up with the ‘Konigsberg,’ although all that was known of her was that she was somewhere in the Indian Ocean. In the event of her not being there—and it was hoped to gain more precise information on this point from the ‘Choising’—I thought of landing in German East Africa. . . . After some consideration I gave up this plan as being impracticable. . . . No course now appeared open other than that of making the journey home round South Africa. . . . At last we found in one of the newspapers some mention of a fight between the Turks and the English at Scheik Seid, near Perim . . . and, after further search, came across the news of the outbreak of war between England and Turkey. Thereupon Arabia appeared to us to be the most attainable objective, and thither I determined to proceed. . . . The earlier idea of joining up with the ‘Konigsberg’ was abandoned, it having been learnt from the ‘Choising’ that she had either been sunk in battle off North Australia, or was blockaded in the Rufiji River. . . . In the latter event, she must have no coal on board, and coal we were unable to give her. The fifty men whom I could have taken would only have been so many unnecessary mouths.”

The *Choising* first stood to the south, in order to get away from the liner track, and also the region of cyclones. Attention was then given to the need for concealing her identity, which was but too clearly indicated by the black, white, and yellow paint of the Nord Deutscher Lloyd Line. She was first coated to resemble a Dutch vessel. On reflection, however, and in view of the very uncertain position of Italy with regard to the issues of the war, it was decided that the flag of that country would best conduce to non-interference by English warships when passing through the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb. It so happened that an English shipping list on board showed that a 1,700-ton English ship had been sold to a firm at Genoa, and renamed the *Shenir*. She was promptly adopted as a foster ship, her name and port duly advertised on the stern, and an Italian flag was successfully designed and manufactured by an art committee appointed *ad hoc*.

## VI.

On January 7th, 1915, the *Choising* arrived near Perim, and cruised off and on waiting for the night. A large steamer leaving Djibuti caused some moments of anxiety, but she proved to be only a French mail steamer and passed on unconcerned. At dusk, and with all lights out or masked, the ship entered the Straits at her best speed. The four boats had been fully armed, provisioned, and prepared for launching in case of need; to each of them an officer and men were told off with the one order to "follow the leader" in case the ship had to be abandoned.

The Straits are very narrow, and though the ship kept as close to the African coast as possible, thus securing the advantage of a dark background, she did not escape coming within the radius of the Perim lighthouse. Two English warships were also seen in the port exchanging Morse signals, but no patrol boats were observed in the Straits, doubtless owing to the prevalence of a stiff breeze and a moderately high sea. By great good luck the *Choising* escaped detection, and slipped through the Straits into the Red Sea, after two hours of extreme anxiety to all on board except the Chinese crew.

The ship was now kept off the ordinary steamship course, and at night-time on January 8th she approached Hodeida. Little was known of this port, but it was gathered from a popular book of travels, and also from one of the officers on board, that there had been a branch of the Hedjaz railway in course of construction there several years back. Whether this was the case or not, it was decided to call there to obtain charts of the Red Sea for use in the event of it being decided to proceed further, should this be deemed desirable in the light of such information as might be gathered.

As the ship approached the conjectured position of Hodeida a long row of electric lights was seen, which were assumed to be on the town front and at the harbour entrance. Soundings were taken and a depth of twenty fathoms reported; as this meant that the shore must be several miles distant, a new significance was given to the lights, which could hardly be those of the harbour. The *Choising* was therefore steered to the south until some miles away, the four boats were manned and lowered, and the master was given written orders to proceed in the first instance to an appointed rendezvous, and to return on each of the two succeeding nights; if the boats did not then appear he was to go on to Massowa.

The *Choising* then disappeared in the darkness, and the expedition pulled away in the direction of the coast. The boats were by no means tight, and a good deal of baling was necessary.

In the early morning the rising sun showed that the illumination of the night did not belong to the town, but to a two-masted, four funnelled French cruiser—the *Desaix*—and partly to an Italian steamship named the *Juliana!* The small regatta, now under sail, was promptly directed towards the shore, in much concern lest the manœuvre should be observed from the *Desaix*.

The flotilla was taken through the surf on the bar without mishap, and on the way to the shore a small Arab fishing boat was encountered, from the solitary occupant of which it was gathered that Hodeida was in French hands—a purely lingual misunderstanding which was cleared up later.

The boats grounded some 800 yards from the shore, rafts were improvised from masts, oars, and swimming vests, and in course of time all arms and provisions were landed. In the meantime two Arabs were seen but could not be induced to approach. A little later another appeared, this time clothed in a red-and-blue uniform, and mounted on a camel. He dismounted and watched the disembarkation from a safe distance with his rifle prepared for eventualities. He was very unwilling to allow himself to be approached, and finally remounted and disappeared at full speed in the direction of Hodeida, whose white houses were visible in the distance.

In the belief that Hodeida was in French hands, hasty preparations were now made for a march into the desert, but the exodus was forestalled by the arrival of more than a hundred armed Bedouins, who took up defensive positions in the sand dunes. The German party did the same, and awaited developments, but shortly after a number of unarmed and beckoning Arabs came out from their hiding places. A parley then took place, with endless gesticulations but no comprehension. At last, on a picture of the Kaiser being produced, one of the Arabs cried out *Aleman!* The word was a talisman. With a general cry of *Aleman* all misunderstandings disappeared, and the Germans found themselves the centre of a howling, friendly pack of Arabs, fussily anxious to assist them to carry their accoutrements and weapons to Hodeida. It was now learnt from one who spoke a little broken English that the town was in the hands of the Turks. On the way hundreds of other Bedouins were encountered, armed and ready for the fray. On being enlightened they joined the escort, and the approach to the town was made in the midst of a crowd of some 800 sympathizers, who indulged in a regular fantasia of dancing, singing, shrieking, and indiscriminate rifle firing.

On the outskirts of the town the first Turkish officer was encountered, and then others, some of whom could speak German. Great was the jubilation on both sides. The Turkish garrison was called out, and joined in the procession, which marched into the town with Colours flying, amidst the plaudits of the inhabitants.

Barracks were prepared for the use of the sailors, and the officers were installed in a house set apart for their use. From its windows, with a mind at rest, they could see the French cruiser *Desaix* lying peacefully on the blue waters miles away in the distance.

## VII.

At a conference held with the Governor of Hodeida and the Colonel of the troops, it was decided that the safest course would be to march north until the railway was reached, and to give up all idea of any further progress in the *Choising*. The Turkish authorities

stated that the land route would be clear, and that the railway could be reached in about two months' time.

In the night signals were thrice repeated to the *Choising* from the officers' quarters, notifying her of danger from the French cruiser, and ordering her to proceed forthwith to Massowa. It was learnt later that she arrived safely.

The climate of Hodeida proved very trying, and the men were soon suffering from dysentery and malaria.

On the Kaiser's birthday, a military review was held on the parade ground, followed by a feast of mutton and rice given to the seamen by the Turkish garrison, and another—also of mutton and rice—given by their Turkish *confrères* to the German officers.

It had been decided to leave Hodeida that evening, and to repair to more healthy quarters at Sanaa, there to recuperate and complete preparations for the northward march. At 5 p.m. they set forth, mounted on a motley assembly of horses, mules, and asses, and accompanied by a special caravan of pack camels. In many cases this was the seamen's first experiment in equitation; riderless quadrupeds and discomfited cavaliers were therefore much in evidence during the march, and a special duty officer had to be detailed to collect waifs and strays of this description, and to form them into a rearguard.

For three days, or rather nights, the party journeyed through a desert peopled by none but occasional bands of brigands—the terror of small caravans. One such band was encountered, but decamped on viewing the strength of the German force, which was augmented by a small escort of Turkish gendarmes. On the third day they found themselves on the edge of a mountainous region, where the peaks rose in places nearly 4,000 feet sheer from the level. The road now led over rocky slopes and along the dried up beds of the mountain torrents, emerging finally into a region of trees and bushes. On the higher summits of the hills were perched many small Arab towns, surrounded with walls, and looking much like mediaeval fortresses. Everywhere the expedition was kindly received by the Arabs and furnished with accommodation, usually in rest houses specially appropriated for Turkish troops when on the march. A few days' journey brought them ultimately to Menacha, a small town placed on the highest peak of a transverse ridge of hills, beyond which the country gradually sloped down to another plateau on which Sanaa is situated.

The expedition marched into Menacha accompanied by the Turkish garrison; a considerable number of the inhabitants, clad in picturesque costumes, escorted them into the town with songs and dances. The seamen were here housed in the barracks and the officers in an hotel, equipped with real beds. This was the only hotel encountered in Arabia.

In these quarters, from whence they saw the clouds rolling down the mountain slopes beneath them, they rested for two days. The officers spent much of this time visiting the local dignitaries. With them they sat on cushioned divans, in white-painted rooms lit by brightly-coloured windows, smoking narghilehs and drinking

the coffee of Mocha. Such conversations as took place were more amicable than enlightening. On the third day they left these hospitable surroundings and proceeded in column, sometimes at a trot, along a well-made road leading through mountain landscapes of great beauty. Seventeen days after leaving Hodeida they gazed down from the pass on the fruitful plain of Sanaa, sprinkled with villages and towns, amongst which the capital was easily distinguishable by its size. Here, again, they were met by the Turkish garrison, and made an impressive entry to the strains of *Deutschland über alles*. The French Consul, who had been detained in Sanaa as a hostage, looked down on the visitors from the balcony of his house.

Sanaa consists of three separate divisions—the Jewish, Turkish, and Arab quarters. Each of these constitutes a separate fort, surrounded by walls, and the whole town is also enclosed by an outer mud wall. Each house is a small fortress in itself, and the streets and passages are laid out in such a manner that they can be swept by rifle fire from certain fixed positions. Yemen is a very unsettled and turbulent province, and the frequent battles between the Turks and Arabs sufficiently explain the military design of its capital.

Sanaa was found to be much less healthy than had been expected. Even in the daytime it is extraordinarily cold. A few days after their arrival, 80 per cent. of the men were prostrate, a large number of them being attacked by sudden cramp and chills. After a fortnight's stay it became evident that the difficulties of the march were so great as to rule out the possibility of further progress by the land route, and it was therefore decided to march back again and try the sea once more. Another fourteen days, however, were necessary before the men were sufficiently recovered to mount their beasts, and retrace their steps to Hodeida.

### VIII.

In Hodeida arrangements were made to purchase two small shallow draft sailing vessels of the type known on the coast as a zambuk. They were about forty-five feet long by thirteen feet beam, and were rigged like a dhow. As the *Desaix* still lay in the offing, another point of departure was necessary, and choice alighted on a small bay named Jabana, north of Hodeida. The district swarmed with French and English spies, and, in order to mislead them, it was given out that the expedition would sail from Isa Bay on the 12th March. On that day, for the first time since the beginning of the war, an English gun-boat appeared off the bay visibly searching the coast.

The small squadron actually set out from Tabana on March 14th, the Commander-in-Chief in the van flying the Imperial ensign, the Rear-Admiral (Lieut. Gerdts) following in his wake. The latter officer commanded the larger of the two vessels, and was therefore entrusted with the care of the invalids. Information had been received before setting out that two British gunboats and the auxiliary cruiser *Empress of Russia* were on the blockade line Loheia—Kamaran—Zebavir—Zukur. It was necessary to break through this

line, and, in order to diminish the risk, the two boats separated, Lieut. Gerdts receiving orders to report at a more northerly rendezvous.

Daybreak found the senior flagship becalmed in the actual line of the blockade, nor did a breeze spring up till the afternoon. “ *Not, however, without intent had the departure been postponed until the end of the week, for I had learnt sufficient of the ways of Englishmen to know that they do not like working on week-ends.* ” The period of calm gave no evidence of any blockade activity, and the friendly night at last brought them safety and sleep.

On the next day the flagship sailed between the reefs of the Farisan bank, a mighty 350-mile long coral shoal, dangerous even for small vessels, and impossible for large. Her consort hove in sight in the course of the next day, and thenceforth they sailed in company.

A few Arab sailors and pilots had been shipped in the zambuks, making the total complement of each about thirty-five men. The boats were therefore very crowded, more particularly as a goodly portion of space was taken up with provisions, munitions, guns, and water. The heat of the day was warded off by woollen awnings, but these afforded only a partial protection. Cooking was carried out in a small open fire hearth, and endeavour was made to give the men a varied dietary. Thus on one day they were regaled on tough mutton, rice, and fat, on the next with rice, fat, and tough mutton, on the third with fat, tough mutton, and rice !

Frequently they had to contend with calms, contrary winds, and adverse currents. Nor were they spared more intimate conflicts, which raged most violently at night, when cockroaches, bugs, and lice were particularly mobile. Garments not actually in use were lashed together to keep them from running away. In the morning, as the sun rose, all hands took off their shirts, and there then ensued a general vermin hunt (*frühlausen*). The record was seventy-four from one shirt !

In the evening of March 17th, as night sailing had become too dangerous, the order was given for the two vessels to proceed to the lee of the small island Marka, and there anchor for the night. The leading vessel bumped very heavily over the reef, but finally reached the allotted position. The second was not so fortunate. In endeavouring to avoid one reef she ran on another, and in a few minutes nothing but her mast was visible above water; she had foundered, and that just at sunset on a moonless night ! The anchor was at once weighed by the surviving zambuk, which was sailed as fast as possible towards the scene of the disaster. The anchor was dropped at about 400 yards distance—it being too dangerous to proceed further on account of shoal water—and the small dug-out carried on board, capable at the best of carrying two men, was sent to the rescue. It was now pitch dark, and the wind so strong that neither lantern nor flares could be lit. Voices could be heard from men swimming at random in the shark-infested waters, and, as it was imperative to show a light, the hazardous expedient was adopted of

making a bonfire of wood and petroleum on board the zambuk; in course of time all the swimmers were rescued, and, ultimately, with the assistance of the two dug-outs, the wounded and officers were also retrieved. By great good luck the vessel had sunk on the edge of the reef, and the wounded and non-swimmers were able to cling to the mast. Had the wreck slipped over into deep water nothing could have saved them.

In order to take them all on board it had been necessary to jettison the great bulk of the provisions and water, and only three days' supply remained in the deeply laden vessel.

Another zambuk, belonging to the Arab tribe called Idriss, lay in the neighbourhood during the operations. These tribesmen are not well disposed to the Turks, and, though they first sent their dug-out to the rescue, they withdrew it as soon as they saw they had to do with Europeans. Shortly before daybreak, von Mücke sent his Arab dragoman on board to offer a large sum for a short charter, but he was told that not for a hundred thousand pounds would any assistance be given to the Christian dogs! Though painfully aware of the eventual possibility of political complications, von Mücke determined on force, but postponed operations till the morning. Daybreak, however, brought a smart slant of wind from the south, and it was thought best to leave the Idriss alone. A valedictory visit was paid to the sunken zambuk, and two machine-guns, as well as a portion of the arms and ammunition, were recovered by divers. The rest, including the stock of medical comforts, was irretrievably lost.

All that afternoon the vessel ran before the breeze, making capital progress, and in the evening the party landed safely at Kunfidda. They were hospitably received, and managed to charter a zambuk large enough for the whole party. A Turkish official about to return to Constantinople with his wife here attached himself to the party, and subsequently rendered good service as a dragoman.

On March 24th, without any event of note, the new zambuk reached Lidd, at the northern extremity of the Farisan bank. Beyond this it would be necessary to face the open sea, exposed to the risk of capture by the British. In Lidd a letter was shown to von Mücke, written by a merchant at Djidda, from which he learnt that Djidda was closely blockaded by a British squadron, and that all vessels, including the zambuks, were searched on passage. He concluded therefrom that further progress by sea was impossible, and abandoned the project in favour of a renewed attempt by land.

Two days were spent at Lidd preparing the caravan, and here the first of the party fell out—a seaman named Keil. He had suffered from typhoid, and the recent exposure had dealt his weakened frame the *coup de grace*. He was taken out to sea and buried with full naval honours.

## IX.

On March 28th the caravan, at first ninety camels strong, set out from Lidd, journeying by a route leading along the sea coast. The custom was to saddle up at about 4 in the afternoon, and to march

throughout the night, and on till 9 or 10 the following morning. Water was obtained from holes dug in the desert, some forty-five to fifty feet deep, from which it was drawn up in leather bottles. Round the water holes lay many bodies of dogs, sheep, etc., and the evil-smelling fluid, varying in colour from brown to black, was hardly drinkable even when boiled, and often had a strong brackish flavour.

The path lay through a district infested by brigands, and for the first part of the journey a Turkish officer and seven gendarmes marched as escort. Afterwards the expedition was handed over from one sheik to another, who were regarded as responsible for the safe conduct of the caravan whilst it proceeded through their respective jurisdictions.

On the morning of March 31st a halt was made at a waterhole one day's journey from Djidda. Here a junction was effected with a small party of Turkish gendarmes who had come out to convey greetings from the civil and military authorities of the town. At four in the afternoon they again set forward, striking somewhat inland, and following a path leading over endless sand drifts; the visible horizon was never more than 400 yards distant. The inhabitants of this district, though claiming direct descent from the offspring of the Prophet, were notorious for their addiction to robbery and violence, and it was known that parties of Bedouins roamed this stretch of country and were a terror to caravans. All precautions had been taken against an attack, but the caravan was unmolested throughout the night, although some suspicion was aroused by a group of twelve or fifteen Bedouins who passed by on the right and disappeared at a smart trot.

It was now hoped that Djidda would be reached without misadventure—an illusory hope!

As the first light of morning broke on the high mountains away on the right, a whistle was heard, which was immediately followed by a continuous crackle of musketry. The attackers were invisible, but their fire came from all sides, and the rifle flashes showed them to be barely eighty yards away. The camels were hastily forced to their knees, and the hostile fire was promptly reduced by the machine-guns, which were brought into action with good effect. As the day brightened, it could be seen that the hillocks around were black with Bedouins, of whom 300 at least were visible. Far from being disheartened at the number of their opponents, the seamen begged to be allowed to charge with fixed bayonets. The order was given to do so, and the Bedouins, greatly astonished at this departure from the accepted theory of caravan tactics, retired precipitately some 1,200 yards, followed by a heavy rifle fire.

On taking stock of the damage it was found that only one German had been wounded. Of the Arabs, several who had taken shelter behind the camels had been shot in the legs whilst endeavouring to induce the stubborn animals to kneel down. Naturally many of the camels had been killed. The four-and-twenty Turkish gendarmes were reduced to seven. The others had decamped, and were not again seen until the party arrived in Djidda. Though the total Bedouin

casualties were unknown, at least fifteen of their dead had been counted when the bayonet charge had been made.

The caravan was again formed up and the fighting men divided into four groups, two being disposed on the flanks, the others forming the van and rearguards. They were placed under the command of Lieutenants Gerdts, Gyssling, and Schmidt. Lieut. Wellmann commanded the caravan itself, the sick and wounded being in the hands of Dr. Lang. Ten minutes from the start the firing again commenced. Great numbers of Bedouins were seen by the advance guard, and the whole force was shortly after brought to a halt by the fall of one of the machine-gun camels. A strong attack was now also developing on the rearguard, and news was brought to von Mücke that the seaman Rademacher had been killed and Lieutenant Schmidt mortally wounded. Quite abruptly the firing ceased, and two of the Arabs with the caravan were then seen to be waving white flags. One of the gendarmes approached von Mücke, and informed him that he and his comrades thought it best to parley with their assailants. The pause was not unwelcome, as it was manifestly impossible to proceed under the fire of a tenfold superiority; the interval was utilized in building up a defensive position, and in placing the sick and wounded in comparative safety.

The exchange of conditions was brief. The Bedouins demanded the surrender of all arms, ammunition, food, water, and the payment of £11,000 in gold. On these conditions no further hindrance would be offered! The answer was equally curt. The caravan were guests of the country. They had no gold, and if the Bedouins wanted gold they could fetch it from Djidda. The surrender of weapons was not a German custom.

Firing again started, the caravan being now reduced in size by the defection of the dragoman and of all the remaining gendarmes and camel drivers. The fight lasted till the evening without any casualties on the German side, except as regards the camels, many of which were slain. No attack was made during the night, and the period of immunity was spent in cleaning the guns from sand-grit, digging trenches, and dragging the bodies of the dead camels to leeward of the camp.

Lieutenant Schmidt died of his wounds at 9 o'clock that evening, and was buried by his brother officers two hours later.

During the night, and before moonrise, one of the Hodeida Arabs who spoke a little English had been sent off to Djidda, eight hours' march distant. It was learnt later that he arrived safely and duly reported the position of affairs to the military authorities.

Firing again commenced at sunrise and continued all day. It was evident that this was no ordinary affair but one which had been carefully engineered beforehand. From the camp there were visible two large zambuks anchored off the coast and in constant communication with the Bedouins. Large numbers of camels could also be seen grazing in the distance, and it seemed clear that the attacking party was made up of two forces, one of which had been transported by sea.

Two men were badly wounded during the day, including a stoker named Lanig, who died in the course of the night. No other event of note occurred, but the caravan suffered severely from the heat and from the effluvia of the dead camels to leeward. The trenches swarmed with huge blackbeetles, busily engaged in dragging camel dung all over the camp. As fast as they were destroyed others took their place, and a new fear arose that their loathsome activities would introduce the deadly bacillus of tetanus amongst the wounded men.

Throughout the day the wind-blown sand fell on the sweating camp and plastered the faces of the men till they became almost unrecognizable. High overhead, scenting their pastures, twenty or thirty vultures wheeled slowly in the unchanging blue.

The second night was very much a repetition of the first. Hyenas and jackals were heard prowling round the camp and were fired on by the sentries, who mistook them for Bedouins. On the third day matters had become desperate. The water supply was sufficient for but one day more, and orders were therefore given to break a way through at any cost if relief did not arrive by the evening. The sick and wounded would have to be left behind; those who fell by the way would have to lie where they dropped.

Towards midday another envoy from the Bedouins appeared. He announced that the caravan might go free on payment of £22,000 in gold, retaining its weapons, provisions, and water. Von Mücke endeavoured to delay the parley as long as possible, and spoke in confident terms of his power to resist a long siege. His water supply was good for four weeks, and he still had heaps of ammunition!

The bluff seemed to have some effect, and the envoy departed in doubt, only however, to return again with the same conditions. In order to gain yet more time he was told to go away and bring back with him the Chief of the Bedouins, so that the matter might be personally debated between the two leaders. This suggestion was not effective, and after indulging in some wild threats the envoy moved off. A few angry volleys now came from the Bedouins, followed by a dramatic silence. Half an hour passed away, then an hour. Nothing was heard, nothing could be seen. Eventually two strangers appeared mounted on richly caparisoned camels, and waving a white flag. At fifty yards distance they dismounted and told the interpreter that they were emissaries of the Emir of Mecca, who had heard of the attack and was sending his troops to the rescue. They asked to be brought to the leader of the caravan.

Not without suspicion of their good faith, von Mücke, with drawn sword, went out to meet them, having first given instructions that, if he were attacked, fire was to be opened at once without regard to his personal safety. The envoys informed him that Abdullah, the second son of the Emir, was now close to the camp, and their report was confirmed shortly after by the appearance of some seventy camel riders bearing with them a dark-red banner bedecked with golden texts from the Koran. Abdullah then rode forward, and expressed his father's regrets for the attack on the caravan. A much-needed supply of water was produced, and the whole party soon afterwards

evacuated the camp, and were on the forward march again. Little had its leader ever dreamt that he, a Christian, would ride through the desert beneath the banner of the Prophet, with the son of the Emir of Mecca by his side!

That evening they rested by a hot spring welling up from the earth not far from the sea coast, and indulged in much-needed ablutions. From their camp they saw away out at sea a restless searchlight probing the darkness of the night. "*Our friends, the English, before Djidda!"*

A friendly reception was given the party in Djidda, and the sick and wounded were taken to a moderately well equipped military hospital.

Notwithstanding the fact that the masts of the English blockading squadron could be frequently seen from the shore, it was deemed best to take to the sea again. On the night of April 8th they set sail in a newly-purchased zambuk. The breeze was fair and steady, and by sunrise they had slipped without misadventure through the blockade. The Arab English-speaking pilot had an excellent knowledge of the channels, and the zambuk was kept hugging the coast, and dodging behind the reefs, in order to make the task of a pursuer as difficult as possible. At night, when sailing was too hazardous, the vessel was anchored near shoal water by means of a couple of grapnels which were fixed between blocks of coral by Arab divers.

Off the coast, which is very sparsely populated, an occasional native was encountered, who usually proved nothing loth to exchanging the fish in his dug-out for a supply of rice.

The few sailing vessels encountered on passage were vastly astonished to be greeted by a vociferous yell from fifty German throats, it being the custom, when Arab sailing vessels meet each other, for their respective crews to give each other a friendly howl of salutation.

Without event of note Sherm Munnaiburra was eventually reached, and though it had been originally intended to finish the voyage at El Weg, some ten miles north, everyone showed a disinclination to sail further. These ten miles were in open water, and the risk of capture at the eleventh hour could not be ignored. The zambuk was therefore sent on independently in charge of the Arab crew, and the short journey to El Weg was made on foot. Three days after arrival there, i.e., on May 2nd, the party set forth from El Weg, fully equipped as a caravan, under the leadership of Sheik Suleiman. In the earlier stages the way led through the familiar landscape of the desert, but finally the hills were reached and the scenery improved. A better quality of water was got from the springs, and all looked forward to the alluring prospect of a bath in the running water of the mountain streams.

Profiting from the painful experience of the past, the party always retired to rest in a properly prepared lager, with machine-guns in position and loaded rifles ready to hand. No fires were lit, although the nights were very cold, for fear of attracting unwelcome visitors.

During the final stage of the journey to El Ula Sheik Suleiman was joined by large numbers of his tribesmen, many of whom acted

as scouts and vedettes in the van and on the flanks of the caravan. These precautions were taken as there was reason to suppose that the Sheik of the district they were now entering was hostile, and might swoop down from the mountain passes at any moment. Fortunately he happened to be engaged on a predatory expedition away to the north, and no opposition was encountered. Now that El Ula was so near, von Mücke decided to ride in advance of his party, together with the Sheik and his two sons, and make arrangements with the railway authorities. The little town was entered towards midday. To their great delight, not only was a special train found to be awaiting them, but also a banquet at which, for the first time for many months, they drank the wine of their native land. A few hours later the caravan approached the town, and was met by von Mücke, who led them in with Colours flying. A few more hours were spent refreshing the inner, and refurbishing the outer man, and then the train rolled northward at twenty miles an hour and all troubles were forgotten!

On two occasions the train was left, as the railway track was still incomplete, and a short journey made on foot, but otherwise their passage was uninterrupted. The long route by Damascus and Aleppo, and so through Asia Minor to Constantinople, was a veritable triumph, everybody vying to do them honour, and to load them with presents. In Aleppo, for the first time for ten months, a mail from home was received and also the Iron Cross!

On the afternoon of Whit Sunday the train entered the station of Haidar Pasha.

Admiral Souchon, the Senior Officer of the German Mediterranean Squadron and Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Fleet, had come thus far with his staff to receive the wanderers.

With his men drawn up in line, and with the much worn Colours flying on the left, Lieut.-Commander von Mücke made his brief report to the Admiral :—

*"I respectfully report present the landing party from the 'Emden,' five officers, seven petty officers, and thirty-seven men strong."*

## A GERMAN CAPTAIN'S NARRATIVE OF THE RUSH TOWARDS PARIS.

Retold by THOMAS F. A. SMITH, Ph.D.,  
*Author of "The Soul of Germany" and "What Germany Thinks."*

THE Kaiser's mobilization order overtook Captain Heinrich Heubner<sup>1</sup> while he was imbibing various glasses of beer in the market place of a small town in the Harz Mountains. After hurriedly shaking a few friends by the hand, he says, I ran home, where my kit had been ready packed for some days past. The next train to my garrison town started at 8 p.m., and on that evening I learned what it meant to tear oneself from wife and child. My brave wife and our two eldest boys accompanied me to the station, and soon afterwards the train rolled away towards an uncertain, yet certainly a great future. But the dawn of that future was for the moment accompanied by numerous unpleasantnesses. Instead of keeping my luggage with me, I had it registered to my home garrison, with the result that I got it a week later in Liège. Then there was no train, and none of the officials knew when one would start. Still, after various changes and hours of waiting, I arrived at my destination early next morning.

The second day, a Sunday, was occupied with all kinds of military duties. I reported myself at the regimental headquarters and was allotted to the 2nd Company as First Officer. To my great joy my captain was also a reserve officer whom I knew well from manoeuvres in former years. At 8 p.m. the battalions forming the regiment assembled in the various barrack yards. The Divisional Chaplain delivered a short but moving address, after which we marched through the crowded streets to the station where a train stood in readiness for each battalion.

Up till then we were absolutely in the dark as to whether we were being sent against France or Russia. Of course every one of us hoped that it would be our fate to fight against the French. The younger officers were already dreaming of French wines and all the other glories of *la belle France*. Hence there was an outburst of joy when we saw by the engine that we were going towards the West. Our train started at about 10 p.m. amid the hurrahs of thousands who had gathered round the station.

Thus began our never-to-be-forgotten journey in the darkness through the plains and valleys of Germany. Every railway station

<sup>1</sup> Heinrich Heubner: *Unter Emmich vor Lüttich. Unter Kluck vor Paris.* (With Emmich at Liège. Under Kluck before Paris.) Heubner is a captain of the reserve, and in civilian life a professor in the classical school at Wernigerode.

through which we passed was crowded with the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages, and again and again we were woken up by their joyous shouts and greetings. Our journey to the West lasted twenty-six hours, and the farther we travelled the higher ran the popular enthusiasm. We passed through Magdeburg, Brunswick, Hildesheim, and Hamelin. At the last-named place we were served with coffee and rolls, and in Dortmund we officers hurriedly swallowed a luxurious meal in the refreshment room. The enthusiasm was greatest in Düsseldorf, where we stopped for half an hour. From the station we were able to look down on to a large square in which many thousands were standing cheering us unceasingly. Every house in the beautiful Rhine city was decorated with flags, and just as our ancestors a hundred years ago, so we, too, greeted the great German river with never-ending shouts of jubilation.

As far as the Rhine the weather had been fine, but from that point it rained heavily. Late in the evening of August 3rd we stopped near Aix-la-Chapelle and had to march half an hour in torrents of rain to our quarters in the village of H—, where we snatched a few hours' sleep. We were off on the following morning at a quarter to six, but we had no idea how many we were or what task lay before us. After a five-hours' march in the rain we reached the frontier village E—, and were very much astonished as well as pleased to learn that we had to invade Belgian territory. It gave us quite a curious feeling when the order to load our rifles was given and the rattle of numerous rifle locks brought home to us the seriousness of the hour. We crossed the frontier at 10.15 a.m., August 4th, and that was the commencement of a period of tremendous strain and many hardships—but a time, too, full of world-historic grandeur.

Not a single Belgian soldier was to be seen. We passed through the industrial towns of L— and V—, the last-named a seat of industry and beautifully situated in a deep valley surrounded by hills. The road led up hill and down dale, and on all sides our brigade—for we numbered no more—was received in a very friendly manner by the inhabitants, of whom, it is true, a good percentage were Germans. Apparently the Belgians were completely astonished by our sudden invasion, and were unable for the moment to comprehend the situation. Troops who marched along the same route later were fired upon by civilians, and it was necessary for German cannon to drive the lessons of international law into the excited populace with shells and shrapnel. But, as already mentioned, we were well treated; the soldiers were given cigars, fruit, milk, and beer, while one French lady came up to me with the words: "*Monsieur, vous êtes notre ennemi, mais malgré . . .*" and handed me a glass of beer.

After a two hours' rest in the town our long marching column wound its way out of the narrow streets by tortuous paths up to the top of the heights. Arrived there the field-kitchen was drawn up by four horses, and we enjoyed our first meal prepared by that admirable institution. The same night we were quartered in a village; four other officers and myself were billeted in the house of the *curé*.

We stopped up chatting pretty late, but I had hardly got to sleep when I was woke up by a great noise of shooting and screaming in front of the house. We got into our uniforms and rushed down-stairs, but found the street door locked. I hastened back to my window and called to our men to break down the door, but on returning found the door open and was met by the priest with a smile on his innocent-looking face. Meanwhile, a heavy fire came from the hills around, so the brigade took up positions on all the roads leading into the village to resist any attacks by Belgian troops.

Several companies—among them my own—remained in the village to protect the baggage. Wounded began to arrive in the market-place, and in the pale light of a lantern a Belgian civilian was led past with his hands bound to his back. It was the burgomaster of the treacherous village, who had been arrested as a ringleader, and, needless to say, he did not escape the punishment deserved.

The brigade waited for some time, expecting an attack from Belgian troops, but as nothing happened we marched out in a long column with the ammunition waggons, etc., in the middle. That march in a pitch-dark night is very vivid in my memory. As the day dawned we entered a more undulating district. Incidentally I found myself in the vanguard. In the distance we could see more hills, while a field-path twisted upwards and disappeared behind thick bushes. At the last turn of this path several dark moving dots could be distinguished. They were the first Belgian soldiers whom we fell in with, in their dark uniforms. After firing a few shots at 1,200 yards' range they disappeared behind the hedges.

Taking advantage of every bit of cover I crept up with the men, and to our surprise found, on the spot where the Belgians had been seen, a knapsack—our first booty in the war.

The way which we had come led straight into what looked like an unoccupied village. But when we came round the last corner a number of Belgian infantry, with an officer, sprang out and fired rapidly at us. We stormed through the narrow streets on to the village square round which the principal buildings were situated. The village appeared deserted, shutters up, doors locked, and no enemy in sight.

From the other end of the village we could see hostile infantry at a considerable distance in full flight along a park wall.

On rising ground opposite there was a second large village, about a mile and a half distant, and the Belgian troops were just disappearing into it. We waited till our company had all come up and then proceeded to search the château and afore-mentioned park for concealed enemies. But there were no signs of life, so we had to break the doors open to gain admission. In searching the château our men found the unhappy castellan, who, in my opinion, was perfectly innocent. Therefore I intervened just as they were about to make short work of him, and saved his life.

While passing through the village single shots had been fired at us from some of the houses. The male inhabitants were fetched out of them, and our soldiers were none too gentle in dealing with

this Walloon rabble. We were soon—to our cost—to make the nearer acquaintance of these black-haired, cunning, physically degenerate people. Four peasants were driven along with kicks and blows with the butt-ends of rifles; of course, protesting their innocence all the time.

Pursuing the retreating enemy, we came to F——, another flourishing village, also with a large château surrounded by a park. We advanced in firing formation, but were compelled, owing to artillery fire, to take cover in a thick wood on the slope of a valley where we lay for nearly an hour, keeping the four peasants with us. On entering F—— a halt was made, knapsacks thrown off, rifles stacked, and the men stood around chatting and eating. I turned to get something out of my knapsack, which was on a window-ledge, when suddenly there was a blinding flash above my head and a tremendous detonation. Turning round I saw six of my men dead and fourteen lying wounded in their blood on the road. The first Belgian shell fired at my regiment had taken its toll.

Some of us went into the next house, a grocer's shop. In reply to my remark, "Your countrymen are very kind to us!" the shopkeeper merely gave me a glance full of hate. Meanwhile most of the soldiers crowded into the yard behind the house like a panic-stricken herd, and a moment later another well-aimed shell exploded right over the yard, spreading death and destruction among our people. After a little time, however, we succeeded in getting the rifles and knapsacks from the street, and both companies marched off towards the next village, leaving a few men to look after the wounded. I do not know how it happened, but I remained behind.

In any case we endeavoured to get the injured under cover; their groans and screams echo in my ears even to-day. Unfortunately there was only one experienced ambulance man and not enough materials to dress the wounds of the bad cases—more than twenty of them. There was no water handy, and it could only be fetched in a dirty condition from the other side of the street at great risk. I decided, therefore, to hunt up the next dressing-station, which could not be far away, in order to find medical men and attendants.

So I borrowed a bicycle from a Belgian family and left the scenes of horror to follow in the track of the two advancing companies. The ride was not exactly agreeable, for in the meantime a violent artillery duel had commenced between the Belgian guns which had sent us the first messengers of death (we learned later that they were in an advanced, concealed position between two of the Liège forts) and our artillery, which was placed to the side of the wood along which I was riding. The ambulance station was about three hundred yards behind our guns, and I got there without mishap.

I had to cycle along that way several times, and took the opportunity to visit the artillery observation post. A lieutenant lay there in a pit connected by telephone with the guns. "One hundred yards too short," "fifty yards to the left," were the kind of messages passed over the wire to the battery in action. Among the wounded in the dressing-station lay the gallant commander of our battalion,

wounded in several places by shrapnel bullets. But after being hit he had still had the force of will to swing himself on to his horse and bring the two companies under cover. I found the latter in a meadow behind some massively-built houses. They were again under artillery fire, and the aim was so exact that we were convinced someone in the village was betraying our position to the enemy by signals, for we were behind the last house and invisible to the enemy. By order of the new commander of the battalion, I proceeded with a sergeant and a group of men to search the village. It was situated on a hill, and it would have been perfectly easy to send signals to the Belgian artillery from the commanding church-tower. Of course the village was quite deserted. But just before the church, in a beautiful garden on our left, we saw two men hurrying from a house at the end of the garden.

On my shouting "Halt!" and presenting my revolver, they stopped and turned out to be the burgomaster and his son-in-law. We gave them a good fright, threatening them with immediate death if they did not keep the villagers from treachery.

After this incident we continued our way to the church, at the door of which a portly priest appeared, who, as a matter of course, protested his innocence, assuring us that he had only been reading a harmless mass. We were ourselves still too innocent and inexperienced, otherwise we should have arrested him and the burgomaster.

Somewhat irritated at the fruitlessness of our labours we marched back through the village. On the way the sergeant, who was quite beside himself, arrested another priest who was standing before his house, and whose facial expression was little calculated to arouse confidence.

Then an honest butcher, who was so indiscreet as to peep through a crack in his shop-door, was seized by the collar by my sergeant—who in his rage began to joke with me about it—and compelled him to accompany us in his velvet slippers. I was curious to see what would come of it, and determined to intervene if things should take a serious turn, for the men were, in my opinion, quite innocent. And, as a matter of fact, the sergeant reported that these two scoundrels had given treacherous signals, and begged the battalion-commander's permission to shoot them.

Meanwhile the priest, who understood a little German, and guessed from the excited faces of our men that no good was intended him, had knelt down, and, with hands and face turned heavenwards, was murmuring prayers. Just then I interfered and protested against the shooting of the men, of whose innocence I was fully convinced. They were then dismissed, and thanked me with silent glances for their rescue.

Captain Heubner adds that, although some priests were guilty of treachery, he is still convinced that many innocent persons lost their lives through the "white-heat rage" of the German soldiery.



The author goes on to describe the

#### FALL OF LIÈGE.

My company, he says, was second in the column. The company marching before us had just disappeared round the corner, when, just as I was about twenty steps from a large red house standing near a factory to my left, a terrific fire was poured on to us from all the windows in the house and the factory. The men behind me at once returned the fire, and so for the fraction of a second I had the agreeable feeling that I might be shot either from the front or the rear. There was nothing to do but lie down.

For about half a minute—which seemed to me an eternity—I lay still while bullets struck the earth all round me. Every moment I expected the fatal head-wound (*Kopfschuss*), and, in fact, one bullet grazed my left temple. At last the fire from the house and factory died down, and, after repeated orders to cease fire, our men stopped too.

After placing all the males from the two buildings already mentioned against the nearest wall and putting a fusillade into them, we deployed, and the first proper battle began for our brigade in the Belgian campaign and in the great war. Our regiment advanced to the right behind the red house, while the brigade-regiment remained on the road in reserve.

The Belgians were hidden in an orchard beyond the turn in the road and dug themselves in, in trenches running parallel and one above the other. In front of this position they had erected wire entanglements. We were met with a murderous fire from this position, causing immediate and heavy losses. My company was thrown out far to the right, and we came off pretty lightly.

After the struggle had lasted for about half an hour, the Belgians were hurled back and disappeared behind the houses of the next village, which was quite near. A part of the brigade-regiment and a company from ours had reached this village by the road. They, too, came under a heavy fire. A Belgian battalion was defending it under cover of a strong barricade. It was here, close to the enemy, that both our gallant colonel and a major from the brigade-regiment fell.

When the fight had died down there was a truce of several hours to bury the fallen, and we had a great number of them. It was after this fight that I had my first view of a real battlefield. Our fallen men and officers lay in all kinds of positions. One n.c.o. lay at his observation post just as if he were alive. A dead rifleman sat with his back against a tree, giving the impression that he slept.

But behind the barricade the Belgian battalion stood like a black wall, ready for more battle if we desired it. The brigade-commander, however, considering the heavy losses, thought it best for the present to withdraw the brigade from the village, and so—severely shaken by the death of our regimental chief and the loss of so many brave soldiers—we began a retreat.

Thereby the brigade got into considerable disorder—the companies were completely mixed up—and I determined to take the half-company

which was with me to protect our machine-gun section and the munition-baggage, which were without any covering infantry.

A halt was made and the field-kitchen brought up. In spite of the prevailing depression amongst us we made a good meal.

Sitting close by the road were eight Belgian civilians with their hands bound. They were men of various ages, from 17 to 60, who had been caught with weapons in their hands, and were awaiting the decision as to what fate would be theirs. About that there could be no two opinions, but still it was an awful moment when a group of infantry approached, made them stand up, then covered them with their rifles, while the unhappy, cowering victims of their own country's errors held their hands before their terrified faces till they were stretched on the earth by some well-aimed shots, falling one over the other like a heap of tin soldiers. Although we had only been a few days under arms, we had become so hardened that we calmly ate our meal by the side of the corpses.

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The next morning (August 7th) the advance on Liège was continued, says the author, in bright, warm sunshine. Our company was leading the brigade, and I, as leader of the first platoon, was at its head. Our march took us once more over the battlefield of the previous day. Several rows of dead comrades were lying under the trees, among them our colonel with a green wreath at his head. Two mass-graves had been dug to receive the dead. Artillery fire of continually increasing violence sounded on our left. It came from one of the forts and the other side of the village.

We marched through the village of R—, then turned down a road at right angles, which was completely blocked by the guns of the X— artillery regiment. The road led, as it afterwards turned out, straight to F—, one of the most powerful Liège forts. As we turned into this road I was surprised to see the artillerymen sitting or ducking under the gun-carriages and horses. "Now, then, children, what is the matter? Why are you sitting under your wagons?" "Mr. First-lieutenant will soon see if he goes a bit farther," answered one.

The words had hardly passed his lips when a shell whizzed above us, exploding thirty steps to the rear. But what was the use; I had orders to proceed to the end of the village street. An order is an order, and must be carried out; so we made our way between the horses and guns, while shrapnel exploded above, before, and behind us, pouring down a deadly hail of bullets.

At the exit of the village a battery was in position by the side of the last house, heavily engaged with the fort. I took shelter behind the house, and for two hours had the pleasure of enjoying the magnificent spectacle of an artillery duel. The enemy's fire followed at short, regular intervals, and we knew it was coming by the chief of the battery commanding: "Decken!" ("Cover!") A few seconds later the projectile fell either in our immediate neighbourhood or exploded on the roofs of the houses.

Remarkable to relate, in spite of the terrific cannonade, our losses were relatively small. After two hours' intense bombardment the enemy fire became gradually weaker, and the brigade assembled outside the village in the valley on the other side of which stood the fort. The valley lay in the fire zone of the enemy's artillery; but if we found it difficult to understand why we had to leave cover in order to be led, so to say, before the mouths of the Belgian cannon—we really thought we were dreaming when the word was passed along: "We march direct into Liège!"

We had been standing under the heaviest artillery fire, and had by no means received the impression that we had made progress or silenced the enemy fire. Yet all at once we were to march into this powerful fortress as victors! It was beyond a mystery, but still it was true. No doubt military history will give in due course the scientific explanation of this remarkable phenomenon.

The weather, which had been sunny and clear in the morning, had changed towards mid-day and a fine, steady rain set in, and our entrance into Liège was marked by torrents of rain. At first we marched through one of those ugly industrial suburbs such as one meets with in Germany, in Westphalia, and so on. Then our view of the beautiful city, lying on both banks of the Meuse, became more extended. The inhabitants were standing on the pavements and in the streets in thousands, some faces betraying curiosity and others black hate.

Finally a halt was called in a steep street to the left of the citadel, and there we waited, wet to the skin, till quarters were found in a large dancing hall.

We had hoped to remain for some time in these airy quarters, but the higher command had ruled otherwise. The extraordinary situation demanded special precautions: a great and rich city had capitulated, although the ring of twelve forts was still in the hands of the enemy. Our small forces had thus not only the task of suppressing any outbreak on the part of the inhabitants, who were seething with hate, but also to prevent and defeat any attacks which the garrisons in the forts might undertake against us.<sup>1</sup>

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During our sojourn in Liège there was no cessation in the thunder of cannon all round the town. The noise of the guns in the forts was continuous as well as the distant roar of Krupp's 42-cm. howitzers, succeeded by overwhelming detonations as their shells got home on the forts. In a few days they completed their terrible work of destruction. By August 16th all the forts were in our hands, hence our march continued in a northerly direction from Liège. On that morning I was put in charge of the 9th Company. Our brigade was detached from the so-called "Army of the Meuse," under General von Emmich, and joined up to the IIIrd Brandenburg Army Corps. For some

<sup>1</sup> The rush of the German captain's narrative is tempered by a stay of some days in Liège; then on August 18th he says they were again on the dusty roads, a tired column rolling northwards.

time we had been wondering why we had seen practically nothing of the Belgian Army. But the following day brought with it another serious engagement.

What struck us most of all was the astonished, frightened look on the faces of the inhabitants, who had not expected such a rapid German advance, and now saw with amazement and terror the endless columns of field-grey pouring by.

Suddenly my company was ordered to advance in open order through a wood on the right. When we had passed through the wood a wide stretch of pastureland, traversed by ditches and damnable barbed wire, lay before us. Some distance away it was intersected by a railway bank, and, beyond that, by a pretty wide canal; the only bridge over it had been partly destroyed by the Belgians.

As soon as we were clear of the wood, bullets from an invisible enemy began whizzing about our ears. On our left and right were other battalions, and we advanced on a wide front to the canal, which we had to cross singly, like rope-walkers, with the help of the destroyed bridge. The enemy was already giving ground on the right, and with little trouble we succeeded in driving back this advance guard of the Belgian Army on to their main positions.

Several hundred prisoners were taken in N—, which was occupied by our right wing, and soon several houses were ablaze, for treacherous shots had been fired from them at our troops. After we had occupied the hill which rose with a gentle slope behind the village, there was a pause in the fighting, and we were able to observe how our artillery assailed the next enemy positions with a terrific fire. For half an hour a veritable storm of shells and shrapnel was poured on to the Belgians. Towards evening we heard heavy rifle fire, followed by shouts of "Hurrah!"—a sure sign that our men had stormed the enemy's lines.

A short march through a side valley brought us near to the scene of the fight. We made a short halt before a village; a few hundred yards to the left lay the enemy trenches, which the X— regiment of the Schleswig-Holstein Army Corps had stormed. Only few prisoners had been taken, mostly well-set-up Flemings. Bundles of straw were fetched in the hope that we should bivouac at this point, when the order to advance was brought.

We marched in the darkness past the blazing village of N—. It was a gruesome yet magnificent spectacle to see the flames striking heavenward. The blaze lit up our route for a long time, inspiring sad and serious reflections. Hence we found it doubly agreeable when at last we bivouacked on a field of stubble near to some captured enemy trenches which were still full of mutilated Belgian soldiers. It was a night of horror; on all sides burning villages; near to us the corpses of our enemies, and hundreds of unmilked cows lying in the country round.

Our first duty on the following day, August 19th, was the sad task of burying the dead Belgian and German soldiers. The appalling effect of our artillery fire was evident in the shocking wounds inflicted.

Some of the men who had taken part in the storm told us that, in spite of the devastating artillery fire, the Belgians had defended the trenches with great gallantry, firing on the advancing infantry to the last moment. These, too, had suffered considerable losses.

The trenches were deepened and then used as graves; the silent warriors resting side by side in death just as they had fought shoulder to shoulder in life.

Before reaching Louvain we bivouacked near a large well-built village, and here we had the wettest and merriest evening in the whole campaign. Some of our battalion water-carriers discovered a wine-cellar in the village. On going into a cellar they noticed a stack of faggots, and guessed that they were put there with a purpose. The faggots were quickly cleared away, and behind them appeared a door. It led to a cellar filled with thousands of bottles of wine. They loaded themselves inside and out with the precious liquid, so that it is no wonder they walked into camp with unsteady gait.

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Louvain, which afterwards attained so sad a fame, received us in quite a friendly manner. The inhabitants put vessels of drinking water in the streets. During a long halt in one of the suburbs they willingly brought us food, drinks, and cigars.

Towards evening we marched past a splendid red sandstone building, the Congo Museum. It is surrounded by a beautiful park, through the trees of which we caught glimpses of the royal palace, Tervueren. Soon afterwards we entered the southern suburbs of the Belgian capital. The streets re-echoed the tramp of thousands of feet and the marching-songs of the troops. Thousands of the inhabitants lined the streets, watching the endless columns with curiosity and dismay.

It was quite dark when our regiment marched on to a large drill-ground before the barracks of two crack cavalry regiments. We had hoped to spend a few days in the beautiful and luxurious capital. But the soldier thinks and the General decides otherwise; we had to leave Brussels the following morning.

#### FIRST FIGHT WITH THE ENGLISH.

Belgian ladies donned mourning and the Belgian flag waved in defiance on many buildings, says Captain Heubner, but he and his men hastened away to Mons. August 23rd, he continues, brought us into touch with the hated English.

A report came that about 30,000 English were in position on the other side of the canal, and our two divisions had to attack them. Our regiment was in reserve in a forest intersected by a railway. As we marched to our position in the forest we could hear the rattle of rifle-fire and the thunder of artillery in the distance. But we were soon ordered forward.

We marched over a railway crossing, and at the quick step along the wide, dusty street of a large village with a burning August sun

overhead, while the kindly villagers handed our men supplies of water and fruit.

A short halt was called under the high wall of a park, and there we learned to our great joy that the artillery had successfully bombarded the station at J—, near Mons, thus preventing the detrainment of English troops. In advancing we passed the munition wagons of our heavy artillery, then, taking a path to the left, crossed meadows straight for the village. A part of it was already in flames, and the rifles were crackling in the park of a large château on the right.

Large numbers of wounded were carried past us; they were from the gallant X— regiment, which had stormed forward on its own, and, after heavy street fighting, had captured the station and some factories. We lay down for a short time while our artillery continued to pour shells into the village. Cries of jubilation greeted a well-aimed shot which took away the top of the church-tower with the Belgian flag fluttering on top and set the tower on fire.

It was nearly seven o'clock before the English, who had obstinately defended the place, evacuated it and retreated at top speed. They had had their first taste of the *furor teutonicus*. Our regiment did not come under fire again that day, but now we rushed forward and crossed the canal by an excellent bridge which our pioneers had erected. On the other side were the ruins of the railway station; a little further on we saw the first English prisoners—a corporal and eight men—sitting with their backs against a wall. Our men were standing round gazing at the helpless Britons. I must admit that they made an exceedingly good impression—strongly-built, sun-burnt, well-equipped soldiers. I was sorry that I could not speak English, but a one-year volunteer<sup>1</sup> noticed my embarrassment and offered to interpret. This young soldier then narrated this extraordinary story: "I know the second prisoner from the left quite well; he is an old school friend of mine. My parents lived in England for twenty years, and we sat on the same school-bench together. We have met again here, but, it is true, under very different circumstances." The world is indeed small!

The farther we penetrated into the village the traces of the fight became more evident. Large buildings had been literally riddled by the German shells; the rifle bullets had split the red bricks in the houses, and as we turned a street corner there lay before us the first dead Englishman. In a signalman's cottage we found quite a number of the enemy's dead, for it is said that the British—if it is at all possible—carry the dead as well as the wounded into cover.

It was an industrial village, but the streets were quite deserted. Beyond it the country sloped upwards to various single hills, on the highest of which we could plainly see a huge stone obelisk, topped by a gilded object. We recognized the gigantic granite monument

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<sup>1</sup> All young Germans who pass a certain examination at the end of the sixth class in a State Secondary School get the privilege of serving only one year in the German Army. They have to bear the entire expenses of the year's training, and are called *Einjährige-Freiwillige*.

erected by the French in memory of their victory over the Austrians at the battle of Jemappes, 1792.

Our battalion encamped at the foot of the obelisk. But while the shadows of evening fell upon the landscape our artillery advanced to pursue the retreating English with their fire. On the left the neighbouring division was still hotly engaged with them. They were only able to force a passage over the canal, which the English had defended with obstinate bravery, and were now endeavouring to drive the enemy out of the factories, woods, colliery-buildings, and villages, in order to come into line with our division. Across there the fire swelled to one long tremendous roar, then weakened, and after sunset ceased entirely. I shall never forget the scene, nor our own feelings, as we sat around on the monument steps. We felt a kind of mad joy that at the first set-to the hated English had got some good German blows and been hurled back.

But we were compelled to admit that these English mercenaries—whom many of us before the war had looked down upon with disparagement and contempt—had in every case fought valiantly and tenaciously. This was sufficiently obvious from the heavy losses which our German troops had suffered here.

After a hurried meal from the field-kitchen, we marched on a good distance in the waning light, in spite of the day's exertions. The English, however, had vanished; so the regiment assembled in the long, desolate street of a neighbouring village for a halt. We all sank absolutely exhausted on the cobble-stones, and very soon loud snoring sounded between the long rows of houses.

It was by no means inspiriting when an order was brought for us to return and act as a cover for the heavy guns. It seemed as if our superiors were determined that we should be quite pumped out, for the march back through blazing Jemappes to the village of G—— was an endless, racking strain. Our feet and legs almost refused to fulfil their functions; no word was spoken, and we rejoiced when, after two hours, a halt was called.

Towards midnight we arrived at G——, where the heavy artillery had marched up; guards and double sentries were detailed, and we looked for quarters. After a long search and much hammering of doors I found excellent quarters for four of us in the house of a frightened but very obliging schoolmaster. After I had got to bed the good man brought me a bottle of red wine and some roast beef which his wife had just prepared. During the whole campaign I have seldom slept so well and comfortably as in the house of these good people.

The first day of the great battle with the English, of which our fight was only a part, was a Sunday. With us Sunday came to be synonymous with *Schlachttag* (battle-day), for nearly every important engagement fell on that day. On the first day our regiment had not actually gone into action, but what we had missed was more than made good on Monday, August 24th.

First of all we had to cover again the long march of the night before, and while on the road we could hear the roar of battle ahead. Our regiment was allotted the task of driving the English out of

the village F——, in which they had employed all sorts of devices to defend the houses. The village stood on a moderate height before us; on the left it turned back almost at right angles, while on the right a number of factories and collieries stretched down the slope. Open, stubble land rose gently between these two wings to the village.

While our battalion halted behind a huge slag heap, the other two battalions of our regiment were heavily engaged with the enemy. From our covered position we could see the English projectiles exploding with great exactness above our comrades, but they were already pushing forwards, and finally our turn came too. We had hardly swerved into the open when English bullets began to whistle round our heads. We at once advanced in open formation, while a battery came up on the right and, after a short duel, silenced the enemy's guns, but his rifle-fire increased in violence, and we had to cross 1,200 yards of open field.

Here and there one or other of our men sank with a short scream or dragged themselves groaning to the rear. Finally we rushed to a railway bank, across the top of which the enemy's bullets fled through the air like swarms of bees. But we could not lie there for ever; the two first battalions were heavily engaged about 300 yards in advance of the railway, and badly in need of our support. So I yelled the order: *Sprung auf, marsch! marsch!* (Up and forwards!)

A veritable hail of bullets greeted us as we rushed over the bank. Then we advanced by short rushes; throwing ourselves flat after each short rush we worked our way into the first line. While our artillery was hurling shells into the village and into the factories on the right we climbed the height and entered the village from behind. Just as on the previous day, however, the English had completely vanished. They must have run at an extraordinary speed. We got into the houses through the back gardens and by breaking open doors and windows, for everything was locked and bolted; the English had even put sand-bags against the cellar windows. In order to get into the street we had to break open the front doors, and I was nearly shot by my own men in the process, for they mistook me for an Englishman trying to escape.

Three of the enemy's wounded were discovered, two of whom were able to walk, but the third had had his shin-bone shattered by a bullet and lay in great pain behind a house. As we put a first dressing on the wound he screamed in agony under our clumsy, inexperienced fingers, but nevertheless he managed to stammer his "thank you."

Thus ended our second day in the great battle of Maubeuge,<sup>1</sup> and again we had driven the English out of their fortified positions, although we had to attack across the open. It is true our losses had been heavy, but so had theirs. We had discovered that the British are brave and doughty opponents, but our Army had inspired in them a tremendous respect for the force of a German attack. Captured English officers said that they had not believed it possible for us to storm across such open country.

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<sup>1</sup> The German designation of what we call the battle of Mons.

Several of our companies had suffered very severe losses through the enemy's artillery fire and the machine-guns which the English had very cleverly placed so as to catch our troops in the flank. There was desperate street and house-to-house fighting, but the same regiment which had met the English the day before succeeded in driving them out at the left side of the village and in making many prisoners.

An incident which I witnessed characterizes the feeling of our soldiers towards the English people. A number of prisoners were being escorted past us when our men shook their clenched fists and rained down curses of the foulest kind on Tommy Atkins, who marched past erect, with his head up and a smile on his face. When, later, French prisoners were brought in, I never observed any similar outbursts of a national hate which is only too well founded.

After the English had been thrown back along the whole line we bivouacked in an open place in the village of F—. The straw was already spread out, but nothing came of it. We had only a two hours' rest then started again; after a long march we reached the village of W—, where we found passable sleeping quarters but nothing to eat.

#### PARIS NOT KLUCK'S OBJECTIVE.

On August 25th, the narrative continues, a period of tremendous forced marches began, which brought us in a few days across the Marne to the south-east of Paris. Our Armies were close on the heels of the retreating enemy, the purpose of the General Staff being to push him away from Paris and hurl his Armies back on to the line of fortresses (Belfort, Verdun, etc.) in the west. Unfortunately the scheme failed, for various reasons which I cannot and may not discuss in this place.

Nevertheless, that hurried rush through Northern France—a rush which called for the most tremendous exertions of both man and horse—will remain for ever in my memory. In those breathless forced marches I did succeed, however, in keeping at least a list of the towns and villages which we passed through.

On August 25th our battalion was detailed to cover the light munitions column of the X Field Artillery Regiment, and on the same day we crossed the French frontier at 3.15 p.m. Only a small ditch marked the dividing line between the two countries, and our two companies crossed the little wooden bridge with loud hurrahs.

On the 26th, after a long march, we reached B—, and found decent quarters. The news that two English divisions had been annihilated aroused great enthusiasm; but the fact that I had received no news from my family for twenty-six days considerably damped my share of joy.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, in those days of forced marches the food supply was exceedingly irregular. There was no bread to be had, although the field-kitchens worked fairly well. But it was quite

<sup>1</sup> During the first weeks of the war the German authorities "held up" all correspondence between the German Armies and the folk at home in order to veil the mobilization and concentration of their Armies.

impossible<sup>1</sup> for the provision-columns to keep pace with us. I was exceedingly glad to find a large boiled ham in the village shop, and promptly requisitioned it.

On the following day we continued the pursuit of the English. In order to stop our advance they made another stand at Le Cateau, but, in spite of a most gallant defence, received a crushing defeat. Our regiment did not participate in this fight, but as we marched near to the battlefield, on our way southwards, we found numerous traces of the English retreat. The enemy artillery had left great heaps of their ammunition on both sides of the road, in order to save at least the guns. For quite an hour we were marching between these remarkable monuments of German victories and English defeats, and never have we enjoyed a higher degree of malicious joy<sup>1</sup> than during that day's march.

The countryside teemed with small parties of English troops who had got cut off from the main body. As it was easy for them to hide in the woods, and as one was never sure of their strength, a lot of valuable time was lost in rounding them up.

One of our cavalry patrols discovered a party of them near the village W—, and our battalion, with my company in front, was detached to clear them out. Very soon we got glimpses of the well-known English caps, and here it must be admitted that in making use of cover and in offering a stubborn defence the English performed wonders.

When we advanced against their first position we were received with rifle-fire, then they vanished, only to pop up in a second position. They were dismounted cavalrymen whose horses were hidden farther back, and, after decoying us to their third line, they mounted and fled. Between two of their trenches we found the dead horses of a patrol of Uhlans which they had apparently ambushed.

After a very fatiguing march we reached the townlet of B— about 7 p.m., and were lucky to find some excellent beer in an inn by the market-place. Of course the place was packed with thirsty soldiers; the hostess and her daughter did splendid business that evening.

August 28th was another day of tremendous exertion. Our course led at some distance past St. Quentin, and this day brought our first fight with the French.

During the ensuing march to find our regiment again, we were amazed on entering a village to see the inhabitants welcoming us with shouts and other signs of jubilation. They had mistaken us for English,<sup>2</sup> and it was exceedingly funny to see the transformation in their faces, and how quickly they disappeared into the houses, when they discovered their mistake.

<sup>1</sup> *Schadenfreude ist die reinste Freude* (Malicious joy is the purest joy) is a well-known German saying.

<sup>2</sup> A mistake easily made, for the German field-service uniform is greenish-grey in colour; it is popularly called *Feldgrau* (field-grey). But the Germans themselves had never seen the uniform before the mobilization in August, 1914.—T.F.A.S.

I have forgotten where we slept after the terrible fighting and marching exertions of that day; but in my diary is the short notice: "Disgusting quarters." Next morning, by 7.30, we had reached the Somme. Our men were gradually getting accustomed to this race across France. The number of those who dropped out decreased from day to day; the feet got hardened, but our bodies, it is true, got thinner.

It is noteworthy that on these tremendous marches one suffered comparatively little from hunger. A swede or turnip from the next field, some chocolate, a cigarette, or a cigar, was often sufficient for a whole day. Further, the exultation of having defeated the enemy helped us to endure anything.

We crossed the Somme by St. Christ, and were astonished that the enemy made no kind of stand at this river. At that point the river flows round the village in two arms. After marching a considerable distance further, our company was ordered back to guard the heavy baggage near the Somme; there we had a few hours' rest after the tremendous exertions of the last few days.

Furthermore, I had an opportunity of observing the endless procession of wagons and troops hurrying forward. Sitting in the shade of a peasant's cottage I drank a bottle of wine, smoked a cigar, and wrote home, for on that day, August 29th, I had at last heard from my wife. When the last lot of baggage wagons had rolled past, my company joined up behind.

August 30th was Sunday, so, of course, we had to expect a battle; and we were not disappointed. The fact that French cavalry patrols had appeared in our vicinity proved that the enemy must be near. Yet we marched unmolested as far as A—, and were on the point of leaving this village when we came under infantry fire. One of the first bullets wounded our captain, and I had to take over the leadership of the company.

One of our batteries took up a position outside the village, which was the signal for a terrific artillery fire from the enemy. My regiment had to seek cover behind the houses, and our battery was soon silenced. Besides possessing great superiority, the enemy knew the range to a foot. Shells and shrapnel exploded all round. At last, in spite of the rain of shells, half the regiment deployed and advanced against the enemy's position.

The other companies (including mine) returned through the village, branched off to the right, and went forward in firing-line. More artillery came up and silenced the French guns. Quite a number of French prisoners were taken in the woods, but we, too, suffered considerable losses. Towards 4 o'clock the fire died down, and a report was brought in that the Second Army was sorely in need of our help. We marched due east, but when we got to the townlet B—, at 7 p.m., and had gone into quarters, the news arrived that the Second Army had gained the victory of St. Quentin alone. There was a great outburst of joy among our men, with corresponding depression among the natives.

On Monday, August 31st, we marched south-east towards Noyon, the ancient capital of Picardy. Unfortunately, we were not to pass through the town, but passed it on our left. Late in the evening we went into quarters in the small village, P—. September 1st, the anniversary of Sedan, was just as beautiful a day as forty-four years before. We crossed the Aisne in the early morning by Vic, and crossed a wide stretch of open country to a plateau in the hilly, forest district of Villers Cotterets.

At the edge of this plateau we could hear our guns in front bombarding the village V—, and soon afterwards we heard heavy infantry fire—a sure sign that we were close to the enemy. As a matter of fact, our brigade-regiment was heavily engaged with the English rearguard. Unfortunately, we only came up in time to congratulate our comrades on their splendid success.

A forest fight is always a difficult affair, but the woods in France claim particularly heavy sacrifices, because the French allow the under-growth to grow very thick. This forms a great obstacle to an advance, and at the same time affords the defender great advantages. The English had chosen a height commanding a turning in the road which led through this huge forest, and spent several days in strengthening the position. Yet our gallant brigade-regiment, in a fight of a few hours, had hurled them back and inflicted heavy losses on them.

When the last shots had echoed through the magnificent forest, several companies of our regiment were ordered to accompany the Field Artillery through the forest. At intervals of ten steps we marched by the side of the guns in case of a surprise attack. As we passed the scene of the fight which was just ended we met numbers of our stretcher-bearers and small groups of captured British. At the top of the height in the forest we saw a large number of the enemy's killed and seriously wounded.

Near to the turn in the road lay an officer—also severely wounded—talking excellent German with some of our men. I stepped up too, and, after saluting him, inquired about his wound. He told me that he had seen a friend fall, and, while going to look after him, was himself shot in the abdomen. He lay on his right side, unable to move. His uniform only differed from that worn by the men in that it was of finer material.

A dead horse lay twenty steps off, and I asked to whom it belonged. He very much lamented that it was his own favourite animal, but when I asked him whether they were infantry troops or dismounted cavalry he quickly replied: "Sir, I can give you no information on that point!"

Apparently the fight had raged hottest at the turn in the road, for just there the dead and wounded lay thick around, some 900 in all, in comparison to which our losses had been relatively light.

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The strain and exertion which we endured on September 3rd were almost beyond human capacity. From 6 a.m. till 10 p.m. we tramped along the dusty roads under a hot September sun, with only a couple of hours' rest at noon, till we reached the neighbourhood of the Marne.

Towards evening several hostile airmen circled above us at a great height.

At S——, in the Marne valley, we found passable quarters, and, after the terrific efforts of the day, sank exhausted into a deep sleep. Still these terrible marches did not bring us to the desired goal; we could not overtake the retreating enemy, and it was said that the French and English were marching to the south-east, towards Italy.

On Friday, September 4th, we crossed the Marne at 7.30 a.m. in beautiful autumn weather. But this delightful day was to be impressed on our memories by another tremendous march. We passed through the district where Blücher had been well thrashed by Napoleon a hundred years ago, and crossed the Morin (a tributary of the Marne) in the vicinity of Montmirail, reaching our quarters in the village, M——, just as darkness fell. Several officers, including myself, were in a miller's house at the exit of the village. A strong barricade of ploughs, wagons, etc., was erected, and a strong guard placed about 100 yards down the road.

We had not slept long when we were roused by heavy rifle-fire. The guards had seen a troop of soldiers marching towards them in the moonlight, and opened fire. Our companies were\* alarmed and awaited an attack which never came. The sentries asserted that they had shot a number of the enemy, and, as a matter of fact, we found several dead and wounded by the roadside, among them a French colonel.

The other companies in the village had also made some captures, among them being Turcos and some Zouaves, with their unpractical, theatrical uniforms. From the prisoners we learned that the English and French Armies, defeated at St. Quentin and Maubeuge, had fallen into great confusion. Portions of these Armies had completely lost themselves and were wandering about aimlessly between the German columns advancing to the south. Again and again they collided with German troops on the right or left, till at last they did not know which way to turn.

The enemy, therefore, was more exhausted and suffering more than we were; added to this we were the victors, a fact which enabled us to endure all the demands put upon our energies. It is true that we suffered greatly in those days from want of food. In my diary is the remark: "Nothing to eat for three days; abjectly wretched."

Early on Saturday, September 5th, we were again on the march. The morning was cold and misty, so it behoved the columns to feel their way very carefully. The day cleared up slowly, but almost immediately we came under shell-fire, and were obliged to take cover in a wood. For a whole hour we had the pleasure of lying under heavy shell and shrapnel-fire which inflicted, however, but few losses. After a long march we reached Montceaux, out of which we drove the French before entering it. Here we spent the afternoon, and eventually found our night's quarters there, hoping that the enemy would not disturb us, although some of his marching columns had been sighted in the twilight. But we had forgotten that the next day was a Sunday, hence a battle was certainly due.

Refreshed after a good night's rest, the brigade was to be launched towards Paris on that day. Our battalion was assembled, and we officers stood in a group, chatting and admiring a cavalry division passing through a hollow below us. The squadrons of Uhlans, Dragoons, Cuirassiers, and Hussars moved forward like waves in the morning sun, and finally disappeared behind a hill. Suddenly a shell whizzed over our heads and exploded 200 yards away.

Others came in quick succession, and then commenced an artillery fire and a day of battle which belong to the most appalling, but still the most magnificent, in my memory. Everyone who went through that day at Montceaux, and escaped with a whole skin, will be stirred to the depths whenever the name sounds on his ears, and will never tire of telling the tale.

The farm where we had encamped lay to the rear of the village; several batteries had gone into position on the right, while a road led straight to the left, descending a little, and continued along the wall of a park. Immediately behind a farmhouse a lane branched off from the road towards the left, and led through the valley, where the cavalry division and baggage column had gone, to the next village.

The continually-increasing violence of the Anglo-French artillery-fire not only silenced our guns, but compelled us, man and horse, to seek cover behind the buildings and under the park wall. But the enemy fire grew worse, till it could only be compared to a raging torrent of shells, before which we were absolutely helpless. A part of my company was lying behind the barns; the horses of the machine-gun section were standing there, too, with their heads to the wall. In face of these fires of hell they became restless, and it was with the greatest difficulty that they were kept from bolting.

After sitting for several hours in the midst of this fearful concert, the tension suddenly relaxed, and I slept for about fifteen minutes. But we had not lived through those awful hours without losses. Several times shells and shrapnel had exploded in the road along the park wall, tearing fearful gaps in the ranks of our men. Yet fortune had often smiled on us, for "duds" fell more than once right in the midst of one company or other.

At about five in the afternoon the enemy fire attained its greatest intensity; a shell struck the roof of a barn, and in a few minutes thick masses of smoke ascended to the sky. Moreover, hostile infantry, in greatly superior numbers, had crept up to the village under cover of their artillery-fire. Under these circumstances the brigade was ordered to evacuate the village and withdraw to a neighbouring hamlet.

With that began the most terrible moments of a day full of terrors. We had to leave our cover and get through a valley behind us which was being literally ploughed by the enemy's shells. There was no endeavour to retreat in formation through such a fire; every man had to get across as best he could. Several prudent company leaders chose to go round our artillery positions, but I, unfortunately, took what men were with me straight across the open.

The iron messengers from the enemy were exploding on all sides till I had only three men left, and one exploded so near that I was

smothered with earth. As soon as the whiz of a shell was heard I threw myself down till it had exploded, then up and made another ten-yards' rush. This race for life lasted over a quarter of an hour, but the heavens were gracious and we got to the rallying place. This was the edge of a wood near the village, and from this point of vantage we enjoyed for some hours the magnificent spectacle of a tremendous artillery fight for the village of Montceaux.

Our heavy guns had come up and joined in the music; from time to time a heavy boom echoed behind our wood, and the great shells went howling over our heads on to unhappy Montceaux. This high-lying village was now for the most part in flames, and heavy masses of smoke lay over the country darkening even the pale light of the moon.

Then, too, we could hear the roar of battle on the front of the neighbouring corps which was heavily engaged on our left with a vastly superior antagonist. The distant thunder of the cannon came over to us, mixed with the rattle of rifles and the tack-tack of the machine-guns. Towards 9 o'clock there was silence on that side too; firing ceased along the whole line, and only the smoke squadrons from the burning villages reminded us that the war-fury had raged in unchained wildness over this fertile and pleasing district:

#### KLUCK'S DECEPTION AND DEFEAT.

The *communiqué* issued by the German Headquarters on August 27th, 1914, contains this sentence: "The Army under Colonel-General von Kluck has hurled back the English Army by Maubeuge, and to-day has renewed the attack south-west of Maubeuge by encircling it." Consequently the whole German Empire waited in breathless suspense to hear that the B.E.F. had capitulated.

On September 10th the official *communiqué* stated that the troops east of Paris had been heavily attacked by fresh forces from Paris. The Germans had held them up for two days, but "when the advance of new enemy columns was reported their wing was withdrawn. The enemy pursued at no point."

On September 4th the occupation of Rheims, without resistance, had been announced, and on September 20th the German public was officially informed that "Rheims lies in the fighting zone of the French Army. Compelled to return the enemy's fire, we regret that the town is being damaged thereby. Instructions have been given to spare the Cathedral as much as possible."

No other announcement of the retreat from the Marne was made, and the Germans were left to imagine how Rheims had again got into the hands of the French.

Montceaux, says Captain Heubner, was the most southerly point which we reached in our rush for Paris. On the following day we rejoiced to hear that we were to advance to attack the enemy who had taken up a strong position at Coulommiers, half-way to the capital. So we set out in beautiful weather, marching towards the north on almost exactly the same route which we had come. We crossed

several tributaries of the Marne, and towards evening, after a long and tiring march, halted for supper, when the news arrived that the enemy had evacuated his positions and probably withdrawn to the north. In spite of our tired condition we had to do a night march of twenty kilometres, but fortunately the men had eaten and rested and the night was mild.

In dense darkness we marched mostly by field paths, past sleeping villages and dreaming woods. Then we descended by winding roads to the beautiful valley of the Marne, while signal lights from the heights on the opposite side served to guide us. At 2 a.m. we reached the town of Ch—, on the Marne, found quarters, and, although we were dead tired, the companies started again at 6 o'clock. We marched under a burning sun till twelve mid-day. This extraordinary demand on the strength of the men was not only necessary but fulfilled its purpose. The two German army corps which had to protect the right flank of our Armies on their march to Paris, and which had taken up positions to the north-east of the fortress, had been heavily engaged with far superior Anglo-French forces for several days.

Especially the right wing of these corps was in danger, and we had to march behind them to take up a position on their right to prevent the enemy from surrounding them, while another corps was thrown on to their left wing. And the task was accomplished! Even though half the men in our exhausted companies were compelled by the heat of the sun to fall out—we others held out. By 12 o'clock our sister division had reached the threatened wing, and we could distinctly see by the exploding shrapnel and shells how the right wing extended, and the awful danger that it would be rolled up, disappeared.

Then we gave the men a well-deserved mid-day rest and continued our march to Antilly, in the neighbourhood of which we held ourselves in readiness to support the hard-pressed right wing. The thunder of the battle swelled louder, and our comrades suffered heavily under the fire of the Anglo-French heavy artillery. At a quarter to five, when the II<sup>nd</sup> Army Corps arrived on the left wing, the battle was as good as won by the Germans, in spite of the superior numbers of the enemy.

After a short pause, however, at about 7.30, heavy firing began again on the right wing; the thunder of the guns, as well as the rattle and crack of rifles and machine-guns, made it clear that the enemy was making a last attempt to break our right wing. For a whole hour he kept up a tremendous attack—in vain. The enemy was hurled back with heavy losses, and for him the day was lost. It is true that we had not been actually engaged in this battle, but the tremendous marches which we accomplished had not been in vain—they had saved the two corps from a catastrophe.

On the following morning the battle began anew, and we were engaged near the village of Betz. Our battalion had to advance on both sides of a large park, but we had scarcely reached the road which led past the château when we came under a terrible shell-fire.

My company escaped with slight loss, but several others, among them the 5th Company, lost heavily; the commander of the battalion

and a major were severely wounded. Just then a regiment from the IIIrd Army Corps swarmed out, and we deployed with them. I went with my company through the park, climbed over a railway bank and saw French troops retreating behind some low hills. We had advanced farthest, which left our left wing without support, so for the moment we held on to the road and occupied the ditch.

The first platoon of my company had not come up, so I went up the road in search of them. A large pear tree covered with fruit attracted my attention, and I was just about to throw empty wine bottles at them when bullets began to sing round my ears. Springing into the ditch I crept back on all fours. At last the other platoon arrived, and we pushed forward while the enemy retreated before us.

#### THE MARNE TALE OF WOE.

We ate our supper behind a huge straw-rick, enjoying the music of our guns hurling shells over our heads after the retreating foe. We were in the best of spirits; we believed that we had again beaten the enemy. Hence we were all the more astonished, and our depression all the greater, when orders arrived late in the evening that we were to march northwards immediately, as the neighbouring Army had been defeated.

As a matter of fact, during the night from September 9th to the 10th, we covered forty kilometres by an exceedingly trying night march, and then continued marching the whole of the next day till late in the evening. The day seemed as if it would never end, and exhausted the last energies of our poor soldiers; particularly the older reservists had the greatest difficulty in keeping up. Every village which came into view we fondly hoped would prove to be our halting place, but the hope was doomed again and again to disappointment. Then I learned the state of desperation to which the men can be driven by violent over-exertion. One reservist sprang out of the ranks, screaming like a wild animal, and threw himself on the ground, declaring amidst terrifying howls that he could not march any further.

Late in the evening we crossed the Aisne, and in absolute darkness and torrents of rain found our longed-for quarters; but before entering them the men lay down in the streets, so extreme was their exhaustion. Only after lying for some minutes in the rain and slush were they able to get into their billets. But we had not yet got to the end of our long, forced marches, for on the next day we trudged along from early morn till late evening in heavy rain; the only consolation being comfortable billets and well-cooked cutlets. Saturday, September 12th, was marked by another long march and more rain, accompanied by the thunder of cannon, till we halted on the north-east of Soissons. On the Sunday the weather cleared up; a strong wind dispersed the clouds, affording us an excellent view of the magnificent landscape. The canal which connects the Oise and the Aisne sparkled in the valley on the left, while beyond it in the distance the citadel and soaring cathedral of Laon were visible. Our route led us right through

the Guards Cavalry Division, the ancient and élite regiments of Prussian horsemen.

A long rest at mid-day gave us an opportunity to recuperate, and there at last our breathless retreat came to an end. We turned to face the enemy and awaited his attack from Soissons. We spent the afternoon lying on heaps of straw, reading and chatting, till members of the cyclists corps brought news that the enemy had already reached the Aisne valley behind us. Towards evening our battalion advanced in fighting formation across ploughed fields. My company was on the right wing, and to the right of us there was another brigade of our army corps. The enemy disturbed us very little with his fire as we proceeded to the entrance to a beautiful little side valley of the Aisne. Our task was to prevent English or French forces from penetrating further to the north of the river and causing our complete rout (*uns über den Haufen werfen*).

\* \* \* \* \*

Before midnight I went the rounds in torrents of rain. The sentinels were standing behind the walls enveloped in their cloaks; their comrades were lying around on heaps of straw, protected to a certain extent by the wall. But the poor devils out in the open fared much worse. Yet all these precautions were absolutely necessary on account of a wood which covered the left side of the valley. It would have been very easy for the English to make a night attack through it, although it is true that French woods have such a thick undergrowth that it is very difficult to get through in the dark.

In the twilight we had seen the flash of enemy artillery on the opposite side of the Aisne valley. I had immediately reported this to our artillery regiment and requested them to send an observation officer. Unfortunately nobody came. Next morning, when thick masses of mist filled the valley, our position was visited by the Brigade-Commander and our battalion commander, to whom we explained the position. We were ordered to descend into the valley in the afternoon to throw the English, who were opposite us, back over the Aisne. Our neighbouring brigade was heavily engaged, and we could see distinctly how their successive lines went over the heights and disappeared in the wood. Our regiment, too, went down into the valley, my company being the last to leave the sheep farm, together with the machine-gun company.

A very severe fight developed itself in the valley as well as on the heights to the right and left. We were too weak to hurl our determined antagonist back into the Aisne valley; consequently we suffered heavy losses. Our brigade regiment, too, on the small hill to the left was only able to make small gains and lost many men. Under the heavy artillery fire which the enemy poured on to us, the leaders of the companies forming our battalion had been ordered each to get his men under cover as best he could.

According to agreement with the battalion-commander I had led my company into the valley of a brook, where for several hours, together with the 5th Company, we had excellent cover. We neither

saw nor knew that the 2nd Battalion was engaged in a heavy fight on the hill to our left. On the other hand we thought it was our brigade regiment.

At last I started off myself to get orders, and was at once entrusted with the task of climbing the said hill to take the English in the flank. In order to reach the top we followed the edge of a wood, the first platoon in open formation in front, we following fifteen yards behind; then the second and third platoons. Suddenly a bullet whizzed past within an inch of my head. After I had thrown myself down a second struck the ground a few inches away, and I noticed that they had been fired from a tree.

I crept on all fours behind a beech tree, where the hidden foe registered a third miss. Just as I had ordered four snipers to advance as a patrol the adjutant of the battalion appeared with orders that the fight in the valley and on the hill was to be broken off. The following night was particularly unpleasant. It rained in torrents and we had to lie on the reverse slope in the open air, but at last we got to sleep. At about 1 a.m. we were aroused by a terrific rifle-fire on the front of the neighbouring brigade.

The English had attempted a surprise attack; they had crawled over the intervening turnip fields and popped up quite unexpectedly before our comrades' trenches, only to receive a murderous fire and to be thrown back again. After this disagreeable interruption our gallant soldier-cooks came up and handed us hot food.

The next night, September 15th to 16th, was still worse. In the early morning of the 15th we had left our damp camp to find cover in a wood near the farm, and we had not evacuated the slope before it was time, for during the day it came under heavy artillery fire.

We took bundles of straw into the wood, and with the help of tree branches made roofs above our heads, but in spite of that the rain trickled through and dropped on us unceasingly. At midnight the music began again, and we were called up to aid the next brigade. After knocking our heads against trees and branches we found we were not wanted; on returning we found our straw heaps soddened, and spent the night freezing and swearing.

\* \* \* \* \*

The following thirty-six pages of Captain Heubner's book contain letters written to his wife during the period September 14th to November 1st. They describe the commencement and first few weeks of the siege war.

In spite of all the exertions, he says, I feel quite well and cheerful, only tortured by perpetual hunger. The poor French peasants have to give up all their cattle and potatoes to us. Yes, *c'est la guerre!*

Now that Antwerp has fallen I hope that our giant howitzers will soon settle off Verdun and Toulon, and the whole line of French defences will break down. But then, however, across to England. These dogs must be forced to their knees; they must lie in the dust at Germany's feet.

\* \* \* \* \*

During the night of November 1st to 2nd, four pieces of field artillery were hauled with great secrecy on to our hill. They were dug in on the edge of the wood about 450 yards from the French<sup>1</sup> trenches. Walls of sandbags were stacked round them, and it did one's heart good to see with what zeal the youngest volunteers carried up supplies of shells.

In my dug-out I could hear guns rolling past nearly all the night. The night was altogether unquiet, almost impossible to sleep. Quite late the four company leaders were ordered to the battalion commander, who gave us the final instructions for the attack which was to begin at 10 a.m. on November 2nd. From 8 till 10 a.m. our heavy guns were to hammer the enemy trenches, and on the stroke of ten we were to open quick fire all along the line.

I had to await the arrival of our brigade regiment at a certain point and then send two of my platoons forward. Everything went off like clockwork; for two hours the heavy artillery bombarded the enemy's lines, each shell throwing up a huge column as it exploded. Punctually at 10 o'clock rifle-fire began along the whole line to the accompaniment of machine-guns and the four field-pieces. This whole volume of sound became veritable battle-music which inspired us and intoxicated us; the blood throbbed in our temples, urging us forward.

My men knew—I had told them often enough—that everything depended upon being quick. The quicker they got out of the trench, down the bank and on to the opposite slope leading up to the hostile positions, the fewer casualties we should have.

When the brigade regiment came up, a little after ten, I hunted<sup>2</sup> the two platoons out of the trench, and it was only necessary in one instance—an old reservist—to threaten with my revolver in order to drive him out of cover. All the others sprang out like cats and disappeared in the hollow below.

The third platoon was to have remained behind in reserve, but a glance through a sniper's hole showed that the others were lost in the stretch of open ground. So I rushed through the trees, brought the third platoon forward, and drove them forward too. Having convinced myself that no *Angsthase*<sup>3</sup> was left in the trench, I proceeded over by the same route with four men whom I had kept back till then. By these methods I got the whole company to storm forwards.

On reaching the cover afforded by the valley one of my companions was missing; he had no doubt fallen. The company was already within seventy-five yards of the enemy, but to my horror I perceived that neither the brigade regiment had come up on the left nor the 5th Company on the right. What was to be done? I determined to take my three men and fetch up the 5th.

<sup>1</sup> The British troops had been removed from Heubner's section of the front in October.

<sup>2</sup> This is an exceedingly naïve but interesting description of how German officers "lead" their men. "Hunted" is an exact rendering of the German original "*jagte: hinaus.*"

<sup>3</sup> Literally "frightened hare," equivalent to "white liver" or "cold feet!"

Under a heavy fire we rushed to the wood on the right and reached it without accident, but could see no signs of them. Probably they had advanced further through the wood, so I went along the outskirts of the wood towards the French trenches, and there Dame Fortune played me a scurvy trick. We suddenly came under fire from the right front, threw ourselves down and crept under the trees.

While lying on my stomach I felt a terrible blow in my right arm, near the wrist, and a lesser blow on the breast. It felt as if a woodman had struck me a heavy blow with an axe. My hand hung limp while the blood spurted in all directions, and I saw that the arm-bone was shattered. One of the men put on a first dressing, and my active campaigning was at an end.



## THE COLLECTION OF MATERIAL FOR A REGIMENTAL RECORD OF THE WAR.

By LIEUT.-COLONEL A. F. MOCKLER-FERRYMAN.

AFTER this great war has come to an end, every regiment will be anxious to have written, printed, and published, a true, accurate, and interesting account of its own particular deeds. Some regiments, doubtless, imagine that the official War Diaries, which units render monthly, and which are stored up in Record Offices, will be sufficient for the purpose. Other regiments will wish for something more, and it is for these that I am offering suggestions. I do so with a certain amount of diffidence, because there must be many men more fitted than I am to suggest a plan of action, and who, moreover, by working on totally different lines, will attain the same ends with less labour. But there are, I know, regiments who have not yet made up their minds as to the form in which their records shall be compiled, or even how a start shall be made, and I have been consulted by more than one regiment on the subject.

When one considers the difficulties under which regimental histories have been written hitherto, one is astonished at their being as good as they are, for the material available was usually of the scantiest. Previous to the period of the Peninsular War there was little or nothing to go on, except a few odd books dealing with early campaigns in a general way, a certain number of official documents (Returns, Inspection Reports, etc.), and Despatches, which were for the most part sketchy. A year or two after Waterloo, regiments were ordered to keep an official Record Book, or Digest of Services, in their orderly rooms, and in the opening pages of these books a start was made by writing up as much as could be gathered of the past history of the regiment. At this time the Peninsular War and the Waterloo campaign were fresh in the memories of serving officers, and so it was possible to collect a good deal of accurate information about these six or seven years. Some ten years later, Napier produced the first volume of his monumental History of the Peninsular War, in which he wrote the praises of many individual regiments, and gave a number of anecdotes of regimental interest. There then appeared on the scene several old Peninsular officers and not a few N.C.O.'s, who, taking Napier's history as their Bible, wrote up such of their own experiences as they could remember. Some had kept careful diaries throughout the war, and had these been published intact within a year or two of the termination of the war, they would have been of great value. But, unfortunately, they were usually re-written, or, at any rate, heavily edited, after reading Napier, with the result that the majority of them bear traces of the famous historian's influence.

Since those days much has been done, both by private enterprise and officially, to make the regimental historian's task an easier one. Nearly every old Regular regiment has had (and in many cases still has) its own paper or journal; and the official War Diaries, forwarded each month to the Record Offices, go some way towards the making of detailed and accurate regimental history.

When peace comes, the pen will in a great measure take the place of the sword, and in one or other battalion of each regiment there will be found someone of acknowledged literary ability who will be willing to play the part of regimental historian, and who will be able to write with personal experience of service with the regiment. But it is doubtful if such a man will be prepared to write a history of his regiment until he shall have had access to the authentic official accounts, which cannot be expected to be issued for some years after the declaration of peace. And, before commencing to write his history, he will require to be put in possession of a veritable store-house of material to work upon. The gathering together of this material should be in full progress now, otherwise years must elapse before a regiment will be able to handle even the first volume of its splendid record—and in this war, it must be remembered, every regiment of the British Army has made for itself a record worthy of being written in letters of gold.

The first point to be decided is, whether the regimental record shall be that of only the old Regular battalions, of the Regular and Service battalions, or of all the battalions of the regiment. This can be decided in no other way than by consulting the wishes of the officers of all the battalions. I mention only the officers, because it is solely by their subscriptions, and those of their friends, that the publication will become possible; but, of course, extra copies would be printed for sale to other ranks at cheap rates. My own view is that, in cases where battalions are not inordinately numerous, there should be one record for the whole regiment—for reasons too obvious to need pointing out. That matter settled, the next to be gone into is the form in which the record shall be published. The process will be practically the same whether there be one record for the whole regiment, or a separate record for each battalion.

In either case I advocate most strongly two distinct publications, with an interval of time between them, viz.:—

- I.—A PROVISIONAL RECORD.
- II.—A REGIMENTAL HISTORY.

#### I.—THE PROVISIONAL RECORD.

The object here is to collect and sort out material, edit it, print it, and publish it. A great mass of material is already in existence, but requires to be sought for, and of this material the principal items are the private diaries and letters of officers and other ranks. At the beginning of the war, before censorship was rigidly enforced, interesting letters appeared in local newspapers, but of recent years nothing has been available from this source. The compiler of the provisional

record, therefore, must search for diaries and letters, by getting in touch with battalion officers and others, and by keeping constantly on the look-out for information of all kinds.

If the record is to be that of a regiment of, say, twelve battalions (quite a feasible number to work), a volume for each year of the war will be found sufficiently bulky. The period, however, to be covered by each volume must depend entirely on the amount of material, or, in other words, on the amount of service seen by the various battalions, and until material has been got together and overhauled, it is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule. But whatever the period eventually decided on, each volume should be complete in itself, and should keep strictly to events within the period, *i.e.*, future events should not be anticipated. For instance, when describing a gallant act for which a man was awarded the V.C. in 1915, it would be inadvisable to add a note stating that the man was killed in 1917.

The arrangement of the contents of volumes would be somewhat as follows:—

(1) *Title-page.* A purely personal matter for the regiment to settle. The title might run—"THE BLANKSHIRE REGIMENT IN THE GREAT WAR": "*A Record of all Battalions, compiled from Private Diaries and Letters and from other Sources.*" Then, towards the bottom of the page, "VOLUME —"; and below again, the period embraced by the contents of the volume (*e.g.*, "4TH AUGUST, 1914, TO 31ST MARCH, 1915.").

(2) *List of Subscribers.*—This is not absolutely necessary, but is usual in a work of this kind, and is certainly interesting.

(3) *Table of Contents*, with list of maps and illustrations.

(4) *Regimental Calendar.*—Days of the month and of the week, with an event (connected with some of the battalions) for every day. In this way one gets a summary of the principal regimental events of the period included in the volume.

(5) *Record.*—The records of the battalion should now follow, one battalion after another, with a title-page preceding each (*e.g.*, "1ST BATTALION BLANKSHIRE REGIMENT IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS, 4TH AUGUST, 1914, TO 31ST MARCH, 1915.").

As this is the most important part of the volume, I will offer my suggestions in detail.

Right through the record there should run a diary, the date (in italics) being placed before each day's entry; and in order not to tire the reader by requiring him to wade through page after page of the diary, it is as well to break it up into periods, and to give to each period a heading and an introductory summary of events. Thus, dealing with the early months of the war:—"MOBILIZATION, 4TH—12TH AUGUST, 1914." An editorial summary describing briefly the declaration of war, mobilization, composition of the Division to which the battalion belonged, etc. Then the diary of events more or less in detail.

Subsequent headings of periods would be, "EMBARKATION FOR FRANCE," "ADVANCE TO AND WITHDRAWAL FROM MONS," "RETREAT FROM MONS," "BATTLE OF THE MARNE," and so on.

Each of these headings would have the date attached, and would be followed by a short account, by way of introducing the section of the diary, and so giving the reader an outline of the sequence of events by which his interest will be maintained.

These summaries should be quite simple—a *précis* of the despatches, or a condensation of accounts contained in some of the many books on the war. The main point is to make clear the general situation and to show how the battalion came into the scheme. It is advisable to stick to facts, and to avoid matters of controversy altogether. What the editor has to do is to show what happened, and not to offer his own opinions on strategy and tactics.

Now for the diary matter. If the editor is fortunate enough to have placed in his hands a number of private diaries, he should sift them carefully, and select one that seems to be accurate, full, and interesting—preferably the diary kept by the C.O. or other senior officer, who writes with full knowledge and in a somewhat serious strain.

The name of the diarist should be given, e.g., "Extracts from the Diary of Lieut.-Colonel J. D. Jones, D.S.O., Commanding the Battalion."

But there is no necessity to keep throughout to one diary, and very often it will be found of interest to give a second account of the same event from another diary, or even to interpolate a letter, or narrative, descriptive of the particular event. In such matters the editor must, of course, use his own judgment; but he ought always to give the name of the writer of a diary, letter, or narrative, in order that the reader may know what weight to attach to statements.

In editing these diaries, letters, etc., it is best to allow them to remain as nearly as possible in their original form, correcting only slips in grammar and obvious mis-statements, and omitting such things as personal remarks about unpopular officers, and palpably foolish opinions about the conduct of operations.

I attach great value to information forthcoming from these private sources, because the entries were made close to the time of the event, and probably before the writer's mind had become warped or influenced by discussions and arguments with brother officers. From them, also, one should get the real life and soul of the war from every point of view, and many sidelights which would otherwise go unrecorded. Accounts of sports, concerts, and other entertainments, which come with periods in rest, help to make an interesting story, and it must be remembered that the most trivial incidents are of interest to those who had a share in them. The editor, therefore, should be a man able to look on life from the subaltern's point of view, as well as from that of the Colonel; and when he is dealing with a subaltern's diary or letter, he should let it remain gay, light-hearted, and slangy, for there will be plenty of tales of real misery, hardship, danger, and death to make the picture a gloomy one in the main. But at the same time, the editor must be judicious in his use of the subaltern's effusions, for an undue amount of levity mingled with the sober earnest of war would be liable to spoil the whole thing.

Occasionally an officer at home wounded may have a rough diary, from which he could write up a narrative of recent events before he forgets detail. Such a man should be sought out, as his narrative, if written within a short time of the events, would probably prove of deep interest.

Before leaving this part of my subject, I will say something about the editor of this provisional record. Every regiment may not find it easy to get a man to undertake the task, but, by looking about, someone will generally be discovered. It is, however, worse than useless to force a man into it, or to tell one off for the job. The editor must be a man of leisure, possessed of unbounded *esprit de corps*, of immense energy, of considerable tact, and with a full measure of discernment. He must have confidence in his own ability and judgment, and he must be content to be a perfect slave to his work. There is no short cut to this kind of undertaking; diaries cannot be handed over to the typist to copy. If the editor is not prepared to copy out for himself such extracts as he proposes to use, he should not undertake the work, for in no other way can it be carried out efficiently.

To continue about the contents of the record. At the end of the diary of each battalion should come various statistics—casualties, wastage, reinforcements, honours, and rewards, etc., as well as a complete roll of officers who served (within the period of the volume) with the battalion, setting forth their services in detail.

(6) *Roll of Honour*.—After the last battalion has been dealt with in the above way, there should follow the Roll of Honour, containing obituary notices of all the officers of the whole regiment; such notices as it is possible to compile of other ranks; and, in tabulated form, a complete list of fallen N.C.O.'s and men, with place and date of death.

(7) *General Suggestions*.—At first the editor will probably find himself in the unhappy position of attempting to make bricks without straw, but if he sets to work to get in touch with C.O.'s of battalions, he will soon find material drifting in. Such material should be regarded as strictly confidential, and it is most distinctly inadvisable to publish anything until after the war. This latter decision will probably meet with strong objection from battalions, but it is, for many weighty reasons, an absolute necessity to keep things back. In the first place, the cost of book production at the present time is prohibitive; secondly, the heavy hand of the censor would make a mere skeleton of the record; and thirdly, the record cannot be made complete until the editor has had access to War Diaries and various other official documents.

In the meanwhile, the editor should be busy with all his different volumes, working up such material as he has for each, and getting everything gradually pushed forward. As soon as he has a battalion record for any volume fairly complete, he should have it typewritten, and should then submit it to be checked by those officers and others who furnished him with the material. This checking is of the greatest importance, if anything like accuracy is to be arrived at. Naturally, the editor will concentrate on his first volume, in order

that it may be ready for publication as soon as possible after the declaration of peace. With luck, he will have the letterpress of his first volume ready for a final check with official documents as soon as these are released.

There are, however, other matters on which I have not yet dwelt, and some of which can be proceeded with simultaneously with the preparation of the letterpress. These I will now discuss.

(8) *Maps*.—A war record without good and sufficient maps would be valueless; but the number of maps must be limited on the grounds both of expense and of the bulkiness of the book. The editor, therefore, should go into this matter very carefully, with a view to having the best maps that the funds can afford. Before the end of the war, a great many maps will have appeared in books and periodicals, and the publishers might be willing to strike off copies at a cheap rate, for use in a regimental record. It must be borne in mind that some of the maps will be required in other volumes, and that they will be wanted yet again for the eventual history, so it will be seldom that one volume will have to bear the entire cost of its maps. Above all things, let the maps be clear, and not unduly loaded with place-names; but every place mentioned in the text should be shown on some map in the volume.

(9) *Illustrations*.—These add immensely to the interest of a record, but, since cameras were forbidden, few photographs of purely regimental interest will be available. Still, there were cameras at work during the early part of the war; and groups have been taken by professional photographers in France at different times. Also, there are to be had hundreds of picture post-cards of places in the war area; while many other means of getting together a small collection of suitable subjects for illustrations, such as aeroplane photographs, etc., will be discovered.

(10) *The Finish*.—With the maps and illustrations decided on, and the text as far advanced as can be, the editor ties up the first volume in a packet, gives it a drawer to itself, and waits for the war to end. When that time arrives, he will have to see to the reproduction of his maps and illustrations, and make his final check by comparing every line of his text with the contents of War Diaries and other official documents. And not until all that has been conscientiously done, will he be able to send off his copy to the printers. I need not enter into details about the correction of proofs, or the make-up of the book, but I may mention that the editor's labours are not ended until he has completed his index to the volume. An index is, in my opinion, essential, and should contain the names of all officers mentioned in the volume, as well as those of such N.C.O.'s and men as have distinguished themselves, in addition to references to other matter usually found in any ordinary index.

When the editor has seen the last volume of the provisional record through the press, he will have the satisfaction of knowing that the foundations for the regimental history (if one is ever called for) have been well and truly laid.

## II.—THE REGIMENTAL HISTORY.

I do not propose to offer words of advice to the future historian, for his work will be one with a wide scope for the display of skilled writing and even of originality. There is no necessity for him to adhere to a stereotyped form of history, but he has to tell his tale not only with accuracy, but also in such a manner as to carry his readers with him from start to finish. He will find in the record which has been prepared for him every incident of regimental interest, every act of gallantry, and every anecdote worth relating, and it is for him to make the best use of the material placed ready to his hand. If the editor of the provisional record has been faithful to his trust, the writer of the regimental history will start work under circumstances such as have been enjoyed probably by no previous historian. Yet, even with these abnormal advantages, he will find it necessary to study deeply official and other accounts which may have been published since the production of the provisional record, in order to make sure of his facts; for his history will be the last word, as far as the regiment is concerned.

When this history will be written and in what form it will appear are matters to be dealt with by a committee representative of all units of the regiment. It may be that a regiment will be satisfied with only one publication, either the collection of diaries, etc., which I have termed the provisional record, or the more ambitious history in narrative form. In either case the material must be sought for and gathered together, and if any publication is to see the light of day during the lifetime of the men who helped to make the history which is to be written, the bulk of the necessary material (at any rate down to the last events of 1917) should already be in store and undergoing the sifting process.

It behoves every commanding officer to do his best to prevent the deeds of his battalion passing into oblivion. It is a solemn duty which he owes as much to the gallant dead as to the survivors, but unless he furthers to the utmost of his ability the collection of material for a record worthy of his men, posterity will know nothing of their prowess.

This, be it remembered, is the greatest of all wars; compared with it all other wars loom immeasurably small. Without belittling the deeds of our ancestors, we may truly say that never in the history of the British Army have so many acts of conspicuous gallantry been performed in an equal period of time; and never before has the British Empire produced so many heroes. Their splendid heroism must be faithfully and fully recorded—

“LEST WE FORGET, LEST WE FORGET.”

## WHAT FRANCE OWES TO HER COLONIES.

Translated, by permission, from an article by  
M. HENRI LORIN,

In *La Revue des Deux Mondes* for May 1st, 1917.

GERMANY expected that one result of the war would be the conquest of the greater portion of the Colonies of France; her public men spoke only of how little of our colonial possessions they would leave to us; and when, at the end of July, 1914, the Chancellor reckoned on the neutrality of England, he assured Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador at Berlin, that no territorial annexation at the expense of France was intended. When, however, the Ambassador put a question to him in regard to the future of the French colonies, he said that he "was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect." We have not forgotten the noble reply, dated July 30th, made by the British Minister for Foreign Affairs; it began: "His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms."

Cherishing the illusion that by means of her irresistible powers the war would be ended in a few weeks' time by a complete victory, Germany had long ago prepared everything for dispossessing us of our colonies. She imagined that these dominions were for France a source of weakness; she believed that our troops and war material were scattered over all the world; she was convinced that in every one of our possessions the dread of an insurrection of the inhabitants would "hold up" all our colonial garrisons at the very least; and that her aggressive designs would be assisted by diversions which would of themselves arise in our colonies. Then the bait was a tempting one; had we not allowed our enemies to insinuate themselves everywhere, to load in our ports, to establish in Hamburg markets for the produce of our West African colonies, for the woods of the Gaboon Valley, the rubber of Madagascar?

The future seemed to them to be so assured that they made no secret of their ambitions, and conducted their intrigues almost openly; a few local disturbances would, they thought, be sufficient to ruin the French sovereignty, which was but feebly established; Germany the organizer would then step in and would quickly establish order, and proceed to exploit all things on a scientific basis. A hasty comparison of two books assists one to understand the cynicism and make clear the methods of procedure of our adversaries. One of these is "*La plus grande Allemagne*," by Otto Tannenberg; the other, "*La provocation allemande aux colonies*," by Pierre Alype. The former is a Pan-German, less of a diplomatist than Prince von Bülow; but all he has written is inspired by the same ideas; the same fetish of

"the superior race," as we find in "*La politique Allemande*" of the ex-Chancellor; both talk the language of immortal Germany. Tannenberg explicitly demands for Germany a huge Central African Empire constructed at the expense of France and Belgium. Another in tropical Asia; a zone of influence in Central China; not to mention new German possessions in Central America and in Asiatic Turkey—"since we enjoy the most amicable relations with the Turks."

The system of provocation had not been spared introduction into any one of our colonies; it was exercised by the Young Turk Party among the Mussulmans of Tunisia and Algeria; in Morocco a second *coup d'Agadir* was being prepared with the help of agents in the towns and scattered among the tribesmen; rifles were handed out among the foreign residents, Germans and others, through one Karl Ficke, who lived at Casablanca. The only two independent States in Africa, Liberia and Abyssinia, were the *foci* of German plots against other colonial powers in Africa. In the Far East the German Consul at Hong-Kong, Herr Voretsch, surrounded himself with revolutionaries from Hunan, with whose help he prepared plans for the expulsion of the French from Indo-China; he corresponded with the Chinese officials of the provinces bordering on Tonking, and with the soldiers of German origin in the Foreign Legion serving in our frontier garrisons; he had his emissaries in Siam and had laid plans against British India.

Germany of herself could effect little or nothing against our colonies; the only warlike measures of which she was capable was the bombardment of Philippeville or Bona by the "Göben" and "Breslau" as they hurried to Constantinople, or the sinking of a gun-boat in the port of Tahiti—exploits of a feeble and resultless character. But she had allotted a more active rôle to her local accomplices, whose labours were most carefully distributed; these labours would, it was believed, not only drive the French into the sea, but would disturb the British and the Italians sufficiently at least to make them decide to remain neutral in the coming struggle. The guns of the Marne have destroyed the German dreams, equally in the Colonies as in Europe; the German Emperor no longer fixes his hopes on conquest, but rather on the defence of an Empire the offensive vigour of which has been definitely diminished. The French colonies, on the other hand, upon which he reckoned for affording him direct assistance against their Mother Country, have provided a new force to add to those already allied against German power; for the national struggle which caused the mobilization of the whole energy of France, she finds men, supplies, and money in her colonies, and she works with them while at war for the elaboration of a future of close and prosperous union.

Men of French birth are found in our colonies, but in comparatively small numbers; only in the temperate climate of Northern Africa, where we have been established nearly a century, has there gradually grown up a not inconsiderable population, French in speech and origin, who live under laws almost exactly the same as those by which the inhabitants of France are governed. The conscripts and reservists

of Algeria received and acted on the mobilization order on the same day as did those of the Mother Country; it was very much the same thing in Tunisia, while in Morocco the Resident had to draw up certain special regulations to restrain the ardour of the inhabitants of this recently occupied territory, all of whom were anxious to do their duty to the full. One may reckon at 120,000 the strength of the contingent of Frenchmen, who were drawn from Northern Africa to complete the different units on our front—equal to three strong army corps on a war footing. In our older colonies, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guiana, and Réunion, the Military Law had not been made generally applicable at the date when the war opened; it has, however, become universal since April, 1915, and, including all soldiers, from territorial reservists to recruits, has passed some 140,000 Frenchmen under the Colours, to do military duty according to their age and degree of efficiency.

In our tropical colonies of Africa and Asia, where men of French origin are few in number, a complete mobilization would have at once deprived our possessions of all officials, economic and administrative, and it was only right and proper to make certain relaxations in the strict recognition of the general principles involved. The *Journaux Officiels* of our colonies contained nominal rolls of such Frenchmen as were "temporarily exempted"—these only amounted to a few hundreds. Let us pay our tribute of respect not only to those who "joined up," but equally to such as had to remain behind, for while ordinary prudence forbids an over-protracted stay in a tropical climate, these latter remained at their posts, occupied with work of an onerous character, far beyond the ordinary limits of service; in this way it may be said that all served, some died of disease, many others served on the colonial front; and among these we find the incarnation of French energy, resisting the decadent influences of a recently established civilization, and sowing for a harvest which will only be reaped when the war is ended.

Thus the colonies added nothing to the cares of France, then engaged in Europe in the most formidable struggle known to history; they required for their due administration a minimum number of French officials, who found a firm *point d'appui* in the general loyalty of the inhabitants. The chief service which the colonies could render to the Mother Country—the first rebuff they gave our enemies—was to give France no cause for disquiet on their behalf: a negative benefit, perhaps, but none the less valuable, since it was made manifest at the outset and has undergone no change. It is not to be claimed that here and there there may not have been noticeable a certain feeling of discontent among the natives, but, thanks to the help of the natives themselves, these incidents nowhere led to serious trouble; and they are only briefly mentioned in order to point out how hard our enemies attempted to turn our colonies against us and to what extent such manœuvres have recoiled against them to their own confusion.

In Indo-China, foreign travellers, Chinamen for the most part, spread rumours of German successes in August, 1914; predicted the fall of Paris, and advised the natives to get rid of their French bank-

notes at whatever loss. Robber bands profited by the general disquiet to pillage the villages of Tonking and Cochin-China; others spread themselves over the country, led by deserters from our Annamese regiments. At the Hué Court, round the very youthful King Duy Tan, a suspicious agitation existed, and was kept up in certain royal circles; disquiet reigned there for a longer period than in any other part of Indo-China up to the date of a really childish outbreak on the part of the King in the spring of 1916.

This excitement, however, was wholly superficial: Duy Tan and his brother were deported to Réunion, and the Council of Annamese Ministers, with the approval of the Governor, selected another king. On the other hand, the King of Cambodia, from the very commencement, gave to the French a personal assistance of the most sincere and useful character; he was to be noticed travelling about the country, explaining to the peasantry in simple language the duty of submission and of assistance in the struggle in which France was engaged. The same action was taken by the King of Luang-Prabang in the Laos country; while in the rice-fields of the deltas the headmen of the communes joined the French administration in promptly suppressing the brigandage of which they were the first sufferers. A reinforcement of the garrisons on the China border, a few demonstrations by flying columns, and, above all, the battle of the Marne, did all that remained to be done; and from the end of 1914 portraits of General Joffre appeared in very many cases beside the altar raised to the family ancestors.

West Africa has been the scene of an experience too rapidly acquired and actually imprudent, namely, the hurried recruitment of our black riflemen, the Senegalese. The tribes from which these warriors are drawn are very unequally composed, some being naturally warlike, while others are very peacefully inclined; and when recruiting is not carefully conducted, as before the war, it happens that the village chiefs get rid of their bad characters and troublesome men by causing their forced enlistment as volunteers. No matter how experienced and how patient the French officials charged with so delicate an operation may be, they may easily be deceived or imposed upon; and thus in West Africa there arose a certain number of local disturbances, particularly in the loop of the Niger and the highlands of Dahomey. At this period, the coast officials, weakened by the departure for France of all their best men, had neither the effectives nor the supplies required for promptly crushing insurrection, so that consequently the movement assumed a certain importance. M. Clozel, the Governor-General, admitted as much himself when, in December, 1916, he opened at Dakar the session of the Council. But the few administrators and officers remaining in the colony, assisted by some of the French residents wherever they were to be found, were at least able to confine the insurrection within certain limits: finally, being joined by disciplined troops, few, however, in number, they managed to regain control of the whole country.

German provocation found in Morocco very favourable soil; it was a country still but partially occupied, whose difficult mountainous parts

were the abode of a very active race of malcontents, and which was the hotbed for the growth of such international questions as were aimed at the continuance of the French protectorate, it seemed indeed to offer exceptional chances for those who desired to stir up trouble. In France it had been proposed that we should evacuate almost the whole of Morocco, holding only the ports; but General Lyautey, the Resident, had vetoed this suggestion. He had decided to hold the whole extent of frontier, to extend as far as possible the region maintained within our sphere of influence, and to draw the inhabitants even more closely to us. The most decisive success proved the wisdom of this bold and far-sighted policy, which was immediately met by the most fervent devotion of all the French in Morocco. The Berbers of the Atlas Mountains, who had been momentarily elated by a check inflicted upon one of our detachments, at El Herri on November 14th, 1914, were quickly taught wisdom by a lightning stroke delivered by General Henrys. Other lessons were imparted to the northern tribes, who had received supplies from German agents by way of Spanish territory. Although every difficulty may not even yet have been solved, it may be stated that by the beginning of the year 1915 the worst was over; Morocco remained French, and has never ceased to afford substantial aid to the Mother Country. Very significant was the occasion of the visit of the Resident, on September 22nd, 1915, to Agadir, the notorious scene of the German demonstration of 1911.

Algeria and Tunisia also passed through some evil days, during which we were able to realize the constancy of our fellow-countrymen and the loyalty of the natives. When in May, 1915, Italy entered upon war, she, like the French in Morocco, had scarcely completed her work of pacification in Tripoli. She decided to withdraw her troops from the interior to the coastal region, a resolve which was doubtless guided by the desert character of the Hinterland, so different to the northern slopes of the Atlas.

This provisional retirement encouraged the hostile nomads; Turkey, the ally of Germany, allowing officers, arms, and money to pass through to the rebels by unguarded routes. The French troops in Southern Tunisia received as brothers the Italian garrisons of certain posts which fell back in a north-westerly direction, and had themselves to sustain some very desperate attacks, while the defence of one post by a handful of territorials dying of thirst, who held out until the arrival of reinforcements, provides an episode worthy of record on the finest pages of our African military history. While Central and Northern Tunisia bravely played their part in *la grande guerre*, the Resident, accompanied by one of the sons of the Bey, and by the General Commanding the Army of Occupation, opened the Gabes railway, a strategic line, on which the trains were running in April, 1916, to the edge of the Sahara, some 325 miles from Tunis.

Algeria, while already an ancient possession of France, had only commenced quite at the close of the 19th century to accurately define the *régime* under which she became an integral portion of the Mother Country; she required her own financial Budget, special laws similar to, but not altogether the same, as those by which France was

governed; the natives, who, for three parts of a century have seen the French alongside them, had fully realized the benefit conferred upon them by such an association, but recognized at the same time that this association had not been developed as it might have been by the ruling race.

For three years now we have been experimenting with conscription among the native Algerians, according to methods not too cut and dried and tested by experience. The war caused us to resolve on an expansion of the movement, and this in certain districts resulted in disappointment. In 1914 and 1915 the poorness of the results obtained was traceable to certain agitators, and the Government was obliged to make some examples. Order was quickly re-established with the active assistance of the native chiefs who are the most highly respected among their co-religionists. In the colonies where the French element abounds, in the mixed communities where European families live in isolation among thousands of natives, the womenkind of those colonists who have been mobilized have evinced, in conjunction with the working energy of the French peasant woman, a courage and a spirit of discipline and leadership to which the Governor-General, M. Lutaud, has justly rendered public tribute.

Thus the colonies have managed to ward off the dangers of a crisis which surprised them in the act of evolution; they put in practice the proud Italian motto—*sara da se*; they have actually established themselves more firmly during the war, they extended their efforts in the overseas countries, even beyond their appointed boundaries, and have played their full part in the war in its main theatre. This proof of the French colonial power is nowhere more clearly to be seen than in Morocco. The introduction which General Lyautey wrote in January, 1916, for the general report on the state of the protectorate on the eve of the war, shows this unmistakably and gloriously. In vain did the agents of Germany encourage those tribal chiefs who are inimical to our rule—Abd-el Malek, in the north, El Hiba in the south, and in the immediate neighbourhood of Tangiers, that same Raisuli, whom the Spaniards have boldly accepted as one of their adherents. The abolition of German and Austrian protection, the arrest of such enemy residents as appeared to be most deeply compromised, the arrival of several thousand prisoners, who were employed on various public works, soon showed the people of Morocco what was the value of German bluster: thenceforward they drew closer than ever to France, which to them appeared not only powerful, but which at the same time added to their prosperity.

Colonial troops conquered those African possessions of Germany which bordered our colonies—Togo and the Cameroons; they co-operated in the friendliest way with the British on one side, and on the other with the British and the Belgians. The occupation of Togo was relatively easy, although from that country the Germans had made every preparation for the invasion of Dahomey; a German Governor of Togo, who was visiting that colony in 1908, and who was invited to our review of the 14th July, insinuated to the natives of Dahomey that the French were on the point of abandoning that

territory and were already paying military honours to the chief of their successors! By September, 1914, the whole of Togo was in the hands of the Allies; prior to surrender the Germans destroyed a big wireless station which had been set up in the utmost secrecy, and which was known to have given assistance to their pirates in the Atlantic. The administration of the Togo country has been amicably and provisionally carried on by the French and British authorities of the neighbouring colonies, those of Dahomey and of the Gold Coast; the two Mother Countries have not interfered with the arrangements made beyond recording their approval of the convention drawn up through the happy initiative of the colonial officials and of the troops serving under their orders.

The campaign in the Cameroons, on the other hand, was protracted and laborious; it was not brought to a close until the early part of 1916, with the retreat of the last of the German contingents into the Spanish territory of Muni, where they were disarmed. It will not have been forgotten that by the treaty of November 4th, 1911, a considerable portion of our Congo territory, and particularly two "piqures," by which the new Cameroon extended to meet the Belgian Congo connecting with the navigable waterways of the interior—had been ceded to Germany in exchange for certain disinterested concessions in Morocco. When war began the Germans, with their usual bad faith, were quibbling over the matter of these "piqures," and we were on the point of referring the case to the Hague Tribunal. The first care of our equatorial troops, on war commencing, was to re-occupy the ceded territory, where the Germans had already raised important defence works, but we did not waste time, and by degrees the Old Cameroon had met the fate of the New. In this manner the French colonies avenged the sacrifices imposed upon our Equatorial Africa by the treaty of 1911, and made ready this vast region for the inter-Allied repartition of the Dark Continent.

The conquest of the Cameroons relieved of all cares the Belgians, who, like us, had been threatened by the insatiable ambition of Germany. The special neutrality of their Congo colony had been violated at the end of August, 1914, by a German attack upon a Belgian post on Lake Tanganyika; since that date the troops of the Belgian Congo assisted in the operations against the Cameroons in the same manner as they later took part with the British in the investment of German East Africa; the French, British, and Belgian flags were hoisted simultaneously over Yaoundé, the last strong place in German Caimeroon. In the colonial war on another front, in Tunisia, France was able to render useful assistance to her Allies. We have already seen that our troops from Southern Tunisia were able to co-operate with the forces from Italian Tripoli, and Bizerta, with its thoroughly up-to-date arsenal of Sidi Abdalla, formed a very valuable base of operations in combination with Malta for the fleets of the Entente Powers; many troop transports and supply ships were organized and prepared at Bizerta. It was in the neighbourhood of this town that most of the regiments of the brave Serbian Army collected at Corfu, were installed, rested, and reconstituted. Through,

and by means of, Bizerta, we find the direct participation of our colonies in the great war.

This participation is represented in very many different ways; in levies of troops, in material, in the way of contributions in supplies or in money; whatever the contribution made by our colonies, it formed a very real help to the Mother Country. Something has already been said about the French citizens inhabiting our colonies, and of the brave way in which they accepted their military obligations; we may return to this subject to allude to the patriotic zeal of those French who had taken up their abode in foreign lands; these all, whether engineers, merchants, missionaries, or workmen, rivalled one another in the ardour with which they all returned to take their places in our regiments, without considering the interests they left behind them, and which, in some cases, consequently were hopelessly endangered. The native inhabitants of our colonies could, of course, not afford us a military assistance of the same character, since, except in Algeria and Tunisia, they only entered the army voluntarily. But the same was the case with our discharged riflemen from Northern Africa, those whom we familiarly call Turcos, Senegalese; also of our Malgaches, the men from Indo-China, and later on by our troops from the "Moroccan Auxiliary Force." During the summer and autumn of 1914 we sent quickly to the front all the available native troops of Northern and Western Africa. "The Moroccan Division," which covered itself with glory at the battle of the Marne, included, besides soldiers of French birth, native infantry from Morocco, who showed themselves no whit inferior as fighting men to their French comrades.

Greatly reduced in numbers in the earlier battles, these troops drew reinforcements from dépôts which had only recently been created and organized; but by degrees the North African and black troops were allotted their instructional and rest camps, their ammunition parks, their hospitals, even their mosques—all in France; philanthropic associations were formed for the provision of comforts of all kinds for these brave men who were shedding their blood so generously in the service of France. Many successive governmental decrees, between 1914 and 1916, show that the War Administration had studied how to make the most of these splendid resources, by mobilizing our natives according to their several aptitudes, and so combining the best interests of the Motherland with those of the colonies themselves, which are only two sides of the *national* interests. The system of giving bonuses for engagement and re-engagement was made more complete by the grant of allowances to the families of men serving with the Colours; and, although the domestic customs of the natives differ so widely from ours, nothing has done more than the grant of these allowances to make the population of our colonies realize that all sexes and ages are engaged in the same great work as is the Protecting Power.

One can give approximate figures only of the numbers included in the various native contingents which have been enrolled; the most accurate have been compiled by M. Georges Boussenot, Deputy of Réunion, and published recently in an interesting pamphlet.<sup>1</sup> According

<sup>1</sup> *La France d'Outre-mer participe à la guerre.* Paris, Blum, 1916.

to these French subjects overseas have contributed at least 280,000 men to the defence force of the Mother Country, many of whom enlisted in various *corps d'élite*; the spirit of our North African riflemen and of the Spahis was worthy of their traditions, no matter where they were engaged; the Senegalese, and the warriors from Indo-China, distinguished themselves at Verdun; and others at the Dardanelles. It is remarkable to notice that everywhere the leading native families sent some at least of their sons to the front in France, and many of these, in their different stations, have won successive steps of commissioned rank with *citations* of the most laudatory kind.

From 1915 onwards recruiting has not been used only for the raising of fighting men; other engagements were entered into requiring the employment of many thousands of natives in the rearward services of the Army, and also in the munition factories. Since 1912 the Kabyles have taken service as miners in the Pas-de-Calais or in the sugar refineries of Paris. The experiment, having proved successful, was further extended, and this civilian mobilization, which provides for the families of those employed similar allowances to those granted to men mobilized for military service, has supplied the required manpower, first, for the munition factories in Algeria, and, later, for others in the Mother Country; other men from Algeria have been sent into Beauce to assist in the harvest, or to the ports to help in the docks. A similar effort has been called for in Morocco, and experts have drawn up labour contracts suited to the new requirements. From August, 1915, Indo-China has sent gangs of workmen to France; these Annamites are very smart, and possess in a high degree the faculty for imitation, and their services are much appreciated in the munition factories and in the aircraft workshops; others again, such as the Malgaches, make excellent hospital orderlies, being quiet, sober, and careful. The importance of these discoveries, due to the improvisations of war, will certainly not be lost sight of on the return of peace.

Being but indifferently prepared for industrial production, our colonies have not been able to give much assistance in the manufacture of material of war in their own territories. As a rule, the colonial handicraftsman requires for such work a special education which he cannot obtain locally, while further, the means of communication are not suited for the movement of minerals or of heavy pieces of machinery: Algeria is still awaiting the construction of the railway which in the future is to bring to the port of Bona the iron to be found in huge quantities in the mountains of Ouenza; in New Caledonia the new great furnaces for the treatment of nickel were only set going a very few months before the outbreak of hostilities. In face of the impossibility of equipping the colonies with the means of supplying the Mother Country with the requirements of war, the authorities judged it best to keep up such factories as were already established in France, and to these it has often been necessary to import largely from abroad.

But the colonies were able to co-operate in another way in supplying the needs of the front in Europe; many of their natural products are greatly needed for the wants both of civilians and soldiers, and they have mobilized these resources in order that France—and also the

Allies—may to the full profit by them. The long duration of the war has brought a matter to the front—that of exchange—which at the first was debated only by the specialists. The figures for 1916 show that during twelve months France imported goods to the value of six millions of francs more than she exported. This excess would be even more formidable if the calculation had been made on the actual value of the goods dealt with and not on their average value; at the present time we cannot include the gain we ordinarily realize from the arrival and stay in France of numerous foreign visitors. It is therefore correct to state that, owing to the war, our country is living mainly on its capital; her foreign credit has not been able to meet the rebuff, causing loss in exchange, which our paper experiences in the neutral markets. This crisis has been greatly eased for us by the arrival of colonial produce, the settlement for which, being wholly a matter of domestic finance, is not quoted on 'Change; but it will be necessary greatly to extend this movement.

Indo-China, the rice granary, has sent many thousands of tons of this cereal to Europe; some of it was a free contribution; maize was also sent, which the people of Annam have now cultivated for some years past alternately with rice, wherever, that is to say, irrigation could be properly controlled. In 1914 and 1915 there were bad harvests in Northern Africa, and she was not able to send us her usual amount of grain, and the authorities even found it necessary to take measures for preventing its export, and had even to import sufficient for seed purposes; but the contribution in wine was good, as was that also in fruit and meat. The Antilles and Réunion, where the cane had done well, have sent to France their sugar and rum. In Morocco the Commissariat made considerable purchases of corn, which was used to supply Tunisia and the Armies of the East; while eggs from Morocco, sent by thousands to France during the winter months, took the place of those which could no longer reach us from the Balkans and from Russia. The Abyssinian railway, completed in 1915 to Addis Ababa, brought to Djibouti grain and coffee from Ethiopia.

Particular mention should be made of the progress of the factories established in the colonies for the slaughtering of cattle and freezing of carcasses as a commercial measure. Already before war began some of the municipalities in France had experimented in bringing to the notice of the public these frozen meats, long since used in England, but against the employment of which with us there had been considerable opposition due to the jealousy of vested interests. The serving soldiers, who were often rationed on this "frigo," did much to cause more justice to be done to the introduction of such meat, but our colonies, so rich in cattle, have so far only sent us over but small quantities of frozen carcasses. After the war very much larger consignments will be called for if the expenses of living are really to be reduced. New Caledonia is too far to send to Europe, but should find customers enough in her own territory and in Oceania. Madagascar is a near neighbour of the important British markets of East Africa, and has already done something to help to supply the Allied troops

fighting in German East Africa. France will have mainly to rely on West Africa, where the Lyndiane factory, near Kaolack, already employs a thousand natives; another will shortly be established at Dakar; other projects are engaging attention on the west of Morocco, where also the fisheries of these latitudes should by no means be overlooked. While the flocks and herds of Western and Northern Africa have furnished food for our Armies, they have also supplied wool and skins (sheep and goats), which have been greatly appreciated in rough weather in the trenches. The oils of Africa and the rice-spirit of Indo-China have been largely used in the explosives factories in France.

Statistics for 1916 show that our colonies, selling their raw materials and receiving in exchange but a relatively small quantity of manufactured goods, have seen their exports rise and greatly exceed their imports. But they did not wait for this improvement in their commercial balance before investing in French loans. Not only the Colonial Treasuries from their reserve funds, not only the Colonial Banks (those of Indo-China, West Africa, Algeria, and others), have largely subscribed to the funds and to the *Bons de la Défense Nationale*, but the lead thus given has been generally followed by the French residents and by the native inhabitants. Prior to the loan of 1916 the subscriptions from Algeria reached 370 millions of francs; the Bank of Indo-China, which has branches in our colonies in India, in Djibouti, and in Oceania, had gathered in 146 millions; the little island of Réunion subscribed 3 millions. Private charity has shown itself to be inexhaustible, even as in France—hospitals and dispensaries, parcels for soldiers and for the prisoners of war, work of all kinds for the wives of those called up for service. Some of the presents from the natives are very touching: the people of Djerid sent boxes of dates to the dépôts of the Tirailleurs, and the gardens of Sahel, in Tunisia, sent presents of oranges to the convalescent soldiers. The "Days" were a brilliant success in our colonies; "the Day of the '75," kept in Indo-China on July 14th, 1915, realized in Cochin China and Cambodia alone more than 500,000 francs.

Thus we may say that with soul and body the colonies have taken their share in the war; contrary to the belief of those who held that the colonies would prove only a dead weight for France, they have shown themselves to be one of the most active expressions of the national vigour. It is worth our while to ask ourselves how we have managed to create this valuable solidarity, and whether it is not possible to increase in the future the advantages to be drawn from it. It is one of the characteristics of French oversea expansion that she has always colonized by sympathy, the whole of the recent growth of her colonial empire has been guided by the principles of close association with the natives. The Mussulmans of Northern and Western Africa have noticed that France re-opened the pilgrimage to Mecca at the same time that the Shereef of the sacred city cut himself adrift from the Sultan of Constantinople. Kabylia is becoming transformed by means of the money which her workers in French factories are sending to their homes; the post office at *Fort National* paid out between

March 15th and June 15th, 1916, no less than 700,000 francs for the postal orders sent by the natives. The interest shown by the people in the Casablanca Exhibition of 1915, in the Fez Fair of 1916, is proof of the interest all take in a progress which they see that they are all helping to promote. In Indo-China the people have began to make pulp for paper from the bamboo.

It cannot be doubted that sooner or later our colonial possessions will reap the benefit of this collaboration. In the speeches made by the Governors-General since the commencement of hostilities there is a striking unanimity on this point; however much they may declare against a hard and fast system of legislation imposed by the Mother Country, and intended to confer on all the natives the exact status of French citizens, the more do they insist upon the introduction of a system of policy which will call upon the natives to take their share in the administration of the colonies. We notice the same tendency to-day among the British in India and among the Dutch in Malaya; it is all in the direction of a judicial and fiscal system suited to the mentality of the natives, respecting their traditions and customs, and based upon a distinct desire for progress. Created during the sufferings of war, such a system will in the future become more human and spiritual, something far better than a mere formula evolved by the school or the public office.

Recognizing what our colonies have done during the war to keep up the national supply of food, we must for the future look upon them as complementary to our European territory, and must consequently work them to the best advantage. In July, 1916, the *Union Coloniale Française* addressed a letter to the President of the Council pointing out that, of 4,700 millions of valuable goods imported into France during 1913, many could well be supplied by our colonies, to the great advantage of our exchequer, of our industry, and, provided certain needed changes are made, of our mercantile marine. Within a very short period the importation of woods, oils, grains, fruits, meat might be organized; within from five to ten years our colonies might well become reservoirs for our supplies of wool, cotton, minerals, coffee, rubber, etc. All this is taking it for granted that French capital, which has hitherto so complacently been placed at the disposal of foreign enterprize, will be directed towards our colonies, and that at the same time we will find for them, by suitable educational methods, the *personnel* capable of providing for them, in our countries beyond the seas, a small staff of Frenchmen to oversee the native artisans.

During the first year of the war at least the exchange of goods of our colonies with Europe suffered greatly from the disappearance of the German flag from the seas; our mercantile marine had allowed itself in the past to be ousted; by means of steamships from the port of Hamburg the produce of the French colonies was carried to Austria, to the Balkans, to our Russian Allies, with whom we seem, in regard to certain goods, to have abandoned any direct relations. The Colonial Congress, the local newspapers, and the reports of colonial ministers have repeatedly denounced these haphazard ways; the scientific works of Professor Perrot, and of M. Auguste Chevallier, were, prior to

the war, scarcely noticed by our merchants and workers; as lately only as 1913 was a syndicate established in Paris for importing wood from Gaboon; while the needs of our Army have afforded an admirable stimulant—hitherto wanting—to the exploiting of the minerals of Madagascar.

It is the general wish of all Frenchmen, of France and of the colonies, that this progress should grow and flourish. It must, of course, be supported by a re-creation of our mercantile marine, which will emerge from the war exhausted by the clash of fleets. One of the most important items in the programme of the French *renaissance* will be the nationalization of the ocean-going ships of our colonies; we must have ships constructed especially for certain freights, specialized, as are our railway trucks, for the carriage of wine, minerals, cattle, garden produce, etc. To the question of the reorganization of our maritime transports is closely allied that of the linking-up of the colonies with France by means of electric cables, wireless installations, and railways. We must profit by the lessons of the war to demand the construction of our great political and, later, economic line of rail, the Trans-Saharan. We must be ready to extend during peace the practice of an inter-Allied colonial policy, which has been so happily initiated during the war; especially in Africa have we opportunities for the exchange of goods with our British, Belgian, and Portuguese neighbours. Let us, in a word, bear in mind that France in Europe, even with the return of those provinces demanded by justice, is not thereby wholly completed and rounded off: her whole constitution includes also her colonies, successors of those which in the past have too often been condemned, but which have now given to France such abundant evidence of their wealth and their loyalty.



## THE WAR.

### ITS NAVAL SIDE.

#### THE SUBMARINE MENACE.

The chronicle of naval events of the war is continued in the present issue of the JOURNAL to the end of the year 1917. In the previous issue, that for November, 1917, the appointment of Sir Eric Geddes to be First Lord of the Admiralty, in succession to Sir Edward Carson, was reported, and a new Patent for the Board of Admiralty, dated September 11th, 1917, was given. A fresh Patent was published on November 7th, 1917, the only difference in this to that previously announced being the addition of the name of Sir Herbert Heath, who took the place of Second Sea Lord, while Sir Rosslyn Wemyss was given a new post, that of Deputy First Sea Lord.

The Board of Admiralty was then arranged as follows:—

First Lord : Rt. Hon. Sir Eric Campbell Geddes, K.C.B., M.P.

First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff : Admiral Sir John R. Jellicoe, G.C.B., O.M.

Deputy First Sea Lord : Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn E. Wemyss, K.C.B.

Second Sea Lord : Vice-Admiral Sir Herbert L. Heath, K.C.B.

Third Sea Lord : Rear-Admiral Lionel Halsey, C.B.

Fourth Sea Lord : Rear-Admiral Hugh H. D. Tothill, C.B.

Fifth Sea Lord (Director of Air Service) : Commodore Godfrey M. Paine, C.B.

Deputy Chief of Naval Staff : Vice-Admiral Sir Henry F. Oliver, K.C.B.

Assistant Chief of Naval Staff : Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff, C.B.

Civil Lord : Rt. Hon. Ernest G. Pretyman, M.P.

Controller : Sir Allen G. Anderson, K.B.E.

Parliamentary and Financial Secretary : Rt. Hon. Thomas J. Macnamara, M.P.

Permanent Secretary : Sir Oswyn A. R. Murray, K.C.B.

Additional Parliamentary Secretary : The Earl of Lytton.

On November 1st, Sir Eric Geddes, in a maiden speech in the House of Commons, reviewed the naval situation. The First Lord explained in outline the changes which had been made in the organization of the Admiralty. He said that the members of the Board, in addition to dealing individually with the work allotted to them under the table of distribution of business in the Admiralty, had been grouped into two formal committees : The Operations Committee, and the Maintenance Committee. The former dealt with large questions of naval strategy, with operational plans, with the scale of provision and equipment of the Navy as a fighting force, and with its efficiency, organization, and utilization. The other Committee consisted of the six members of the Board concerned with personnel, material, supplies, works, production, and finance. This organization he reported to be working smoothly, and to be merely the development of a policy initiated by his predecessor, Sir Edward Carson. The First Lord also referred to the constitution of the Naval Staff, to the Operations side of which had been added a new section consisting of younger officers with recent experience in the Grand Fleet, and under a flag-officer who left the Grand Fleet to take up the position. "It is hoped that by these means to add to the ripe and valuable experience of those distinguished officers who have served at the Admiralty for considerable periods, and whose experience cannot be dispensed with, the latest and up-to-date knowledge of naval warfare in its ever-changing aspects of to-day."

On October 23rd, 1917, Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, who had recently served as Second Sea Lord, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the East Coast of Scotland, in succession to Admiral Sir Frederick Hamilton, who had died rather suddenly on October 4th.

No further change took place in the composition of the Board until December 27th, 1917, when it was announced that Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss had been appointed First Sea Lord in succession to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, upon whom, in recognition of his very distinguished services, the King had been graciously pleased to confer the dignity of a peerage of the United Kingdom. A hope was also expressed in the official announcement that the services and experience of Sir John Jellicoe might be made use of at a later date in another important appointment.

A new Admiralty Patent had not been published at the end of the year.

No reason was assigned at the time for the change at the Admiralty, which was received with some surprise by the country. At the Lord Mayor's banquet on November 9th, 1917, Sir Eric Geddes, in replying to the toast of the Navy, said :—

"I can assure you that I deem it the highest privilege to preside over the Board of Admiralty, with Sir John Jellicoe and his naval colleagues at my side, and also to know that we have the honour of administering that wonderful Fleet of which Sir David Beatty is the Commander-in-Chief, and of administering those other great naval forces which patrol the Seven Seas. It is a great satisfaction to me and to my colleagues to know that upon all questions of broad naval strategy there is complete agreement between the Board of Admiralty and the Commanders of our great Navies afloat."

On December 4th, 1917, at a meeting of the French Cabinet, M. Pichon, the Foreign Minister, announced that it had been decided to create a Supreme Naval Council of the Allies. On December 15th, 1917, the Secretary of the Admiralty made the following announcement :—

"At a conference held at the Ministry of Marine at Paris on Thursday and Friday, November 29th and 30th, presided over by M. Leygues, Minister of Marine, and the following delegates being present :—

"*For France.*—M. Jules Cels, Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Marine; Vice-Admiral de Bon, Chief of the General Staff:

"*For England.*—Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty; Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, First Sea Lord:

"*For the United States.*—Admiral Benson, Director of the Bureau of Operations; Vice-Admiral Sims, Commanding the American Naval Forces in European Waters:

"*For Italy.*—Vice-Admiral Cusani Visconti, Sous-Chef of the General Staff:

"*For Japan.*—Rear-Admiral Funakoshi:

it has been decided to create a Naval Allied Council in order to ensure the closest touch and complete co-operation between the Allied Fleets.

"The task of the Council will be to watch over the general conduct of the naval war and to ensure the co-ordination of effort at sea as well as the development of all scientific operations connected with the conduct of the war. The Council will make all the necessary recommendations to enable the Government to make decisions. It will keep itself informed as to the execution of plans decided upon.

"The members of the Council will report to their respective Governments as may be necessary. The individual responsibility of the Chiefs of Staffs and of the

Commander-in-Chief at sea towards their Governments as regards operations in hand, as well as the strategical and tactical disposition of the forces placed under their command, remains unchanged.

"It has been decided that the Council should consist of the Ministers of Marine of the nations represented and of the Chiefs of the Naval Staffs.

"As the meeting of the Council will, of necessity, be held in Europe, the Chiefs of the General Naval Staffs of the United States and of Japan will be represented by Flag Officers nominated by their respective Governments.

"The Allied Naval Council will be provided with a permanent secretariat, whose business it will be to collect and collate all necessary information, etc. The Council will meet as often as may be thought necessary under the presidency of the Minister of Marine of the country in which the meeting is held.

"The various Admiralties will furnish the Council with the information which is necessary for the work to be carried out."

On December 20th, 1917, Dr. Macnamara, in answer to Commander Bellairs, in the House of Commons, said that it had not then been settled who would be the British naval representative on the permanent secretariat on the Allied Naval Council, or where the permanent secretariat would have their offices. Advice upon all large naval questions affecting military operations would be given to the Inter-Allied Military Staff in Versailles either by the Inter-Allied Naval Council or by the Chief of the Staff of the Admiralty concerned. For the daily discussion of minor matters at Versailles, the British naval liaison officer in Paris, Commodore Heaton-Ellis, would at all times be available.

With regard to the origin of the Inter-Allied Naval Council in Paris, Mr. Josephus Daniels, in his Annual Report on the United States Navy, stated:—

"Upon the suggestion of this Government, a conference of naval experts of all the countries engaged in war against Germany was held in London, and Admiral Mayo, Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, was delegated to visit England and France, and, with Vice-Admiral Sims, to represent the United States at the Conference. Admiral Mayo was accompanied by members of his staff. During his stay in England, all the information gathered by the British Admiralty during the war was open to Admiral Mayo and his staff. The same is true of the Admiralties of the other countries he was able to visit. The conference was a full and frank one, resulting in such interchange of views as has drawn into close co-operation the naval authorities of the nations fighting against Germany. As a result of this conference plans were discussed which it is believed will result in more effective co-ordination of the naval forces of the countries represented."

On November 24th the Admiralty announced the formation of a Shipbuilding Council under the chairmanship of the Controller. On this council, representatives of the shipbuilding and engineering trades, as well as officers of the Admiralty, will meet to consider problems of naval and commercial shipbuilding and repair.

The Council differs from the Shipbuilding Advisory Committee by the inclusion of naval shipbuilding in its purview and by being relieved from certain executive functions in placing and following up contracts, which have been undertaken by the Admiralty Controller and Director of Contracts.

All those who served on the Shipbuilding Advisory Committee and who have not since joined the staff of the Controller's Department have consented to serve on the Council.

During this period many statements were made by public men in connection with the submarine campaign.

On October 11th Lord Beresford, in his presidential address to the members of the Birmingham and Midland Institute said that the advent of the submarine and its barbarities by the assassins of the sea had added to our dangers to an immense extent. If we had had the requisite number of small craft and destroyers at the beginning of the war, the necessity of which would have been represented by a proper War Staff making out plans of campaign for protecting the trade routes and ensuring our food supply, the submarine would never have attained its present position. . . . Public mention had been made of the hydrophone, or listener, and mines, as well as the smoke-boxes now in use, but owing to our ineradicable dilatory methods, these inventions, which were brought out a short time after the outbreak of war, were held up. If they had been taken and pushed at once, the hydrophone would have saved the country many millions sterling, as the enormous barrages and obstacles which had been placed in the sea would have in many cases been quite unnecessary, and the smoke-boxes would have saved many a vessel from gun and torpedo attack. Many vessels lost now would be afloat, and many precious lives saved.

On October 22nd Mr. Lloyd George spoke at a great meeting held in the Albert Hall to launch a new economy campaign. He said, after mentioning the advent of America in the war as the first event which had changed the outlook, "What is the second factor? The increasing failure of the Germans' submarine campaign. You can hardly realize, without going into it thoroughly, how much Germany gambled on that. They said: 'In 1917 America will not count. She has no Army. In 1918,' they said, 'she will not have very much of an Army; 1919 will never arrive.' That is how they reckon at Potsdam. Why did they say that? 'Because,' said Potsdam, 'before 1918 arrives the shipping tonnage of the world will be rusting at the bottom of the deep.' That was their reckoning. It was wrong. There are fluctuations, there are ups and downs, there are bad days and good days, bad weeks and good weeks, but our monthly loss in tonnage in the good and the bad is not much over one-third of what it was in April last. I will give another figure I have never given yet. The losses of German submarines during this year—not quite ten months of the year—are more than twice what they were in the whole of last year. Time is on our side. Our shipbuilding is increasing. We have laid down plans and made arrangements by which we can turn out next year four times what we turned out last year. America is doing the same. Let me say just one word in passing. There are people who do not like politicians—especially if they happen to be lawyers. One of the main reasons why we have succeeded beyond our expectation, earlier than we anticipated, in destroying so many German submarines and protecting our own merchant ships, is due to the insight, to the courage, the persistency of a lawyer who is a politician, and a politician who is a good lawyer—Sir Edward Carson. I am afraid he will not be very popular in Potsdam."

While on a tour with General Smuts to Sheffield, Sir John Jellicoe, on October 25th, addressed a large meeting in which he said that there were a great many misapprehensions about the submarine. And perhaps those who knew all about it would forgive him if he gave those who did not know all about it some idea of the qualities of the submarine. It could submerge completely in periods varying between thirty seconds and two minutes, according to her state of trim at the time. She could steam on the surface at a speed between eighteen and fourteen knots, submerged between ten and eight knots. She could remain under the water without coming to the surface for forty-eight hours, and she could steam under the water without coming to the surface for about 100 miles. She carries a number of torpedoes according to her size, up to twenty, and which had a range of five miles and a speed of from thirty to forty knots. It was quite unnecessary

for the submarine to come to the surface to fire her torpedoes, no self-respecting submarine would think of doing it. All that was necessary was for her to show about three inches of periscope above the surface. The consequence was that very few of the ships that were sunk either saw the torpedo or the submarine.

The Admiral also said that another task of the Navy had been to safeguard the transport of 13,000,000 of troops overseas, and 25,000,000 tons of stores and ammunition. This task had been carried out with the loss of 2,700 men out of 13,000,000. Concurrently with the protection of our sea communications for the Army, they had had to safeguard our traffic round our coast. We had 7,700 miles and the Germans 290 miles in the North Sea—and Germany rarely had a merchant ship to protect. Of course many people would say that the best way of protecting our own shores and our commerce was to stop the enemy submarines getting out. He added: "I wish we could do it." But when they remembered that a submarine could remain forty-eight hours under water, and travel 100 miles under water, and sit on the bottom, they would realize the task was not very easy. The British Navy had not only to look after our own ships and those of our Allies; but in this war it had to do what it had never had to do before: protect neutrals—neutrals were never sunk in other wars. The average daily number of targets for submarines round our coast was 1,478, of which 1,276 were British.

At a meeting under the auspices of the local War Aims Committee at Bedford on December 10th, 1917, Mr. Churchill said:—"Our Navy is grappling with the submarines. It is a dangerous and deadly struggle, but not only are we striking under the seas at this menace, but side by side with the sinking of the submarines there is a large and broadening flow of newly-built ships coming into the water. Do not relax for one moment your efforts. We may to-night feel a solid assurance that if all do their best, if every scrap of food and material is saved, the submarines will not prevent us from doing all that we have to do. . . . Unless the British race, unless we inhabitants of this small island, can bear during the greater part of next year the main weight and burden of the war on land on our shoulders, and unless at the same time we can keep the submarine choked down under the sea, there can be no American aid, there can be no deliverance, no victory. Is not this, I ask you, the greatest responsibility ever laid upon any nation of men? Is it not the most splendid opportunity offered to any nation of men? Is it not the climax to which all English history has led us, in which all the work of all our heroes and worthies of the past and present time finds its consummation?"

Sir Arthur Yapp, the Food Economy Director, during this time made many statements concerning the submarines and our food supply. On October 15th, in a speech at the City Temple, Sir Arthur said:—"Owing to the difficulties of sending ships long distances, we had to depend almost entirely for our supplies of grain on the United States and Canada. I do not desire to minimize the importance of the 'U'-boat peril, yet I have such confidence in the courage and skill of the Navy and in our inventors that I have not the slightest doubt that the menace will be overcome. But if it were overcome, and the 'U'-boats ceased their depredations, the need for food economy would be practically as great as to-day." Again, on December 7th, at Glasgow, Sir Arthur Yapp said:—"The average tonnage of a wheat ship is 6,000. Suppose two ships a week are sunk for a month, then 25,668,264 average bread rations of 4½ lb. would be lost. That would feed, on the new bread rations, all Scotland for over five weeks, Glasgow for six months, and Edinburgh for one year and five months. A big meat ship could carry, say, 50,000 carcases of sheep, or about 3,500,000 lb., which would keep Glasgow in meat rations alone for nearly two weeks."

Lord Rhondda, at Magor, Monmouthshire, on November 10th, said that he thought it rather early to say that the "U"-boat menace had been overcome,

although we appeared to have got it to some extent in hand. They would not be able to say that menace was completely mastered until the time came—and it was coming in the course of next year—when the Allies were building more vessels than the enemy were sinking. Although he fully appreciated the something more than inconvenience the submarine menace had caused us, a worse thing could not have happened from the German point of view than their decision to sink all shipping ruthlessly. It was the best thing that could have happened to the Allies for the shortening of the war, because it brought the United States into the conflict. . . .

Many German boasts were made during the period under review, and also many time limits were fixed for the endurance by the Allies of the submarine war. Count Hertling, the German Chancellor, before the Reichstag on November 29th, said, of the High Seas Fleet:—"As a support and reserve it stands behind our submarine boats. It protects their places of support and opens out a way for them into the open sea. The submarine warfare against merchant ships exercises systematically its powerful and inevitable effect. It was, and is, the only thorough-going means for carrying on, against the superior force of our adversaries, the economic war forced upon us. It directs itself against enemy tonnage and that voyaging in the enemy's service. If our adversaries have sought for some time to fill the thinned-out ranks of their merchant fleet with neutral ships which they have forcibly impressed by hunger blockade, and other oppressive means, into their service, this procedure cannot be continued at will, and will soon reach its limit. Even by the most hurried building of new ships in the yards of our adversaries, the number of ships sunk will continually exceed that of those newly built. All observations give us unmistakable proof that the submarine war against merchant vessels will reach the aim intended for it."

#### NORTH SEA.

"U"-BOATS SUNK.—On September 18th it was reported from Bergen that, thirty miles south-east of the Shetlands an armed British steamer sank a German submarine which was engaged in shelling a neutral sailing vessel. Shortly afterwards a British destroyer appeared and sank another German submarine which began an attack upon the armed steamer.

OPEN BOATS.—At the end of September the following incidents were published showing the German practice of shelling seamen from torpedoed ships:—The schooner "Jane Williamson," of Arklow, encountered a small German submarine off the coast of Cornwall at four o'clock in the afternoon of September 10th. The submarine open fire, shelling the schooner until she sank. Meanwhile her crew had taken to their boat, but the submarine, after sinking the schooner, turned her gun on the open boat. The shipwrecked crew were picked up by a British trawler at eight o'clock next morning. The master, the mate, and one seaman had been badly wounded, and the remaining three members of the crew lay dead at the bottom of the boat.

On September 11th, at 6.45 a.m., the schooner "William," of Dublin, was attacked by a "U"-boat. After the schooner had been sunk by gun-fire, her crew were fired on with shrapnel, one man being wounded.

GERMAN MINES.—At the end of September it was also reported that the Germans were sowing small floating mines which were difficult to sight, and which exploded on slight contact.

DANISH NEUTRALITY.—The British Government expressed its sincere regret to Denmark for the violation of neutrality by British warships off the Jutland coast

On September 1st (see last issue of the JOURNAL, page 831). Indemnification was also offered for any damage.

**THE GRAND FLEET.**—A special correspondent of the Paris *Journal*, who has visited the British Grand Fleet, says that it is impossible to discover any traces of the battle of Jutland except those which the Fleet cherishes out of "coquetry." The officers, he says, are for the most part of the opinion that the Germans, beaten on land, will not allow the war to finish without staking their all and accepting a great naval battle.

**STANDARD SHIPS.**—Following the decision in February, 1917, of the Government to build a fleet of standardized ships, it was announced on August 30th, 1917, that the first standard ship had completed her tests and had been put into commission as a cargo-carrier. In an article written from Glasgow on August 30th, 1917, a staff correspondent of the Associated Press described the tour he had made of the principal yards on the Rivers Tees, Tyne, Wear, and Clyde as the guest of the Foreign Office and the Admiralty. He said especially fast work is being done on the merchant vessels, as the Government and the builders are eager to increase British tonnage by building standard vessels, of which many are even now under construction, many having been launched. These standard vessels, builders unanimously agree, will greatly enlarge the output of tonnage. In the first place, construction has been simplified; all parts of hulls, engines—everything—are standard, and may be used where first needed. Heretofore, thirty-five sizes of steel sections were used in the construction of ordinary vessels; the standardization process has reduced this number to eight. On October 17th Sir Leo Money stated that up to September 30th, 1917, the number of standard ships actually completed was three, and again, on October 29th, 1917, he said that the total number of standard ships built, completed, and entered on service up to October 25th was five. The tonnage approximately was 5,200 tons gross each. One of the steamers had been lost. The number of standard ships expected to be completed between October 25th and December 31st was 18, of which 16 would be of approximately 5,200 gross tons each, one of 3,000 tons gross, and one of 2,000 tons gross. In the House of Commons on December 12th, 1917, Sir Leo Money, in answer to a question, said that the number of standard steamers completed and started on voyage up to November 30th was seven, their respective gross register tonnage being 5,173, 5,167, 5,170, 5,204, 5,174, 5,170, 5,166—total, 47,224 tons gross. One vessel had been sunk, her gross register being 5,173 tons.

**NATIONAL SHIPYARDS.**—On September 16th, 1917, it was unofficially announced that the Admiralty had decided upon the construction of a large naval dry dock at the confluence of the Wye and Severn at Beachley, near Chepstow. The preliminary steps had already been taken, and property owners and occupiers of land and houses at Beachley had received notice.

The dock, it stated, will be used exclusively by the Admiralty during the period of the war, and as long afterwards as required, and will then in all probability be taken over by the Standard Shipbuilding Company of Chepstow, who are proceeding with a very large scheme there. To facilitate the construction of the dock it is expected that a temporary bridge will be thrown across the Wye.

On November 9th, 1917, it was understood that three out of the four new national shipyards which the Government were establishing were already in progress on the Bristol Channel, at Chepstow, Beachley, and Portbury. The site for the fourth had yet to be selected, and an inspection was then being made of suitable localities on the East Coast and on the Bristol Channel.

At the beginning of December, 1917, the Admiralty decided that there should be three national shipbuilding yards (all on the Bristol Channel), not four, as

was first announced. A site, however, might be secured in South Wales near the three yards sanctioned, for ship-repairing. Much criticism was levelled at the Government over the question of the cost, labour, and other matters connected with the National Shipyards, but on December 18th it was announced that the first steamer built under war conditions had been launched at Chepstow the day before, and that she was a vessel of 3,300 tons, and was named the "Petworth."

**ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE.**—During September and October, the Admiralty issued a series of four articles containing descriptions of encounters with "U"-boats by various classes of sea and aircraft in the Royal Navy. These extracts from official records were somewhat similar to an earlier series entitled "The-Navy-that-Flies," which were issued for publication during May, 1917.

**"DRAKE"** TORPEDOED.—On the morning of October 2nd, off the north coast of Ireland, the armoured cruiser "Drake," Captain S. H. Radcliffe, R.N., was torpedoed. She reached harbour, but then sank in shallow water. One officer and 18 men were killed by the explosion. All the remainder of the officers and men were saved. Gratifying evidence of the spirit of camaraderie between the Navy and Army was shown by the manner in which the survivors of the "Drake" were entertained and cared for by a battalion of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. The survivors were accommodated in the huts at Ebrington Barracks during their stay in Londonderry. On their departure the party were played to the station by the band and pipers of the battalion, and were given an enthusiastic send-off. The C.O. of the battalion subsequently received a letter from the "Drake's" commander expressing deep gratitude "for the perfectly wonderful reception which you accorded me and the officers and men of the 'Drake' during our stay in Londonderry." The surviving officers of the "Drake" presented a silver cup to the officers' mess of the battalion as a memento, while the chief petty officers, petty, and non-commissioned officers of the ship also presented a silver billiard challenge shield to the sergeants' mess.

**GERMAN NAVAL MUTINY.**—The first intimation of the mutiny in the German Navy at Wilhelmshaven in August, 1917, was through the speech of Admiral von Capelle, the Minister of Marine, in the Reichstag on October 9th, 1917. In it he said that "under the influence of Russian revolutionary ideas, there had been a mutiny in the Fleet at Wilhelmshaven, and that the ringleaders had suffered the penalty. The principal agitator, the Admiral said, had acted with the cognizance and support of the Independent Socialist Party, including Herr Hase. The object was to paralyse the Fleet and to force peace upon the country." According to an Amsterdam message on October 10th, 1917, the mutiny in the German Fleet arose among the crews of four German battleships in Wilhelmshaven. One of these was the "Westfalen," the captain of which vessel was thrown into the sea by the mutinous sailors, and his body was not recovered for eight days. The mutinous crews left their ships and went ashore. Marines were ordered to attack them, but refused to do so. An Oldenburg regiment was then ordered to undertake the task, and surrounded the mutineers, who surrendered. Besides the crews of the four battleships who mutinied the crew of the light cruiser "Nurnberg," which was at sea at the time, also revolted, seized the officers and proceeded in the direction of Norway for the purpose of getting interned there. On the way the "Nurnberg" fell in with a torpedo-boat flotilla. The flotilla signalled to the "Nurnberg," which, however, made no reply. The commander of the flotilla upon this grew suspicious, and wirelessed to Wilhelmshaven that the "Nurnberg" had not answered his signals. He was then instructed to stop or sink the "Nurnberg," the men of which, seeing themselves surrounded, surrendered, and the ship was taken back to Wilhelmshaven. After the mutiny had thus been suppressed the

Kaiser, accompanied by Dr. Michaelis, went to Wilhelmshaven and ordered that one out of every seven mutineers should be shot. Dr. Michaelis objected on the grounds that he could not assume such a responsibility before the Reichstag. Eventually only three men were shot, and heavy sentences of penal servitude were imposed on the others.

Since then several participants have written various accounts of the actual happenings, some describing the cause as being lack of food, and others the fear of serving in the Submarine Service, and all agree that the inactivity of the German Fleet was the greatest factor in lowering the morale of the German sailors.

"BEGONIA" SUNK.—About the middle of October, the mine-sweeping sloop "Begonia" was lost with all hands. The announcement was made by the Admiralty on October 15th that the vessel was considerably overdue, and must be considered as lost. She was commanded by Lieut.-Commander B. S. Noake, R.N.

"CHAMPAGNE" SUNK.—In the same Admiralty *communiqué* it was stated that the armed merchant cruiser "Champagne" had been torpedoed and sunk, five officers and fifty-one men losing their lives. The "Champagne" was commanded by Acting-Captain Percy G. Brown, R.N.

SUBMARINE FIGHT.—In the middle of October it was also reported that the French sailing ship "Blanche" had been torpedoed and sunk by a submarine, after a fight lasting over two hours.

FRENCH STEAMER'S ENCOUNTER.—On October 30th the French Minister of Marine, M. Chaumet, officially notified the satisfaction of his department with the conduct of the steamer "Loire," which on the night of October 9th—10th last bravely engaged and beat off an enemy submarine. The "Loire," which was bound for Archangel, had turned from her course in order to land at the Shetland Isles some sailors rescued the previous evening from a Norwegian sailing vessel which had been sunk, when she was fired on and pursued by a submarine of large size, armed with two guns. After an engagement lasting about an hour and a half, during which more than 200 shells were fired, the captain of the French steamer saw that the distance between the two vessels was increasing. The submarine, which at the beginning of the engagement had been gaining rapidly on the "Loire," was now beginning to lose speed, having probably been hit by shells and obviously been damaged.

SHELLING SURVIVORS.—On October 17th accounts were published in the Press of the destruction of a steamer from which Captain Clarke and forty-eight men were landed. They reported that on Sunday, October 14th, when off the coast, the steamer was attacked by two submarines, shelled, torpedoed, and sunk. When the captain and fifty men hurriedly got into two boats one submarine shelled them with callous brutality. One of the men was killed at once, and another died on the quay after being landed. Six others were seriously injured, and are now in hospital. The men were in the boat for about thirty minutes, during which time about twenty shells were fired at them.

CONVOY ATTACKED.—On October 20th the Admiralty announced that "two very fast and heavily-armed German raiders attacked a convoy in the North Sea about midway between the Shetland Islands and the Norwegian coast on October 17th. Two British destroyers, 'Mary Rose' (Lieut.-Commander Charles L. Fox) and 'Strongbow' (Lieut.-Commander Edward Brooke), which formed the anti-submarine escort, at once engaged the enemy vessels, and fought until sunk, after a short and unequal engagement. Their gallant action held the German raiders sufficiently long to enable three of the merchant vessels to effect their escape. It is regretted, however, that five Norwegian, one Danish, and three Swedish vessels

—all unarmed—were thereafter sunk by gun-fire without examination or warning of any kind, and regardless of the lives of their crews and passengers. Lengthy comment upon the action of the Germans is unnecessary, but it adds another example to the long list of criminally inhuman deeds of the German Navy. Anxious to make good their escape before British forces could intercept them, no effort was made to rescue the crews of the sunk British destroyers, and the Germans left the doomed merchant ships whilst the latter were still sinking, thus enabling British patrol craft, which arrived shortly afterwards, to rescue some thirty Norwegians and others. The German Navy by this act has once more and further degraded itself by this disregard of the historic chivalry of the sea. The German official report on this subject states that the attack took place within territorial waters of the Shetland Islands, and that all the escort vessels, including the destroyers, were sunk with the exception of one escort fishing steamer. The statement as to the locality of the attack is untrue, as is the statement regarding the destruction of the escort vessels. The enemy raiders succeeded in evading the British watching squadrons on the long dark nights, both in their hurried outward dash and in their homeward flight. It is regretted that all the eighty-eight officers and men of H.M.S. 'Mary Rose' and forty-seven officers and men of H.M.S. 'Strongbow' were lost."

**GERMAN REPORT.**—The text of the German report, referred to above, was given as follows by the Wireless Press:—"On October 17th light German sea fighting forces in the northern part of the North Sea, within the territorial waters in the neighbourhood of Shetland Islands, attacked a convoy bound from Norway to England, consisting of thirteen vessels, including, by way of protection, the two modern English destroyers 'G.29' and 'G.31.' All the ships of the convoy, as well as the protecting vessels, including the destroyers, were destroyed, with the exception of an escorting fishing steamer. Our fighting forces returned without loss or damage."

**OFFICIAL INQUIRY.**—On October 23rd, answering Sir H. Dalziel, Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord, stated that a court-martial to inquire into the loss of two destroyers and the attack on the convoy would be ordered by the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet immediately the survivors were fit to attend. A naval inquiry had been convened and would deal with the general question of the convoy. "Occasional isolated raids by fast surface craft," said Sir Eric, "could not invariably be prevented. Such incidents had been the raids on the East Coast." It was later stated by the Admiralty that, according to a further report from the hospital ship, the injuries sustained by Lieut.-Commander Brooke, late of the "Strongbow," although serious, were not so severe as at first announced. The First Lord of the Admiralty stated in the House of Commons that Commander Brooke had lost a leg and an eye. Later, however, the First Lord had much pleasure in stating that it was hoped that the officer, although severely wounded both in the leg and the eye, would not suffer the loss of either.

**RESCUE REPORT.**—It was reported in the Swedish paper *Politiken* that Captain Jansen, of the s.s. "Visbur," stated that the armed British trawler which rescued some of the crew of His Majesty's ship "Strongbow" declined to save any of the crews of the neutral steamers. This was made use of also by the Wolff Bureau. It was officially announced that, as a matter of fact, the armed trawler "Elise" rescued and brought into harbour twenty-nine Norwegians and Danes after having cruised about for four hours searching for survivors.

**"ORAMA" SUNK.**—On October 19th the armed mercantile cruiser "Orama," Commander W. Moorsom, R.N., in command, was torpedoed and sunk. There were no casualties. The "Orama" was a triple-screw vessel of nearly 13,000 tons, with a speed of eighteen knots, and was built in 1911.

**DESTROYER SUNK.**—On October 23rd, at the same time that the loss of the "Orama" was announced, the Admiralty reported the sinking of one of H.M. destroyers as the result of a collision. Two officers and twenty-one men were saved.

**OSTEND BOMBARDED.**—On October 21st it was reported that Ostend had that day been bombarded by British ships. Photographs showed the results to have been satisfactory.

**DESTROYERS AND AEROPLANES.**—On the afternoon of October 27th six British and French destroyers patrolling off the Belgian coast sighted and attacked three German destroyers and seventeen aeroplanes. Two direct hits were obtained on the enemy's destroyers, which immediately retired under the protection of their land batteries. The aeroplane formation was broken up by the anti-aircraft gunfire of the Allied destroyers. Each of the aeroplanes dropped three bombs in the vicinity of the Allied vessels, which suffered no damage beyond two men being slightly wounded.

**NORWEGIAN TONNAGE LOSSES.**—During October nineteen Norwegian merchant vessels, of a gross tonnage of 34,577, were sunk, and forty-eight Norwegian seamen lost their lives.

**LIVERPOOL TONNAGE LOSSES.**—On November 1st a report prepared for the Liverpool Steamship Owners' Association, dealing with the question of the liner services, war wastage, and replacement, showed that of the liner tonnage entered in the association, 231 ships of 1,465,046 tons had been lost from war causes during the war. There was a net loss in liner tonnage of 20 per cent.

**COMMANDER SCHNEIDER DROWNED.**—On November 2nd a Berlin telegram announced that Lieut.-Commander Schneider, who had a particularly successful career as a "U"-boat commander, had been washed overboard by a heavy sea on the last voyage of his submarine. His body was recovered, and he was buried at sea. The "U"-boat safely returned to its base.

**BELGIAN RELIEF SHIP CAPTURED.**—On November 3rd the relief steamer "Haelen," bound from Montreal to Rotterdam with a full cargo of grain for the relief of the Belgian civil population, and carrying the recognized signs of the Relief Commission, was captured by a German submarine and taken into Swinemunde. The master was at first given to understand that his ship would be released immediately, but after an interval of a month she was still detained in spite of the repeated protests of the Relief Commission, the protecting Ministers, and finally the Dutch Foreign Office. The German authorities proposed to place the vessel and her cargo in the Prize Court, but offered no explanation of their arbitrary action towards a ship to which they had themselves granted a safe-conduct pass. The "Haelen" was outside the German prohibited zone when captured, so that the German Government had not even the excuse of a technical violation of their regulations in support of their action. A large part of the crew of the "Haelen" were stated to be Dutchmen. It is interesting to recall that in March last, while engaged on a previous voyage for the Relief Commission, and similarly furnished with the so-called German safe conduct, the "Haelen" was shelled by a German submarine in the North Sea, seven of her crew being killed. The vessel was, however, ultimately allowed to proceed.

**KATTEGAT OPERATIONS.**—On November 2nd successful operations by British light forces were undertaken in the Kattegat. The first official report said:—"Our naval forces operating in the Kattegat have been engaged with enemy forces, probably patrol craft. All the official information that the Admiralty has is that certain of our vessels have been detached to bring in prisoners and are nearing their bases. The affair is not believed to be of any magnitude."

A later *communiqué* said:—"Further reports of our forces operating in the Kattegat have been received. We have destroyed a German auxiliary cruiser armed with 6-inch guns, and also ten armed patrol craft. Sixty-four prisoners have been rescued by our forces. No British losses reported. Further details will be published on the return of our forces to their base."

**GERMAN ACCOUNT.**—On November 5th a Berlin official report gave the following particulars:—"A small German auxiliary cruiser (Commander Captain-Lieutenant Lauterbach) was sunk in the Kattegat on November 2nd after a brave defence against superior forces—six enemy cruisers and nine large torpedo-boat destroyers. An English announcement reports the destruction of ten patrol vessels. This does not correspond with the facts. No German vessels other than the said auxiliary cruiser are missing." According to the Danish Press, the German cruiser was named the "Maria," of Flensburg, and was believed to be coming from Hamburg. She was attacked by British destroyers near Kullen, close to the northern entrance to the Sound. Of her crew of about eighty, thirty were rescued by the British, fifteen were landed at Copenhagen, and the rest probably drowned. The second officer of the "Maria," who was killed by a shell, was reported to be Lieutenant Christiansen, who in the early days of the war succeeded in breaking through the British blockade and reaching German African colonies with a shipload of provisions and war material. Similarly, the captain of the lost vessel, Commander D. R. Lauterbach, was described by the *Weser Zeitung* as "one of the heroes of the 'Emden,'" and was stated to have commanded the collier accompanying that raider. When the "Emden" was lost he succeeded in reaching the Malay Archipelago. Captured by the British and interned at Singapore, he escaped with nine companions and returned home via the Philippines, Japan, and America.

**THE TRAWLERS' CREWS.**—On November 6th it was reported from Copenhagen that a Swedish magistrate of the town of Falkenberg had examined the crew rescued from the "Julius Weitting," one of the German trawlers sunk by British warships in the Kattegat. The men assured him that they had neither arms nor ammunition on board the trawler, and felt sure that none of the other trawlers were armed. They had been inspected by the Customs as well as by the military authorities before they left a German port. As the crew gave their word of honour that the statement was correct, the sailors were not interned in Sweden, but sent back as civilians to Germany.

**ELECTRIC BOAT DESTROYED.**—On November 3rd revelation of the use of a new sea device was made when the Admiralty announced that an attack had been made that day on our vessels patrolling the Belgian coast by "an electrically-controlled high-speed boat." The attack was defeated and the boat destroyed. On November 12th this announcement was supplemented by further information from the Admiralty as follows:—"The electrically-controlled motor-boats used on the Belgian coast are twin petrol engined vessels, partially closed in, and travel at a high speed. They carry a drum with between thirty and fifty miles of insulated single-core cable, through which the boat is controlled electrically. The fore part carries a considerable charge of high explosive, probably from 300lbs. to 500lbs. in weight. The method of operating is to start the engine, after which the crew leave the boat. A seaplane, protected by a strong fighting patrol, then accompanies the vessel at a distance of three to five miles, and signals to the shore operator the helm to give the vessel. These signals need only be starboard, port, or steady. The boat is zig-zagged while running. This may be either intentional or unintentional. On being steered into a ship the charge is exploded automatically. The device is a very old one. A boat similarly controlled was used in H.M.S. 'Vernon,' the torpedo experimental ship, as far back as 1885. The only new features in

the German boats are petrol engines and wireless signals, neither of which existed then."

"E.17's" INTERNMENT.—On November 5th the Foreign Secretary was questioned in the House of Commons by Major Hunt as to the internment in Holland of the crew of the wrecked British submarine "E.17," in view of the fact that a German submarine previously interned in that country, and her crew, were released. Mr. Balfour replied that the sailors belonging to the "E.17" had been interned, and added that "the reasons for the release of the German submarine had not been satisfactorily explained to His Majesty's Government, and the whole matter, together with the case of 'E.17,' is being further considered."

"U"-BOAT SINKINGS.—On November 8th, in reply to a question in Parliament, Dr. Macnamara said: "The number of ships sunk by submarine and mine from the end of February to the end of October inclusive, is now regarded as 1,052 instead of 1,033, the difference being mainly made up by vessels reported missing which, after due consideration, are now regarded as probably due to war risks. Only one of these is over 1,600 gross tons. There were also several vessels which were reported as total losses which have since been salved, and, on the other hand, there were vessels which were reported as damaged and beached which have since become total losses. Among the merchant vessels reported sunk on November 8th was the United States ship 'Rochester,' one of the first 'test ships' to run the submarine blockade when the Germans began their unlimited submarine war."

THE SUBMARINE MENACE.—In the official table of losses of merchant ships by torpedoes and mines, for the week ending November 11th, there appeared only one British vessel of 1,600 tons or over, as compared with eight in the previous week, fourteen in the week ending October 28th, and forty in the worst previous week since the new campaign began, viz., the week ending April 22nd, 1917. Replying to a question in Parliament, Sir Eric Geddes said that the good report of the week ending November 11th, and the comparatively favourable results for the last two months, should not be taken as indicating that the submarine menace is defeated. He referred to his statement on November 1st, that the enemy were building submarines faster than we were destroying them, and that we were not maintaining our mercantile marine tonnage against the depredations of enemy submarines, and he saw no reason to qualify those statements. The calls upon the merchant shipping of the world for waging war were so great that nothing should be left undone to bring home to the people of this country and Allied countries the vital necessity for economy in everything seaborne, and for the diversion of labour from unnecessary work to the shipyards, which were short of men and women. He earnestly begged the House and the country not to be uplifted or cast down by one good or one bad week or month in tonnage sinkings. The steady downward curve of the sinkings since April showed that we held, and for the present were mastering, the submarine. The rise in merchant-ship building showed that we were counteracting the enemy's efforts, but we must have rigid economy and increased output in the marine engine shops and the shipyards.

SPECIAL LOOK-OUTS IN MERCHANTMEN.—By an Admiralty Order published in the *London Gazette* of November 21st, all British merchant vessels of 2,500 tons gross and upwards are required to include in their crew four men, specially engaged, who are to act as look-outs at the mastheads. The total number of the crew is, however, not to be increased for this purpose. When in areas in which submarines may be encountered these look-outs are to be employed solely on their special duty, keeping watch in four watches, each watch to be of not more than two hours' duration. When off watch in these areas they are not to be employed

upon any of the ordinary work of the ship. Before men are signed on for this duty they must agree to undertake this special work, and they must obtain the special Board of Trade certificate as to eyesight. Provided that the duties are carried out to the satisfaction of the master, who will be required to give a written certificate that this is the case, the men should be given extra pay at the rate of 15s. per month while the ship is in areas in which submarines may be met. A proper crow's nest is to be provided as high as possible in every ship which has a mast suitable in character. From daybreak till dark the look-out is to be stationed in the crow's nest, when fitted, and in other cases he is to be stationed as high aloft as possible. From dark to daybreak he is to be stationed in the position which the master considers to be the most suitable. It is added that information as to the areas in which submarines may be encountered may be obtained from the Shipping Intelligence officers at home ports and the Reporting officers abroad.

**SIR A. YARROW'S AWARDS.**—In connection with the foregoing, special interest is attached to some results published in October of the scheme promoted by Sir Alfred Yarrow of awarding a prize of £20 to anyone on board merchant ships who first sighted an enemy submarine. This patriotic offer had a stimulating effect upon the men in the ships to keep a sharp look-out for the periscopes of submarines. Statistics published showed that out of 172 cases in which Sir Alfred Yarrow's award was given for sighting "U"-boats up to October 1st, 1917, the number of vessels attacked and sunk by torpedo was twelve; the number attacked and sunk by gun-fire was five; the number attacked and damaged seriously, but not sunk, was five; the number attacked which escaped without serious damage was sixty-five; and the number which observed submarines, but were not attacked, was eighty-six. As showing the value of a good look-out in decreasing the mercantile losses, in over 85 per cent. of the claims made, the vessels were brought safely into port without damage of any kind, while in nearly one half of the cases, or 49·7 per cent., the ships got in without being attacked at all.

**CONVOY SYSTEM RESULTS.**—Sir L. Chiozza Money, in reply to a question in Parliament, said that the general result of the convoy system had been greatly to diminish losses. Of all cargoes homeward bound to the United Kingdom (whether in British or foreign vessels) in the months of September and October 3 per cent. was lost, of which 1 per cent. was represented by food. In November only 2 per cent. of the homeward-bound cargoes was lost, of which 0·5 per cent. was represented by food. Of the wheat homeward bound in November none whatever was lost.

**BELGIAN COAST INCIDENTS.**—The Secretary of the Admiralty issued the following statement with reference to a Berlin official report received on November 14th:—"On November 12th some German torpedo-boat destroyers came out from under the protection of their shore batteries and fired a few rounds at our patrol vessels, none of which were hit. The fire was promptly returned, and the Germans immediately retired under the protection of their shore batteries, and our patrol was resumed. *Incidents of this nature occur daily, and in no way interfere with the maintenance and efficacy of our patrol, and they are, therefore, not reported.*" The German report alluded to stated:—"In the afternoon of November 12th a short artillery engagement took place off the Flanders coast between German torpedo-boats and English advanced patrol forces, as a result of which one enemy destroyer was hit. The German boats returned to port undamaged."

**HELGOLAND BIGHT AFFAIR.**—On the morning of November 17th there was some "liveliness" in the Heligoland Bight. The Germans announced that "for the first time since the early months of the war, strong British naval forces sought

to penetrate into the German Bight on Saturday morning. They were discovered by German naval patrols as soon as they had reached the Horn's Reef—Terschelling line, and by counter-operations, which were commenced immediately, by our advanced post forces, were repulsed without difficulty and without loss to ourselves."

The British Admiralty made two announcements on the subject. The first, on November 17th, was to the effect that "our light forces operating in the Heligoland Bight have been engaged with enemy light forces this morning. The only information we have at present is that our vessels have engaged enemy light cruisers, that the latter have retired at high speed, and that our vessels are in chase." Next day it was announced that "we have as yet no further detailed information as to the operations of our light cruisers in the Heligoland Bight yesterday, beyond the fact that the enemy's light cruisers were chased by them to within thirty miles of Heligoland, until they got under the protection of their battle fleet and minefields, when our light forces retired. One of the enemy's light cruisers was seen to be on fire, and another one appeared to be damaged in her machinery, as she was dropping astern. One enemy minesweeper was sunk in addition. We had no losses and only slight material damage in ships, and our casualties in personnel were light."

"**BARRED ZONE**" EXTENDED.—On November 21st a Berlin official telegram announced an extension of the German "barred zone," stating that the hostile Governments were endeavouring, by an intensification of the "hunger blockade" against neutral countries, to force out to sea neutral cargo space which was keeping in port, and to press it into their service. As Great Britain's violence was "trampling under foot all rights, especially those of the smaller nations," the Germans were "obliged to extend the field of operation of their submarines in order to hit the increasingly important traffic to Britain from other quarters. The extension principally consists in the establishment of a new barred zone around the Azores, which have become, from an economic as well as from a military standpoint, important hostile bases of Atlantic navigation; and, further, in the closing of the channel to Greece, which hitherto has been left open in the Mediterranean, as it has been utilized by Venizelos for the supply of the Greek population with foodstuffs. Safety can only be guaranteed from January 1st, 1918, in the areas described. Neutral vessels and vessels of the Belgium Relief Commission which at the time of the publication of this declaration are in ports within the new barred area around the Azores and in Greek harbours, may before November 29th safely leave such areas by the shortest route. Precautions have been taken that no military measures shall be applied against neutral and Belgian relief ships within an adequate period of grace should they be unaware of the announced extensions and enter the newly-proclaimed barred areas."

**SHIPS SUNK "WITHOUT TRACE."**—On November 28th, Dr. Macnamara, replying to a question by Commander Bellairs, stated that twenty British merchant vessels of over 1,600 tons were posted as missing during the ten months of 1917. Of these it was considered that three were probably sunk by submarine or mines. Two of them were sunk before the weekly returns were issued, and the third had been included in a weekly return. The weekly list did not include vessels damaged by submarine attack, many of which came back to service after repairs.

**DETAILED ACCOUNT.**—On November 21st the Admiralty issued the following statement regarding the operations on the 17th:—"From the report received from vessels engaged in an action on Saturday, November 17th, in the Heligoland Bight, it appears that shortly before 8 a.m. our forces sighted four light cruisers in a northerly course accompanied by destroyers and mine-sweepers or patrol vessels. The mine-sweepers or patrol vessels made off to the north-east, and one of them

was sunk by gun-fire from a destroyer, a number of survivors being rescued, among whom were a naval lieutenant and five naval ratings. The enemy light cruisers and destroyers turned off towards Heligoland, and were pursued by our advanced forces through the minefields. A running engagement took place under a heavy smoke screen until four enemy battleships and battle-cruisers were sighted. Our advanced forces broke off the engagement and turned back to meet their supports outside the minefields. Owing to the presence of minefields it was necessary for our vessels to keep to the line taken by the enemy ships, and consequently this area was too restricted for the supporting ships to manoeuvre in. The enemy did not follow our vessels outside the minefields. Our vessels report that during the action they scored a number of hits on the enemy. One light cruiser was seen to be on fire; a heavy explosion was seen on another; while a third was dropping behind, evidently damaged at the time the action was broken off. The destruction of these ships was prevented by the presence of the enemy's large vessels and by the proximity of Heligoland. The damage done to our vessels was slight, but some casualties were caused to officers and men in exposed positions."

The Germans officially denied that they lost a mine-sweeper, but admitted that a fishing steamer was missing.

"APAPA" TORPEDOED.—On December 3rd the announcement was made of the loss of the Elder Dempster liner "Apapa." The vessel was sunk by two torpedoes, and eighty lives were lost among the passengers and crew. On the same day it was reported that several more Norwegian vessels had been destroyed by German submarines. Norway had then lost about 800 ships in this way.

CONVOY QUESTIONS.—In the House of Commons on December 5th the following interrogatories were made in respect to the convoy of shipping:—In answer to Mr. Houston, who asked whether when a certain steamship was sunk she had parted from convoy, if so, whether it was by Admiralty instructions she had parted convoy, whether at the time of being sunk she was provided by the Admiralty with any protection other than her own gun, and, if so, what protection, and whether he could state how many lives were lost, Dr. Macnamara said: The answer to the first two parts of the question was in the affirmative. If by the third part the hon. Member referred to the protection of a convoy, that part of the question therefore had already been answered. As regards the last part of the question, the latest report received stated that 38 passengers and 39 of the crew were missing. Dr. Macnamara, in reply to a further question as to whether any, and, if so, how many, vessels were sunk at about the same time and at about the same place as the aforesaid steamship, said he was advised that it was not in the public interest to furnish this information. Being asked by Mr. Houston for some assurance that better protection would be afforded British shipping against the operations of enemy submarines in Liverpool Bay and the adjoining waters, Dr. Macnamara said the forces available for the protection of shipping were used to the best possible advantage, their disposition being adjusted as circumstances required. Mr. Houston asked whether the right hon. gentleman was aware that enemy operations had been going on for quite a considerable period, and that there was a strong feeling growing up in Liverpool about it? Dr. Macnamara, in reply, said that he could only repeat that the resources of the Admiralty were used to the best advantage. Replying to further questions, Dr. Macnamara said that some delay to shipping must necessarily result from the system of convoy sailings. Mr. Houston asked whether there had not been various inefficient methods adopted up to the present; that steamers were kept waiting ten days for convoy, and that fast and slow ships were run together, with the result that the convoys went along at a speed of only from four to seven knots. Dr. Macnamara said that if his hon. friend had any views about that he would be glad

to have those views and submit them to his naval advisers. Mr. Holt suggested that in view of the widespread impression that there had been avoidable delays, it might be a good thing to have a consultation with representative shipowners. Dr. Macnamara said he would certainly make that representation. There had been such consultations already, at which the hon. Member had been present, and if he could help the Admiralty further as an expert they would be glad of his advice.

**NORWEGIAN SHIPS REQUISITIONED.**—On December 7th it was reported from Christiania that a semi-official statement issued there said that the foreign Press had published untrustworthy information regarding the British requisitioning of Norwegian ships, the extent of which had been exaggerated. The number of ships taken over by the British Government under the "Jus angariae" was ninety-three, with a total tonnage of 130,000. With regard to the crews of these ships, it was explained that they were given the opportunity of continuing their engagements under the British flag on particularly favourable terms, but, as far as was known, none of them accepted this offer; they preferred to be paid off, and in that case the British paid the cost of sending them home, and granted one month's wages from the day on which they were due at their destinations. It was further emphasized that not one ship was requisitioned which was required by Norway for her own imports.

**NORWEGIAN PROTESTS.**—On December 7th it was reported that all the marine unions of Bergen had adopted a resolution addressed to the German nation expressing extreme detestation of the methods of the German Navy, and recalling the sinking of five Norwegian steamers under convoy and the many Norwegian sailors who had been killed by gunfire. On the same day a report from Spain announced that twenty-one additional survivors of the American steamer "Actæon," which was sunk by a submarine on November 25th, had arrived at a Spanish port, exhausted with fatigue, hunger, and thirst, and having suffered terrible hardships.

**FURTHER CONVOY INCIDENT.**—A second convoy mishap occurred two months after that which took place on October 17th. The official statement in this case was made by Sir Eric Geddes in the House of Commons as follows:—"I regret to inform the House that a convoy bound from Scotland to Norway was attacked by the enemy on December 12th (Wednesday last). The convoy consisted of one British and five neutral ships, and totalled about 8,000 tons of shipping. They were protected by an anti-submarine escort of two destroyers, the 'Partridge' and 'Pellew,' and four armed trawlers. For some reason, as yet unexplained, the force which had been sent to sea by the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, for the purpose of protecting the Scandinavian convoys against attack by surface vessels, was not on the scene in time to prevent the destruction of the convoy. A second convoy, which was also being covered, was not attacked. The whole of the circumstances connected with the attack on the convoy, the escape of the enemy vessels, and the absence of the protecting vessels detailed to protect it, are being inquiry into by a Court of Inquiry appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, presided over by Sir Doveton Sturdee, with Vice-Admiral Sir John de Robeck and Rear-Admiral W. E. Goodenough, and the Commander-in-Chief has been requested to expedite the proceedings of the Court, which, he reports, was to hold its first sitting yesterday.

"The circumstances of the attack, according to the information at present available, were as follows:—

"H.M.S. 'Partridge' sighted four enemy destroyers at about 11.45 a.m. on December 12th. Shortly afterwards an action resulted, the 'Pellew' and 'Partridge' engaging the enemy while the convoy scattered in accordance with orders.

Shortly after the engagement commenced the 'Pellew' observed that the 'Partridge' had been heavily hit, and a little later saw an explosion on board her, and she sank. About this time the 'Pellew' herself was holed on the water-line, and her engine-room filled with steam, her engines being partly disabled. She eventually was brought safely to this country. The enemy then apparently attacked the convoy. The six merchant vessels and four armed trawlers were sunk. Eighty-eight Scandinavians, two of whom were women, and ten British survivors, were rescued by four destroyers which had been detached at full speed from a cruiser squadron which was hastening to the scene. Other survivors reached Norway in boats. The entire crew (twelve) of the trawler 'Lord Alverstone' was saved in their own boat. The casualties in the 'Pellew' were one officer and three men killed and two men seriously wounded.

"Information as to the survivors from H.M.S. 'Partridge' was incomplete, but a telegram had been received from the British Naval Attaché in Holland that a report from Kiel states three officers and twenty-one men belonging to the 'Partridge,' eleven men of the trawler 'Livingstone,' and one officer and fourteen men of the trawler 'Tokio' have been brought there: ten of these are wounded. One of the three officers is stated to be Lieutenant Aubrey A. D. Grey, of H.M.S. 'Partridge.' "

**BERLIN REPORT.**—An official telegram from Berlin gave the following version of the affair:—"Simultaneously with the attack on commercial traffic on the English East Coast, our light forces on December 12th, under the command of Lieut.-Captain Hans Kolbe, again attacked a convoy. The convoy, consisting of six steamers, with a total gross tonnage of 8,000, including an armed English steamer and the English destroyer 'Partridge,' and four armed vessels, were destroyed in the battle. The English destroyer 'Pellew' escaped damage. Our forces returned without losses and with a large number of prisoners, including four officers." A Kiel telegram stated that the prisoners landed from vessels sunk in the convoy included three officers and twenty-one men of the "Partridge," eleven men of the patrol vessel "Livingstone," one officer and fourteen men of the escort steamer "Tokio." Ten of the prisoners had been wounded. The prisoners included Lieutenant Grey, nephew of Viscount Grey, late Minister for Foreign Affairs. Lieutenant Grey, who was wounded by a shell splinter, was on board the "Partridge," where, during the fight, he took over the command from the commander, who had fallen. Lieutenant Grey was picked up by a torpedo boat, and on board the boat was given medical attention. Other prisoners, said the message, had expressed gratitude for the treatment they had received.

**RAID OFF THE TYNE.**—On the morning of December 12th the Germans made a raid on fishing craft off the Tyne. In reply to Mr. Houston, Dr. Macnamara stated in the House of Commons on December 17th that the fishing steam trawlers "Ranter" and "J. J. Smart" were attacked by gun-fire off the Tyne about 4.30 a.m. on the 12th, the former being damaged and the latter sunk. Eight men were reported killed on both trawlers. The first report stated that the attack was made by submarines, but later reports were to the effect that it was made by destroyers. In addition to the attack on the trawlers, said Dr. Macnamara, two neutral merchant ships were sunk about the same time. A Berlin official report of this occurrence stated that "Light forces under the command of Captain Heinicke attacked enemy mercantile traffic off the mouth of the Tyne close to the English coast on the morning of December 12th. In a successful fight with the British advanced posts two large steamers were sunk. Our forces returned without losses or damage."

**DESTROYER SUNK.**—On December 12th one of His Majesty's destroyers was sunk after being in collision. All the officers and ship's company were saved, with the exception of two men, who were missing and presumed drowned.

**BRITISH AIRSHIPS WRECKED.**—A report which terminated in an official announcement concerned the loss of a British airship. This report, published on December 14th, 1917, came from Baarn, Holland, and stated that at 6.30 on the morning of December 12th the British dirigible No. 26, flying the French colours, descended at Eemnes. There was no crew in it, but maps and coats were found in the gondola, and it was presumed that the crew were British. The dirigible was driven by two 12- and 14-cylinder Daimler motors, which were intact, and which were still working when the dirigible came down. In its descent the airship did some damage to telephone wires, chimneys, and trees. The airship was further stated to be manned by a crew of five men, four of whom landed near Poortgael, south-west of Rotterdam, while the fifth man, whose name was given as William Wasman, of Norfolk, the wireless operator, landed near Sliedrocht, south-east of Rotterdam. The crew were interned at Groningen. The loss of this airship was officially confirmed, however, on December 17th, 1917, in an Admiralty statement which announced the loss of two airships. It stated that "a British airship of non-rigid type, with a crew of five, which proceeded on patrol on December 11th from an East Coast base, had not returned, and from information available it was believed that she had been destroyed by a hostile seaplane in the southern part of the North Sea. A second airship of similar type was forced to descend in Holland through engine failure on December 12th." This second airship was without doubt that mentioned in the report from Holland.

**ARMED BOARDING STEAMER SUNK.**—On December 22nd the Admiralty announced that the armed boarding steamer "Stephen Furness," Lieut.-Commander T. M. Winslow, R.D., R.N.R., had been torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine in the Irish Channel. Six officers and ninety-five men, including mercantile crew, were lost.

**THREE DESTROYERS LOST.**—During the night of December 22nd—23rd three British destroyers were mined or torpedoed during foggy weather off the Dutch coast. A total of thirteen officers and 180 men were lost. On receipt of the news a salvage steamer, flying the Red Cross flag, and a steam lifeboat, proceeded from the Hook of Holland to the scene of the occurrence to render all possible help. The *Gazette de Hollande* of December 24th, referring to the loss, said that a considerable German squadron was seen off Schiermonnikoog, the island to the north of Holland, on the same evening, including large cruisers, destroyers, Zeppelins, and seaplanes.

**NEW CONVOY CHIEF.**—On December 30th the Admiralty announced that Captain A. Trant, master mariner, of the Leyland Line, who had been attached to the Naval Staff at the Admiralty since September, had been appointed Marine Superintendent in the Convoy Section of the Naval Staff. In this capacity he would visit the ports from time to time, and masters of ships were invited to call on him if they had any matters they wished to report or discuss.

**AUXILIARY VESSELS SUNK.**—On December 31st the Admiralty reported that the mine-sweeping sloop "Arbutus," Commander Charles H. Oxlade, R.D., R.N.R., had founded in very severe weather after being torpedoed. Her Commander, one other officer, and seven men were missing and presumed drowned. It was also announced that the armed boarding steamer "Grive," Commander Stephen A. Pidgeon, R.D., R.N.R., had also been sunk in bad weather after being torpedoed. There were no casualties.

**BRITISH NAVAL AIR RAIDS.**—During October many raids were carried out on towns near the Belgian coast in German possession. Altogether nineteen raids took place during the month, and from October 14th to the last day of the month, no fewer than fourteen raids were carried out. The towns which seemed to bear the brunt of these attacks in the main were Zeebrugge, Varssevare aerodrome, Thourout, and St. Denis Westrem. During these raids and other patrols many fights occurred with enemy airmen, and altogether five hostile machines were completely destroyed, besides thirteen driven down out of control.

**OSTEND BOMBARDED.**—On October 21st the naval works at Ostend were bombarded by our ships, and from photographs taken it is evident that the results were satisfactory. This appears to be the only official announcement of a raid from the sea during October, but a Central News telegram from Amsterdam on October 13th said that a message received from Oostburg stated that the Belgian coast was being shelled from the sea.

**VIEW OF ATTACK ON BRUGES.**—On October 17th a correspondent of *The Times*, in a despatch from France, stated that during a raid on the Bruges Docks and Zeebrugge Canal on the night of October 14th he was able to watch the effect of the bombing. He said that the number of searchlights in use against the raiders was dazzling, and that the air was sprinkled with pin-points of the exploding shells from the anti-aircraft guns. The uproar created by both the bombs and guns, he stated, was as continuous as he had ever heard in the raids on London, and he concludes by saying that long after the raid was over a great red fire burned on through the night.

**RAIDS ON LONDON.**—The midnight raid on London on October 1st was the last of four consecutive moonlight raids. The casualties were ten killed and thirty-eight injured, these being less than any of the previous three. Following this raid, a lapse of three weeks passed, when, on October 19th, six or seven hostile airships attacked the Eastern and North-Eastern Counties, bombs being dropped in London as well. This raid was a complete fiasco, for the raiders apparently lost their way in a fog, and drifted over France where the French anti-aircraft defences engaged them with success. One was brought down in flames by gun-fire; a second, attacked by aeroplanes, was captured intact with its crew; and two others were forced to land but were destroyed by fire by their crews. Three other Zeppelins were also in difficulties, two of which were lost in the Mediterranean and Switzerland. More than a week after this, on the night of October 29th, hostile aeroplanes attempted to raid the South-Eastern Counties. Our aeroplanes went up and guns and searchlights were in action, no hostile machine succeeding in passing the outer defences. Following this, at 4.30 a.m. on the morning of October 31st, a hostile machine crossed the Kentish coast, and tried to penetrate inland, but was stopped by guns and aeroplanes. No damage or casualties resulted, the raider dropping some of its bombs in the fields and the rest in the water. The same night, however, a much more determined attack was made on London by about thirty enemy raiders in seven groups attacking from different quarters. Owing to the fierce barrage put up against them, only about three raiders managed to reach the heart of London. The damage done was very slight, and the casualties were eight killed and twenty-one injured.

**GERMAN REPORT OF ZEPPELIN RAID.**—Following the raid on England on October 19th when five or six German airships were destroyed by the French, the Germans stated in a Berlin official telegram that a naval airship squadron attacked with great success London, Manchester, Birmingham, Nottingham, Derby, Lowestoft, Hull, Grimsby, Norwich, and Mappleton. "On the return journey," the telegram

continued, "owing to an adverse wind and dense mist, four airships, under Captains Habbert, Koolle, Hans Geyer, and Schwander, came over the French battle zone, where they, according to the French, were shot down or forced down. No details regarding the fate of the vessels and their crews are available at present." The last-named place mentioned as having been bombed is described in the Gazetteer as a village in Derbyshire, and a village in Yorkshire is so named also, both of which have populations of 250.

**REPRISAL RAID ON GERMANY.**—Following on the appointment of Lord Rothermere as Air Minister at the end of November, he stated on December 14th that the Air Board was in favour of whole-hearted air reprisals on Germany. Ten of our machines, on the morning of December 24th, attacked the town of Mannheim in two formations. Eighteen heavy bombs were dropped in all, and four bursts were observed in the main station, several in the Lanz works, two in Ludwigshafen, and several in another munition factory, these bursts being partially confirmed by photographs taken at the time. Two formations of enemy aeroplanes were encountered, totalling eleven machines, none of which attempted to attack our machines. The anti-aircraft defences around Mannheim appeared strong, and brought down one of our machines, which was last seen descending under control. The effect of this raid in Germany was, according to reports, very great, and much damage appears to have been done. The casualties, according to a German semi-official message, were two killed and about a dozen wounded.

**BRITISH RAIDS DURING NOVEMBER.**—Owing to the inclement weather probably, there was a lull in the activity of our airmen on the Belgian coast during November as contrasted with that during October. From November 4th to the 15th, six raids were carried out on aerodromes, railway stations, and docks. On almost each occasion fighter patrols were carried out, resulting in the loss to the enemy of five machines destroyed, besides nine being driven down out of control. In each case our machines returned safely.

**RAIDS ON ENGLAND.**—After the raid at midnight on October 31st, a month passed before another attempt was made to bomb London. This was in the nature of a trial by the Germans, for the raid was carried out at 1.30 a.m. and 5 a.m., and, as on the last occasion, was made by about twenty-five aeroplanes in seven groups. Of these, only about five or six reached London, bombs being dropped as well in Kent and Essex. Two of the raiders fell victims to our defences, in each case the entire crew being captured alive. The casualties were seven killed and twenty-one injured. A similar raid was made on December 18th, when about twenty raiders in six groups attacked the capital, only five of which managed to reach and bomb London. One raider was hit by gunfire and came down off the Kentish coast, two of its crew of three being captured alive. The casualties on this occasion were ten killed and seventy injured. Only another raid was attempted during the year after this, when, on December 22nd, an air raid was attempted on the Kentish coast shortly after 6 p.m. One raider was forced to descend, the crew of three being captured alive. A second attack developed about 9.30 p.m., when a few bombs were dropped in Thanet. The raiders did not penetrate farther inland, and no damage or casualties were reported.

**BRITISH AERIAL ACTIVITY.**—After the unfavourable weather at the end of November and the first few days of December, British naval aircraft were very active in raids on the Belgian coast. From December 5th to the 23rd ten raids were carried out, making an average of one raid every other day. During these raids the aerodromes of St. Denis Westrem, Ghistelles, and Engel were continually bombed, as well as the docks at Bruges and various railway stations.

**MANY FIGHTER PATROLS.**—During December a great number of fighter patrols were carried out by our machines. In some cases enemy machines were encountered while a raid was being carried out on one of the towns near the Belgian coast, and in others while our machines were on patrol. During these fights eleven enemy machines were destroyed and nine shot down completely out of control. Only two of our machines were missing.

**DARING DEEDS.**—During the raids on the Belgian coast from October to December many plucky and daring deeds of our airmen stand out. On October 9th patrols were carried out by naval airmen during which enemy trenches were attacked by machine-gun fire. One pilot, on being heavily shelled by the enemy's anti-aircraft guns, descended and attacked the guns' crews, scattering them and silencing the guns. During offensive and reconnaissance patrols on October 21st, five of our scouts engaged about twenty hostile scouts. In the fight that ensued two of the latter were destroyed and two others driven down completely out of control. Only one of our pilots was lost. Another similar incident to this occurred on December 10th, when several patrols were carried out by naval aircraft, in the course of which three of our machines attacked and drove back five enemy scouts and seven large seaplanes. Two enemy machines were also destroyed and two kite balloons attacked. On the same day enemy trenches and an active anti-aircraft battery were attacked with machine-gun fire by our airmen.

#### AMERICA IN THE WAR.

**GERMAN SHIPS RENAMED.**—On September 29th it was announced that twelve large ex-German Atlantic liners which found refuge in American harbours when war began, and had since been seized for the American Navy, had been renamed by order of the Secretary of the Navy. The changes were:—"Vaterland" to "Leviathan," "Kronprinzessin Cecilie" to "Mount Vernon," "Kaiser Wilhelm II." to "Agamemnon," "Amerika" to "America," "Hamburg" to "Powhatan," "Grosser Kurfurst" to "Æolus," "Konig Wilhelm II." to "Madawaska," "Neckar" to "Antigone," "Rhein" to "Susquehanna," "Prinzess Irene" to "Pocahontas," "Friedrich der Grosse" to "Huron," and "Barbarossa" to "Mercury." It was added that the vessels "George Washington," "President Grant," and "President Lincoln," would not be renamed.

**NEW DESTROYERS.**—On October 4th it was reported from Washington that the remarkable progress which was being made with the construction of an immense flotilla of American destroyers encouraged naval officials to expect that all those then being built would be ready for delivery in European waters early in 1918, instead of in the following winter, as originally expected—a saving of about ten months. The destroyers are of new design, the majority being very fast vessels of improved sea-going qualities, which add to their effectiveness as submarine hunters. The first of the new type had been tried with results which amazed the officers who made the trial trips.

**BRITISH CO-OPERATION.**—On October 5th, Mr. Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, issued a statement regarding the co-operation of the British Admiralty with Admiral Sims and other American naval officers. "The spirit shown by the Admiralty," he said, "has been one of perfect openness and frankness and co-operation. Our officers have had access to every bit of information Admiralty officers have had in relation to submarine warfare. They have opened every door to Admiral Sims and his associates." This statement was prompted by published reports that a British invention for combating submarines had been withheld. "On the contrary," said Mr. Daniels, "every device employed by the British Navy has been fully explained to the American officers."

**ITALIAN SUBMARINE INCIDENT.**—On October 9th the Navy Department announced that they had been informed by Vice-Admiral Sims that recently an American patrol vessel, while on patrol duty at night, encountered an Italian submarine, and when the latter failed to answer the established recognition signal the patrol vessel opened fire, which resulted in the killing of one officer and one enlisted man before the identity of the submarine was established. The Secretary of the Navy, upon receipt of the first news, despatched a message of deep regret to the Italian Minister of Marine.

**DESTROYERS CONTRACTS.**—On October 9th contracts for the construction of a number of destroyers, for which Congress had appropriated an additional £70,000,000, were reported ready for signature. The whole scheme was to be completed in eighteen months, and a large number of the vessels constructed on the Pacific coast. Plants on the Atlantic coast also had been extensively enlarged in anticipation of the award of the contracts.

**ADMIRAL MAYO'S VISIT TO ENGLAND.**—On October 13th Mr. Daniels authorized the announcement that Admiral H. T. Mayo and his Staff had returned from a visit to England, where they had conferred with officials of the Allied Navies, to become intimate with every detail of the existing situation and to discuss plans for the future. The Admiral visited the British Fleet and the American forces in British and French waters.

**ADMIRAL BENSON'S VISIT.**—Early in November, Admiral William S. Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Ranking Officer for the Navy, left America for Europe as a member of the Commission named by the President to attend the important War Conference in Paris. On November 16th the British Admiralty announced that since the arrival of Admiral Benson and his Staff he had been in frequent conference with the First Lord and with the Chief and principal members of the Naval Staff. He had also visited the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet on board his flagship, and was at the moment visiting our principal naval bases. "Very great benefit," said the Admiralty, "has been derived from these meetings, and from the interchange of ideas and views; the co-operation of the American and British Navies is thus made easier and more complete."

**OTHER VISITORS.**—In the Annual Report of the Secretary of the United States Navy, dated December 1st, 1917, it was stated that "Other naval officers of the line and Staff have been sent abroad to make studies of conditions, and their reports have been of interest and value. Experts in ordnance, construction, engineering, medicine, and supplies are now in frequent conference with the specialists of other navies, and the spirit of co-operation between our officers and the officers in the admiralties across the seas has been all that could be desired. Our officers have been given every opportunity to know what other nations have done and their plans for future operations, and the interchange of views on strategy and all phases of naval warfare have proved most helpful to all who participated."

**"CASSIN" TORPEDOED.**—On October 16th a submarine in the war zone torpedoed the American destroyer "Cassin," Lieut.-Commander W. H. Vernon, killing one sailor and wounding five. The damaged vessel was able to reach port. This was stated to be the first hit scored by the Germans against the American destroyers.

**SQUADRON IN SOUTH AMERICA.**—On October 18th a report from Montevideo stated that a United States squadron under the command of Admiral Caperton had arrived there. In the Annual Report of Mr. Daniels, it was stated that "In addition to the patrol maintained in co-operation with the English and the French on this side of the Atlantic, the Cruiser Squadron, under the command of Admiral Caperton, has paid visits of courtesies to neighbour countries in South America

and was received with every evidence of the friendship now more strongly cemented than ever."

"U"-BOAT AT NEW YORK.—On October 18th a captured "U"-boat, flying the British flag, arrived at New York. The announcement of the arrival was made by the Liberty Loan Committee, which invited the public to inspect the instrument of "ruthless piracy which was the cause of our going into the war."

NAVY TO MAN TRANSPORTS.—On October 25th the Navy Department announced that in future Army transports would be manned by bluejackets and commanded by naval officers. On the question of transport, the Secretary's Annual Report says:—"The first transports carrying troops to France were under the command of Rear-Admiral Gleaves, and, though attacked by submarines, there was no loss of life, and every ship reached its destination without accident. It is a matter for thanksgiving that the Navy has so far successfully convoyed all the troops in safety. During his stay in Paris Admiral Gleaves was in conference with the naval authorities, and arranged for the future co-operation in the arrival and departure of transports."

BRAZILIAN CO-OPERATION.—On October 30th it was reported from Rio de Janeiro that as a result of a conference between Admiral Caperton, commanding the American South Atlantic Fleet, and Admiral A. de Alencar, Minister of the Brazilian Navy, the following dispositions had been agreed upon:—"Twenty-nine Brazilian warships will be responsible from this month for the supervision of the Brazilian coasts. They will be divided into three squadrons as follows:—1, Northern Squadron, ten ships, including two destroyers and the coast defence ship 'Marshal Deodoro'; 2, Central Squadron, with Rio de Janeiro as a base, consisting of thirteen units, including the battleships 'Minas Geraes' and 'Sao Paulo,' and ten destroyers; 3, Southern Squadron, of six ships, including a cruiser and two destroyers. Brazil will police her territorial waters in conjunction with the American Fleet, which will cruise in the Atlantic. In this manner steamers and sailing vessels will be able to navigate the approaches of Brazil safely."

"FINLAND" TORPEDOED.—On November 1st it was announced from Washington that the transport "Finland," torpedoed recently while on the return voyage to the United States, was able to gain a foreign port without being aided.

PICKET BOAT MISHAP.—On November 3rd the picket boat of the American battleship "Michigan" foundered, and apparently the entire crew were lost, although only three bodies of the members of the crew were found.

"ALCEDO" TORPEDOED.—On November 7th it was announced officially that the American patrol boat "Alcedo" was submarine in the war zone on the 5th. One officer, Lieutenant John T. Velvin, and twenty enlisted men were missing, and six officers and sixty-five men were saved. The "Alcedo" was described as an armed yacht. The "Alcedo" was the first American war vessel to go down in the war. She was sold to the Government in June, 1917, by George W. Childs Drexel, of Philadelphia, and was removed to the New York Navy Yard for reconstruction. Captain Lane was placed in command of the vessel, and she was allotted to patrol duty in the North Sea.

SMOKE BOXES.—In November it was announced that the Bureau of Ordnance of the United States Navy Department is having manufactured by the Du Pont Company smoke boxes suitable for use by merchant vessels as a means of escape from attacking submarines. Merchant vessels desiring to procure these smoke boxes can obtain them from the Du Pont Company. The cost is approximately to be as follows:—Smoke funnel, \$125 (£25) each; phosphorus, \$1.75 per pound (8s. 9d.); smoke boxes, \$25 (£5) each. The smoke funnel is for the production

of smoke on board the vessel, and requires only the fuel for its continued use. The smoke boxes are for throwing overboard, and once used cannot be recovered. The Navy Department is preparing to issue smoke boxes to all vessels carrying armed guards, and has announced as its policy that smoke-producing apparatus for the use of merchant vessels should be available for every vessel whose owner desires to purchase it. Owners of merchant vessels are urged to give prompt and favourable consideration to the desirability of purchasing smoke-producing apparatus. The Department of Commerce regard this matter as of great importance for the protection of merchant vessels.

"CHAUNCEY" SUNK.—On November 19th the United States destroyer "Chauncey" was sunk in collision in the war zone. Twenty-one lives were lost in this accident.

"U"-BOAT SUNK.—The United States Navy Department issued the following statement on November 24th :—"One more German 'U'-boat has been accounted for by the American destroyers operating in European waters. While on patrol duty a destroyer sighted a periscope 400 yards off. Immediately ringing up full speed ahead, the commanding officer headed his craft to pass a few yards ahead of the submarine. As the destroyer passed over the 'U'-boat's course a depth charge was dropped. This evidently caused damage to the 'U'-boat, which shortly afterwards broached about 500 yards away. Fire was immediately opened on the submarine by two of our destroyers, which circled about their target. The submarine did not return the fire and was evidently disabled. One of the destroyers got a line to her, intending to tow her, but the boat soon sank."

"JACOB JONES" SUNK.—On December 6th the United States destroyer "Jacob Jones" was sunk while on patrol duty. The survivors, including the Commander, numbered forty-four.

JAPANESE COMMISSION.—A Japanese Commission visited the United States in November, and in the following month Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State, in the course of an announcement said that the discussion covered the military, naval, and economic activities to be employed with due regard to relative resources and ability, and the United States Government had been gratified by the assertions of Viscount Ishii and his colleagues that their Government desired to do their part in the suppression of Prussian militarism, and were eager to co-operate in every practical way to that end. Complete and satisfactory understandings upon the matter of naval co-operation in the Pacific for the purpose of attaining the common object against Germany and her Allies had been reached between the representative of the Imperial Japanese Navy, who was attached to the Special Mission of Japan, and the representative of the United States Navy.

#### BALTIC.

"OCHOTNIK" SUNK.—During the night of September 25th the Russian coast of the Irben Channel was twice attacked by Zeppelins, nearly forty bombs being dropped. On September 26th, off the southern part of the island of Oesel, the Russian destroyer "Ochotnik" was damaged and sunk by an enemy mine. A boat containing eleven sailors, four of whom were wounded, reached the coast. The officers, who refused to leave the ship, sank with the vessel. A report received on September 29th states that only forty-three men were saved from the torpedo-boat "Ochotnik." The "Ochotnik" was a vessel of 615 tons, built in 1905, with a complement of ninety-eight. She carried two 47-in. and six 6-pr. guns, with three torpedo tubes; her speed was twenty-five knots.

CROSS-RAIDING.—During September the German activity in the Baltic was chiefly characterized by aerial reconnaissances and submarine manoeuvres, which endeavoured to prevent Russian vessels approaching the Courland coast. Near the latter and in the Irben Channel Russian naval and aerial forces endeavoured to prevent enemy vessels from entering Russian waters.

IRBEN CHANNEL FIGHTING.—During the night of October 1st the enemy undertook several air raids on Oesel, north of the Gulf of Riga, and dropped bombs, which set on fire a Russian magazine. Explosions followed. Several officers and sailors who worked to extinguish the fire perished. As reprisals Russian airmen dropped bombs on the camps situated on the Courland coast. On the same date enemy trawlers appeared in the Irben Channel, but were repulsed by the fire of the Russian coast batteries. On October 2nd and 3rd enemy hydroplanes carried out several scouting raids on Cerel, in the island of Oesel, and on Ainazhi, forty miles south of Pernau. The explosions at Cerel killed seventy and wounded forty-four persons, a total loss of 114. Early on October 8th Russian patrol boats encountered in the Irben Channel ten enemy patrols and trawlers and attacked them. One of the enemy trawlers was set on fire, and the enemy retired to the south.

OPERATIONS AGAINST OESEL.—On October 12th the Germans made a combined naval and military attack on the island of Oesel. The enemy succeeded in landing troops on the coast of Tagga Bay, on the north of the island. While the enemy troops were being landed on Oesel Island enemy naval forces engaged the Russian shore batteries on Dago Island. It is reported that during this operation the enemy lost four torpedo-boats, and a cruiser ran aground.

On October 14th fighting for the possession of the island of Oesel still continued. The enemy occupied Arensberg. Enemy naval and aerial forces energetically supported the land operations, and attacked north and south of the island. In the south a squadron of enemy cruisers, torpedo-boats, and trawlers attempted to force the entrance of the Irben Channel. The northern group of enemy warships despatched a squadron of torpedo-boats between the islands of Oesel and Dago, which pressed back the Russian patrol boats in the direction of the Moon Sound. Russian naval forces reinforcing the patrol boats, the enemy retired.

DETAILS OF FIGHTING.—On October 17th a German squadron forced the Irben Strait and drove the Russian ships north towards Moen Sound, hemming the vessels in between the islands off the Gulf of Riga and the Estonian coast. The guns of the German battleships outranged those of the Russian warships and sank one of them—the battleship "Slava" of 13,500 tons. The Russian warships, twenty in number, according to the German report, defended the southern entrance to Moen Sound, but were eventually beaten back to the north, where another German squadron, which had fought its way through the Sound between Oesel and Dago Islands, attempted to bar the passage to the open Baltic. During the engagement aircraft dropped bombs on the Russian warships. What was left of the Russian Riga squadron made its escape towards the Gulf of Finland. The enemy reports that, in addition to the battleship "Slava," the Russians lost four other vessels. The Russians claim to have sunk two enemy trawlers. On October 18th, in the neighbourhood of Moen Sound, two enemy torpedo boats ran into a Russian minefield and subsequently sank. Admiral Dakhireff, who was in command of the Russian naval squadron during the naval operations, bears testimony to the gallantry of the Russian crews. The German naval units, which participated in the operations are reported to have consisted of ten Dreadnoughts of the newest type ("Kaiser" and "Koenig"), about ten cruisers, some fifty destroyers, twenty of which were of the "Novik" type, and about ten submarines.

There were also operating with these forces a large number of trawlers and other auxiliary ships, transports, hydroplanes, and rafts. According to eye-witnesses a German Dreadnought is said to have run into a minefield on October 12th, and after an explosion to have made for the shore. Her ultimate fate is, however, unknown. On October 21st German troops landed on the Russian mainland at Verder, opposite Moen Island, on the north of the Gulf of Riga, and made good their footing. A British submarine took part in the fighting, according to an official Russian naval report, torpedoed a German Dreadnought and sank a transport. The fate of the Dreadnought is unknown, for the submarine, being heavily shelled, was compelled to dive.

**RIGA ISLANDS BOOTY.**—It was on October 1st that the operations for the possession of the Riga islands began, and by about the 21st the islands of Oesel, Moen, Dago, Sehi dau, Abre, and Runo were in the possession of the enemy. On October 23rd the German Main Headquarters claimed that the total captures in the operations against the islands in the Gulf of Riga were:—20,130 prisoners; over 100 guns (including 47 heavy naval guns); some revolver guns; 150 machine-guns and mine-throwers; over 1,200 vehicles; 2,000 horses; 30 motor cars; ten aeroplanes; and three State chests with about £18,000 in roubles. Large quantities of stores and war material were also captured.

**MINE CASUALTIES.**—On November 27th, the Russian destroyer "Dyelnyi," a boat of 350 tons and twenty-six knots' speed, built in 1906, was destroyed by an enemy mine in the Baltic. On December 5th, a Copenhagen report stated that a German auxiliary cruiser had struck a mine and sunk.

#### ADRIATIC.

**AERIAL OPERATIONS.**—On September 18th, an Italian seaplane dropped a ton of explosives on the naval dockyards and vessels anchored in the Bay of Privilaca, in the island of Lussin, Dalmatia. On September 26th enemy machines flew on the Lower Isonzo and bombed some inhabited centres without doing damage or causing casualties. Italian airmen, with the intention of interrupting the railway traffic in the Bazza Valley, on September 27th caused destruction to the railway plant at Podberdo. An aerial squadron reached the fortified maritime port of Pola and effectively bombarded the arsenal and the submarine base at the Olivi Rock with over three tons of high-explosive shells. On the night of September 28th enemy seaplanes, coming from Salvore and Trieste, bombarded the Aquileja-Villa Vicentina-Palma Nova district. As an immediate reprisal, four Italian seaplanes ascended and dropped on the military establishments of Capo di Salvore eighteen explosive shells and several incendiary bombs. The seaplanes returned undamaged to their base.

**DESTROYERS AND AIRCRAFT.**—On the night of September 29th, while squadrons of Italian aeroplanes were carrying out an attack on the naval base at Pola, enemy aeroplanes dropped bombs on the neighbourhood of Ferrara, causing some damage but no victims. Groups of Italian destroyers on patrol duty sighted a group of enemy destroyers supporting the seaplanes which had attacked Ferrara. The Italian vessels attacked the enemy and pursued him, shelling him until the enemy's vessels reached the barrage of the Parenso batteries. Explosions were observed on the hostile destroyers, which were hit again and again. The Italian vessels sustained no damage. About the same time another squadron of enemy aeroplanes attacked the South Adriatic coast in the district between Monopoli and Lecce, dropping many bombs on Ostuni and Brindisi. At the former place no damage was done, and at the latter, which was the particular object of attack, the materi-

damage was unimportant, while five persons were killed, including two civilians and twenty-two injured. The attack was received with violent anti-aircraft fire, which, besides limiting the effectiveness of the enemy's attack, brought down one hostile seaplane. The two airmen were made prisoners.

**AUSTRIAN BATTLESHIP TORPEDOED.**—On the night of December 9th—10th a daring feat was executed in the harbour of Trieste by Italian torpedo craft. According to the official report of the Chief of the Naval Staff in Rome, dated the 11th, the Italian light vessels made their way among the obstructions on and under the water, entered the port of Trieste, and launched against two vessels of the "Monarch" type four torpedoes, all of which exploded. One of the vessels, the "Wien," sank. Although the object of the launching of torpedoes, and of an intensive enemy fire, the Italian vessels returned safely to their base. The "Wien" was an old battleship of 5,500 tons, launched at San Roce on July 7th, 1895.

**SEAMEN AT CORTELLAZZO.**—On December 14th, it was announced in the Press that the Duke of Aosta, commanding the Third Italian Army, had sent a telegram to the Commandant of the Maritime Department at Venice, congratulating him on the heroic actions of the sailors at Cortellazzo, at the mouth of the Piave, where a naval force landed and did much execution among the enemy.

**NAVAL BRIGADE'S WORK.**—According to the *Agenzia Stefani*, the naval brigades did magnificent work on the lower reaches of the Piave and in the marshy region of Capo Sile, barring the road to Venice. A detachment of Hungarian engineers having fortified a dyke on the Cavallino Canal with numerous machine-guns, thus seriously annoying our lower Piave positions, the small torpedo-boat "Sauro" steamed up the canal by night, and landed a party consisting of a petty officer and two men. They attacked the Hungarians with the bayonet, and killed many. They destroyed the telegraphic and telephonic installations, set fire to buildings, and carried off machine-guns as trophies, returning safely on board. These daring exploits by Italian bluejackets were of daily occurrence.

**"U"-BOAT COMMANDER DECORATED.**—Captain Morah, brother of Major Morah, the German military writer, was awarded in November the Order of Merit for sinking a number of ships from his submarine in the Mediterranean. The Kaiser travelled from the Isonzo to Pola in order to decorate this officer personally.

**THE NAVY AND THE RETREAT.**—In the great Italian retreat which began about October 24th, and in which the Germans claimed three days later to have taken 100,000 prisoners and 700 guns, the naval forces of the Allies lent their aid in stemming the onrush of the enemy. On November 16th, it was announced from the Italian Headquarters that "guns of the Navy are co-operating with the Italian Army in opposing further progress by the enemy in the inundated region at the mouth of the Piave. In this British monitors took part." On November 21st the Italian *communiqué* said: "On the coastal zone, the National Navy and British monitors lent valued co-operation."

**BRITISH MONITOR'S HIT.**—In the Italian official *communiqué* on November 30th, it was stated that "On the coastal area a British monitor obtained a direct hit on and interrupted a bridge of boats which the enemy had thrown across the river in the vicinity of Passarella (about seven miles from the sea)." Writing from Venice on the same day, Mr. G. Ward Price, the war correspondent, said:—"Three bridges across the Lower Piave which the enemy was using for supplying his troops in the delta between the two channels of the river mouth were yesterday destroyed by the British monitor 'Picton' with big-gun fire of remarkable accuracy. The range was 18,000 yards (ten and a quarter miles), and the three bridges

which were the target lay 200 yards apart. One was a stone bridge, which the Austrians had repaired; the other two were three yards wide. On these slight marks the monitor's guns put five direct hits out of seven shots. The very first shot was on the target, and the pontoon bridges were each hit at either end, one of them being so effectively cut in two that the aeroplane observer reported that the middle part of it floated away downstream. A shell was also dropped right into the stone bridge. Smaller guns mounted on rafts, which are towed in pairs by launches, are scattered about the waterways nearer to the front."

**LATER BOMBARDMENT.**—On December 10th the Italian official *communiqué* announced that "A battery of the Royal Navy, having ranged on a bridge thrown by the enemy between Vianelle and C. Sacca (Lower Piave), obtained a direct hit on it, interrupting it while intense traffic of troops and transport was going on."

**ARMOURED TRAINS AND DESTROYERS.**—On December 2nd, a naval *communiqué* issued at Rome said:—"On the morning of November 28th, fourteen enemy light craft attacked the coast at some points between Porto Corsini and Pesaro. Counter-attacked by our armoured trains they quickly withdrew to their base, which they reached, escaping our torpedo craft, which made a dash for Pola to intercept them. Although repeatedly attacked by enemy aircraft our ships returned safely. An enemy ship was struck by a shot from an armoured train."

#### ATLANTIC.

"**SINKING WITHOUT TRACE.**"—On September 9th there was revealed in Washington certain despatches which threw light upon the manner in which the Swedish Legation in the Argentine had acted as the secret means of communication between the German Chargé d'Affaires in Buenos Ayres and the Berlin Foreign Office, transmitting information of the sailing of ships, and directions for their destruction by submarines. The statement issued by Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State, was as follows:—

The Department of State has secured certain telegrams from Count Luxburg, the German Chargé d'Affaires in Buenos Ayres, to the Foreign Office in Berlin, which I regret to say were despatched from Buenos Ayres by the Swedish Legation as its own official messages addressed to the Stockholm Foreign Office. The following are the translations of the German text:—

May, 1917, No. 32.—This Government has now released the German and Austrian ships on which hitherto a guard has been placed. In consequence of the settlement of the Monte Protegido case, there has been a great change in public feeling, and the Government will in future only clear Argentine ships as far as Las Palmas. I beg that the small steamers "Oran" and "Gauzo," January 31st (meaning, which sailed 31st), 300 tons, which are now nearing Bordeaux with a view to the change of flag, may be spared if possible, or else sunk without a trace being left (*spurlos versenkt*).—(Signed) Luxburg.

July 3rd, 1917, No. 59.—I learnt, reliable sources, that the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is a notorious ass and an Anglophile, declared in secret session of the Senate that the Argentine would demand from Berlin a promise not to sink more Argentine ships, and that, if unagreed to, relations would be broken off. I recommended a refusal, and, if necessary, the calling in of the mediation of Spain.—Luxburg.

July 9th, 1917, No. 64.—Without showing any tendency to make concessions, postpone the reply of the Argentine note until the receipt of further reports. A change of Ministry is probable. As regards Argentine steamers, I recommend

either compelling them to turn back or sinking them without leaving any traces, or letting them through. They are all quite small.—Luxburg.

**RAID ON FUNCHAL.**—On December 11th an enemy submarine bombarded Funchal, Madeira, destroying a great number of houses and St. Clara's Church, and killing and injuring many people. Forty shells fell into the town, the bombardment lasting twenty minutes.

#### MEDITERRANEAN.

**"U"-BOAT SINKINGS.**—On September 23rd, the French steamer "Medie," of 4,770 tons, was torpedoed while with a convoy, and sank in a few minutes. Of those on board, 250 were missing out of about 630. About the same time, the Italian steamer "Bari," of 324 tons, was reported to have been torpedoed. Her lifeboats were sunk by the enemy submarine.

**PALESTINE LOSSES.**—On November 15th, it was officially announced that one of His Majesty's destroyers and a small monitor had been sunk by an enemy submarine whilst co-operating with the Army in Palestine. There were seven men missing from the destroyer and twenty-six men from the monitor.

**PATROL BOAT SUNK.**—On November 18th one of the British patrol vessels was torpedoed by an enemy submarine in the Mediterranean. Four officers and five men were killed.

**"U"-BOATS SUNK.**—On December 16th, two enemy submarines, according to news from Athens, were sunk in the Ionian Sea between Otranto and Itea. One submarine was sunk with all hands, and the other was abandoned by its crew, the commander, two officers, and sixteen men being rescued.

**"CHATEAURENAULT" SUNK.**—On December 20th, news from Paris stated that the old cruiser "Chateaurenault," used as a transport, was sunk by an enemy submarine on December 14th. All passengers and troops were saved, but ten of the crew were missing. The submarine was reported to have been sunk.

**RECORD LONG-DISTANCE FLIGHT.**—On November 22nd the Admiralty made the following announcement:—"It will be remembered that during July a successful air attack was carried out on objectives in the vicinity of Constantinople. This was accomplished by a large British bombing aeroplane of the Handley Page type, which flew from England, where she was constructed, to one of our bases in the Mediterranean. The journey was accomplished in a series of eight flights. Amongst other places, stops were made at Lyons and Rome. The total distance flown was nearly 2,000 miles, the machine being actually in the air for just over thirty-one hours. During some parts of the flight strong winds and heavy rain-storms were experienced, and for one stretch of over 200 miles the course lay over mountainous country, where it would have been impossible for any machine to land. Nevertheless, the aeroplane carried out its journey practically to timetable, which is believed to be easily a world's record for a cross-country journey, and also for the weight carried for the distance, the machine being self-contained as regards engine and aeroplane 'spares.'"

**GREEK DESTROYER'S WORK.**—On November 29th it was reported that the Greek destroyer "Niko," while escorting a cargo boat in the Aegean, successfully shelled an enemy submarine which attempted to torpedo the cargo boat.

**FRENCH PATROL BOAT SUNK.**—On December 13th, the "Paris II.," a French patrol boat which took part in an attack on the Syrian coast defences on the

previous day, was sunk by Turkish gunfire. A boat reached port with a part of her crew, but it was feared that the captain and sixteen men had been taken prisoners.

**SEA OF MARMORA.**—An official report issued in December stated that in the recent air raids on Gallipoli and Constantinople the Royal Naval Air Service had the assistance of a Greek naval unit, and during the five nights when the raids were in progress some very satisfactory results were achieved. The Gallipoli Peninsula was bombed both by day and by night, the objectives including warehouses, aerodromes, a seaplane base at Nagara, and a Turkish camp near Bulair. All the Greek machines returned safely except one, which contained Sub-Lieutenant Chalkias and Observer Lazaris. These officers are unfortunately missing. At Constantinople our machines, in spite of heavy anti-aircraft fire, dropped to a height of 800 feet to attack the "Goeben." The first salvo of four bombs missed the ship, but hit some submarines and destroyers moored alongside her. The second salvo hit the "Goeben" a little forward of amidships, causing a large explosion and a big conflagration. Our machines then bombed the "General" in which the German Headquarters at Constantinople are reported to be situated. Bombs were dropped from a height of 1,300 feet, and two direct hits were secured on the stern of the ship. The next object of attack was the War Office, on which two direct hits were observed in the centre of the building. The Turkish Minister at Berne has made a statement in reference to these air attacks, in which he acknowledges that the War Office at Constantinople and a destroyer were hit, "a certain amount of damage" being done.

#### PACIFIC.

**RAIDER "SEADELER" CAPTURED.**—A message from Samoa via Washington on October 5th announced the arrival at Tutuila of an open boat containing the master of the American schooner, the "C. Slade." He stated that the German raider "Seeadler" ran ashore and was abandoned on Mopeli (Lord Howe Island) on August 2nd. Later the commander and crew of the raider seized a motor sloop and the French schooner "Lutece," which were armed, and put to sea respectively on August 21st and September 5th for the purpose of carrying out raids. Before she stranded the "Seeadler" sank the American schooner the "C. Slade," "A. B. Johnson," and "Manila." The "Seeadler" left forty-seven prisoners on the island. The "Seeadler" was said to be a captured American barque which was taken into Cuxhaven by a German prize crew in August, 1915, having been captured on a voyage from New York to Archangel with a cargo of cotton. She was equipped, presumably at Cuxhaven, with two 4.2-in. guns, sixteen machine-guns, wireless, provisions for eighteen months, and an ample supply of ammunition, including mines. The crew numbered sixty-four, and the "Seeadler" was under the command of Count Luckner. The raider is believed to have left Germany on December 22nd, 1916, and, having slipped through our blockade, commenced laying mines off the coast of Brazil. Then at the end of March, 1917, the French barque "Cambronne" arrived at Rio de Janeiro with over 200 British, French, and Italian sailors and passengers from eleven vessels sunk by the German raider off Trinidad. Nothing was then heard of her till this news of her grounding on Lord Howe Island. A few days later, however, it was announced that one of the boats which escaped had been captured, and among the crew were the commander and the first officer of the "Seeadler."

## THE WAR.

### ITS MILITARY SIDE.

Sites of unusual artillery activity are marked \*, enemy reports within [ ].

OCTOBER 1st-31st, 1917.

#### BRITISH—FRENCH FRONT.

1ST, British.—Night September 30th—October 1st. \* N. of Ypres, and near Nieuport. 1st, 5.30 a.m., “powerful” attack on over 1 mile front N. of Ypres—Menin road—E. of Polygon Wood “driven back in disorder.” 6—9 a.m., attack twice renewed. Repulsed “at all points” except 2 advanced posts in S.E. corner of Polygon Wood. \* Bullecourt, N. and S. of Lens.

French.—Night September 30th—October 1st. \* Aisne and both banks of Meuse, “notably the river—Bezonvaux.” 1st, \* Laffaux—Ailles, Miette—the Aisne. Attack Chaume Wood—Bezonvaux repulsed.

2ND, British.—Night 1st—2nd. 5 attacks Ypres Menin road—N.E. corner of Polygon Wood. One, S. of Ypres—Roulers railway on Zonnebeke, “ended in complete failure.” 2nd, \* E. of Ypres.

French.—Night 1st—2nd. \* Craonne and Samogneux—Bezonvaux. 2 attacks near Beaumont “stopped.” 2nd, “heavy” attack Hill 344—Samogneux repulsed after “desperate fighting.”

3RD, British.—3rd, attack Tower Hamlets—Polygon Wood broken. \* E. of Ypres.

French.—Night 2nd—3rd. E. of Reims concentration “neutralised.” \* N. of Hill 344 (Verdun). 3rd, \* the Aisne and Meuse.

4TH, British.—6 a.m., attacked on over 8-mile front S. of Tower Hamlets—Ypres—Staden Railway N. of Langemarck. All objectives gained by noon Right, N. of Ypres—Menin road, English battalions carried Polderhoek village and chateau, numerous farms and woods, S. and S.E. of Polygon Wood, Reutel, Noordemdhoeck, and high ground overlooking Becleraere. Stiff fighting. Centre, Australians captured Molenaarelstroek and Broodseinde: New Zealanders, Gravenstafel. Left, English Divisions stormed most of Poelcappelle. Advance anticipated enemy attack. Troops assaulting caught under our barrage, suffered “exceedingly heavy losses.” Early afternoon, 2 counter-attacks E. of Gravenstafel broken: another N.E. of Langemarck repulsed after “severe fighting.” Later, 3 “unsuccessful” counter-attacks S.E. of Polygon Wood.

French.—Night 3rd—4th. \* Right bank Meuse. N. of Hill 344 attack repulsed. Concentration dispersed.

5TH, British.—Night 4th—5th. \* New positions E. of Ypres. 5th, “No infantry fighting of importance.” Since 4th, 4,446 prisoners, including 114 officers.

French.—Night 4th—5th. Surprise attacks foiled E. of Butte-de-Souain (Champagne), and near Michelbach (Alsace). \* Hill 344—Bezonvaux (Meuse). 5th, W. of Navarin Farm. Concentration dispersed near Caures Wood.

6TH, British.—Night 5th—6th. \* E. of Ypres. 6th, \* Broodseinde—S. No counter-attacks “developed.” 380 more prisoners.

French.—Night 5th—6th. Various attempts Hurtebise—Craonne repulsed. “A more serious attempt” N.W. of Hill 344 “set foot in some advanced elements. Line re-established in its entirety.” 6th, \* Bray-en-Laonnois, and N. of Chaume Wood. Successful surprise near Senones.

*7th, British.*—Dawn, attack repulsed S. of Reutel. Towards dusk  
\* Broodseinde—Hollebeke.

*French.*—\* Vauxaillon—Laffaux—Hurtebise, and N. of Hill 344—Bezonvaux, Belgium, on the Aisne, and right bank of Meuse.

*8th, British.*—Night 7th—8th. Attack E. of Polygon Wood repulsed. 8th, \* Ypres.

*French.*—Night 7th—8th. Attempts repulsed near Les Bouvettes, Craonne, Main-de-Massiges, Mont Haut. 8th, \* Belgium, Hurtebise—Craonne.

*9th, British.*—5.20 a.m., in conjunction with French, attacked S.E. Broodseinde—St. Jansbeck (1 mile N.E. of Bixschoote), "with very satisfactory results." Right, Australians advanced over crest E. and N.E. of Broodseinde. Right centre, third line Territorials (Manchesters, E. Lancs., Lancs. Fusiliers) advanced 1 mile towards Passchendaele. Centre, advanced to main ridge, Poelcappelle. Left centre, completed capture of Poelcappelle. Left, English, Welsh, Irish, and Guards battalions gained outskirts of Houthulst Forest (2 miles N.N.W. of Poelcappelle). Left flank, French crossed flooded Broenbeek stream, gained outskirts of Houthulst Forest. So far, over 1,000 prisoners. Counter-attacks near Broodseinde repulsed.

*French.*—Night 8th—9th.\* The Panthéon (Aisne), and N. of Chaume Wood. 9th, Belgium. 5.20 a.m., in conjunction with British, attacked Draeibank—Wiendredreft, S. of Houthulst Forest. Crossed the "marshy" Broenbeek; captured St. Jean, Mangelare, Veldhoek, many farms: advanced 1½ miles to edge of Forest. So far, 300 prisoners (12 officers). \* Royère Farm, Ailles—Craonne.

*10th, British.*—Night 9th—10th. Attack repulsed near Ypres—Staden Railway. S. of the line "forced back a short distance" on 2,000 yards front. 10th, "local fighting" on \* new positions. Prisoners now 2,038, including 29 officers and 400 taken by French: "a few field guns, number of machine and trench guns."

*French.*—Night 9th—10th. Belgium, captured Papegoed Farm (E. of Draeibank): 40 prisoners. \* Laffaux, Chaume Wood. 10th, Belgium, prisoners now over 400. Violent all day attacks N. of Chaume Wood, gained footing in some advanced elements.

*11th, British.*—Night 10th—11th. \* W. of Passchendaele. 11th, "hostile artillery less active." 77 more prisoners.

*French.*—Night 10th—11th. Belgium, E. of Draeibank, attack Papegoed—Victory Farms broken. "After lively fight," attack repulsed N. of Hill 344. 11th, \* Chevregny Ridge, S. of Butte-du-Mesnil.

*12th, British.*—5.25 a.m., "attacked Ypres—Roulers Railway—junction with French on S. edge of Houthulst Forest. Number of fortified positions and concreted strong points taken. Severe fighting W. and S. of Passchendaele. Action broken off because of heavy rain, etc." 41 officers, 943 other ranks taken.

*French.*—Night 11th—12th. Attempt W. of Maisons-de-Champagne, and 3 Auberive—Souain, failed. \* Bezonvaux. 12th, Laffaux Mill, Craonne.

*13th, British.*—"Nothing of special interest."

*French.*—Night 12th—13th. Several attacks Hurtebise—Chevreux repulsed. W. of Hurtebise Monument and S. of La Royère, attempts dispersed. \* Chaume Wood. 13th, Craonne, Laffaux, Mont Sans Nom, Samogneux, Hill 344, and Chaume Wood.

*14th, British.*—Successful raids by E. County troops S.E. of Monchy-le-Preux. 64 prisoners, including 2 officers, 3 machine-guns taken. \* No infantry action.

*French.*—Night 13th—14th. \* The Panthéon, Vauclerc, and California Plateau. 14th, \* Ailles—Craonne, and on right bank of Meuse. Attempt repulsed S. of Hartmannswillerkopf.

*15th, British.*—Night 14th—15th. \* Ridge S. of Broodseinde, Lens, Nieuport.

*French.*—14th—15th, \* Ailles—Craonne, N. of Hill 344. 15th, Aisne.

16TH, *British*.—\* Ypres—Staden railway.

*French*.—Night 15th—16th. \* Aisne. Attack repulsed N. of Hill 304 (left bank of Meuse). Right bank. \* N. of Caurières Wood. Attempts repulsed S. of Courtecon and of Ailles. \* "In region of Plateaux."

17TH, *British*.—\* N.E. of Ypres and near coast.

*French*.—Night 16th—17th. \* Chaume Wood. 17th, Ailles Plateau, right bank Meuse. Argonne, 2 attempts "completely failed."

18TH, *British*.—Night 17th—18th. \* S. of Ypres—Comines Canal, and Zonnebeke—Broodseinde: 18th, S.E. of Poelcappelle.

*French*.—Night 17th—18th. \* Aisne Plateaux, Hill 344, and Chaume Wood. 18th, attack repulsed near Vauclerc Plateau. \* Maisons-de-Champagne, N. of Souain, Moronviller, and Chaume Wood.

19TH, *British*.—\* Zonnebeke—St. Julien—the Steenbeek, and Arleux (E. of Vimy).

*French*.—Night 18th—19th. Successful operation Laffaux Mill—Braye-en-Laonnois: 100 prisoners. Attempt broken near Chevreux. Right bank of Meuse, attack repulsed N. of Chatélon-sous-les-Côtes. 19th, \* the Aisne, near Souain, and both banks of Meuse.

20TH, *British*.—\* N. of Lens and N.E. of Ypres.

*French*.—Night 19th—20th. \* N. of Bezonvauz and Caurières Wood. "Strong attack" near Bezonvauz repulsed. 20th, "intervention of our artillery put an end to violent bombardment" N. of Chaume Wood.

21ST, *British*.—"Nothing of special interest."

*French*.—\* Ailles—Cerny.

22ND, *British*.—5.40 a.m., attacked N.E. astride Ypres—Staden Railway, E. of Poelcappelle: Norfolks, Suffolks, Essex, Berks, Northumberlands, on 1½-mile front, "captured number of fortified buildings and concreted redoubts." All objectives gained. S.E. of Poelcappelle, "carried other valuable positions beyond line of their objectives." In co-operation with French, Gloucesters, Cheshires, Lancs. Fusiliers, and Royal Scots, on over 2-mile front Ypres—Staden Railway—N. of Mangelaere, "established themselves well beyond S. boundary of Houthulst Forest." Counter-attack on railway only checked advance. 200 prisoners.

*French*.—Belgium, captured and advanced N. of Veldoeck: some prisoners. 2 field guns. \* Chevregny Ridge—the Panthéon, Cerny, Avocourt, Chaume Wood.

23RD, *British*.—Counter-attacks repulsed Westroosebeke—Poelcappelle road, N. of Ypres—Staden Railway, and in Houthulst Forest, N.E. of Veldhoeck. Attempt on fortified farm S.E. of Poelcappelle "equally unsuccessful."

*French*.—Night 22nd—23rd. \* N.W. of Reims, N. of Hill 344. 23rd, 5.15 a.m., attacked on 4-mile front E. of Laffaux Mill—La Royère Farm. Right: captured Pruty and Bohery quarries, heights commanding Pargny and Filain. Centre: stormed Fort Malmaison, Mont Parnasse quarries, and Chavignon. 2½ miles advance. Left: carried Allemant and Vaudesson. Over 7,500 prisoners, 25 heavy and field guns, "immense quantity of material," so far counted.

24TH, *British*.—Night 23rd—24th. Attack in Houthulst Forest "completely repulsed." (7th attack since morning 22nd).

*French*.—Night 23rd—24th. \* New positions, especially Vaudesson, E. and W. of Cerny. "Violent" attack N.E. of Hill 344 repulsed "after desperate fight." Attack on Caurières crest heavily repulsed. 24th, \* La Royère—Les Bouvettes, and Malmaison Fort. Now over 8,000 prisoners, including 160 officers, staff of 3 regiments: 70 guns, 30 mine throwers, 80 machine-guns, etc. \* Samogneux, Vacherauville, Chaume Wood, and W. of Douaumont.

25TH, *British*.—Night 24th—25th. Attack S. Houthulst Forest "completely repulsed."

*French.*—Night 24th—25th. Chavignon—Mont-des-Singes, advanced to Rozay Farm. Now 500 prisoners. \* Cerny-en-Laonnois, Vaux Maisons. Attempt near Sapigneul bridgehead broken. \* Chaume Wood, 25th, “general advance” to banks of Oise—Aisne Canal. Occupied Pinon Forest and village, Pargny, Filain, and St. Martin and Chapelle Ste. Bertha Farms (S. of Filain). “Enemy abandoned a considerable quantity of material, including about 29 guns, several of them 6in. howitzers.” 2,000 more prisoners. Since 23rd, over 11,000 prisoners, including over 200 officers, and about 120 guns, “several hundred” mine throwers and machine-guns. Attempt on Chaume Wood “stopped.”

26TH, *British.*—5.45 a.m., in conjunction with French attacked E., N.E., and N. of Ypres. Main operation. Canadians seized rising ground S. of Passchendaele. Canadians, Naval Brigade, London Territorials, captured spurs Passchendaele—E. of Poelcappelle, number of strong points and fortified farms, “Strong opposition.” 2 counter-attacks repulsed. E. and N.E. of Poelcappelle, W. Lancs. and North Country troops “made progress.” Subsidiary operations. English troops attacked astride Menin-road. Severe fighting all day near road and E. of Polderhoek. “A number of prisoners.” N. of Bixschoote, French crossed the St. Jansbeek, captured objectives. Allies took 800 prisoners.

*French.*—Night 25th-26th. Attack repulsed N. of Chaume Wood. Argonne, attempt foiled. 26th, Belgium, 6 a.m., attacked Drei Grachten—Draiebank: crossed the St. Jansbeek and Corverbeek, “Water up to shoulders”: captured Draeibank, Papegoed Woods, numerous fortified farms, over 200 prisoners. Aisne, advanced N. of Chapelle Sainte Berthe, to further edge of plateau N. of Chevregny spur. Since 23rd, 160 guns taken, including “several” 210 m.m. howitzers and “numerous” heavy guns. Champagne, 2 attempts broken near Maisons-de-Champagne. \* Samogneux—Bezonvaux, “especially violent” near Chaume Wood. Attempt N. of Bezonvaux failed.

27TH, *British.*—Night 26th—27th. Progress W. of Passchendaele, 18 machine-guns taken. 27th, French advanced astride Bixschoote—Dixmude road: captured Ashoot, Kippe, Mercken, and “a number of prisoners.” Belgians, in conjunction with French, occupied Vijfhuisen. Since 26th, over 1,100 prisoners (300 of them taken by French).

*French.*—Night 26th-27th. \* W. of Ailles. 27th, Belgium, 5.15 a.m., attacked astride Ypres—Dixmude road. Carried all positions on 2½-miles front to 1½ miles depth. “Stubborn resistance.” On right, reached W. border of Houthulst Forest, captured Verdrendesmis, Ashoot, Mercken, Kippe, “number of solidly fortified farms,” about 100 prisoners. Aisne “Feeble enemy artillery activity.” From Chevregny spur progress E. of Froidmont Farm. \* Heights and right bank of Meuse. 23rd—27th, Aisne, 11,157 prisoners, including 232 officers, 180 guns.

28TH, *British.*—Night 27th-28th. Progress near Ypres—Roulers Railway. 28th, French captured Luyghem. Mercken peninsula “now in hands of Allies.” Number of prisoners. \* Battle front and S. of Lens.

*French.*—Night 27th—28th. Belgium, progress in Luyghem peninsula. Since 26th over 200 prisoners. Aisne, \* Hurtebise. Champagne, attempt repulsed near Maisons. 28th, Aisne, \* Pinon, Chavignon, and Chevregny spur. Noon, “strong” attack on Froidmont Farm broken: 60 prisoners. \* Moronviller area.

29TH, *British.*—\* N.E. of Ypres, and near Roulers Railway.

*French.*—Night 28th—29th. \* N. of Vaudresson and near Hurtebise. Attack Chaume Wood—Bezonvaux, gained footing on 500 yards front N. of Caurières Wood: “immediate counter-attack” regained most of the ground. Attempt in Apremont Forest failed. 29th, \* Chaume Wood—Bezonvaux.

30TH, *British.*—5.40 a.m., attacked Ypres—Roulers Railway—Passchendaele—Westroosebeke road. Right: Canadians reached Passchendaele. W. of village 5 counter-attacks repulsed. Left: Naval and London Territorial battalions

captured number of fortified farms and strong points. 191 prisoners, including 3 officers.

*French*.—Night 29th-30th. \* Chavignon, Pargny, and Filain (Aisne), Chaume Wood—Bezonvaux. More ground regained on Caurières Ridge. 30th, \* Brayen-Laonnois, Hurtebise, and left bank Meuse.

31st, *British*.—"Local fighting" near Ypres—Staden Railway : "progress."

*French*.—Night 30th—31st. Aisne, \* Vauxillon—Pinon, and on new positions, Froidmont Farm. Attempt repulsed N. of Loivre. (N.W. of Reims). 31st, afternoon, \* Bezonvaux—the river.

During October, British took 9,215 prisoners, including 242 officers, 15 guns, 431 machine guns, 42 trench mortars. Allies brought down 281 aircraft. Germans, 109. British brought down 113, damaged 73, lost 109. French brought down or damaged 95. Returns approximate ; since October 22nd, include R.N.A.S. attached to Army.

#### ITALIAN FRONT

1ST.—Bainsizza Plateau, local attacks "at once checked." N. Carso "gained some ground."

2ND.—Attack on W. slopes of San Gabriele "failed completely" : 1 officer, 79 other prisoners.

3RD.—W. slopes of San Gabriele, repeated attacks broken.

4TH.—\* Asiago Plateau. Near Monte San Gabriele, repeated attacks repulsed.

5TH.—Night 4th—5th. Attempt repulsed in Daone Valley (Chiese). 5th, \* N. of the Vipacco, Dosso Faiti.

6TH.—Attempts repulsed on Costabella massif (Pellegrino Valley), and on Croda dei Longerini (Padola—Virdendi).

7TH.—"Mainly artillery activity."

8TH.—Night 7th—8th. Renewed attacks on Costabella massif repulsed. 8th, Bainsizza Plateau. In local engagements 100 prisoners, 5 machine guns, taken. Carso, \* "in Castagnavizza region."

9TH.—Night 8th—9th. Carso, attack repulsed Castagnavizza. 9th, \* Bainsizza Plateau and Adige—Brenta Rivers. Evening, Vipacco River—Castagnavizza, "violent artillery preparation crushed, numerous and strong 'attempts' driven back."

10TH.—"No event of importance."

11TH.—\* Zugna (Lagarina Valley), and N. of Tolmino.

12TH.—Night 11th—12th. Near Costabella, attempt "promptly crushed."

14TH.—Attempts repulsed near Dosso Alto (Lagarina Valley), Assa Valley, Monte Granuda (Fella Valley), and Brestovizza Valley. Near Lokavac (S.E. of Monfalcone), attack "completely broken up."

16TH.—\* Monte Nero—the sea.

17TH.—S.W. of Selo, attack "repulsed."

18TH.—Night 17th—18th. "Repeated attacks in force" repulsed in Posina and Rio Freddo Valleys. 18th, attack N. of San Gabriele "crushed."

21ST.—\* Plezzo, Tolmino, and S. of Vipacco.

22ND.—Strong attack on Monte Piana (Cadore) "driven back with severe losses."

23RD.—Strong enemy concentration, "a large proportion of Germans."

24TH.—Night 23rd—24th. "Increased intensity of artillery fire" Monte Rombon (50 miles N. of Gorizia)—N. Bainsizza Plateau, "marked beginning of attack. Decreased towards dawn." 24th, attack launched. Failed at the Narrows of the Zaga (5 miles S.W. of Plezzo) : further S., penetrated advanced lines on left bank of the Isonzo. "Taking advantage" of Santa Maria and Santa Lucia bridgeheads (close to Tolmino), "battle brought on to slopes of right bank."

"Powerful attacks" W. of Volnik (Bainsizza Plateau) and of San Gabrielle "checked": counter-attacks took "a few hundred prisoners." \* Carso, [Austrians advanced N. and S. on Monte Nero, opening Caporetto road. Germans captured Globacac, advanced to Judria Valley.]

25TH.—Night 24th—25th. Offensive continued, "conducted by powerful forces." 25th, Monte Maggiore (8 miles S.W. of Plezzo)—W. of Auzza (on the Isonzo, 7 miles S.W. of Tolmino), withdrawal "to boundary line." "Provision made" for evacuation of Bainsizza Plateau. E. of Gorizia and Carso, "situation unchanged." [7 a.m., Monte Matajur (3 miles S.W. of Caporetto) "fell." Advanced beyond Caporetto and Ronzina (on right bank of the Isonzo, opposite Auzza).]

26TH.—Enemy advanced Monte Canin—Judria Valley (20-mile front). "Attempted to reach an opening on the plains" (down Natisone Valley). Carso, "hostile effort increasing. Strong thrusts repulsed." [Captured heights of the Stol (2½ miles E. of Monte Maggiore). Now 60,000 prisoners, 450 guns.]

27TH.—"Enemy pierced left wing on Julian" sector [Germans occupied "burning" Cividale: Austrians Gorizia.]

28TH.—"Enemy advance into plains kept in check." [Austrians captured Cormons (8 miles W. of Gorizia): "standing before Udine" (10 miles W. of Cividale).]

29TH.—"Withdrawal continued. Enemy advance detained." [Occupied Udine.]

30TH.—"Various engagements" in hills of San Daniele del Fruili (left bank of the Tagliamento, 12 miles N.W. of Udine), along Ledro Canal (San Daniele—Udine), at Pasian Schiavonesco (8 miles S.W. of Udine), and Pezzuala del Fruili (6 miles S.W. of Udine). [Now 120,000 prisoners, 1,000 guns.]

31ST.—"Effect ed withdrawal on the Tagliamento." [In mountains and Fruili plain as far as Udine—Codroipo—Treviso, Italians retired W. of the Tagliamento. Near bridgeheads at Pinzano, Dignano, and Codroipo, "violent resistance." Germans captured the two latter. Austrians advanced to Latisana (15 miles S. of Codroipo). 60,000 prisoners, "several hundred" guns.]

#### RUSSIAN FRONT.

3RD.—Riga, \* near Jacobstadt.

5TH.—Riga, attempts repulsed near Skuli (N. of Pskoff road), and Urdzani (E. of Lemberg).

6TH.—Riga, \* near Jacobstadt.

7TH.—Riga, attack repulsed near Pauske Farm (27 miles N.E. of Riga). \* Near Lake Vishneff (90 miles S. of Dvinsk), and N.E. of Baranovitchi.

8TH.—\* Butneeki, Ninzenberg, and Spitali (Riga): N. of Lake Drisviaty (Dvinsk).

9TH.—Riga, near Skuli, \* S.E. of Spitali Farm and N. of Lake Miadziol.

10TH.—Riga, \* near Skuli. 7 p.m., Spitali—Timermani "some companies pressed back."

11TH.—Riga. Night 10th—11th. Spitali—Timermani, 9 p.m., counter-attacked, position restored. 11th, Skuli, advanced posts retired.

12TH.—Gulf of Riga, enemy detachments landed at Tagga Bay (N. coast Oesel Island), and Serro (S. Dago Island). Shore batteries silenced by Dreadnoughts. From Tagga Bay, enemy advanced E. on Orisar. Repulsed from Moen Island. On Dago Island, "unable to maintain position, promptly returned to ships."

13TH.—7 p.m., enemy occupied Arensburg (S.W. Oesel Island).

16TH.—Oesel Island, pressed back on mole to Moen Island. "Completely lost touch with our forces in Oesel." [Troops and batteries in Svorbe peninsula surrendered.]

17TH.—“Complete occupation of Oesel Island.” Coast batteries on Moen Island silenced. Noon, enemy landed near Serro, S.W. Dago Island. [10,000 prisoners, 50 guns, etc.]

18TH.—Moen Island evacuated. [5,000 prisoners, etc.]

20TH.—Enemy detachments retired on Skuli—Lemburg (30 miles E. of Riga). Near Deliatitchi (S. of Baranovitchi), artillery dispersed “Germans who attempted to fraternize.”

21ST.—Enemy landed at Verder (E. of Moen Island, 75 miles S.W. of Reval). Attempted landing 8 miles N. repulsed.

21ST—22ND.—Riga Bay—the Dvina, enemy advanced posts withdrawn.

23RD.—Enemy on 17-mile front Rodenpois (on Riga—Petrograd Railway)—Turkallas (on the Little Jaegel, 5 miles N.E. of Oger Station on the Dvina). Patrol advanced to Meirini Farm (on the Little Jaegel) “without having encountered enemy.”

24TH.—Enemy retired 15 miles Riga Pskoff road—the Little Jaegel (N.N.E. of Uexkull).

25TH.—N. W. of Dvinsk. \* Illukst.

27TH.—Illutsk (N.W. of Dvinsk), “scores of men” fraternizing with enemy dispersed by artillery. The same near Krevo and Baranovitchi.

28TH.—Enemy evacuated Werder.

29TH.—Riga, 8 a.m. near Skuli, 3 p.m. near Jaunzen, attacks repulsed. \*Kokenhusen Castle and Stockmannshof Manor (on the Dvina, below Jacobstadt).

30TH.—Near Dvinsk and Vilna, attempts at fraternization “stopped” by artillery.

31ST.—Riga, enemy withdrawal “at certain points.”

#### RUMANIAN FRONT.

3RD.—8 miles N.W. of Sotip (Poliani), “enemy evacuated his advanced trenches.”

4TH.—Milleschoutz—Istensegits (S. of Radautz), 7:30 p.m., “attack in dense waves stopped.”

5TH.—Night 4th—5th. Near Maxineni (N. of mouth of the Buzeu), Bulgarians penetrated “several advanced trenches.” 5th, 7 a.m., counter-attack “restored position.”

6TH, 5:30 a.m.—Captured height and half village of Washkoutz (2 miles N.W. of Sereth town, 25 miles S. of Czernowitz). 1 and 3 p.m., counter-attacks repulsed. “Abandoned village.” 12 officers, 750 other ranks, 7 machine-guns, taken.

9TH, 5 a.m.—S. of Krudcheni (River Buzeu), attack repulsed.

14TH.—\* 6 miles S.W. of Sabasa—Varnitza—Fitonesti—Marasesti.

20TH.—Dispersed working parties N. of Muncelui (N. of Susitza Valley). \* Marasesti. “Russian artillery dispersed enemy detachments attempting to fraternize.”

23RD.—Gas attack S. of Grozesti repulsed.

#### BALKAN FRONT.

2ND.—\* Liumnica and in Tcherna bend.

4TH.—\* Tcherna bend and N. of Monastir. British cleared Osman Kamilla (S.W. of Seres).

14TH.—Successful raid by Scots near Komondos (5 miles S.W. of Seres): 143 prisoners, 3 machine-guns. \* Doiran—the Vardar.

15TH.—\* N. of Monastir. Landing repulsed near Ufunista (left shore of Lake Ochrida).

17TH.—\* The Vardar, and N. of Monastir.  
 19TH.—\* N. and N.W. of Monastir, near Doiran.  
 20TH.—\* Doiran—the Vardar, N. of Monastir.  
 25TH.—British captured and evacuated Salmah, Kispeki, Ada, and Kakaraska (S. of Seres). 109 prisoners, 1 machine-gun. \* The Vardar—Dobropolye.  
 During October, British captured 281 prisoners.

## CAUCASIAN FRONT.

2ND.—Captured Marufa, near Dizaoromur.  
 3RD.—Captured Tchul (both places 94 miles W. of Urmia). Took 250 Kurd prisoners, rifles, stores of cartridges. Released 200 Syrians. Enemy fled to right bank of the Great Zab, after destroying 3 bridges.  
 11TH.—Near Kamakh (16 miles S.W. of Erzjinjan) attempt "observed and repelled." Captured Stiak Kuh height, 50 miles S. of Urmia.  
 25TH.—Near Penjvin (Persian frontier), occupied Merivan Valley, advanced to S.E. shore of Lake Zeribar.

## PALESTINE FRONT.

18TH.—"No change."  
 27TH.—Enemy reconnaissance repulsed near Karm (6 miles S.E. of Shellal, on Beersheba road). London Yeomanry maintained position for 6 hours.  
 31ST.—Captured Beersheba. 4th Australian Light Horse ended resistance by rushing trenches. 1,800 prisoners, 9 guns.

## MESOPOTAMIAN FRONT.

18TH.—W. bank of the Diala. Left column occupied Deli Abbas. Right column crossed Ruz Canal.  
 19TH.—Dawn, occupied Mansouriye. Enemy burnt Kizil Robat bridge, retired on Kara Tobe road.  
 23RD.—Enemy advanced from Tekrit on both banks of the Tigris on Samarra. Declined action and retired.

## EAST AFRICA.

1ST.—"Severe fighting" on Lindi—Massassi road midway Mtua—Mtama : "strong" counter-attacks repulsed : progress Mbemkuru Valley. Fighting 8 miles S. of Nahungo on road to Nangano. N. of Central Railway, at Luita Hill (75 miles S.E. of Kondea Irungi) : 15 Germans, 160 Askaris, "several hundred carriers" surrendered.

4TH.—Belgians in contact on 9-mile front E. of Mahenge. Enemy evacuated 2 villages S.W. of town.

5TH.—Mbemkuru Valley, enemy engaged 16 miles from Nahungo : 1 mountain, 1 machine gun, taken.

6TH.—Lukeledi Valley, enemy engaged at Mtama (5 miles N.E. of Nyangao).  
 9TH.—At Oldeani Hill, N. of Lake Eyassi, 3 Germans, 50 Askaris, surrendered. Belgians occupied Mahenge.

11TH.—Mbemkuru Valley, occupied Rupoonda (important road junction N.W. edge of Muera Plateau). W. area, "strong enemy detachment dislodged" from position overlooking Luwega River Drift near Mpanda's (53 miles S. of Mahenge) : retired 6 miles N.E.

13TH.—Belgians repulsed attack 20 miles S.E. of Mahenge.

15TH.—Enemy attacked at Mtama, retired on Nyangao.

16TH.—Belgians captured convoy at Litsangos (19 miles S. of Mahenge).

17TH.—Occupied Lukeledi Mission, driving enemy E. Pursued main body to Mahiwa (4 miles S.W. of Nyangao). Severe fighting. By night, Nyangao occupied.

18TH.—Fighting W. of Nyangao. "Minimum estimate" of loss inflicted : 54 Germans, 268 Askaris, killed : 241 Germans, 677 Askaris, taken.

19TH—29TH.—Enemy driven from Mahenge retreated E. to Mgangira (on the Luwego). Party driven from Mponda's, engaged at Kingoli (43 miles E.S.E. of Mahenge).

29TH.—Liwale occupied (122 miles S.W. of Kilwa) · 24 Germans taken.

#### NOVEMBER 1st—30th, 1917.

##### BRITISH—FRENCH FRONT.

1ST, British.—Night October 31st—November 1st.—Concentration near Passchendaele dispersed.—1st, \* E. and N. of Ypres.

French.—Night October 31st—November 1st. \* Belgium, the Aisne. Attempt repulsed N. of Loivre (N.W. of Reims). \* The Aisne, Maisons-de-Champagne, N. of Bezonvaux.

2ND, British.—Night 1st—2nd. Progress S. and S.W. of Passchendaele and S.E. of Poelcappelle : "number of prisoners." 2nd, \* near Ypres—Staden Railway.

French.—Night 1st—2nd. Attempts dispersed near Chevreux, Main-de-Massiges, Tahure, and N. of St. Mihiel. 2nd, "enemy compelled to abandon the Chemin-des-Dames" on 12½ miles front, Froidmont Farm—E. of Craonne. Occupied positions to 1 mile depth "at certain points," Courtecy, Cerny-en-Laonnois, Ailles, and Chevreux. Contact patrols reached the Ailette between Braye-en-Laonnois and Cerny.

3RD, British.—Night 2nd—3rd. \* E. of Ypres. 3rd, 3 attacks S. and S.W. of Passchendaele repulsed. \* N. of Ypres.

French.—Night 2nd—3rd. N. of Aisne. Advanced from Oise Canal—Corbeny to S. bank of the Ailette. \* Chavignon and plateau. Since October 23rd over 200 heavy and field, 220 trench, 723 machine-guns taken. \* Chaume Wood. 3rd, Chemin-des-Dames, and 4 p.m., Chaume Wood—Bezonvaux.

4TH, British.—Night 3rd—4th. 2 "strong points" captured E. of Broodseinde and S.E. of Poelcappelle. 4th, \* on battle front.

French.—Night 3rd—4th. N. of the Aisne, \* Pinon-Vauxaillon. 2 successive attacks N. of Chaume Wood "easily repulsed." 4th, \* N. of the Chemin-des-Dames, N.W. of Reims, and in Upper Alsace.

5TH, British.—Night 4th—5th. Progress E. of Poelcappelle. 5th, \* N. of Ypres—Roulers Railway.

French.—Night 4th—5th. Attempt W. of Courcy Forest failed. 5th, \* Corbeny.

6TH, British.—6 a.m., Canadians advanced on Passchendaele and spurs N. and N.W. of village. Passchendaele, Mosselmarkt, Goudberg, and all objectives captured before noon. So far 400 prisoners counted, including 21 officers.

French.—Night 5th—6th. Attempt near Mont Cornillet "met with no success." \* Right bank Meuse. 6th, afternoon, "very violent fighting on whole front N. of Chaume Wood."

7TH, British.—Night 6th—7th. \* Battle front. 7th, "no interruption from enemy."

French.—Night 6th—7th. Attack near Chaume Wood broken. 7th, \* Chavignon—Filain, Chaume Wood. Successful raid near Schoenholz (N.W. of Altkirch, Upper Alsace) : 120 prisoners, material taken.

8TH, British.—\* Passchendaele.

French.—\* S. of Corbeny and near Seppois (Alsace).

*French.*—Night 8th—9th. Attacks repulsed near Chaume Wood and Arracourt (Lorraine). 10th, \* Chaume Wood and Upper Alsace.

10th, *British.*—Dawn, attacked on  $\frac{1}{2}$ -mile front astride Passchendaele—Westroosebeke road. Right: Canadians advanced N. on crest of main ridge: British battalions on their left. Objectives reached. “After fierce and obstinate fighting,” some advanced positions on left lost.

*French.*—Night 9th—10th. N.W. of Reims, attempts broken near Loivre, Courcy, and the Godat. \* Chaume Wood.

11th, *British.*—Night 10th—11th. \* New positions bombarded.

*French.*—Night 10th—11th. \* Chaume Wood. Vosges, attacks on Hartmannswillerkopf and Reichaker repulsed. 11th, \* Papegoed (Belgium), Hill 344 and Chaume Wood.

12th, *British.*—\* N. of Ypres.

*French.*—Night 11th—12th. \* Chaume Wood—Bezonvaux: and 12th, the Miette—Aisne.

13th, *British.*—Heavy bombardment of new Passchendaele positions. 4.30 p.m., attack on high ground N. “completely repulsed.”

*French.*—\* Moronvilliers and Argonne.

14th, *British.*—Night 13th—14th. Slight progress N.W. of Passchendaele. 14th, afternoon, reconnaissance driven off near Polderhoek Wood N. of Menin road.

*French.*—Night 13th—14th. \* Right bank Meuse. 14th, N. of the Aisne, near Vauclerc, and Apremont Forest (right bank Meuse).

15th, *British.*—Night 14th—15th. Attempt near Bixschoote broken. 15th, Attacks stopped N. of Menin road and N.E. of Passchendaele. \* N. and S. of Passchendaele.

*French.*—Night 14th—15th. \* Caurières Wood. 15th, Braye-en-Laonnois and right bank Meuse.

16th, *British.*—Night 15th—16th. Reconnaissance repulsed N. of Poelcappelle. 16th, \* Passchendaele.

*French.*—Night 15th—16th. Belgium, attempt N. of Veldhoek foiled. \* Right bank Meuse. 16th, Belgium—Champagne, and on right bank Meuse.

17th, *British.*—Night 16th—17th. Detachments of Highland, Berks, and Lancs. advanced line N. and N.W. of Passchendaele. \* On battle-field. 17th, N.E. of Ypres.

*French.*—Night 16th—17th. \* N. of Courtecon, attempt repulsed. \* Schonholz (Upper Alsace). 17th, right bank Meuse. Attempt broken N.W. of Altkirch.

18th, *British.*—\* Passchendaele, Langemarck, and S. of Polygon Wood.

*French.*—Night 17th—18th. \* N. of Chemin-des-Dames and on right bank Meuse. Successful attempt N. of Mont Cornillet. 18th, \* Hill 344 (right bank Meuse).

19th, *British.*—Night 18th—19th. \* Battle area. Progress N.W. of Passchendaele. Attack N.E. of Polygon Wood repulsed. 19th, attempt S.E. of Poelcappelle destroyed. \* E. and N.E. of Ypres.

*French.*—Night 18th—19th. \* Chaume Wood. Attempt repulsed S.W. of Malancourt.

20th, *British.*—\* Zonnebeke and Passchendaele. 6.30 a.m., St. Quentin—the Scarpe, attacked on 12-mile front “without previous artillery preparation.” Tanks broke through “successive belts of wire”; infantry following, “swept over outposts, stormed 1st and 2nd Hindenburg Line.” Right: E. County troops took Bonavis and Lateau Wood. “Stiff fighting.” English Rifles and L.I. captured La Vacquerie and “formidable defences of the spur” (“Welsh Ridge”). Centre: English troops stormed Ribécourt and Couillet Wood. Highland T. crossed Grand Ravine, entered Flesquieres. “Fierce fighting.” W. Riding T. captured Havrin-

court and defences N. Left : Ulsters moved N. up W. bank Canal-du-Nord. Rapid progress. Crossed Canal at Masnières, captured Marcoing and Neuf Wood. W. Ridings stormed Graincourt and Arneux. Ulsters carried line to Bapaume—Cambrai road. W. Lancs. advanced to Epéhy. Irish captured line Bullecourt—Fontaine-les-Croiselles. Advance 4—5 miles in depth.

*French.*—Night 19th—20th. \* Butte-du-Mesnil, and right bank Meuse. Attack N. of Caurières Wood repulsed. 20th, \* Belgium, N. of Chemin-des-Dames, right bank Meuse.

**21ST, British.**—Right : Progress towards Crèvecœur-sur-l'Escourt (Scheldt Canal). N.E. of Masnières, captured double line of trenches E. bank of Canal de l'Escourt. Counter-attacks driven off. N. of Marcoing, early captured Noyelles. Counter-attacks repulsed. N.E. of Flesquieres, Scots captured Courtaing, lines S.W., 500 prisoners. Later, advanced over 5 miles behind former 1st line. N. of Arrneux, W. Ridings in contact S. and S.W. of Bourlon Wood. Ulsters entered Moeuvres. Near Bullecourt, strong counter-attacks repulsed. So far, over 8,000 prisoners counted, including 180 officers. Guns not counted.

*French.*—Night 20th—21st. Chaume Wood. 21st, 3 p.m., captured salient S. of Juvincourt (E. of Craonne) on nearly 1-mile front to ½-mile depth. 476 prisoners, including 9 officers, 400 rifles, many machine-guns, etc. N. of Largitzen (Upper Alsace) and on both banks of Meuse, attempts broken.

**22ND, British.**—Withdrew from Fontaine Notre Dame (2½ miles S.W. of Cambrai), captured overnight. \* Passchendaele.

*French.*—Night 21st—22nd. \* W. of the Miette. 22nd, counter-attacks S. of Juvincourt repulsed. \* N. of Chemin-des-Dames, Aisne—Miette, N. of Les Chambrettes (right bank Meuse).

**23RD, British.**—Night 22nd—23rd. Progress S.E. of Ypres. 23rd, \* Passchendaele. W. of Cambrai. Stormed dominating ground about Bourlon Wood. Severe fighting. Progress E. of the Wood, near Fontaine Notre Dame : W. of Wood, astride Canal-du-Nord on Moeuvres. Between Moeuvres—Quéant, London Scottish captured important spur.

*French.*—Night 22nd—23rd. \* Right bank Meuse, Cerny, Juvincourt. S. of Juvincourt, attack stopped. 24th, \* Juvincourt, Sepois, and Largitzen.

**24TH, British.**—Night 23rd—24th. Captured strong point near Bullecourt. Forced back from Bourlon, and slightly on the hill in Bourlon Wood. 24th, before noon, line re-established on N. edge of Wood. Evening, pressed back slightly in N.E. corner. Progress near Banteaux (on St. Quentin Canal, 4 miles E. of Gouzeaucourt). \* Passchendaele.

*French.*—\* Beaumont—Bezonvau.

**25TH, British.**—Night 24th—25th. Bourlon and all Wood re-captured. Fierce struggle. Noon, pressed back in Bourlon. Positions in Wood and on high ground intact. Fighting W. of Moeuvres. Since 20th now 9,774 prisoners, including 182 officers.

*French.*—Night 24th—25th. \* Attacks repulsed N. of Hill 344, broken before Beaumont and Chaume Wood. 25th, \* on 2½-mile front Samogneux—Anglement Farm, captured 1st and 2nd lines, and dug-outs on S. slopes of Caures Wood ravine. Over 800 prisoners. Vosges, attempt failed near Sondernach (S.W. of Munster).

**26TH, British.**—\* Passchendaele.

*French.*—Night 25th—26th. \* N. of Hill 344. 26th, \* Belgium, N. of Chemin-des-Dames. Concentration dispersed N. of new positions Samogneux—Caures Wood.

**27TH, British.**—Night 26th—27th. Attack repulsed N.E. corner of Bourlon Wood. 27th, severe fighting all day. Line advanced near Fontaine Notre Dame and Bourlon. Afternoon, repulsed attack on spur W. of Moeuvres. \* E. and N.E. of Ypres.

*French.*—Night 26th—27th. \* Filain, Pinon. N. of Hill 344 captured strong point : completed objective of 25th. 27th, \* Belgium, Juvincourt, Chaume Wood.

28th, *British.*—Night 27th—28th. \* Bourlon Wood, E. and N.E. of Ypres. 28th, E. of Ypres.

*French.*—28th, \* N. of the Aisne, Argonne, Les Chambrettes (right bank Meuse).

29th, *British.*—Night 28th—29th. Belgians repulsed attack near Aschoop (W. of Houthulst Forest). 29th, \* Bourlon Wood. Progress W. of Wood. \* Avion, Hollebeke, E. and N.E. of Ypres.

*French.*—Night 28th—29th. \* N. of the Aisne, Sapigneul, Upper Alsace. Attempt repulsed N. of Mont Cornillet. 29th, \* Somme—Oise, Massiges, left bank Aire (Argonne), Chaume Wood, Bezonvaux, Upper Alsace.

30th, *British.*—Night 29th—30th. \* S.W. and W. of Cambrai, E. of Ypres. 30th, \* 8 a.m., enemy attacked "with strong forces" Vandhuille—Crévecoeur-sur-l'Escourt, S. of Cambrai : and shortly afterwards near Bourlon Wood and Moeuvres. After many hours' fierce fighting, all attacks repulsed Masnières—Moeuvres. S. of Masnières, Bonavis—Villers Guislain, enemy penetrated to La Vacquerie and Gouzeaucourt. Counter-attacks regained these villages and ridge E. of Gouzeaucourt. At other points, attacks checked. [4,000 prisoners, "many batteries," taken.]

*French.*—Night 29th—30th. Argonne, Les Chambrettes. 30th, N. of Chemin-des-Dames, right bank Meuse.

During November British took 11,551 prisoners, including 214 officers, 138 guns (40 heavy), 303 machine-guns, 64 trench mortars, "great quantities" of material. 370 aircraft brought down, including 1 by British, 50 by French, not reported in October. Actually in November 318 : 108 by British, 84 by French. (?) 126 by Germans. 65 British missing.

#### ITALIAN FRONT.

1ST.—\* The Tagliamento. [Fella Valley—the sea (50 miles), "left bank of the Tagliamento free of the enemy."]

2ND.—"Pressure more noticeable on left wing. Attempts to reach right bank detained."

3RD.—"Intensified pressure on left wing." Attacks repulsed in Daone and Giumella Valleys (W. of Lake Garda). [Secured bridgehead at Pinzano, 16 miles N.W. of Udine.]

4TH.—"Enemy having crossed N. of Pinzano, pressure on left intensified."

5TH.—"Intensified pressure" on the Upper Tagliamento. Enemy detachments repulsed S.E. of San Vito at Tagliamento" (25 miles from sea). Evacuated Fella Valley—Col Bricon (E. Trentino, 64 miles).

6TH.—Low water in the Tagliamento. Retirement "in good order" on the Livenza. (15—20 miles W.).

7TH.—"Numerous engagements" hills of Vittoria (at head of the Monticano)—confluence of the Monticano and Livenza (at Notta). ["Cut off retreat of troops still holding out at the Middle Tagliamento between Tolmezzo and Gemona, and in permanent fortified works at Monte San Simeone" (on W. bank, between Tolmezzo and Gemona). 17,000 prisoners, 80 guns. The Livenza crossed.]

8TH.—Troops arriving at positions "chosen for resistance." [Crossed the Livenza, advanced on the Piave.]

9TH.—Stelvio (Swiss frontier)—Val Sugana (E. Trentino), "normal fighting." Ledro Valley (W. of Lake Garda), attacks "promptly repulsed." Sugana—Piave Valleys, fighting. On the Brocon (Ticino), "thrust checked." At Lorrenzago, surrounded rearguard cut way out. Sugana—the sea, rearguards crossed the

river, blew up bridges. [Advance in Sugana and Upper Piave Valleys. Captured Asiago (24 miles from Venice, ruined and deserted May, 1916). Val Sugana—the sea, reached the Piave.]

10TH.—Attacks repulsed at Gallio (2½ miles N.E. of Asiago) and Monte Ferragh (Hill 1116, 1½ miles W.N.W.) : 100 prisoners. Captured vanguard at Tezza (Val Sugana). Rearguards repulsed attack on heights of Val Dobbiadene, crossed to right bank Piave, destroyed Vidor bridge. [Belluno taken. Italian stand on Lower Piave.]

11TH.—Attack repulsed Gallio—4 miles N. Counter-attack took "some prisoners." In hills, "stubborn resistance" to enemy vanguards. [Advance to Feltre (3½ miles W. of the Piave, 17 below Belluno).]

12TH.—Night 11th—12th. Attack repulsed on Gallio position. 12th, near Canove (W. of Asiago) captured detachment, released prisoners. The Brenta—Lower Piave, contact with enemy. Enemy crossed the Piave at Zenson (18 miles above mouth) : secured bridgehead. [Captured Monte Longaza (4 miles N.E. of Asiago) : Sugana—Cismon Valleys, works at Leone, Cima di Campo, and Cima di Lan : Fonzano (all between the Brenta and Feltre on the Piave).]

13TH.—Night 12th—13th. After repulse of 4th attack, advanced posts on Monte Longaza withdrawn. 13th, dawn, attacks repulsed between Lakes Ledro and Garda, and near Monte Sisemol (S. of Gallio). Asiago—Val Sugana, "lively combats." Brenta—Piave Rivers. Enemy position Tezze—Lanon Fonzano—Arten—Feltre. "Effective defence" of Tezze, Cima di Campo, Cima di Lan. Piave, "Combative activity increased." Artillery "intense." Attempts to cross "suppressed" Quero—Fenere, Santa Dona di Piave, and Intertadura. "Desperate fighting" at Grave di Papadoli and Zenson. Enemy "groups filtering through" at Grisolera to Piave—Vecchia Piave marshes, "held" : 121 prisoners, some machine-guns. [Stormed Monte Lisser (Sette Comuni). Occupied Primolano (on the Brenta) and Feltre.]

14TH.—Night 13th—14th and 14th. Asiago—the Piave, attacks repulsed Monte Sisemol—Meletta Davanti—Monte Fior—Monte Castelgomberto. 14th, near the Frisoni—Brenta—Cismon confluence, columns stopped. Cismon—Piave, attacks repulsed Monte Romconi, "paralyzed" near Quero Pass, slight withdrawal Monte Tomatico. "In the Plain," no change.

15TH.—Asiago Plateau—the Piave, "violent" attacks repulsed. \* The Piave. [Austrians captured Cismon (on the Brenta, 13 miles above Bassano).]

16TH.—Fighting Monte Fior—Monte Castelgomberto, near San Martino, Monte Pressolan, and Roicacisa—Monte Canella—Val Piave (N. of Quiro Pass). River passage forced between Salettua—San Andrea di Barbarana. At Folina, enemy crossing "destroyed" : 300 prisoners. At Fogara, driven back : 600 prisoners, including 20 officers.

17th.—Night 16th—17th. \* Monte Sisemi—Monte Castelgomberto. 4 attacks "completely broken" on Monte Zomo (E. of Gallio) : further N. near Casera Meletta Davanti, "some advanced elements" regained, 100 prisoners. The Brenta—Piave, "orderly withdrawal at some points." 17th, on the Piave, enemy "completely swept from Fogara zone" : at Zenson, driven further back : other attempted crossings "promptly frustrated." 16th—17th, 51 officers, 1,212 other ranks, 27 machine guns, taken. [Austrians captured Monte Pressano (Brenta—Piave).]

18TH.—Night 17th—18th. \* Lake Garda—Astico (W. Trentino). 18th, Asiago Plateau, \* Monte Tondarecar—Monte Badeneche (N.E. of Asiago town) : trenches recaptured : 6 officers, 202 other ranks, taken. Brenta—Piave, attacks "in great numbers" Monte Monfenera—Monte Tomba (S. of Quero), repulsed. On the Plain, attacks beaten off. [Captured Quero, and Monte Cornella (near Monte Tomba) : 1,100 prisoners.]

19TH.—Monte Monfenera, 4 massed attacks repulsed. Near Meletta, 18th—19th, 306 prisoners (8 officers), many machine-guns and rifles taken.

20TH.—\* Monte Pertica (N. of Monte Grappa) : 3 violent attacks repulsed. Monte Monfenera—Monte Tomba, no infantry attack.

21ST.—Night 20th—21st. Asiago Plateau, massed attacks repulsed, Meletta—Brenta—Piave. Attacks repulsed San Marino, Monte Pestica (3), Monte Monfenera.

22ND.—\* Asiago Plateau, repulsed violent attacks in large force on Monte Tondarecar—Monte Badenecche from N., Monte Castelgomberto—Meletta—from W. : 8 officers, 191 other ranks taken. \* Brenta—Piave, severe fighting all day, "definitely stopped by last counter-attack."

23RD.—\* Asiago Plateau—the Brenta, "powerful thrusts" repulsed. Groups crossing the Piave in boats swamped.

24TH.—\* Near Meletta, furious attacks repulsed, counter-attacks took 2 sections machine-guns.

25TH.—\* Brenta—Piave, attacks on Monte Pertica "crushed" : Tasson  $\frac{1}{2}$  miles E.) "annihilated" : Monte Casonet—Col dell' Orso—Monte Solarola—Monte Spinoncia (N. and N.E. of Monte Grappa), "definitely repulsed," 200 prisoners : from E. slopes of Monte Monfenera repulsed

26TH.—E. of Brenta Valley, repulsed attack on Col della Berretta.

27TH.—\* Asiago Plateau, Primolano basin, N. of Col della Berretta, middle Piave.

28TH.—\* Boats shelled Lower Piave.

29TH.—\* Meletta—Mid and Lower Piave. Bridge of boats broken near Passarella (5 miles from sea) by British monitor.

30TH.—\* Monte Sisemol—Monte Castelgomberto (S. and N. of the Meletta).

#### RUSSIAN FRONT.

2ND.—Near Vishnoff Lake (E. of Vilna), fraternization.

3RD.—N. of Kshtava (Dvinsk), fraternization. Near Krondcheni (Buzeu River), attempt at dispersed.

4TH.—\* Near Dvinsk and W. of Lake Sventen (5 miles W. of Dvinsk).

8TH.—Near Dobe (Friederichstadt), 2 attempts repulsed.

24TH.—Near Baranovitchi, fraternization "observed." 1st-line trenches lost.

#### RUMANIAN FRONT.

1ST.—\* Marasesti, Moirleni. Russians repulsed fraternizers in Bukovina.

12TH.—\* Grozesti, Varnilzu. Russians repulsed fraternizers.

#### BALKAN FRONT.

1ST.—\* Tcherna bend and N. of Monastir.

2ND.—\* Doiran.

3RD.—\* The Vardar—Doiran, Tcherna bend, and N. of Monastir.

5TH.—\* The Vardar—Lake Doiran.

6TH.—\* Mouth of the Struma, on the Vardar, and Monastir.

7TH.—\* Sokol (E. of the Tcherna), and N. of Monastir.

8TH.—\* Doiran and N. of Monastir. British monitor shelled Neehovi batteries (at Struma mouth).

12TH.—\* Tcherna bend. Italians repulsed attack near Hill 1050 (N.E. of Paralovo).

15TH.—\* Doiran, Monastir.

18TH.—British repulsed attempt near Doiran, Albanians in Upper Skumbi Valley.

19TH.—Attack repulsed on Cliflik Idris bridgehead (Lower Vojusa, Albania).

\* Vardar, Tcherna, N. of Monastir.

20TH.—Attempt repulsed near Hadji Bari Mah (S.W. of Ghevigli). \* Tcherna bend, N. of Monastir.

22ND.—\* Lower Struma, Vardar, Monastir.

22ND.—\* S.W. of Doiran and N.W. of Monastir, local attacks repulsed.

23RD.—Night 22nd—23rd. S. of Leftimia (Vojusa—Osum rivers, S. Albania), Italians repulsed attack. Counter-attacked between Monastir-Prezleska (on the Osum).

24TH.—\* Doiran, Majadaz (W. of the Vardar), W. of Monastir. Near Kristali (W. of Lake Doiran), British repulsed " 2 local attacks."

25TH.—\* Vardar, Monastir, Tcherna bend. Near the Vardar, attacks at several points repulsed.

26TH.—Italians repulsed attack Cipan—Kobkara (S.E. of Berat), on the Osum ; and

28TH.—At the confluence of the Susiza and Vojusa (9 miles N.E. of Avlona, Albania).

29TH.—\* Doiran, Tcherna bend, S. of Monastir.

#### CAUCASIAN FRONT.

4TH.—Kelkid—Cliftlik (near Black Sea), captured 1st and 2nd line trenches. Near Kemakh (S.W. of Erzinjan), repulsed attempt.

5TH.—Near Konah, captured trenches. Near Ognot (Tchovlin), drove in advanced posts.

12TH.—On the Dialah, 134 officers, 1,600 Turkish Gendarmes surrendered.

#### PALESTINE FRONT.

2ND.—Gaza. Scots and E. Anglians carried Umbrella Hill (500 yards W. of Dir-el-Belah—Gaza road), and 1st line defences to sea. Tanks co-operated. 3 counter-attacks repulsed. 418 prisoners, including 26 officers, 15 guns.

6TH.—Welsh and English county troops captured Khuwelifeh (11 miles N. of Beersheba). Dismounted Yeomen, Irish, and Londoners captured Kawukah—Rushdi line up to Abu Hereira and Tel-el-Sheira on 8 miles' front. Pursuit towards Jammameh and Huj (11 and 9 miles E. of Gaza).

7TH.—Night 6th—7th. Captured outworks of Gaza. Advanced to Ali Muntar (hill dominating town from S. to S.E.)—Sheik Rudwan works (1 mile N.). Enemy retreated. 7th, infantry advanced to Wadi Hesi. Scots, after "exhausting march through sand dunes," to its mouth. Australian, New Zealand, and London mounted troops from Sheira. Charge of Warwick and Worcester Yeomanry. captured 100 prisoners, 12 guns, 3 machine-guns.

8TH.—Scots captured Herbieh (8½ miles N. of Gaza), and coastal railhead at Beit Hanun (5 miles N.E. of Gaza). Near latter, "smart action" by Indian Imperial Service Cavalry.

9TH.—Mounted troops took 10 officers, 700 other prisoners, 5 5.9-in. howitzers, 8 field guns. Over 700 guns now taken.

10TH.—Advance on Esdud (Ashdod, 14 miles N. of Wadi Hesi).

11TH.—Progress near El Tineh (railway junction). Now 5,894 prisoners, including 286 officers.


13TH.—Captured Wadi Sukereir (12 miles N. of Ascalon), fortified posts at Mesmiyeh, Katrah (Cedron), and Mughar. Mounted troops took 1,000 prisoners, 8 guns, 14 machine-guns.

15TH.—Yeomanry captured Abu Shushel Ridge (5 miles S.E. of Ramleh): 360 prisoners, 1 gun.

17TH.—Australian and New Zealand Horse occupied Jaffa (Joppa).

19TH.—Somersets, Wilts, and Gurkhas captured Kuryet-el-Enab (6 miles W. of Jerusalem); Scots, Beit Likia (5 miles N.W.).

#### ADVANCE NORTH OF JERUSALEM.



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General Allenby's Army on Sunday, December 31st took the British line north of Jerusalem to Bethel and across the Shechem road to the Wadi-el-Kelb, and since then some further advance has been made. The black line indicates approximately the British front.

21ST.—Stormed Nebi Samwil Ridge (2,953 ft., 5 miles N.W. of Jerusalem): counter-attacks repulsed.

30TH.—Night 29th—30th. Attempt repulsed near Birket-el-Jamus (N. of Joppa): 2 officers, 146 other prisoners. 30th, 8 officers, 298 other prisoners, taken at Beit-ur-el-Foko (10 miles N.W. of Jerusalem).

During November, 10,454 prisoners, 80 guns, taken.

#### MESOPOTAMIAN FRONT.

2ND.—Captured position on right bank Tigris opposite Dur (20 miles N. of Samarra). "Enemy hastily withdrew towards Tekrit." 98 prisoners, quantity of ammunition.

5TH.—Attacked "strongly entrenched position covering Tekrit. Nightfall, Turks retreated hurriedly."

6TH.—Morning, occupied Tekrit (40 miles N. of Samarra, 100 S. of Mosul).

8TH.—Since 2nd, 319 prisoners, including 17 officers. "Returned to original position." Enemy main body 40—50 miles N. of Tekrit on Mosul road : detachment at Sharaimje (28 miles N. of Tekrit).

During November, took 437 prisoners.

#### EAST AFRICA.

1ST—5TH.—Columns S.W. of Mahenge drove enemy towards Mganjira (50 miles E.S.E.).

6TH.—At Kabati Mtoto (on left bank of the Luwegu, 15 miles W.S.W. of Mganjira), 3 German officers, 130 German other ranks, 140 Askaris (mostly sick) surrendered: 89 Askaris to Belgians further N. Enemy retired on Liwale—Lukeledi Valley. Enemy driven S.W. from Mahiwa (S. of river, 40 miles W. of Lindi). Progress from Ruponda and Lukeledi Mission. A 4-in. naval gun, many machine-guns, rifles, etc., abandoned.

7TH.—26 Germans, some Askaris, surrendered at Mlembwe (40 miles of Liwale).

10TH.—Lukeledi Valley. Occupied Nonda Mission (57 miles S.W. of Lindi): 64 Germans, 129 Askaris found, sick. Masasi entered (80 miles S.W. of Lindi). 57 sick Germans, last naval gun. Lindi column within 4 miles of Nangoo (road junction 5½ miles E. of Ndunda). Enemy main body Nargoo—Chivata (on the Lukeledi, 16 miles apart).

11TH.—Kilwa and Lindi columns joined at Ndanda Mission (on the Lukeledi, 57 miles above Lindi). Remnant of enemy main body at Chivata and Mviti (10 and 20 miles S. of Ndanda, on W. edge of Makande Plateau): many machine-guns and rifles abandoned. Enemy Mahenge force, now reduced by half, retreating S. on Songea—Liwale road.

14TH.—Occupied Mviti.

15TH.—"After sharp engagement," captured Chivata, 46 Germans, 425 Askaris. Mahenge area cleared.

16TH.—Action near Mandebe (30 miles S.W. of Liwale) : 5 Germans, 39 Askaris taken.

18TH.—Occupied enemy camp at Nambindinga (15 miles S.E. of Chivata). 20 German officers, 242 other ranks, 14 civilians, 700 Askaris surrendered: 25 British, 2 Belgian, 5 Portuguese prisoners released. Enemy remnant driven into Kitangari Valley.

21ST.—Took Simba's (Kitangiri Valley), 52 Germans, 75 Askaris: Nevala 126 Germans, 78 Askaris.

27TH.—Near Nevala, C.O., 12 German officers, 6 medical, 92 other ranks, 1,212 Askaris, 2,200 followers, surrendered.

30TH.—Enemy remnant crossed the Rovumu into Portuguese territory.

AUG. 1ST—NOV. 30TH.—Took 1,410 German and other Europeans, 4,149 Askaris, 11 guns, 56 machine-guns. Of these, 1,212 Europeans, 3,191 Askaris, 3 guns, 35 machine-guns, during November.

#### DECEMBER 1st—31st, 1917.

#### BRITISH-FRENCH FRONT.

1ST, British.—Night November 30th—December 1st. Local attack repulsed S.W. of Vendhuile. \* Scarpe Valley. 1st, recaptured Gonnelieu and St. Quentin spur S. of village. "Several hundred prisoners, many machine-guns." Afternoon,

attacks repulsed on Masnières (9), Marcoing, Fontaine Notre Dame, Bourlon, Moeuvres.

*French*.—Night November 30th—December 1st. Attempts near Loivre (N.W. of Reims) and Les Courtes Chaussées (Argonne) failed. Right bank Meuse, \* Beaumont—Chaume Wood. Attack N. of Fosses Wood driven off. 1st, \* St. Quentin, S. of Juvincourt. Right bank Meuse, attempt repulsed N.W. of Bezonvauks.

*2nd, British*.—Night 1st—2nd. Withdrawn from sharp salient at Masnières. 2nd, Rifle, N., and Home County battalions captured some works on main ridge N. of Passchendaele. Attacks repulsed, 129 prisoners. Fighting in and around Gonnelleieu. Later, attacks near La Vacquerie and Bourlon broken. Concentration near Moeuvres “successfully engaged.”

*French*.—Night 1st—2nd. \* Right bank Meuse. 2nd, Chavignon (N.E. of Soissons), Apremont Forest, Upper Alsace.

*3rd, British*.—Night 2nd—3rd. Attacks near Moeuvres repulsed. Near Bourlon, London troops took 12 machine-guns and a “number of prisoners.” \* S. battle front. 3rd, Gonnelleieu—Marcoing, attacks “in great strength” heavily repulsed. Line slightly withdrawn at La Vacquerie and E. of Marcoing. [Now 6,000 prisoners, 100 guns.] Ypres, progress and prisoners S.E. of Polygon Wood.

*French*.—Night 2nd—3rd. \* Miette—Aisne, E. of Reims, right bank Meuse. 3rd, N. of Chemin-des-Dames. Woeuvre, attack broken N. of Fleury.

*4th, British*.—Night 3rd—4th. \* Bourlon, Moeuvres. 4th, concentrations dispersed E. of Gouzeaucourt, near Moeuvres. \* La Vacquerie, N. of Armentières, S.E. of Ypres, Passchendaele.

*French*.—Night 3rd—4th. \* Tahure, Maisons-de-Champagne. Left bank Meuse, attempt stopped W. of Avocourt and near Forges. 4th, Tahure—Maisons-de-Champagne. 2 attacks stopped. \* Beaumont (Meuse), Bonhomme (Vosges).

*5th, British*.—Night 4th—5th. Salient Noyelles-sur-l'Escaut—Bourlon Wood abandoned. 5th, morning, minor attacks repulsed near Gonnelleieu (2) and La Vacquerie. Afternoon, “more serious attack” driven off. Attack Bourlon Wood—Moeuvres broken. Ypres, \* N. of Menin road, position improved.

*French*.—Night 4th—5th. \* Right bank Meuse. 5th, Beaumont, Fosses Wood, Craonne, Moronvilliers. S. of Juvincourt, attempt failed.

*6th, British*.—Night 5th—6th. Attack near La Vacquerie repulsed. Progress S.W. 6th, local fighting near La Vacquerie. Minor attacks repulsed S. of Bourlon Wood. \* The Scarpe, Armentières.

*French*.—Night 5th—6th. Right bank Meuse. \* Louvemont—Bezonvauks. 6th, Beaumont, Upper Alsace.

*7th, British*.—Night 6th—7th. \* Both banks Scarpe. 7th, dawn, Ulsters captured trenches N. of La Vacquerie.

*French*.—Night 6th—7th. \* Right bank Meuse. 2 attempts broken Bezonvauks—Beaumont. \* Rhone—Rhine Canal. 7th, right bank Meuse, Maisons-de-Champagne.

*8th, British*.—Night 7th—8th. \* Flesquières, N. of Menin road. 8th, local fighting near Boursies. \* Flesquières, Monchy-le-Preux, Passchendaele.

*French*.—Night 7th—8th. \* Right bank Meuse, Hill 344, Beaumont—Bezonvauks. 8th, attempt near Beaumont failed.

*9th, British*.—Night 8th—9th. \* S. of Cambrai, right bank Scarpe, S. of Lens, Passchendaele. 9th, Messines.

*French*.—Night 8th—9th. Attempt near Bezonvauks repulsed. 9th, \* Sapigneul, Maisons-de-Champagne, right bank Meuse.

*10th, British*.—Scots recaptured post E. of Boursies. \* N. and S.W. of Cambrai, Polygon Wood, Passchendaele.

*French.*—Night 9th—10th. \* Les Chambrettes, Upper Alsace. 10th, Aisne—Oise, Main-de-Massiges, right bank Meuse, Upper Alsace. Attempts broken near Chaume Wood and S.W. of Les Eperges.

11TH, *British.*—Night 10th—11th. \* Scarpe and Lys rivers. 11th, afternoon, local attack N. of La Vacquerie repulsed.

12TH, *British.*—\* Attacks from N. immediately E. of Bullecourt, and from N.E. and E. on salient S. of Riencourt-lez-Cagnicourt (1 mile N.E.), repulsed. Later attack gained obliterated trenches at apex. Local fighting all day. \* E. of Bullecourt, S. of Lens, Armentières, Messines.

*French.*—Night 11th—12th. \* Chavignon, Courtecon, Moronvillers, right bank Meuse. 12th, both banks Meuse.

13TH, *British.*—Captured post S. of Villers Guislain. Regained part trenches E. of Bullecourt. \* S. of the Scarpe, N.E. of Ypres.

*French.*—Attempt S. of Juvincourt driven off.

14TH, *British.*—Near Polderhoek Château (Polygon Wood), 300 yards advanced trenches lost. \* E. of Bullecourt, the Scarpe—Gavrelle. Evening, local attack E. of Bullecourt repulsed.

*French.*—Night 13th—14th. \* Maisons-de-Champagne, E. of Suippes, Alsace.

15TH, *British.*—Night 14th—15th. Polderhoek Château, most of lost trenches regained. \* E. of Messines, N.E. of Ypres. 15th, fighting near Polderhoek Château. \* Hargicourt, Flesquieres, Gavrelle, Lens, Passchendaele.

*French.*—Night 14th—15th. \* Beaumont—Bezonvaux. 15th, Chaume Wood: attack repulsed.

16TH, *British.*—Night 15th—16th. Attempt W. of Villers Guislain repulsed. Progress E. of Avion (S. of Lens). 16th, attempt N. of La Vacquerie repulsed. \* S. of the Scarpe, N. of Langemarck.

*French.*—Night 15th—16th. \* Aisne—Oise, Les Chambrettes. Attempt near Mont Cornillet broken. 16th, \* Caurières Wood. Attempt S. of St. Quentin dispersed.

17TH, *French.*—Night 16th—17th. \* Lathur (Vosges). 17th, St. Quentin, right bank Meuse. Attempt near Anspach-le-Bas (Alsace) driven off.

18TH, *British.*—\* E. of Bullecourt, Lens—Armentières, E. and N. of Ypres.

*French.*—Night 17th—18th. \* Rhone—Rhine Canal. 18th, Caurières Wood, Bezonvaux.

19TH, *British.*—\* Ploegsteert, Polygon Wood.

*French.*—Night 18th—19th. \* S. of Juvincourt, Four-de-Paris (Argonne). 19th, Juvincourt, N. of Caurières Wood, Hartmannswillerkopf, Schonholz.

20TH, *British.*—\* Bullecourt, S.E. of Ypres.

*French.*—Night 17th—18th. \* Rhone—Rhine Canal. 18th, Caurières Wood, Bezonvaux.

21ST, *British.*—\* E. of Ypres.


*French.*—Night 20th—21st. Important raid E. of La Fayette (N.W. of St. Quentin) repulsed. \* Right bank Meuse, Fleury, Hartmannswillerkopf, E. of Thann. 21st, \* Caurières. Enemy gained advanced elements near Hartmannswillerkopf: ejected. Cernay (Alsace) attempt repulsed.

22ND, *British.*—\* Armentières—Langemarck. Slight ground lost on 700-yards front near Ypres—Staden Railway.


*French.*—Night 21st—22nd. \* La Fayette, Beaumont—Chaume Wood, Apremont Forest. 22nd, Chenay (N.W. of Reims), right bank Meuse, Thur, and Doller (Alsace).

23RD, *British.*—Night 22nd—23rd. \* Gheluvelt—Poelcappelle. 23rd, N. of Poelcappelle.

*French.*—\* Mort Homme. Attempt near Caurières Wood repulsed.




# THE ITALIAN NORTHERN AN



For the first week in December all the efforts of the enemy were concentrated in breaking down the Italian resistance north-east of Asiago, which comprised the heights of Sisemol, Fior, Castelgomberto, Tondarecar, and Monte Berici. Although the Italian First Army was forced back some distance under the weight of numbers, it prevented the Aus

## AND EASTERN DEFENCES.



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the Italian resistance in the Sette Comuni. Great forces under Field-Marshal Conrad reduced the Italianarecar, and Badenecche. The plan was evidently to break through to the Brenta by the Val Frenzela, ented the Austrian Commander from succeeding in his purpose.

[To face page 182.]



- 24TH.—*British*.—\* Epéhy, Poelcappelle.  
*French*.—Night 23rd—24th. Attempts on Bezonvaux and Caurières Wood broken. \* Bethincourt. 24th, Douaumont, Chaume Wood.
- 25TH, *British*.—Night 24th—25th. \* W. of La Bassée, E. of Ypres.  
*French*.—Night 24th—25th. Attempt on Caurières Wood repulsed. 25th, \* Right bank Meuse.
- 26TH, *British*.—\* Vimy, Havrincourt, E. of Ypres.  
*French*.—Night 25th—26th. \* Bezonvaux. 26th, 2 attacks on Caurières Wood broken. \* N. of St. Quentin, Sapigneul.
- 27TH, *British*.—\* St. Quentin, Arras, Messines, E. of Ypres.  
*French*.—Night 26th—27th. \* N. of Caurières Wood—Bezonvaux. 27th, concentration N.W. of Bezonvaux dispersed.
- 28TH, *British*.—\* S. of Arras—Cambrai road, Lens, Polygon Wood, Passchendaele, Langemarck.  
*French*.—Night 27th—28th. \* Caurières Wood, Veho (Lorraine). 28th, St. Quentin. Attempt on Veho broken.
- 29TH, *British*.—\* Hargicourt, S. and W. of Lens, E. and N.E. of Ypres. Evening, attack near Ypres—Staden Railway broken.  
*French*.—\* Beaumont.
- 30TH, *British*.—Dawn, attack on 2-mile front on "Welsh Ridge": gained footing N. of La Vacquerie and S. of Marcoing. Part of ground recaptured.  
*French*.—Night 29th—30th. Attempts repulsed S. of St. Quentin, Bezonvaux—Vauquois. 30th, \* Louvemont, Bezonvaux, Upper Alsace.
- 31ST, *British*.—Night 30th—31st. Welsh Ridge, most of important ground lost recaptured. Ypres, progress astride Staden Railway. 31st, S. of Marcoing, attack on 1,200 yards repulsed. \* S. of the Scarpe, near Ypres.  
*French*.—Night 30th—31st. \* N.W. of Reims. 31st, Moronvilliers, Bezonvaux.
- During December: British took 1,018 prisoners (10 officers), 4 guns, 3 trench mortars, 103 machine-guns. British brought down 102 aircraft. French 76. British lost 36, French 20.

#### ITALIAN FRONT.

- 1ST.—\* Asiago Plateau—Lower Piave. Attempts on Meletta "put to flight."  
2ND.—\* Pasubio (W. Trentino), Meletta, Monte Grappa, Nos Valley (N. of Asiago), S. slopes of Monte Pertica.
- 3RD.—Dawn, attack repulsed on S. slopes Daone Valley (Giudicaria). \* Monte Sisemol—Monte Castelgumberto. E. of Monte Badenecke, attempt stopped.
- 4TH.—Melette. Attack from N.W. Monte Sisemol—Meletta di Gallio "decisively repulsed, some hundred prisoners": from N.E. Monte Tondarecar—Monte Badenecke, some trenches lost. Slight withdrawal. Zenson (Piave), 3 small bridges destroyed. [Early, Monte Tondarecar, Monte Badenecke "fell"; by mid-day, Monte Miela.]
- 5TH.—Fighting all day on S. slopes of Monte Castelgumberto—Foza spur: ground "yielded foot by foot." Attack towards Frenzala Valley repulsed. [Captured Monte Zoma and rear positions near Foza. Isolated troops on Monte Castelgumberto and Monte Fior captured.]
- 6TH.—Night 5th—6th. Withdrew from Meletta salient. Attempt to enter Frenzala Valley driven back. Afternoon, \* N. of Ronchi Valley—Monte Kaberlaba. Heavy attack repulsed S. of Gallio. "After 12 hours' fight, line linked up regularly at that point also." After 6 attacks, advance on Monte Sisemol "arrested." [Captured Monte Sisemol.]
- 7TH.—Concentration shelled at head of Frenzala Valley. \* Lower Piave.

- 8TH.—\* Asiago Plateau, Brenta—Piave, San Dona Valley (Piave).
- 9TH.—\* Col-della-Berretta, Monte Tomba. Observation trenches lost and recaptured at Agenzia Zuliani (on left bank Piave Vecchia).
- 10TH.—\* On whole front. Attack on Agenzia Zuliani "sanguinarily" repulsed.
- 11TH.—\* Austrians attacked Col-della-Beretta and Col-dell'Orso, Germans from E. Monte Spinonica and Calcino Valley. No gains.
- 12TH.—\* Dawn, some trenches regained near Col-della-Berretta. 2 attacks repulsed on Colcino Valley. Mid-day, renewed attack in force Col-Capriile—Col-della-Berretta—Monte Asolone. Abandoned at nightfall. 3 p.m., attack broken Monte Tomba—Ponte-della-Priula (Piave).
- 13TH.—\* Attack Col-Capriile—Col-della-Berretta repulsed. On Monte Solarola salient (4 miles N.E. of Monte Grappa), 11.30 a.m., attack Col-dell'Orso—Monte Solarola—Calcino Valley, gained slight ground Monte Solarola—head of Calcino Valley.
- 14TH.—\* Early afternoon attack Col-Capriile—S. of Col-della-Berretta repulsed. 2 counter-attacks reached summit of Monte Pertica, lightening pressure. Renewed attack on Col-Capriile reached lower slope. Fighting till nightfall.
- 15TH.—Night 14th—15th. \* 12.30 and 4.30 a.m., attacks on Monte Solarola salient and Col-dell'Orso repulsed. Giudicaria Valley, attempt on Monte Melino repulsed. 15th, \* 3 p.m., attack on Col-della-Berretta driven back.
- 16TH.—Ground lost on Col-Capriile regained. Attack from San Marino (3 miles above junction of Brenta and Val Frenzala) stopped.
- 17TH.—\* Col-dell'Orso—Porte-di-Salton. Attack from N.E. on S.E. slopes Monte Spinonica broken. French artillery engaged. Attack by German Jaeger Division Monte Solarola—head of Calcino Valley repulsed: some prisoners and machine-guns taken. Attempt on Col-della-Berretta "crushed."
- 18TH.—\* Attacks all day Col-Capriile—Monte Pertica: gained "advantages in Monte Asolone zone" ( $\frac{1}{2}$  miles S. of Col-della-Berretta): repulsed W. of Osteria-di-Lepre (between Col-Capriile—Monte Osolone). Vecchia Piave, local fighting Gradenigo—Cavazuccharina.
- 19TH.—\* Brenta—Piave. Afternoon, attack Tasson—Col-dell'Orso heavily repulsed. Lesser attack on Hill 1601 (Monte Solarola) beaten off. Attempt on Conice Valley (Giudicaria) repulsed. \* Asiago Plateau. Attempt S. of Sasso Rosso (Frenzala Valley) repulsed. British on Monte Montello engaged. Piave Vecchia. Crossing frustrated S. of Gradenigo: fighting at Quattro Case (Cavazuccherina): attack on Cortellazzo bridgehead repulsed.
- 20TH.—\* Monte Asolone, much ground lost 18th recaptured. Counter-attack on Monte Pertica repulsed. \* Camonica Valley (W. Trentino), E. of Astico, Monte Tomba—Monte Montello.
- 21ST.—Progress near \* Monte Asolone, counter-attack repulsed. Osteria-di-Lepri, attempt driven off. \* Monte Solarola, attempt "crushed."
- 22ND.—Captured posts N. of Podescalà and W. of Canova-di-Setti. Attempts repulsed on Conca Laghi (Posina), Monte-di-Val Bella (S.E. of Asiago), and S. slopes of Sasso Rosso (Frenzala Valley).
- 23RD.—Summits of Monte-di-Val Bella and Col-del-Rosso lost. S. of Gradenigo (Piave Vecchia), "large enemy parties thrown back across river."
- 24TH.—Most of the ground lost 23rd regained.
- 25TH.—Attack Col-del-Rosso—Frenzala Valley held at Sasso (1 mile S.E. of Col-del-Rosso). Summits of Col-del-Rosso and Monte Val Bella recaptured but abandoned. Attempt W. of Osteria-de-Lepre broken.
- 26TH.—\* Asiago Plateau. (British report, Monte Melago recaptured.)

27TH.—Captured advance post W. of Canove-di-Sotto ( $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles S.W. of Asiago). Destroyed footbridges in Zenson bend (Lower Piave).

29TH.—\* Monte Tomba.

30TH.—\* Monte Tomba. French recaptured positions Osteria-di-Monfenera—Naranzine (2,000-yards front on E. spur or Grappa massif) : 44 officers, 1,348 other ranks, 7 guns, 60 machine-guns, etc., taken.

31ST.—\* Asiago Plateau, Monte Tomba—Piave. Occupied Zenson bridgehead, right bank Piave cleared.

#### RUSSIAN AND RUMANIAN FRONT.

15TH.—28 days' armistice signed at Brest Litovsk and Focșani.

#### BALKAN FRONT.

2ND.—\* Doiran, the Tcherna—Monastir.

3RD.—Night 2nd—3rd. Attack repulsed Lakes Ochruda—Prespa.

13TH.—Tcherna bend, local attacks repulsed.

17TH.—Attempt N. of Monastir broken.

21ST.—\* Doiran, the Vardar.

#### PALESTINE FRONT.

6TH.—Occupied Hebron.

8TH.—Occupied positions on Jerusalem—Jericho and Jerusalem—Shechem roads.

9TH.—Jerusalem surrendered.

13TH.—Progress N.E. of Jerusalem : 140 prisoners.

16TH.—Seized high ground E. of Abu Dis (1 mile S. of Bethany) : 117 prisoners (5 officers).

21ST.—Crossed the Nahr-el-Auja, seized Khurbet Hadrah, Shiekh Muannir, Tel-el-Rekkeit, and El Makhrun (on high ground N. of river mouth) : 305 prisoners (11 officers), 10 machine-guns. Captured Ras-ez-Zemby (2 miles N.E. of Bethany). 99 guns and howitzers, 110 machine-guns, over 7,000 rifles, much material now taken.

22ND.—Captured Rantieh (on railway).

27TH.—Night 26th—27th. 4 attacks repulsed Ras-el-Tarvil—Bir Nebala ( $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles N. and 5 miles N.W. of Jerusalem). 27th, attacked enemy right flank : advanced  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles on 9-mile front. E. and N.E., Germans amongst 130 prisoners. Advance continued till

30TH.—Occupied Beitin, El Balua, El Burj, Janiah, and Ras Kerker (from 2 miles N.E. to 7 N.W. of Bireh, 12 N. of Jerusalem). 27th—29th, 750 prisoners (39 officers) taken.

#### MESOPOTAMIAN FRONT.

3RD.—Bridged the Dialah at Kizil Robat.

4TH.—Captured Sakaltutan Pass (11 miles N. of Deli Abbas on Kifri—Mosul road). Russians co-operated on right flank.

5TH.—Enemy driven through Kara Tepet (25 miles N. of Deli Abbas). Now 277 prisoners (7 officers), 2 machine-guns, taken.

## BRITISH CAPTURES AND LOSSES, 1917.

		Captures.		Losses.		War Office report.
		Prisoners.	Guns.	Prisoners.	Guns.	
Western Theatre	...	73,131	531	27,200	166	
Salonica	...	1,095	—	202	—	
Palestine	...	17,646	108	610	—	
Mesopotamia	...	15,944	124	267	—	
East Africa	...	6,728	18	100	—	
		114,544	781	28,379	164	

## CORRESPONDENCE.

## NOTE ON THE RED COAT IN THE ARMIES OF EUROPE.

To the Editor of THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

"I made a mistake in saying that King Louis the Eighteenth of France 'procured a regiment of Swiss Guards from the Cantons.' In fact, he procured two regiments of Swiss Guards as well as four Swiss Regiments of the Line. When his attempts to reinstate the old *Maison du Roi*, or Household Brigade of his Bourbon ancestors, failed, he formed a Royal Guard on the model of the Imperial Guard of the Emperor Napoleon. It comprised a company of *Gendarmerie à Cheval* (Mounted Military Police), eight regiments of cavalry (four heavy and four light horse), and six regiments of infantry of three battalions each. The cavalry were organized in two divisions of two brigades of two regiments each. The Heavy Division had two regiments of *Grenadiers à Cheval* and two regiments of Cuirassiers: the four regiments of the Light Division were Dragoons, Lancers, Hussars, and *Chasseurs à Cheval*. All these regiments wore blue or green uniforms, which may be seen to-day on life-sized model figures in the Military Museum of the Hotel des Invalides, at Paris.

"The first four regiments of infantry of the Royal Guard were French, and wore uniforms of royal blue with scarlet facings and silver lace. The two Swiss regiments were numbered the Fifth and Sixth of the Guard, and wore scarlet coats with silver lace, and facings of royal blue. The breast of the coatee was adorned with broad bands of silver lace or white braid, according to the fashion of the time. The flank companies of each battalion were Grenadiers and Chasseurs; the Grenadiers wore bearskin caps with metal front plates and white plumes; the battalion companies had broad-topped beaver shakos with silver ornaments and tall white hackle-feathers. The only distinction between the two regiments was the numeral 5 or 6 on their silver buttons and accoutrements. The coat of one of these regiments is preserved in the Historical Museum at Berne, where the custodian shows it to visitors as the coat worn by the Swiss Guard of Louis the Sixteenth, massacred at the Tuilleries on August 10th, 1792; but the number 5 on its buttons, as well as

the cut of it, show it to be the uniform of one of the Swiss regiments of the *Garde Royale* of Louis the Eighteenth.

"The four Swiss regiments of the line were numbered from 1 to 4, and their dress and equipment was similar to that of the regiments of the Guard; two of them had facings of black velvet, and the other two of sky-blue. The regiments with the same facing-colour were distinguished from each other in the following manner: one regiment had the collar and the strappings on the cuffs of the facing-colour; the cuffs were red. The other regiment had the cuffs of the facing-colour, and the collar and the strappings of the cuffs were red. The only field service which these Swiss regiments ever saw was with the French Army which invaded Spain in 1823 to restore the absolute rule of King Ferdinand and to abrogate the constitution which had been wrung from that reluctant monarch by the Liberals under Riego. In the Revolution of the Three Days of July in 1830, they remained loyal to their royal patron, and, after the fall of the Bourbon dynasty, King Louis Philippe cancelled their contracts of service, and returned the six regiments to Switzerland, where they were disbanded.

"The Turkish chronicler, Eviya Effendi, says that the *Ajam Oghlans* (foreign boys), the conscript lads from whom the ranks of the Janissaries were replenished, were 'dressed in red caps and red jackets with a cleft in the shoulders.' Mirza Mahdi Khan, the biographer of Nadir Shah, calls the Janissary the Rose of the Garden of War; and Major Keppel (afterwards Earl of Albemarle), in his account of his Eastern travels, says that the Agha, who commanded the Brigade of Janissaries at Baghdad, in his long scarlet robe trimmed with ermine, reminded him of an English judge.

"I met a Dane recently who informed me that the Footguards of His Majesty the King of Denmark still wear the scarlet coat.

"F. H. TYRRELL,

"Lieut.-General."

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**FIELD SANITATION.** By C. G. Moore and E. A. Cooper, in collaboration with other Officers and Men of the 1st London Sanitary Company. 8vo. 2s. 6d. (Presented by the Publishers). (Baillière, Tindall & Co.). London, 1918.

## NOTICES OF BOOKS.

**The Indian Corps in France.** By Lieut.-Colonel J. W. B. Merewether, C.I.E., and the Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick Smith: John Murray.

This record of the fortunes of the Indian Army Corps in France was undertaken at the request of Lord Kitchener, in the first instance by Sir Frederick Smith, and when his services ceased to be available it was carried on and completed by Lieut.-Colonel Merewether; while the book is now published at the desire and under the authority of the India Office. It may, therefore, be regarded in great measure as an official publication, and the authors acknowledge the assistance they have received in its compilation from the General Officer who commanded the Corps during nearly the whole of the period that it remained on the Western Front,

and the help which has readily been accorded them in the way of access to diaries and records of all descriptions; but the reader will early recognize that the co-authors have throughout their story preserved an independence of thought and opinion which adds very greatly to the value of their work as a wholly trustworthy and impartial account. In their preface the authors point out that the Indian Corps, like many other units engaged in the war, has failed to receive contemporary justice; we expected very much, we believed that India was sending us her whole Army regardless of consideration for her own security; and when the two divisions reached France they seemed, like other divisions which had preceded them, to disappear, and, not hearing of the vastness of their achievements, we were inclined to wonder whether they had answered all our expectations. The authors claim that the Indian Corps saved the Empire, and who shall say that this claim is ill-founded? When the Indian Divisions landed in France the British Regular Army was almost spent; the Territorial Force had scarcely completed its training; the New Armies were still in the making; and, with the exception of the Indian Army, there were no other trained regular soldiers in the Empire at the moment available to stand in the breach.

This book then tells the deathless story of the stubborn valour of the officers and men composing the Corps; of how they stood firm under conditions of warfare to which they were wholly unaccustomed, and in a country where all things were different to anything they had imagined or heard described; and their losses, from the enemy and from sickness, were terribly heavy. To their shattered battalions there came no steady flow of reinforcements; the casualties among their British officers, upon whom the Indian soldiers so greatly depend for guidance in peace and for leadership in war, were high, and replacements were perforce made from men who knew them not. But in the face of all these trials and difficulties, the loyalty, the discipline, and the valour of the Indian soldier maintained the old high standard. The authors have given us something which is perhaps more of the nature of a diary than of a history; but it is a very full and a very personal record, and on that account we may have no doubt that it will appeal very strongly to those of the Indian Corps who survive, while providing a very noble memorial to those who have fallen. Then, too, what a fine tribute it forms to the success of our rule in India: a rule which has aroused loyalty so remarkable and leadership and devotion of so high a quality. At the end of this deeply interesting book, to which Lord Curzon of Kedleston contributes an appreciative introduction, will be found some valuable appendices giving much information about the organization of the Indian Army, about its health in the field, and about the different funds which administered to the comfort of the men.

**The War of Positions.** By Lieut.-Colonel Paul Azan, French Army; preface by Brig.-General Joseph E. Kuhn, United States Army: Harvard University Press.

From the moment that it became probable that the United States of America would find it necessary to declare war against Germany, the American military authorities have authorized the publication of a number of useful books of a description intended to instruct their officers under training in the conditions of the new warfare in which they are about to take their part. One of the most valuable of these works is that dealing with "The War of Positions"—a war such as has never before been waged on anything approaching the present scale, and which has arisen from the employment of huge masses of guns of all sizes and vast supplies of munitions, allied with recent progress in all kinds of mechanical inventions. Lieut.-Colonel Azan is a French officer who has seen much service

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in the present war and who has made a deep study of his subject at close hand; while he writes most clearly and succeeds in making his subject of very real interest. He has divided his matter under four main headings:—THE PRESENT WAR: its character and forms of warfare, the rôles and functions of the various arms. POSITIONS: their organization and forms, trench duties and the principles of relief. ATTACK ON A POSITION: general remarks on the offensive combat, preparation of the attack, attack, pursuit, and the march of approach. DEFENCE OF A POSITION: defensive fighting, organization of the defence, defence, retreat, and counter-attack. To the young soldier under training, and to those, happily increasing every day in number, who are ever endeavouring to add to their knowledge of the military art, this little book may in all confidence be recommended.



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
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